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PART I 
                                                        
Introduction 
1 
Recapturing Asian New Democracies and 
Putting Taiwan in Its Place 
Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao 
I.  Introduction 
Most of the chapters in this volume were first presented at the 
International Symposium on Asia’s New Democracies: Taiwan, The 
Philippines and South Korea Compared, jointly sponsored by The Asia 
Foundation in Taiwan (AFIT), Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (TFD), 
and Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies (CAPAS) of Academia Sinica, 
held in Taipei on September 2-3, 2004. A total of fifteen social scientists 
from the three new democratic countries under study have attended this 
important symposium and enthusiastically shared their keen observation 
of what have and have not been achieved democratically in their own 
countries and what lessons could be learned among the three Asian 
democracies. At that symposium, four general themes were discussed, 
i.e., political and legal aspects of democratic consolidation, social and 
cultural factors of democratic consolidation, unique features of Asia’s 
three new democracies, and prospects of the new democracies in Asia. 
During the course of two day intensive discussions, the issues such 
as electoral politics in democratic transition, political parties’ role in 
consolidating new democracy, building normal civil-military relations in 
democratic governance, changing role of advocacy civil society 
organizations in various phases of democratic development, the real and 
potential threats of armed movements, regional conflicts, ethnic 
cleavages and class contradiction to the formation of new democracy, the 
issues of national identity and constitutional reforms in democratic 
consolidation, democracy’s impacts on center-local power dynamics, 
democracy and the protection of human rights, and the prospects of 
direct democracy in the forms of referendum and deliberative democracy 
were touched and elaborated. 
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II.  Common Issues and Unique Problems 
In reference to the emerging literature on democratic consolidation, the 
above ten plus issues under investigation are not truly unique to Asian 
new democracies. A consensus was then reached among most of the 
participants of the symposium, that is, the new democracies in the 
Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan have indeed shared many common 
concerns and challenges that are also faced by many other established 
third wave democracies. Asia’s new democracies are not alone. The 
struggles for democracy in these three Asian countries have thus been an 
integral part of world movements toward democracy. The most common 
pressing issue for the three democracies is the challenge to consolidate 
the respective new democratic systems by establishing regulated 
inter-political party competition without being trapped into chaotic 
political struggles. The second shared concern is the ability to govern the 
new democracy without having been held up by the structural inertia 
still prevailing in the old bureaucracies in Taiwan, Korea and the 
Philippines.  
One other very important theoretical insight was also hinted from 
the elaboration and debates in the symposium concerns the 
de-essentializing democracy as well as civil society. To us, democracy 
making in Asia should not be interpreted and exaggerated by any 
cultural essentialism. Such anti-essentialism in analyzing the three cases 
of Asian democracies presents itself to be antithetical to the once 
popularized “Asian values thesis” argued by several political leaders in 
the undemocratic Asian states.  
Without doubt, among the three new cases of democracy in Asia, 
there are significant unique features for each case, not so much for the 
causes of democratization, but rather in the consequences of democratic 
transition where the three democratic states have to deal with. For the 
Philippines, it is the real threat of continuing armed movements led by 
both the communist-led guerrilla and Islamic-based secessionist 
campaign that the Philippine states have been forced to face since the day 
of democratic regime change in 1987. The chapters by Rivera and 
Hernandez have directly addressed this specific issue.  
To South Korea, it is the political cleavages and conflicts manifested 
in political party struggles originated and perpetuated by long lasting 
regionalism that the Korean new democratic governments since 1998 all 
had hard time to deal with. Park’s and Shin’s respective chapters analyze 
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this complex democratic problem. Taiwan shares similar democratic 
challenge posed by the opposition party that had reined in power for 
almost five decades and still did not accept the loss in both 2000 and 2004 
presidential elections.  
However, it is the incomplete national identity remaking and its 
resulting political and social conflicts triggered by democratic 
transformation that the new Taiwanese democratic state has been 
seriously confronted with and without easy solutions. The chapters by 
Chang and Hsu, et al. in this volume trace this issue’s origins and discuss 
the feasibility of its political resolution by means of referendum. 
The twelve chapters following this introductory chapter are divided 
into three parts for the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan. As 
mentioned before, the chapters as a whole by having addressed both the 
common issues and unique problems faced by the three new democracies 
in Asia indeed provide a baseline characterization of the present day 
democratic performances of the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan.  
In order to recapture these three Asian new democratization 
experiences, in the following pages of this introductory chapter, an effort 
is made to draw Taiwan’s new democracy as a case in point. The 
historical courses, expected as well unexpected processes, consequences 
and challenges ahead in the making of new democracy in Taiwan are 
critically examined. It is attempted to shed some insight into the similar 
or different democratization experiences in the Philippines and South 
Korea.  
III.  Long Courses of Democratization 
Most observers may consider that the real critical moment of Taiwan’s 
democratization was in 1987. In 1987, the then ruling KMT party lifted 
marital law, which had lasted for almost 40 years. Other people may cite 
the year 2000 as the critical moment in Taiwan’s democratization. In 2000, 
for the first time in Taiwan’s political history, peaceful regime change 
was finally realized, as an opposition party was democratically elected 
into Taiwan’s government. However, despite these two significant events, 
democracy did not come to Taiwan in 1987, it did not arrive in 2000, nor 
did it rise even in 1996, when the citizens of Taiwan could directly elect 
their president. Instead, democracy has been actualized through a long 
process, spanning three decades. The foundation of Taiwan’s democracy 
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6 
was rooted in the 1970s. Only through a combination of nurturing, 
facilitating, and pushing forces organized by various activists and civil 
society organizations during the 70s, 80s, and 90s, could it lead to 
Taiwan’s democracy, and enabled serious analysts to witness, for 
example, the DPP winning the election in 2000 and in 2004 again.  
In the 1970s, there was an all-inclusive movement organized by 
intellectuals to bring Taiwan’s indigenous culture into the public mind 
and public heart; it can be called a cultural soul searching. The movement 
sought to instill the mentality: “Taiwan is the homeland and we are going 
to live here forever.” Taiwanese culture has its own unique character and 
should not be seen only under the Chinese cultural shadow. It is in the 
1970s, through the indigenous literature movement, the campus music 
movement, Taiwan’s modern dance movement, and the social science 
localization movement, that brought Taiwan as a homeland and as a 
culture into the collective consciousness. Indeed, the 1970s was very 
crucial to Taiwan’s later social and political changes, but its importance 
was not paid proper attention by most scholars of democracy. 
The 1980s was also very crucial, because it witnessed a series of 
social reform movements. This decade was responsible for twenty 
different kinds of social reform movements, ranging from consumers, 
women, students, Indigenous Peoples, laborers, farmers, and 
environmental activists. The culmination of these movements brought 
social reform advocacy into the center stage of public concern. The idea, 
simply put, was “we should make Taiwan's society better because it is 
after all our own country”. The 1980s we witnessed various civil society 
organizations and advocacy NGOs pushing for various reforms, and that 
is why in 1987 marital law was finally lifted. Rather than a voluntary 
action on the part of the ruling party, the lifting of martial law came 
about because these social forces pressed and coerced the ruling 
government.  
In the 1990s again, another new decade, it witnessed Taiwan’s 
further political and constitutional changes, the push for Taiwan’s 
upgrade into a politically democratic and free society – a genuine 
democracy. Then it became the public’s concern to find the ways to make 
Taiwan’s polity democratic. As seen from the three decades experienced 
by Taiwan, the transition from culturally indigenous consciousness, to 
social activism, and then to political democracy were all organized by 
civil society, a very significant democratic force from the bottom-up. 
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In Taiwan’s case, as in many cases found in the third wave of 
democratization, civil society is not only the guarantor to sustain the new 
democracy in the later stage, but rather it is the facilitator of democracy 
in the early phase. The cultural movement in the 1970s was initiated by 
many writers, musicians, social scientists, to help construct a collective 
consciousness that Taiwan is increasingly the subject of identity.  1970s 
can be called an era of “cultural identity movement”. 
In the 1980s many social movements and advocacy NGOs were 
established, so it would be seen as the "golden decade" for Taiwan’s 
social movements. Who were those participants or the agents of civil 
society? They were the intellectuals again, students, lawyers, 
environmentalists, women’s organizations, laborers, farmers, young and 
old. So in the 1980s one can clearly detect the rising NGO and civil 
society momentum, beyond gender, beyond ethnic background, also 
beyond class. 
Since the 1990s, the role of the middle class in democratization has 
been important. But the statement “no middle class, no democracy” is too 
simplistic an assertion. Some even argue further that once there is 
economic growth, there is middle class, and then comes democracy. 
These assertions take a very linear and simplistic approach. Something is 
missing, and that something is civil society activism.  
It is true that in Taiwan’s case, most civil society activism was 
middle class originated, middle class backed or middle class supported, 
but that does not mean that the middle class as a whole was the 
vanguard of democracy. Everyone can point out there were many 
ultra-conservative middle class segments as well. It was a specific sector 
or segment of the middle class, i.e., the middle class liberal intellectuals 
and pro-democracy professionals, who committed their energy and 
efforts to the cause of democratization. So the “struggle factor” is even 
more important: without this middle class struggle, democracy cannot be 
materialized. So it is much more accurate to state that “with a middle 
class civil society movement, or a kind of middle class with the 
propensity for democratic activism, then there will be democracy.”  
To conclude the first observation of the courses of Taiwan’s 
democratization experience, one can not single out 1987, 1996, or 2000. 
Instead one should broaden his perspective to three decades, to a broader 
spectrum that places civil society – not limited to middle class – activism 
at the center, and to witness that it was truly a bottom-up process. Such 
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observation or proposition drawn from Taiwan’s experience can also find 
its validity and utility in both the South Korea and the Philippines. 
IV.  Expected and Unexpected Processes of Democracy- 
Making 
In comparison to the Philippines and South Korea, the democratization 
process in Taiwan may have been relatively peaceful and stable. This 
does not mean there was no political struggle; there were a lot of political 
protests after which dissentients were put into jail, and a large number of 
innocent people were also persecuted under the “white terror.” But in 
Taiwan did not witness large scale brutal violence or political unrest, or 
the rise of armed insurgents that upset and jeopardize the “ordinary 
people’s everyday life” during the two decades or three decades of 
democratic struggle. The cost of Taiwan’s democratization was indeed 
paid by many political actors, but not necessarily paid by every citizen.  
During the process, the then ruling elites of the KMT were also 
“forced to be persuaded” to go along with liberalization and 
democratization, in order to accommodate the mounting pressures from 
the social movements and political opposition. Of course, this was not 
necessarily a genuine voluntary act from the authoritarian state.  
The ruling elites then did go along with democracy, but the reason 
was not because of a sudden revelation: “it is time to lift martial law, it is 
time to have constitutional reform.” On the contrary, the ruling elites 
were persuaded – more accurately, they were forced. However, at the 
beginning they did not even realize that liberalization was the best way 
or the most low-cost way to sustain the old regime’s legitimacy. The late 
president Chiang Ching-Kuo in 1986 stated the three very important and 
historic phrases, “the time is changing, the tide is changing, the 
environment is changing,” what he did not say is that “KMT must 
change.” That cannot be interpreted as a voluntary commitment to 
democracy by the authoritarian elites. 
There are, in reference to the process of Taiwan’s democratization, 
two not-so-readily established yet very important paradoxical twists that 
can be observed among the ruling elites in their dealing with pressures 
for democracy.  
In late 1986, Chiang Ching-Kuo decided to lift martial law, and he 
told Mrs.Katherine Graham, then publisher of the Washington Post, that 
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Taiwan was going to lift martial law. There was much resistance to such 
move from within the KMT circles. Why did he still do it? In order to 
sustain the KMT regime’s control. By doing so, he could also maintain his 
unchallengeable position within the KMT party. After all, Chiang was 
still an authoritarian figure. In final Chiang used the authoritarian way to 
terminate his own party’s authoritarian rule over the society. This is the 
first paradox of Taiwan’s democratization. Suppose that Chiang had 
agreed with other party leaders in 1986 to crack down on the 
establishment of the opposition DPP, what would have then happened? 
The cost would have been very high. But he decided not to; it was indeed 
an authoritarian way to finish authoritarianism.   
The second paradox was manifested in the Lee Teng-Hui’s handling 
of the KMT in dealing with further democratic pressures. During the 
1990s, there were still much resistance and resentment within the KMT 
against following through with pro-democracy demands, even to prevent 
Taiwan from achieving genuine democracy. At that time Lee again took a 
not so democratic strategy to deal with the pressures within his own 
party. He knew that he could persist as party chairman only by riding the 
wave for democratization outside his party. Once again, suppose Lee 
chose to act as KMT chairman “democratically” and let the “old guards” 
come into control at the party center, what would have happened? I think 
the KMT then would have turned the course back, and even would have 
thrown out Lee from power. So therefore, the second paradox in 
Taiwan’s democratic transition was to have a not-so-democratic ruling 
party chairman to further facilitate a democratic Taiwan. These are the 
two paradoxes or twists in Taiwan’s process toward democracy. 
Similarly, one looks hard enough, he can also observe paradoxes in South 
Korea’s and the Philippines’ democratic experiences. 
V.  Dialectical Consequences of Democratization 
There are three dialectics in Taiwan’s democratization. First, the 
democratization process in the last three decades has changed the ethnic 
power composition in Taiwan. The democratization process transformed 
the long-lasting power dynamic, in which an abnormal “minority rule” 
persisted for decades, into a normal “majority rule”. This means that the 
minority Mainlander power elites no longer could dictate political power. 
Instead, the majority consisting of Minnanese, Hakka and Austronesian 
Asian New Democracies: The Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan Compared 
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Indigenous Peoples were brought into participating in power distribution, 
thereby making Taiwan’s political structure a more proportionally ruled 
government.  
It is true that ethnic tensions caused by minority rule also provided a 
strong incentive to push for democratization. It is undeniable that ethnic 
tension was an important factor behind Taiwan’s democratization; and as 
a result of such democratization, ethnic power relations was in turn 
changed. Some critics and observers have now even complained about 
the intensification of ethnic clearage among Taiwan’s ethnic groups since 
democratization. However, these criticisms are not quite grounded, it is 
misleading to blame democracy as the cause of ethnic tension, because it 
was originally this tension that somewhat brought about Taiwan’s 
democracy. The change in power relations among ethnic groups in 
minority rule was a necessary process – it was even inevitable.  
The second dialectic relation in Taiwan’s democratization experience 
was the reformation and shift in national identity of Taiwan. In the past, 
the development of a national identity was vague, it existed in a historical 
vacuum of Chinese-ness, the greater Chinese national identity – or be it 
called “One China”. But through the process of Taiwan’s democratization 
over the past three decades, the new national identity for Taiwan has 
became prevalent, which we call “Taiwan subjectivity”, “Taiwan 
consciousness ＂ , or “Taiwan nation-building consciousness”. This 
transition from Chinese-ness to Taiwanese-ness is in part the product of 
Taiwan’s democracy; no democracy, no Taiwan identity. Therefore, it is 
essential to put Taiwan’s democracy into a dialectic framework, in order 
to have a comprehensive understanding of Taiwan’s democratization 
experience. 
The third dialectic relation was between the evolution of Taiwan’s 
democracy and the changing external cross-Strait relations. This specific 
dialectic relation makes Taiwan’s democracy even more complicated in 
comparison to the Philippines and South Korea. Simply put, in the past 
Taiwan-China relations were treated under a civil war mindset; both 
sides were fighting for gaining “One China,” claiming the control of the 
whole of China. It was a zero-sum game, and it was then called “civil 
war”. But then Taiwan’s democratization and its consequential rising 
awareness of Taiwan’s national identity, a new mindset has been 
growing in Taiwan, i.e., to put an end to the “civil war” and to try to 
settle the cross-Strait dispute in a broader regional and international 
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framework. That was the background when President Lee Teng-Hui in 
1999 talked about a “special state-to-state relation” existing between 
Taiwan and China. Lee intended to normalize relations with China under 
the “special state-to-state” framework. Furthermore, when President 
Chen Shui-Bian pointed out in 2003 “one country on each side of the 
Strait,” that was also the same thing: the two sides do not belong to one 
country. These two important political statements reflected the reality of 
cross-Strait relations, yet they also upset those relations.  
Both statements could be described as “political typhoons” in recent 
cross-Strait relations. This means that cross-Strait relations have been 
twisted and intertwined with Taiwan’s democracy. That is why China 
continuously criticizes Taiwan’s democracy as a disguise for Taiwanese 
“separatism”. Of course, to Taiwanese people, this is not “separatism”; 
rather it is simply the inevitable nature of democracy, that people will 
determine their own future. Can one imagine a democracy where the 
people welcome another country to rule them? As long as democracy is 
appreciated the growing national identity bought to be treasured. As 
long as the belief in democracy is established, the upsetting cross-Strait 
relations should be dealt with democratically. Taiwan’s democracy can 
not be comprised in resolving the conflict and tension across the Strait.  
These above three dialectical consequences of Taiwan’s democratic 
processes are very important to comprehend the whole picture of 
Taiwan’s complex democracy. It would not be surprising to find out 
different dialectical impacts brought about by democratization in the 
other two countries under study. 
VI.  Future Challenges to the New Democracy 
Finally, some observations about the future challenges or the unsolved 
issues faced by Taiwan’s democracy are in order. The first challenge will 
be such unsettled “transitional justice”. In recent years, many scholars 
talk about “transitional justice” in new democracies. In Taiwan, many 
victims of the decades of authoritarian rule have been found, and they 
have been compensated with money by the democratic government – but 
no single criminal or perpetuation is found (Wu 2006). So transitional 
justice was hardly served, the historical facts were not completely 
disclosed, and that lingers in many people’s mind, heart, and head. Some 
critics have even suggested that a comprehensive investigation is 
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strongly called for to bring to a close what happened during the “white 
terror era.”  
Since Taiwan’s democratic transition was not a revolutionary one, 
those past authoritarian figures could not put into jail. Therefore, a 
second remaining problem which new democracy has to live with – that 
is the “old guards”. Many “old guards” from the authoritarian time still 
live well and even are still influential in today’s politics. From time to 
time, surprisingly, they turn around and claim themselves to be 
democratic, as if Taiwan’s democracy was born in year 2000 when the 
regime was changed. There is a misguided perception that since the 
former ruling authoritarian party is now the opposition, then the 
opposition has the legal right to challenge the government; even the 
opposition can claim itself to be a new democratic force. Under 
democracy, the undemocratic leaders of yesterday are tolerated to 
exercise their democratic rights today. Many critics might feel 
uncomfortable about such irony in Taiwan’s democracy. They feel it is 
unjust to see these “old guards” suddenly becoming champions for 
democracy. I tend to share such uneasy mood, especially as long as 
transitional justice has not been rightly served. 
The third remaining problem is the “old structure”. The old political 
structure continues to be intact, it has not yet transformed by the regime 
change since 2000. I’m talking about the “old bureaucracy” shaped by the 
past authoritarianism, which is still there. So even though we have a new 
president, a new premier, and many new ministers on the top, the old 
structure is still there down below. This is indeed a big challenge to the 
working of a new democracy.  
The fourth challenge ahead of Taiwan’s new democracy is the new 
regime’s governing ability. The former opposition never had experience 
in governing, and when they suddenly assumed power, their ability to 
govern was questionable. The new democratic regime could not govern 
effectively, it lacked sophistication and fortitude to change the “old 
structure”, and it even lacked the determination to deal with the 
transitional justice and the “old guards”.  
Finally, there is the challenge of the role of civil society in the new 
democratic environment. Just as, in the past, bottom-up forces had been 
the prime mover of democracy, so now we need to bring civil society 
back in to consolidate democracy. Regardless of whether the “cat” or 
“dog” party becomes our ruling party, we still want them to be 
democratic: we want “democratic cat” or “democratic dog.” We cannot 
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say that the opposition party can never again be the ruling party; this is 
the people’s choice. But if they come to power they will have to be 
democratic, otherwise the people will not choose them. 
Transitional justice, the “old guards” issue, the incompatibility of the 
“old structure” with the new government, the problems with the new 
governing authorities’ effectiveness, as well as the role of civil society: 
these are the current five challenges facing Taiwan’s new democracy. 
Taiwan may not be alone on this. New democracies in Asia and around 
the world share similar challenges. What is the best way to deal with old 
guards? How to persuade old structures to work for the new democracy 
without reservation? Can it be an effective way to transform the old 
bureaucrats into new civil servants? How can civil society play its proper 
role in the further consolidation process? These are real issues to be 
tackled. 
Indeed, new democracy can work. But one has to add that 
democracy still needs a lot of work to make it successful. So to conclude, 
Taiwan’s democracy has come a along way, but it did not come for free, 
and it will not be cheap to keep either. In light of this, Taiwan’s path 
towards “quality democracy” and “consolidated democracy” still has 
miles to go, so do the Philippines and South Korea. 
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PART II 
                                                        
The Philippines 
2 
The Crisis of Philippine Democracy 
Temario C. Rivera 
I.  Introduction 
Two decades after the restoration of formal democratic rule, the 
Philippines continues to face intractable problems of democratic 
consolidation. One of the longest electoral democracies in the developing 
world, the country confronts challenges from two major armed 
movements. The military remains a highly politicized institution. In 2001, 
a massive mass protest and military intervention forced the incumbent 
elected president out of office and in 2003 and 2006, rebellious military 
units mobilized unsuccessfully against the government. Furthermore, 
economic growth has lagged far behind the major Asian economies and 
high levels of poverty and income inequality fuel contentious politics in 
the country. Weak institutions of governance fetter the state’s ability to 
pursue necessary reform programs. Dramatizing these unfavorable 
conditions, Pres. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo faces unresolved allegations 
of electoral fraud during the 2004 presidential elections, triggering two 
failed impeachment proceedings against her by Congress. 
This paper examines two critical problems of Philippine electoral 
democracy: its elitist mode of representation and weak system of 
accountability and its continuing political instability. Electoral 
representation and accountability are analyzed in the context of 
oligarchic electoral domination and the lack of strongly institutionalized 
parties. Political instability is evaluated in the context of the continuing 
armed movements and the contentious politics of militant social 
movements and civil society organizations. The paper concludes with an 
analysis of the prospects of addressing these weaknesses of electoral 
democracy and advancing democratic consolidation in the country.  
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II.  Social Origins and Political Legacy of Electoral 
Democracy 
Decisively shaped by American colonial policy, the institution of electoral 
democracy in the country produced contradictory results.1 First, it 
co-opted the national and local elites into the electoral process leading to 
the entrenchment of the traditional elites through the new system of 
electoral legitimation. Second, by institutionalizing this political 
oligarchy of landlords and capitalists, the electoral process foreclosed the 
decisive resolution of basic economic and social problems in the 
post-independence era.2 In other countries, these key problems such as 
national unity, the rules of political contestation, agrarian reform and 
other major socio-economic issues were resolved by revolutions, wars, 
dictatorships, or modernization by developmental states. However, in the 
Philippines, the political oligarchy propped up by American economic 
and military power survived or evaded these cataclysms and sidetracked 
the effective resolution of these key issues. 
With its social origins in landownership acquired initially outside 
the control of the weak central government, the oligarchy in the 
Philippines succeeded in controlling state power through regular 
elections at the local and national levels. As further pointed out by 
Hutchcroft, the preoccupation with electoral democracy by the American 
colonial elites marginalized the building up of autonomous national 
political institutions such as the civilian bureaucracy and the police. This 
resulted in a weak and politicized administrative state apparatus 
(Hutchcroft 2000: 277-306). Thus, this pattern of elite recruitment and 
entrenchment along with weak central bureaucratic agencies largely 
explains the dominance of oligarchic families in the Philippines’ 
politico-social environment.  In contrast, the East Asian states (Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan) had powerful bureaucratic elites with 
significant autonomy from the dominant classes. In the 
post-independence period, the political oligarchy in the Philippines 
further enhanced its power through diversification of its traditional 
land-based activities to the widely protected financial, banking and 
manufacturing sectors of the economy.  
Under a system of competitive procedural elections, the emergence 
of a relatively weak state, dominated by powerful but divided factions of 
the oligarchy resulted in at least three interrelated conditions with far 
reaching impact on the dynamics of Philippine democracy. First, the rules 
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of political contestation practiced through elections failed to incorporate 
the revolutionary and dissident movements representing the 
economically and socially disadvantaged sectors of the society. Following 
Rustow’s framework of democratic transition, it may be argued that the 
“habituation phase” where both elites and officials willingly submit to 
and practice the democratic rules of contestation has not been decisively 
achieved in the country (Rustow 1970). The armed communist and 
Muslim movements which continue to challenge central government 
authority represent the most intractable aspects of this problem.  
Second, a state with little autonomy from the dominant classes of 
landlords and capitalists presided over the country’s long history of 
dismal economic performance. Since the survival of democracies is 
highly correlated with economic growth and per capita incomes,3 it is 
crucial to investigate to what extent the slow-growth of the economy can 
be attributed to the nature of the state and the social bases of its political 
leadership.  
Third, the existence of a dense and assertive civil society in the 
Philippines flows from the interplay of a state dominated by the political 
oligarchy but divided by factional coalitions of power at the local and 
national levels and the continuous challenge from below mounted by 
armed movements and militant social movements. Moreover, in the 
Philippine presidential system of government, the absence of a strong 
party system has undercut the capacity of the political oligarchy to act as 
a consolidated class. In turn, this has enabled militant social movements 
and civil society groups to test the limits of formal democratic rules by 
contesting political spaces for democratic advances. An excellent example 
of this practice in the post-Marcos period is the active participation by 
militant movements in the Party List Law notwithstanding the severe 
limitations set by the law on progressive parliamentary struggle. 
However, the continuing threat from below by armed movements and 
militant social movements has also compelled the political oligarchy to 
maintain opportunistic points of unity and coalition among themselves, 
strengthened at critical conjunctures by American support and 
intervention. 
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III.  Representation and Accountability in an Electoral 
Democracy 
The representation of interests and the accountability of public officials to 
their constituencies form two critical interrelated aspects of democratic 
performance. One disturbing feature of political interest representation in 
the country lies in the long record of overwhelming elite dominance over 
both national and local government positions. Through the selective or 
combined use of the politics of clientelism, patrimonialism, and bossism, 
political elites from the pre-war years to the post-Marcos period have 
succeeded in controlling national and local elective contests.4 One study 
shows that 83% of the members of the lower House in the first 
post-Marcos Congress came from long established political clans. 
(Gutierrez, Torrente and Narca 1992). Another research on the legislature 
up to the 1998 elections, reveals that both old and new political families 
consistently won elections in 80% of the 25 provinces with the highest 
human development indicators (income, education, longevity) (Rivera 
2001). A third comprehensive study of national legislators up to the 2001 
elections summarizes these trends thus: “The great majority of them are 
also part of families whose members have been in public office for two or 
more generations. Those who make the laws for the country are therefore 
hardly representative of its citizens. A Congress of well-connected and 
well-born multimillionaires set the rules for a poor nation.” (Coronel, 
Chua, Rimban and Cruz 2004: viii). 
 From a comparative perspective, the oligarchic control of elections 
in the Philippines is certainly not unique. What draws compelling 
attention is the extraordinary resilience of the established elite families as 
electoral actors, in spite of the country’s endemic political instability and 
economic mismanagement. Political instability and gross economic 
mismanagement as seen in the enduring problems of poverty, 
unemployment, and severe income inequalities are concrete concerns for 
which incumbent politicians are normally held accountable electorally. In 
practice, however, the electorate’s capacity to sanction incumbent 
political leaders has been thwarted by a vicious confluence of structural 
and institutional constraints, including procedural weaknesses in the 
election process. For a long time, elites have taken advantage of the 
pervasive poverty and unequal relations of power particularly in the 
rural areas to sustain and entrench their modes of domination. Both 
incumbent and opposition electoral elites also routinely make use of the 
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procedural and technical weaknesses in the election process particularly 
one that allows them to manipulate the counting and canvassing of votes 
abetted by an antiquated system of manual vote counting.5
With the institutionalization of oligarchic control in electoral contests 
in the Philippines, the fundamental challenge to elitist modes of 
representation and weak incumbency accountability has come mainly 
from extra-parliamentary forces- - - the armed movements, militant social 
movements and civil society organizations. While this mode of 
contestation is unavoidable in the absence of significant social and 
institutional changes, a prolongation of this state of affair invites costly 
confrontations. In turn, such crisis could tempt authoritarian 
interventions, as shown for instance by the politicized military’s role in 
the 1986 and 2001 extra-parliamentary confrontations. In the 1986 case 
that saw the ouster and forced exile of Marcos, the military engaged 
although failed in several coup attempts against the successor Aquino 
government. In the 2001 case that forced an early end to Estrada’s 
presidency, any possible authoritarian agenda by the military was 
preempted by a critical mass of social movements and civil society 
organizations and decisive intervention by the Supreme Court. 
To enhance the mode of representation and accountability in the 
country’s electoral democracy, there is an urgent need to develop an 
alternative political party or parties that could significantly challenge the 
stranglehold of traditional elite parties over elections.6 The recent 
political history of the country shows at least three laws that provide 
openings for the construction of more representative and accountable 
alternative political parties: the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, 
the Party List Law first implemented in the 1998 elections, and the 
Absentee Voting Law which took effect in the 2004 elections.  
The decentralization process mandated by the LGC and the new 
electoral initiatives unleashed by the party list and the absentee voting 
laws provide new opportunities for the emergence of alternative 
leadership and social constituencies that could underpin these new 
political parties. By ensuring local government units a greater share of 
internal revenue allocations, more taxation powers, and more direct 
participation by people’s organizations and NGOs in policy-making, the 
LGC has created an institutional base for new resources and social 
linkages that could be used by progressive leaders to challenge 
established elite control. Although these same resources could be used to 
strengthen traditional elite control, these could also be used by new 
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progressive leaders for significant reforms.7 Meanwhile at the national 
level, the party list elections, in spite of its severe limitations, has 
provided openings for new parties and leaders that consciously represent 
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society.8 For instance, 
the Left parties had a significant presence in the 2004 party list elections. 
Five left parties won 10 seats out of the total 24 accounted for by the 16 
organizations that obtained the 2% minimum vote threshold for a 
parliamentary seat.9 The other winning party list organizations included 
parties representing peasants and national minority communities as well 
as networks of cooperatives, educators, and veterans. 
Another political constituency for new party formation lies in the 
millions of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) who are now allowed to 
vote with the implementation of the Absentee Voting Law that took effect 
in the 2004 national elections. Due to the lack of information and 
difficulties in accessing official registration and voting sites in foreign 
capital cities, the registration and actual voting by this sector in the 2004 
elections was disappointingly low. Nonetheless, the economic clout and 
political reach of this sector will increasingly prove to be a significant 
factor in future elections. Mostly college-educated and multi-skilled 
individuals, the OFWs constitute an enormous political constituency 
begging to be organized and mobilized.10 Recognizing the critical role of 
this sector, a number of organizations have in fact already registered as 
OFW party list groups and participated in the 2004 elections. 
 However, the Party list Law suffers from a number of weaknesses 
that seriously limit its ability to facilitate the emergence of an alternative 
party system and leadership with enough political clout to influence 
national political developments. First, the law limits the maximum 
number of seats for party list representatives to only 20% (or 52 seats at 
present) of the total congressional seats in the lower house. However, in 
the past three elections since 1998, the average number of party list 
representatives elected to the lower house has been only 13 as against the 
maximum 52 seats.11 This inability to approximate even the present 
ceiling of 52 seats is caused by the extreme proliferation and 
fragmentation of parties encouraged by the electoral threshold of 2% for 
a seat.12 Further, the same law also limits the number of representatives 
for each party to a maximum of 3 persons, regardless of the proportion of 
votes gained by the party. These experiences illustrate the limitations in 
the law and highlight the need to improve the party list process to 
transform it into a more potent system for facilitating the emergence of 
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an alternative party system.13 In spite of these limitations, the party list 
elections have made it possible for alternative parties and their leaders to 
be represented in the legislature and provided openings for coalitions 
and alliances with progressive local government officials and civil society 
organizations. This confluence of two progressive streams of leadership 
and their constituencies, from both local and national arenas of 
contestation, serves as a concrete trajectory for a more representative, 
accountable, and progressive political party system. This is one condition 
critical to invigorating and consolidating the democratic process, long 
dominated by the old and new oligarchies.  
IV.  Consolidating Democracy: Armed Movements and 
Contentious Politics 
This section examines one aspect of democratic consolidation and focuses 
on how the state has addressed the problem of continuing armed 
challenges and the contentious politics associated with militant social 
movements.14
In the post-Marcos era, armed movements have persisted side by 
side with a robust civil society and have militantly advanced the 
economic and social interests of various disadvantaged sectors15 
However, the overall weakness and paucity of resources of the state and 
its institutions have limited its ability to address these issues and claims, 
and has led to cycles of contentious politics that make the resolution of 
conflict difficult. Contentious politics in a fragile democracy can have 
contradictory results. By their ability to mobilize and empower 
disadvantaged sectors, militant social movements can democratize power 
relations through enhancement of the representational, participatory and 
accountability processes of governance. On the other hand, by 
overwhelming political agencies with difficult demands and bypassing 
institutional rules and procedures in favor of direct political action, 
contentious politics puts severe stress on the minimum conditions of 
accommodation for political stability. Armed movements and militant 
social movements persist because they are responses to deep rooted 
historical and social structures of domination and exploitation. 
Conversely, comparative evidence shows that these can be addressed in 
political ways by leaders and organizations who can take advantage of 
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political opportunities opened by domestic or international events or a 
confluence of both.  
The Philippines continues to struggle with the difficult situation of 
having to resolve two major armed challenges to central authority: a 
communist-led guerrilla movement and an Islamic-based secessionist 
movement. 
The communist–led armed struggle has proven to be one of the most 
protracted and resilient movements in the world. Founded in 1968, the 
new communist party of the Philippines (CPP) has waged armed 
struggle against the central government but has also engaged various 
administrations in peace negotiations since the fall of the Marcos 
dictatorship in 1986. Although the CPP relies mainly on the strategy of 
building up a peasant-based army, it has developed a wide network of 
urban and legal organizations led by cadres drawn from youth and 
students, factory workers, urban poor, professionals and intellectuals. 
After the fall of the Marcos dictatorship, the communist movement 
suffered from serious organizational splits due to differences in tactics 
and strategies that were provoked by new political opportunities 
provided by the restoration of electoral politics.  
Today, the communist armed struggle continues to be waged by the 
major formation that remained loyal to the original vision and strategy of 
the struggle as articulated by Jose Ma. Sison, its founding chair.16 In spite 
of internal fractures, the resilience of the local communist movement is a 
testimony to the persistence of social and economic conditions that have 
nurtured the struggle as well as the failure of leaders on both sides to 
work out a negotiated political settlement. 
The first significant political opportunity for peace talks between the 
government and the CPP took place after the ouster of the Marcos 
dictatorship under the Aquino administration.17 However, the two 
parties approached the negotiations from fundamentally different 
perspectives. For the CPP, a framework of “comprehensive political 
settlement” on fundamental social and political reforms was to precede 
termination of armed conflict. In contrast, the government focused on 
immediate cessation of hostilities and sidestepped any serious discussion 
of fundamental reforms. Moreover, the Aquino administration faced 
serious challenges from the military as numerous coup attempts were 
mounted by no less than two factions. Thus, fearing backlash from the 
military for any perceived weakness in the negotiation process, the 
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Aquino administration failed to conclude a negotiated political 
settlement with the communist movement. 
At the same time, the communist leadership was also unprepared to 
fully explore the possibilities of a negotiated political settlement short of 
a “comprehensive political settlement”. Internal debates in the 
communist party on strategy and tactics in the face of the restoration of 
electoral politics also intensified and eventually provoked internal splits 
in the movement. 
The peace talks resumed under the Ramos administration (1992-1998) 
in 1992 when both parties signed the Hague Joint Declaration. This 
agreement stipulated a substantive agenda for the talks on four key 
issues: respect for human rights and international humanitarian law, 
socio-economic reforms, political and constitutional reforms, and the end 
of hostilities and disposition of forces. In March 1998, in response to the 
first agenda of the Hague Joint Declaration, both parties signed the 
“Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and 
International Humanitarian Law”.  
However, as in the negotiations with the Aquino administration, 
there were serious disagreements between the Ramos administration and 
the CPP on the nature and scope of the reforms to be implemented to 
address the roots of the armed conflict. For instance, the communist 
leadership insisted that the government take up clear policy positions on 
the issue of foreign domination and control of the economy, 
comprehensive agrarian reform, and the need for a national 
industrialization program. Further, there was no consensus on the need 
for a foreign facilitator or mediator as the government was wary that this 
would give de facto belligerent status to the communist rebels. 
 The government decision to sign a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) 
with the United States in May 1999 triggered the termination of the peace 
negotiations. The communist leadership regarded the VFA as a violation 
of the country’s national sovereignty and thus of the Hague Joint 
Declaration. 
Two new political opportunities enabled the resumption of peace 
talks in April 2001. First, the Royal Norwegian government agreed to 
host the talks and increasingly played the third party facilitator role since 
October 2003. This is significant since one vital ingredient in almost all 
cases of successful resolution of armed conflicts in the world is the 
presence of a third party facilitator/mediator with enough clout to 
influence the process of negotiations. Norway has extensive experience in 
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facilitating and mediating armed conflicts in different parts of the world 
and its facilitating role was welcomed by both parties. 
The second political opportunity was the participation of the militant 
people’s organization, Bayan Muna (Country First), in the Party List Law 
of the 2001 elections. In its maiden participation in the election, Bayan 
Muna (BM) won the maximum of three seats allowed under the law. In 
the 2004 elections, BM also won three seats and two other affiliate 
organizations, Anakpawis and Gabriela, won two and one seat, 
respectively. Three other affiliate party list organizations of BM, 
representing the youth (Anakbayan), the overseas Filipino workers 
(Migrante), and the Muslim minorities (Bangsa Suara) narrowly missed 
winning at least one seat each in the 2004 party list elections. 
The participation of militant people’s organizations identified with 
the communist leadership signals the possibility that a political 
constituency within the armed communist movement more open to the 
possibilities of the parliamentary process could emerge. However, this 
political opportunity has been severely undermined with the systematic 
extra-judicial killings of militants and sympathizers of the various legal 
left-wing militant organizations particularly since the 2004 elections. 
Before and during the 2004 elections, BM and its affiliate party list 
organizations were targeted and identified as nothing more than legal 
dummies of the underground armed movement thus exposing its cadres 
and members to wanton attacks by the military and paramilitary 
groups.18 No doubt, this cycle of political killings has made more 
daunting the emergence of a constituency within the major Left 
formation that could be more appreciative of the electoral alternative. 
Together with the policy of all-out war against the communists 
announced by Pres. Arroyo in early 2006, these killings make it extremely 
difficult to resume peace talks between the government and the 
communist movement. 
Another obstacle to the peace negotiations is the post 9/11 American 
initiative to tag the CPP and its military arm, the New People’s Army 
(NPA), and Jose Ma. Sison as terrorist organizations and personalities, 
respectively. However, the government did not provide evidence for 
these alleged terrorist ties. The CPP and Sison demanded the revocation 
of this terrorist tag before the peace negotiations could be resumed. 
Another important confidence-building measure for the progress of the 
peace negotiations lies in the compensation of about 10,000 human rights 
victims of the Marcos dictatorship. The Arroyo administration has 
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already agreed in principle to set aside some eight billion pesos (about 
US$ 150 million) from the assets recovered from the Marcoses to 
compensate the human rights victims. However, the release of the funds 
to the victims or their relatives is contingent on the amendment of the 
existing law governing the disposal of the Marcos assets. 
V. The Muslim Struggle and Democratic Consolidation 
The Muslim armed campaign for an independent homeland in the 
southern part of the country has also proven to be a protracted and 
intractable case. This tradition of Islamic separatism is nurtured by a 
combination of consciousness of their distinct cultural identity, 
exploitative economic practices by the majority elites and their foreign 
allies, discrimination in development priorities by the central 
government, the role of new Muslim leaders in the secessionist 
movements, and international linkages that provide support for the 
Muslim struggle. 
The starting point of the formal negotiations process between the 
government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) dates back to 
the Tripoli agreement signed in 1976 under the Marcos administration.19 
This agreement mandated the grant of autonomy to 13 provinces in the 
south; however, Marcos and the MNLF failed to agree on a mutually 
acceptable formula for the implementation of the autonomy agreement. 
When talks resumed with the Aquino administration in 1987 at 
Jeddah, Nur Misuari, the MNLF leader, sought the outright grant of 
autonomy to the 13 provinces through an executive order. The Aquino 
administration rejected this demand and instead approved a law in 
August 1989 that created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao 
(ARMM). In the plebiscite to ratify the ARMM in 1989, only four of the 13 
provinces included in the Tripoli agreement voted to join the 
autonomous regional government. In a later plebiscite, one other 
province and one city joined the ARMM. Elections for the ARMM 
government started in 1990 but this and subsequent electoral exercises 
were boycotted by the MNLF and the MILF.20
An important political opportunity to address the Muslim separatist 
movement took place under the Ramos administration in the 
mid-nineties when the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), with 
Indonesia playing a major role, mediated the peace talks between the 
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government and the MNLF. The MNLF was recognized by the OIC as the 
sole legitimate representative of the Filipino Muslims and received both 
political and material support from the OIC member countries 
particularly by Libya (Tan 1993; Arguillas 2001). The OIC and Indonesia 
prevailed upon Misuari to accept an autonomy arrangement with the 
Philippine government. Weakened by internal splits including the 
challenge from the MILF, the MNLF under Misuari was in no position to 
reject the OIC pressure to accept the autonomy arrangement. Moreover, 
the autonomy arrangement came with an offer for Misuari to run as 
ARMM governor under Pres. Ramos’ party. Misuari virtually ran 
unopposed as ARMM governor. However, Misuari had a lackluster 
record as ARMM governor. In 2001 he instigated an abortive uprising 
that landed him in jail on rebellion charges. 
In the case of the MILF, a series of exploratory and formal talks 
facilitated first by Libya and then Malaysia took place in 2001 in the 
aftermath of an all-out military campaign waged by the Estrada 
administration against several MILF camps. These talks focused on three 
main substantive agenda: (1) security aspects related to the cessation of 
hostilities and its implementation guidelines; (2) relief and rehabilitation 
of the conflict areas by accessing both local and international resources; 
and (3) ancestral domain claims. The ancestral domains claim is an 
extremely contentious issue since it requires reconciliation between 
conflicting traditions and practices on land ownership among Muslims, 
Christians, and the other minority communities who are neither Muslims 
nor Christians. 
The participation of Malaysia as a facilitator/mediator in the peace 
talks provides an important political opportunity for the progress of the 
peace negotiations.21 Like the OIC in the negotiations between the 
government and the MNLF, Malaysia has counseled the MILF to drop its 
secessionist project. Malaysia also has material and political resources to 
influence the outcome of the talks. However, the MILF is also cautious so 
as not to repeat what it considers to be a costly mistake by the MNLF 
when it yielded to OIC pressure with no significant lasting gains for the 
Muslim movement.  This decision also contributed to the disintegration 
of the MNLF. In late 2004, the peace process received a major boost with 
the arrival of peace keeping and monitoring forces from Malaysia and 
Brunei. 
In the aftermath of 9/11, American intervention in the heartland of 
Muslim Mindanao has introduced a new dimension to the armed conflict 
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and peace process. The U.S. has charged the MILF and the Abu Sayyaf of 
coddling alleged Islamic terrorists linked to Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaida 
network through the Jemaah Islamiyah.22 In pursuit of this claim, the U.S. 
has provided counter-terrorist training to the Philippine military through 
joint military and naval exercises. It has also provided official 
development assistance to Mindanao and specifically allocated US$30 
million to the MILF conflict ridden areas. However the U.S. reallocated 
this development fund to other areas claiming that the government and 
the MILF were not making enough progress in their peace negotiations. 
The resolution of the Muslim struggle depends much on the 
provision of substantive autonomy for the Muslim dominated provinces 
which is acceptable to the Muslim leaders and its constituencies. This 
concept and practice of autonomy will necessarily have to go beyond the 
limitations of the current ARMM, even to the point of determining how 
shari’ah could be accommodated in the autonomous region. Needless to 
say, the negotiation of a mutually acceptable settlement will have to 
include a clear and determined program of economic growth for the 
region, which also happens to be the most backward in terms of basic 
human indicators of development (income, education and health). Finally, 
much of the contentious points in the negotiations process will definitely 
revolve around the issue of ancestral domain. 
VI.  Some Lessons for Democratic Consolidation and the 
Armed Conflict 
The protracted and intractable nature of the armed conflict in the country 
has been a major impediment to the achievement of national unity, an 
absolutely essential condition for any working democratic order. Not 
only has this resulted in the enormous loss of human and material 
resources; it has also made difficult the nurturing of civic values and 
social trust particularly in conflict areas governed by an atmosphere of 
fear, oppression and terror. Moreover, the protracted armed conflict has 
contributed to the politicization of the military, the weakening of civilian 
control and strengthening of the military’s ability to intervene in major 
policies, oftentimes with veto power on security and related issues. 
Undoubtedly, addressing the root causes of the armed conflict such 
as long established relations of economic and social inequalities, 
pervasive poverty, and ethno-religious discrimination, constitutes the 
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long term resolution of these conflicts. However, at different conjunctures, 
political opportunities opened up by local and international 
developments can be decisively seized and acted upon by leaders from 
both sides to facilitate peace agreements or politically negotiated 
settlements. For instance, a review of the many twists and turns of 
addressing the armed conflicts in the country suggests at least two 
guideposts for facilitating the negotiation and transition process. First, 
the role of third party facilitators/mediators acceptable to both parties 
and with enough clout to influence the turn of events can be a significant 
force in facilitating the negotiation process. Second, since working 
democracies are anchored on competitive electoral processes, the 
militants in the armed movements who are prepared to participate in and 
explore the possibilities of the electoral process, such as in the party list 
elections, must be fully encouraged. 
The resolution of the armed conflicts is imperative for democratic 
consolidation in the Philippines because this will enable the working out 
of a significantly inclusive national consensus on the basic rules of 
political contestation which in turn are prerequisites for pursuing 
fundamental economic and political reforms. 
VII.  Contentious Politics, Civil Society and Democratic 
Consolidation 
In broad terms, civil society and social movements contribute to 
democratizing power relations in society by their ability to articulate the 
interests of the disadvantaged sectors and pressure governments to 
respond to progressive reforms and changes. A major issue for 
democratic consolidation in the Philippines concerns the complex 
relations of conflict and compromise, negotiations and accommodations 
between state authorities and the vibrant but fragmented civil society. 
Due to the confluence of a weak state tradition and a long history of a 
formally democratic political order, there exists a dense and wide 
network of civil society organizations with varying levels of engagement 
with public issues and policy. More than the weakly institutionalized 
mainstream political parties which are active only during election 
campaigns, civil society organizations play a more active role in 
articulating societal interests, monitoring government performance, and 
organizing and mobilizing their constituencies for political action.23
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While the militant people’s organizations have increasingly made 
their political presence felt in the formal legislative body through the 
party list system, their most important contribution to the 
democratization process continues to lie in the diverse ways they have 
organized, asserted and expanded the rights of the poor and 
disadvantaged sectors through innovative ways of claim-making. The 
various social movements have virtually used all available processes of 
claim-making against the state and power holders in Philippine society. 
The issues articulated range from the redistribution of wealth, the 
espousal of alternative worldviews and value frameworks, regulatory 
and monitoring mechanisms on the environment and social services, the 
expansion of citizen’s rights and to the advancement of various aspects of 
governance. Philippine society thus represents an endless arena of 
contentious claim-making by all kinds of civil society organizations but is 
presided by a state with largely unresponsive elites and limited capacities 
for addressing these claims.  
In the context of democratic consolidation in a society like the 
Philippines, which continues to suffer from severe social and economic 
inequalities and riven by contentious politics, three important factors 
about civil society need to be recognized. First, civil society is not a 
homogeneous grouping of like-minded organizations but is in fact 
divided by significant ideological and political differences on the 
conception and realization of the public good. For instance, there is much 
political divisiveness among the few party list representatives elected to 
the lower house on key public issues even though they are supposed to 
represent the interests of the marginalized sectors. Second, the 
contentious politics of social movements and civil society organizations 
has been primarily directed at the national levers of powers. While this is 
a legitimate trajectory, the limits of state capacity and responsiveness 
must be equally tested at the local levels where traditional elites may 
have more vulnerabilities than traditionally thought of. Third, almost all 
civil society organizations, particularly those engaged in development 
and advocacy work, suffer from severe constraints in human and 
material resources which affects their ability to address many basic 
problems of the marginalized sectors. This implies that creative ways of 
cooperation and accommodation between state elites, international actors, 
and other civil society organizations must be fleshed out to resolve such 
problems. 
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Since a key political aspect of democratic consolidation lies in 
forging a national consensus and a working national coalition to address 
fundamental changes and reforms in society, the political leadership 
must find ways to nurture this development. In the East Asian experience, 
this national consensus has been rooted and driven by economic growth 
with equity. In the Philippine experience, the long tradition of armed 
conflict and political disorder requires first a basic agreement on the 
elementary rules of political contestation which could only come from 
negotiated political settlements with forces which have been traditionally 
targeted as enemies of the state.   
VIII.  Conclusion 
The oligarchic control of elections in the Philippines is a major 
impediment to the improvement and consolidation of the modes of 
representation and accountability of the democratic process. A clear 
alternative to this status quo lies in building up a strong and more 
representative and accountable party system that can challenge elite 
dominance in the electoral processes. However, this can only come about 
once the basic institutional rules for political contestation are redrawn to 
allow for the full participation of forces and sectors that have been left 
out from the parliamentary arena. In the post-Marcos period, at least 
three institutional innovations have provided limited openings in pursuit 
of this agenda. Building and expanding on these openings are crucial to 
the development of a strong but accountable political leadership. In turn, 
this is critical in addressing the country’s endemic problems of political 
instability as seen in the continuing armed movements and the highly 
contentious politics between state actors and the militant social 
movements and civil society.  
Notes 
1. For an excellent discussion of the political bases and administrative 
aspects of the introduction of representative electoral institutions 
during the American colonial era, see Hutchcroft (2000). 
2. For the social origins of this ruling oligarchy see Temario C. Rivera 
(1994b) and Alfred W. McCoy (1993). 
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3. The most comprehensive research on the correlation of the survival 
of democracies with per capita incomes is provided by Adam 
Przeworski (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi 2000: 
136-137). 
4. The representative works on these modes of political representation 
and control in the Philippines include: Carl H. Lande (1965), Paul D. 
Hutchcroft (1991) and John Thayer Sidel (1999). 
5. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) awarded a contract for 
an automated canvassing of votes to Mega Pacific Consortium in 
2003 but this was voided by the Supreme Court which found the 
bidding process illegal.  Moreover, the company failed to meet the 
legally mandated technical requirements of the project. 
6. For studies on the need for strong, alternative political parties to 
address the country’s democratic problems, see Paul D. Hutchcroft 
and Joel Rocamora (2003: 259-292) and Gabriella R. Montinola (1999). 
7. An outstanding example of the new breed of progressive politicians 
who have won by their skillful use of these new resources and 
opportunities, particularly in building up working alliances with 
civil society organizations, is Mayor Jesse Robredo of Naga city in 
Southern Luzon. For his exemplary record, Robredo received the 
Magsaysay award for public service. For the dynamics of his rise to 
power, see Takeshi Kawanaka (2002). 
8. The Party List Law was passed in 1995 and took full effect in the 
1998 national elections. Under the law, 20% of the seats in the lower 
house is allocated for party-list representatives (at present, a total of 
52 party list seats). Following a Supreme Court decision in 2001, the 
party list organizations allowed to run are defined as those 
representing “marginalized and underrepresented sectors.” A party 
list organization must get a minimum of 2% of the total votes cast for 
the party list election to be entitled to a seat and each party is only 
allowed a maximum of three seats. 
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9. These five Left parties that ran candidates for the party list in 2004 
included two separate formations of the left movement. Bayan Muna, 
Anakpawis, and Gabriela Women’s Party belong to one block while 
Akbayan and Partido ng Manggagawa represent the other grouping, 
now known as Laban ng Masa (Peoples’ Struggle). Bayan Muna and 
Akbayan which received 9.46% and 6.70% respectively of the party 
list votes cast in 2004 had three congressional seats. Anakpawis with 
4.23% of the votes had two seats while Gabriela (3.65%) and Partido 
ng Manggagawa (3.52%) had one seat each. Bayan Muna and 
Akbayan are multi-sectoral parties while Anakpawis is peasant and 
worker-based. Partido ng Manggagawa draws its support from trade 
union workers. 
10. Between 1994 and 2000, close to one third (28%) of all deployed 
land-based contract workers were working as professionals, 
technicians, managerial, executive and administrative personnel. See 
National Statistics Office (2002: 670). In 2005, the OFWs were 
estimated to number more than 8 million and sent back about 
US$10.7 billion dollars or a little over 10 % of the country’s GNP. 
11. In the 1998 elections when the Party List Law first took effect, 14 
representatives were elected. In 2001, only 9 made it to the lower 
house and 16 were elected in 2004. 
12. For instance, in the 1998 elections, 123 organizations contested the 
party list seats while 163 organizations (later reduced to 44 by the 
Supreme Court) took part in the 2001 elections. 
13. More detailed discussion of possible reforms to the existing Party 
List Law are provided by Ramon C. Casiple (2003) and Montinola 
(1999). 
14. By “contentious politics”, I adopt the framework used by McAdam, 
Tarrow and Tilly when they refer to episodic, public forms of 
collective struggle usually targeting the government as an object of 
claim, and especially when innovative forms of collective struggle 
(unprecedented or forbidden within the regime) are used. See Doug 
McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly (2001: 4-9). 
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15. By “civil society”, I use the common definition of referring to 
voluntary organizations differentiated from that of the state and 
corporate sectors. However, within civil society, one can distinguish 
those associations that are basically “inward-looking and 
particularistic” from those that are oriented toward the wider 
community and engaged in trying to shape and influence public 
policy. For a useful analysis of the internal differentiation of civil 
society associations and its implications for democratic rule, see Iris 
Marion Young (2000: 154-195). 
16. Jose Ma. Sison has been living as a political exile in the Netherlands 
since the late 1980s and continues to be the leading ideologue of the 
communist revolutionary movement. 
17. An assessment of this first stage of the peace process is provided by 
Maria Serena I. Diokno (1992). See also Temario C. Rivera (1994a: 
252-259). 
18. A leading human rights organization, Karapatan, has documented 
that since 2001 to September 2006, the killings of political activists 
number 755. Moreover, in the same period, 46 journalists were also 
killed. Very few of these cases had been investigated and solved but 
there is widespread belief and much circumstantial evidence that the 
assailants are military and police units or their civilian assets. 
Lending credence to this belief are official statements from high 
ranking government officials including the national security adviser 
and top military generals justifying punitive actions against militant 
legal organizations which  they claim are “front organizations” of 
the communist movement.  
19. Founded in the late sixties by a new generation of university 
educated Muslim professionals, the Moro National Liberation Front 
(MNLF) under the leadership of Nur Misuari served as the main 
Muslim organization till the mid-nineties espousing an independent 
Islamic state (the Bangsamoro). In 1996, the MNLF concluded a 
peace negotiation with the Ramos administration and Misuari was 
elected subsequently as governor of the Autonomous Region of 
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). 
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20. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was founded in the late 
seventies as a breakaway formation from the MNLF. Led by Hashim 
Salamat, a Cairo educated religious scholar and himself a founding 
member of the MNLF, the MILF sought to stress a more Islamic 
identity on the independence movement. After the MNLF concluded 
a peace agreement with the Ramos administration in 1996, the MILF 
had become the dominant armed Muslim movement in the country. 
21. For a detailed analysis of Malaysia’s role in the GRP-MILF peace 
talks see Soliman M. Santos, Jr.(2003). 
22. The Abu Sayyaf (Bearer or Father of the Sword in Arabic) was 
founded by Abdurajak Janjalani, an Afghan war veteran and his 
brother, Khadafi. Abdurajak originally espoused a radical Islamist 
program but after his death in 1998, the Abu Sayyaf broke up into 
small units engaged in spectacular, ruthless cases of kidnappings for 
ransom of both local and foreign victims. The Jemaah Islamiya is 
alleged to be the Southeast Asian network of Al Qaida cadres with 
cells and support networks in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand and the Philippines. 
23. For case studies on various aspects of civil society-state relations in 
policy making, policy advocacy, and political mobilizations for 
different causes, see Marlon A. Wui and Glenda S. Lopez (1997) and 
the special issue on NGOs in the Philippines in Public Policy, Vol. VI, 
No. 2 (July-December) 2002. 
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Rebuilding Democratic Institutions: 
Civil-military Relations in Philippine 
Democratic Governance 
Carolina G. Hernandez 
I.  Introduction 
Until lately, the literature on democratization, particularly democratic 
consolidation had for the most part neglected the issue of democratizing 
civil-military relations as a critical institutional reform required to 
consolidate democracy. In Asia, one of the first attempts in this regard is 
the volume edited by Muthiah Alagappa, Coercion and Governance: The 
Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia (2001). In the 1960s and 1970s, 
military intervention in politics, including the take over of elected civilian 
governments bore witness to the destruction of democratic governance in 
many of the new states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. A huge body 
of literature followed this global phenomenon. Yet, most scholars of 
democratization have not paid the same kind of attention to the 
importance of democratizing civil-military relations (CMR) in democratic 
consolidation. The treatment of this issue in most of the literature is in the 
context of military withdrawal from politics, such as the insightful 
volume written by Claude E. Welch, Jr., No Farewell to Arms? Military 
Disengagement from Politics in Africa and Latin America (1987). 
It is the purpose of this paper to focus on civil-military 
democratization by examining the Philippine case. It argues that without 
democratizing CMR, the prospects of democratic consolidation in 
transition countries will be much more problematic. It discusses the 
difficult challenges of democratizing CMR, using the Philippine case as 
an illustrative example. It also provides an update on current efforts to 
democratize CMR under the administration of President Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo and concludes with some thoughts on future 
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prospects. 
II.  How the Philippines Got to the Present State of 
Civil-Military Relations 
Prior to the declaration of martial law in 1972, the Philippines was 
considered an exception to the general phenomenon of military 
intervention in politics that swept most of the new states on the three 
continents cited above. Patterned after the US model, its structure of 
political governance is a presidential form of government where the 
people, from whom sovereignty emanates, directly elect the chief 
executive. The 1935 Constitution made the President the 
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and the military’s contact with 
the President passed through a civilian defense secretary. The legislature 
exercised oversight functions over the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
(AFP) through its power- of confirmation of military appointments and 
promotions, over the defense budget, and investigation in aid of 
legislation that usually unearthed wrongdoing in the military. Other 
civilian oversight institutions were the judiciary, the free press, and civil 
liberty associations (Hernandez 1984: 16-18). 
The declaration of martial law may be regarded as the original sin 
that altered the pattern of CMR, although the increase in the military’s 
sphere of responsibility began in the anti-communist insurgency 
campaigns of the 1950s under Ramon Magsaysay, first as Defense 
Secretary and then as President. Ferdinand Marcos’ first term of office 
saw the institutionalization of the military’s role in national development 
and the alteration of the career development pattern of the AFP where a 
managerial style of leadership replaced the older heroic style (Hernandez 
1984: 16-18). 1 This should have alerted academic and political analyst’s 
perspectives about Marcos’ intention to use the AFP to implement his 
future political agenda. However, lack of genuine understanding of the 
dynamics of CMR at that time prevented them from discerning the 
implications for the military in Philippine politics and for democratic 
governance because of the shift in the military’s career development 
pattern. 
Martial law paved the way for the destruction of the civilian political 
institutions- except the presidency, the enlargement of military functions 
to include non-traditional military roles, the institution of structural 
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changes that “merged” the police with the military through the single 
leadership of the Philippine Constabulary and the Integrated National 
Police within the AFP, and the suppression of civil liberties, including 
elections, freedom of expression and association. Military role expansion 
resulted in a heightened sense of power and political awareness 
particularly among younger officers. In time, they hatched the plot to 
oust Marcos within the context of the snap presidential elections of 
February 1986. On discovered by Marcos’ AFP Chief of Staff, the coup 
plotters- including the Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and the Vice 
Chief of Staff General Fidel V. Ramos, the “Reform the Armed Forces 
Movement” (RAM)- broke away from the AFP chain of command and 
joined the rest of the masses of anti-Marcos groups that protested against 
Marcos’ rule, particularly since the assassination of his principal political 
rival, Senator Benigno (Ninoy) Aquino, Jr. in August 1983 (Hernandez 
1984: 19-21, 1987; Hedman 2001: 175-180). 
While Marcos’ removal from office ushered in a new democratic 
regime under the 1987 Constitution, it did not result in the 
institutionalization of political institutions critical to the consolidation of 
democracy, including the establishment of democratic CMR. Democratic 
constitutional bodies, such as an independent (also honest and competent) 
judiciary, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and the Philippine 
Commission on Human Rights (PCHR) continued to be filled largely 
through political accommodations with the incumbent’s or its political 
allies’ personal or political agenda in mind (Hernandez 1997: 48-49). 
Elections continued to be contested and won by those who had the classic 
guns, goons, and gold. Provisions for the election of party-list 
representatives notwithstanding, Congress continued to be dominated by 
the landed, business, and professional (all moneyed) elites. Further, 
legislators who were supposed to exercise oversight functions over the 
military on the whole had little understanding of the nature of the 
defense and military institution, its functions, its requirements, its 
dynamics, and the critical importance of CMR in governance, particularly 
in democratic consolidation. 
The fact that the February 1986 transition from Marcos to Corazon 
Aquino, Ninoy’s widow, remained unclear in terms of whose role in the 
removal of Marcos was decisive, i.e., whether that of the military 
breakaway or that of People Power 1 – a combination of the role of the 
Church, the civil society, and the broader masses of Filipino; this did not 
help sort out the appropriate relationship between the civilian political 
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leadership and the military’s officer corps. This was compounded by the 
January 2001 transition from the former President Joseph Ejercito (Erap) 
Estrada to his Vice President (the constitutional successor of an 
incapacitated President), the incumbent President Gloria Macapagal 
Arroyo, where the military (and the police) hierarchy again broke away 
from Estrada on the last day of People Power 2. The question remained: 
could People Power 2 have succeeded in ousting Estrada without the 
military and police breakaway? (Hernandez 2001, 2002a) 
III.  Rebuilding Democratic Civil-Military Relations 
Democratic consolidation will remain problematic without the 
establishment of democratic CMR as it affected the balance of power 
between the civilian political authority and the officer corps. Since 
democratization involves the redistribution of power, it must include the 
redistribution of power from the military to the civilian authority whose 
relative power vis-à-vis the AFP diminished during authoritarian rule. 
Authoritarian rule in the past was either under the military or saw the 
military as a partner or its principal supporter. The process of 
democratization would therefore be impaired if the military’s role in 
politics were not reduced if not eliminated, if the institutions that 
checked the military from going beyond its constitutional and legal 
mandate remained weak relative to the military, and if the military were 
not restrained when it tried to grab political power. 
It is in this light that this section will discuss the environmental 
factors shaping Philippine’s CMR as well as the reforms undertaken to 
democratize CMR during the Aquino and Ramos presidency. The point 
here is to determine the state of democratizing CMR since 1986. 
Environmental Factors Shaping Philippine CMR 
There are a number of factors that shape CMR, other than the 
constitutional and legal context already alluded to above. Among them 
are: (1) the mission or role the military plays in the political system, 
including the role of coercion in governance, (2) political legitimacy of the 
civilian government, (3) the strength/weakness of the civilian oversight 
institutions, (4) socio-economic factors, and (5) external factors (Welch 
1976: 1-42, 313-327). 
The mission of the AFP is to provide for external defense against 
Rebuilding Democratic Institutions  43 
foreign aggressors and internal security from armed communist 
insurgency and Moro separatism. In addition, the incremental acquisition 
of developmental roles associated with counter-insurgency since the 
1950s, its institutionalization during the Marcos period and the Military 
Modernization Law of 1995 exposed the military to political governance 
and continuing politicization. The relentless internal conflicts of more 
than 35 years have made the civilian government dependent on the 
military for national security, without which socio-economic 
development is unlikely to take place, as in fact it had failed to take place.  
The military’s participation in development efforts has militarized 
the process on the ground, with undesirable consequences for the AFP 
itself, the government, and society at large. For the AFP, the increasing 
military presence in communities affected by the insurgency and 
separatism resulted in widespread occurrence of human rights violations 
and the politicization of young officers. This in turn exposed their 
vulnerability to political adventurism. The government’s drive against 
insurgent groups took its toll on the national coffers and undermined the 
government’s capacity to deliver basic social services. Furthermore, the 
predominance of the military in the campaign against insurgency was 
coupled by the absence of civilian agencies in the post-conflict areas. The 
overwhelming emphasis and reliance on a military solution did not 
address the root of the problem of discontent stemming from 
socio-economic, political, and cultural issues. This in turn produced 
tremendous stress on the polity as its legitimacy was questioned due to 
its poor performance. Lastly, the society, in the end, was negatively 
affected. Inadequate or lack of human development in the conflict and 
post-conflict areas burdened the populace. Fortunately, the role of 
coercion in governance at the formal level has declined due to 
re-democratization since 1986, although it continued in areas far from the 
seat of government. 
The legitimacy of the civilian government helps shape CMR because 
military organizations tend to avoid taking action against governments 
that enjoy legitimacy. Aquino’s assumption to power had been contested; 
particularly her temporary allies in the defense and military 
establishments in the weeks following the removal of Marcos had 
contested her authority. When Enrile and his followers among the RAM 
were removed from the Aquino government, they questioned her 
legitimacy to the point that Enrile linked the referendum for the 
ratification of the 1987 Constitution to the legitimacy of the Aquino 
Asian New Democracies: The Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan Compared 
 
 
44 
government. His campaign was thus, “a vote for the constitution is a vote 
for Cory and a vote against the constitution is a vote against Cory”. The 
constitution was ratified by 80% of those that voted in the referendum; in 
a sense established Aquino’s right to govern (Hernandez 1991). 
Similarly, the legitimacy of the Arroyo presidency was challenged 
throughout the three years of the unexpired portion of the Estrada tenure 
of office. She remained the legitimate successor to the Office of the 
President, despite the opinion of the Supreme Court that the manner in 
which Arroyo succeeded Estrada was extra constitutional (Doronila 2001). 
This challenge partly explains the numerous political accommodations 
she made to those who helped in Estrada’s removal from office, as well 
as the post-election expectation that her appointments to the cabinet and 
other high ranking government positions would no longer be guided by 
political accommodation once her right to govern had been earned. After 
all, she posted a lead of 1.5 million votes over her closest rival in the May 
2004 elections. 
The importance of political legitimacy in CMR is further reflected in 
the Philippine constitutional provision: “The armed forces are the 
defender of the people and the state”. 2 Mistakenly this provision has 
been interpreted by a member of the commission that drafted the 1987 
Constitution and a leading constitutional lawyer, that in one instance 
military intervention in politics is permissible and that is “when the 
government has lost its legitimacy” (Bernas 1997). Yet he did not 
elaborate on the issue of how to determine whether the government has 
lost its legitimacy. In the context of a liberal democratic constitution, this 
right does not belong to the armed forces, but to the sovereign people. 
As already noted, civilian political institutions remained weak and 
under-institutionalized, making the exercise of oversight functions over 
the military problematic at best. This is a condition faced by other 
democratizing countries elsewhere in the world and therefore, is a 
characteristic feature of democratic transitions. But this cannot remain for 
long without compromising the future of democratic consolidation.3 
Moreover, the perceived dependence on the military to counter armed 
conflict, as well as the role the military played in the 1986 and 2001 
transitions hampered the resolve and capacity of civilian government to 
return the military back to the barracks. 
The prevailing socio-economic conditions do not augur well for 
democratic CMR. In the 1980s, many of the coup attempts against the 
Aquino presidency were preceded by a decline in the socio-economic 
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conditions in the country. The coup attempts usually followed an 
increase in fuel prices, and a decline in popular satisfaction with the 
incumbent president that translated in a decline in Aquino’s popularity. 
The rebel military misinterpreted these conditions as support for her 
ouster, only to realize that decline in popularity of the civilian incumbent 
did not mean public support for a coup. In the Philippine experience, 
rebel soldiers have used social discontent as a basis for mutiny or coup 
d’etat; leaders often justified their uprising on grounds of poor 
socio-economic conditions of soldiers and of the society at large, or graft 
and corruption in the military and the government, and of the need for 
social and political change. Thus, when socio-economic conditions 
worsen, the maintenance of democratic CMR becomes a problem. It is 
therefore, not coincidental that rumors of impending destabilization by 
the opponents of the Arroyo administration had followed oil price hikes 
and price increases for other commodities that fuelled a worsened sense 
of economic well being by Filipinos in the closing months of 2004. 
The Philippine military leadership remained attentive and often 
responsive to US influence. This is seen in the military’s responsiveness 
to US policy on the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), the Balikatan joint 
military exercises, the Mutual Logistics and Support Agreement (MLSA), 
and the Joint Defense Assessment (JDA) for AFP reform and assistance 
from the US. The US also helped in the physical removal of Marcos from 
Malacañang Palace and his airlift to Hawaii in February 1986; thus 
averted possible bloodshed once the People Power 1 forces would have 
reached the Palace, and facilitated, thereby, the transition to Aquino. It is 
not unlikely that the participation of the Philippines in the global 
coalition against terrorism and the coalition of the willing in the war on 
Iraq played a crucial role in the continuing support by Washington of the 
Arroyo administration, even in the face of threat of political 
destabilization by military factions and military-related groups in the 
months before the May 2004 elections. 
Reforming CMR under Aquino and Ramos  
Keenly aware of the need to reduce the political influence and role of the 
military, and committed to the restoration of democracy, Aquino 
undertook measures that helped reform CMR. The most important of 
these reforms are:  
(1) The adoption of the 1987 Constitution – This provided the broad 
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framework of political governance as it reaffirmed the Bill of Rights, set 
limits on the emergency powers of the president, prohibited political 
dynasties by setting rules on terms of office and re-election, recognized 
women’s role in nation-building, guaranteed respect for human rights, 
and promoted political empowerment of the people. In particular, it 
reasserted and installed in the constitution the supremacy of civilian 
authority over the military and provided for institutions of oversight 
mechanisms over the AFP, such as the legislative power over the budget 
and confirmation of military appointments and promotion, as well as the 
participation of the Philippine Commission on Human Rights in military 
appointments and promotions.  
(2) The separation of the Philippine Constabulary and the Integrated 
National Police from the AFP as provided in Article XVI, Section 6 in the 
1987 Constitution. The government operationalized this constitutional 
provision with the enactment of Republic Act 6975, otherwise known as 
the Department of the Interior and Local Government Act in 1990. With 
the separation of the national police from the military, the roles and 
jurisdiction of both forces were redefined. The PNP assumed from the 
AFP the primary role of preservation of internal security including the 
suppression of insurgency (after a period of transition), leaving to the 
AFP its primary role of preservation of external security. However, the 
AFP, upon the recommendation of the Peace and Order Council, 
assumed the primary role in situations of serious threats to internal 
security and the PNP played a supportive role in this regard. Moreover, 
due to the serious nature of the communist insurgency and Moro 
separatist movement, the AFP remained in charge of fighting these two 
groups. This situation warranted the continued frontline function of the 
military in counter-insurgency operations. 
(3) The establishment of the Office of Ethical Standards and Public 
Accountability (OESPA) as well as the adoption of a Code of Ethics for 
the AFP to alleviate graft and corruption. The OESPA was organized 
pursuant to Staff Memo No. 3, dated May 1, 1990, and is organizationally 
parallel to the Office of the Inspector General (OTIG). OESPA has 
exclusive jurisdiction over active AFP personnel involved in major graft 
cases. Its mission is “to enhance professionalism, promote honesty and 
integrity in the military service, instill ethical standards and inculcate a 
strong sense of public accountability among military and civilian 
personnel in pursuit of a common commitment against graft and 
corruption in the AFP”. OESPA strategy to transform the AFP is not only 
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accomplished through a careful design of its projects but also in their 
implementation. The office also receives complaints or reports on 
violations by military and civilian personnel of the AFP. 
One of OESPA’s very first projects was the formulation of the AFP’s 
Code of Ethics (AFCOE). The entire AFP ratified the AFPCOE in June 
1991. On 30 September 1991, every officer and enlisted personnel 
simultaneously took the Oath of Allegiance to the Code of Ethics during 
flag raising ceremonies all over the country. 
(4) The implementation of the Military Values Education (MILVED) 
program to reform and professionalize the AFP. The main objective of 
MILVED is to reform and professionalize the AFP through the 
development, assimilation, and institutionalization of essential moral 
principles that eventually will produce a Filipino soldier who is 
Maka-Diyos (God-centered), Maka-Bayan (Nation-Oriented), and Maka-tao 
(People-Oriented).  
(5) The creation of the Philippine Commission on Human Rights 
(PCHR).  The PCHR was tasked to train the military and the police in 
human rights and international humanitarian law as well as to serve as 
an oversight body – viz., Commission’s certification that the officer in 
question had received training in human rights and international 
humanitarian law and did not have a record of human rights violation, 
was considered necessary for promotion of military officers.  
(6) The adoption of the Kabisig movement. This served to promote 
better military relations with civilian agencies, civil society groups, and 
other sectors in community development projects to help local 
communities.4 KABISIG was more than a program to address the issue of 
poverty and empowerment of communities. Aquino utilized the 
movement to bring about national unity and solidarity and in particular, 
to provide a venue for confidence building between the military and 
civilian groups in and out of government. Through its projects, soldiers 
and civil society groups, which used to face each other across the 
barricades set up by the military to secure the Marcos government, came 
to know each other and work together in nation building efforts.    
(7) Reforms in the Logistics Command to redress corruption in the 
procurement of military equipment and supplies. 
Aquino refused to grant unconditional amnesty to the military rebels 
despite the series of coup attempts against her administration from July 
1986 to December 1999 (The Fact-Finding Commission 1999). However, 
unconditional amnesty was granted by Fidel V. Ramos, with his election 
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in 1992, as Aquino’s successor. Aware that foreign investment would 
continue to elude the country if armed challenges from the communist 
movement, Moro secessionism, and the rebel military would persist, 
Ramos sought to end these challenges through peace talks with each of 
these groups. He succeeded in two instances: forged peace agreement 
with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1996 and enabled 
return of rebel military to AFP by grant of unconditional amnesty to the 
rebel military, many of whom returned to the AFP and redeemed with 
loyal and distinguished service to the state. Two of the1986 breakaway 
leaders, Enrile and Gregorio Honasan became senators during the Ramos 
incumbency, gave them a stake in the political system that they sought to 
displace in the 1980s. While this policy brought temporary respite from 
military adventurism, it did not do well for the discipline of young 
officers who, in July 2003 were again lured by Honasan to conspire 
against the government.  
IV.  The Oakwood Mutiny 
There is no doubt that the Oakwood mutiny of 27 July 2003 had been 
devised with the active participation, if not leadership of Senator 
Honasan. Testimonies heard and received by the Fact-Finding 
Commission, headed by retired Justice Florentino Feliciano, (Feliciano 
Commission for short) point to this conclusion. As in many of the 1980s 
coups, the legitimate grievances of the soldiers were used as a 
recruitment base for the conspiracy. Honasan’s involvement was evident 
in the recruitment process, as well as the documentary evidence collected 
by government intelligence agencies, and testimonies heard by the 
Feliciano Commission. 
Causes  
The alleged causes of the mutiny are old and many are a re-hash of the 
alleged causes of the devastating and dangerous coup attempts against 
the Aquino presidency in December 1989: (1) corruption in the military 
and in the government, particularly in the procurement of military 
equipment and supplies,  (2) poor working conditions of the soldiers in 
the field, (3) inadequate housing, medical, and dental services, (4) 
corruption in the Retirement Service and Benefits System (RSBS), (5) sale 
of arms and ammunition to unauthorized people, including “enemies” of 
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the government, (6) conspiracy by top military officers with the 
government to remain in power by declaring martial law, (7) 
micro-management of the AFP by the Secretary of National Defense, (8) 
delay in the payment of benefits to the heirs of deceased soldiers,  and (9) 
preferential treatment to classmates in the academy by the top brass (The 
Fact-Finding Commission 2003b: 126-135). 
The Feliciano Commission found that many of these allegations had 
basis, but concluded that it was unlikely that the mutineers would have 
adopted measures to remedy or solve these problems in case of success, 
particularly through the adoption of Honasan’s National Recovery 
Program (NRP); the NRP purports to address these and other national 
problems. The fact-finders rather identified the political agenda of taking 
power to be at the center of the mutiny; the main goal was aborted due to 
the government’s discovery of the plot. Interestingly, the plot is a rehash 
of the February 1986 “God Save the King” plot against Marcos and the 
“God Save the Queen” plot against Aquino, in November 1986 and 
December 1989. This is not surprising, given Honasan’s central role in all 
of them (The Fact-Finding Commission 2003b: 126-135). Moreover, 
Honasan was senator for a period of nine years. He did not address the 
issues raised in the NRP while in office and would most likely fail to 
implement the purported solutions had the mutiny succeeded. 
Implications for CMR 
The Oakwood Mutiny put a set-back to the democratization of Philippine 
CMR. The country had lulled into thinking that it had seen the last of the 
coups in December 1989 since more than 13 years had elapsed since then. 
However, apart from the principals, conditions that shaped Philippine 
CMR between February 1986 and July 2003 essentially remained the same 
that facilitated the coup: an enlarged military role, including against 
armed threats to the government and national development roles, 
questionable political legitimacy of the incumbents, weak civilian 
oversight institutions, poor socio-economic conditions, and the external 
US factor. 
The mutiny is a testimony to the erosion of military discipline- an 
offshoot of the policy of granting unconditional amnesty by the Ramos 
administration to the military rebels. It took years to raise its ugly head, 
but it did! The leaders of the mutiny decried the fact that they were in jail 
and Honasan used due process to delay the investigation and subsequent 
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prosecution of the case of rebellion against him. In the given 
circumstances, public apology of the leaders of the mutiny in 20 
September 2004 is unlikely to be followed by a grant of amnesty, given 
Arroyo’s commitment to military reform. However, the response of 
politicians who have very little understanding, if at all, of the sociology 
and the importance of discipline in the military, as well as the dynamics 
of CMR, could be to cater to the popular demands by grandstanding on 
the issue of amnesty to the Oakwood mutineers.5
In addition, there is the unresolved issue of the role of the military in 
the political succession from Marcos to Aquino and from Estrada to 
Arroyo that impacted on the balance of power between the military and 
civilian authorities. Moreover, the military was often perceived as the 
“savior” of the government during the coup attempts of the 1980s and 
the 2003 Oakwood mutiny, enabled them to have at least, a psychological 
advantage over the civilian leadership and at most, the temerity to 
demand major concessions from it. The increase in the number of 
appointments of retired military officers to important positions in the 
civilian bureaucracy since the Aquino period to the present is only an 
indication of the kind of leverage that the military has had over the 
government (Gloria 2003). Needless to say, this is not conducive to 
democratic CMR. Politicians also continue to enlist the military in their 
political and personal agenda, a practice that is insidious and dangerous 
to democratic CMR. Unfortunately, politicians are least aware of the 
dangers and are hardly conversant on defense and military affairs, more 
so about the importance of civil-military relations in a democracy, 
especially to democratic consolidation. 
V.  The Arroyo Government’s Military Reform Agenda 
Contrary to popular opinion that governments undertake military 
reforms and grant concessions to the military after coup attempts, the 
Arroyo administration had undertaken a series of reforms affecting the 
military long before the Oakwood mutiny of July 2003 and thereafter, as 
well. Among them are: 
(1) Pay Increases- starting in 2001, a series of increase in the basic pay 
of soldiers was implemented by the government. The last tranche was 
paid out in January 2004. This increased the burden on government 
considerably as the pay increases of soldiers in the active service are used 
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to benchmark the pensions of the military retirees. As of August 2004, the 
government owed the military retirees their pension differentials for the 
years 2002, 2003, and 2004. This could be a cause for future military 
discontent, given the fact that retirees continue to command substantial 
following among the active duty soldiers due to the peculiar sociological 
characteristics of the military as an institution, and the bonds among 
officers built during their PMA days.  
(2) Creation of the Presidential Task Force for Military Reform – In 
January 2003, six months before the Oakwood mutiny, President Arroyo 
created the Presidential Task Force for Military Reform to look into the 
financial and procurement systems of the military. This led to the 
adoption of the Single Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) in the AFP to 
replace the 119 BACs that provided opportunities for corrupt practices in 
the AFP. 
(3) The institution of the Undersecretary for Internal Control (USIC) 
at the Department of National Defense (DND) to ensure transparency 
and good governance generally in the defense’s and military’s financial 
and procurement systems.  
(4) Creation of the Fact-Finding Commission to Investigate the 
Oakwood Mutiny – Established through Administrative Order No. 78 
dated 30 July 2003 by the President, the Feliciano Commission conducted 
its inquiry from 3 August to 15 October 2003. It called 95 witnesses 
altogether in open or executive sessions. It submitted its report to the 
President on 17 October 2004. 
(5) Appointment of an Official under the Office of the President to 
Implement the Feliciano Commission Recommendations – the Feliciano 
Commission Report made about 27 recommendations, the last being the 
designation with dispatch of “one official of high competence, 
commitment and integrity, with direct access to the President and who 
enjoyed the trust of all political groupings… on a full time basis, with the 
task of implementing the recommendations” (The Fact-Finding 
Commission 2003b) of the Commission.  On 5 December 2003, President 
Arroyo signed Executive Order No. 255 that created the Office of the 
Presidential Adviser to Implement the Feliciano Commission 
Recommendations. The recommendations sought to address the 
legitimate grievances of the soldiers, to improve welfare, to 
professionalize the military, and to avert future military adventurism. In 
this regard, the full cooperation of relevant government agencies beyond 
the DND and the AFP, such as the Department of Justice, the Office of the 
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Solicitor General, the Ombudsman, the Department of Budget and 
Management, and the Congress is important. So far, they have been 
cooperative. Congress however needs to understand and support the 
recommendations to have the appropriate legislation adopted in order to 
realize them. Although, the Senate Defense Committee has begun public 
hearings on the RSBS issue, legislation to reform the military is yet to be 
enacted. A key area is the enactment of a new national defense law that 
would institutionalize the set of reforms embodied in the Philippine 
Defense Review (PDR) as it brings the AFP into the 21st century. In other 
areas some concrete progress has been made. 
(6) The Joint Defense Assessment – the JDA was conducted in 2002 
pursuant to the enhanced partnership and security cooperation between 
the Philippines and the US following the 11 September 2001 attacks 
against the US. As a member of the global coalition against terrorism and 
being situated in what has sometimes been identified as the “second 
front” of global terrorism, Philippines availed the military assistance 
extended by the US to the coalition members. The JDA is intended to 
effect reform of the AFP, from the AFP’s viewpoint, before the extension 
of military assistance by the US to the AFP. US consultants were in 
Manila to assist in this process by building the AFP’s capacity for 
planning its scarce resources to enable it to meet its mission. This was the 
same training used for the new members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) from Central and Eastern Europe before their 
accession to NATO. The JDA was the precursor to the Philippine Defense 
Review (PDR) that will also institutionalize the Davide and Feliciano 
Commission recommendations and will be enacted into a new national 
defense law. 
VI.  Future Prospects for Philippine Civil-Military 
Relations 
In any reform process, it is critical to have individuals in positions of 
authority to initiate, guide, nurse, and ensure the success of the process 
itself. It is also critical to have allies at all levels of governance where 
reform must be undertaken. Together they would form the critical mass 
to ensure the success of the reform process. 
The Arroyo administration appears committed to reform the defense 
and military establishments as an important step for democratizing 
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civil-military relations. This commitment is seen in (1) the reform agenda 
it has taken since 2001, (2) the appointment of credible officials to 
sensitive position of the USIC at the DND and the Ombudsman, (3) the 
priority given to the implementation of the Feliciano Commission 
recommendations, further after her election to the presidency in May 
2004, (4) the removal of certain defense officials that were perceived as 
likely obstacles to the reform process, and (5) the appointment of a 
Secretary of National Defense without any military background. In late 
November 2004 (6) the Defense Secretary was ordered to replace the 
incumbent defense undersecretaries and assistant secretaries with new 
ones. Most of these incumbent officials were retired military officers. The 
nature of implementation of the reform agenda by these officials, 
especially in the defense and military sector will materially affect the 
future of CMR in the Philippines. 
Critical to this issue is the leadership in the DND and the AFP and 
the leaders’ subscription to military reform for democratic CMR. After all, 
the military had the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in society 
and in the Philippine case as seen above, it continues to enjoy significant 
influence and power in governance issues. The break out of the 
corruption case against a ranking military officer, once in charge of 
comptrollership, was an important window of opportunity to 
demonstrate government’s seriousness to root out military corruption in 
particular and to improve governance in general. It is as well an 
opportunity to unearth other forms of military wrongdoing. However, 
President Arroyo ensured that the top leaders of the AFP were credible 
leaders committed to reform as well. Unlike in Taiwan where the first 
and only civilian Defense Minister was not followed by similar 
appointments from the civilian sector due to the military’s objections, in 
Philippines there were no resistance from the military to the 
newly-appointed civilian Secretary of National Defense; although 
Estrada’s civilian Defense Secretary ran afoul with the military hierarchy 
almost immediately after his assumption to office. He supposedly acted 
in a manner not sensitive to the military’s peculiarities as an institution, 
and put CMR on the wrong footing. 
The other side of the picture concerns the politicians. Unless they 
gain better understanding of the dynamics of CMR and the importance of 
democratizing CMR for democratic consolidation, unless they restrain 
themselves from enlisting the military for their political and personal 
agenda, threats to democratic CMR are likely to continue. An example is 
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the abuse of the power of investigation by some members of the 
legislature. Rather than being an instrument to aid the enactment of 
legislation to improve the military establishment, investigatory hearings 
have been exercises of political grandstanding and public humiliation of 
some military officers by unwitting politicians.  They are the more 
difficult to manage because under the current presidential system, 
government has little leverage over them. Hence, do think tanks and civil 
society actors wish to help enhance the politicians’ understanding of 
CMR and the critical issues related to it. How does one try to initiate a 
training program for legislators on legislative oversight over the military? 
Legislators tend to lecture, not to listen, even during public hearings, 
particularly when covered by media. Does one try to train the defense 
committee and individual legislator’s technical staff? And if this were 
possible, would they be able to influence their principals? 
Finally, the role of civil society is critical because it has the power to 
make coups fail. Unless coups are supported by the society, they are 
likely to face serious hurdles and even if coup plotters succeeded in 
taking power, they would not be able to govern, except through the use 
of coercion. This, however, is a limited currency in these times. 
The future prospects for democratic CMR for the Philippines will 
depend on the success of the reformers, in and out of the military, to put 
in place new ways of doing things that are supportive of democratic 
CMR. The role of the Philippine President as commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces is central to this equation; since there lays the initiative, the 
power, and resources to initiate and sustain the reform process. At this 
juncture, understanding CMR is crucial. 
Notes 
1. A more elaborated discussion of the military’s role expansion during 
martial law is found in Carolina G. Hernandez (1985). 
2. The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.  
3. Diamond argues that democratizing civil-military relations falls 
within the ambit of democratic deepening, one of three main tasks 
that consolidating democracies face (Diamond 1999: 64-117). 
4. For a more detailed discussion, see Hernandez and Ubarra (1999) 
and Hernandez (2002). 
5. In November 2004, some 117 members of the House of 
Rebuilding Democratic Institutions  55 
Representatives called for amnesty for the Oakwood mutineers, 
apparently in response to lobbying efforts of partisan groups, 
including the families of the mutineers. 
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4 
The Changing Character of Local 
Government Officials: 
Implication to Clientilism and Traditional 
Politics in the Philippines 
Virginia A. Miralao 
I.  Introduction: Prospects for Change 
Although the Philippines has had a long history of choosing and 
changing its leaders through national and local elections and granting the 
basic freedoms associated with democracies (i.e., of speech, assembly, 
religion and the press), its political system has often been described as 
constituting an “elite” or “oligarchic” form of democracy. Elite families 
and their interests are deeply entrenched in the system, which has 
allowed them to dominate national life and politics. The staying power of 
the elite in turn, is traced to the rather sharp (and historically persistent) 
division between the country’s richer and poorer classes. 
Studies of local community power structures in the Philippines in 
the 1950s and 1960s commonly reveal the two-class division of the 
population that encouraged and sustained patron- client relations 
between members of the upper and lower classes. In a pioneering 
ethnography of a Bikol town in the 1950s, anthropologist Frank Lynch, S.J. 
(1959) described how the town’s wealthy or “big people” sought the 
labor and services of the poor or “little people”- who were willing to 
provide these services to meet their own subsistence needs. The 
mutuality of needs and interests between the two classes translated to a 
mutual understanding of their respective roles in the community: the 
“big people” with their material surpluses assumed the role of patrons to 
the “little people”, who needed material support and became their 
clients. 
In her study of the dynamics of power in a Bulakan municipality in 
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the 1960s, sociologist Mary R. Hollnsteiner (1963) showed how local 
leaders used patronage not only to keep the support of kinsmen but also 
to build new alliances and networks in the community. Members of the 
local elite mobilized their kinsmen and alliance networks for community 
affairs, especially so during local electoral contests when the 
segmentation of the local population into “vertical alliance systems” 
became most obvious, with each leader-candidate having his/her retinue 
of followers and loyalists. 
Describing the Philippines’ postwar political life, political scientist 
Carl Lande (1965) similarly referred to the “mutual aid” relationships 
between “prosperous patrons” (usually landlords) and poor dependent 
clients (typically peasants) as constituting the building blocks of the 
country’s political system. At the national level, traditional Philippine 
politics was viewed to comprise a pyramid of patronage networks that 
made the entire body politic susceptible to the personalistic, familistic 
and particularistic demands and exchanges between leaders and the 
voting public.  
Since then, numerous other studies and writings have touched on or 
alluded to the patrimonial or clientilist character of Philippine politics, 
some even expose the less than benign nature and the more coercive, 
fraudulent and even violent side of so-called “patron-client relations” 
(Sidel 1989 and 1995). But regardless of whether local leaders act as 
benevolent patrons or petty dictators, or as warlords or gangster-like 
bosses, there is a general agreement that clientilism and traditional 
political methods/practices have hindered the country’s democratization 
progress. Philippine’s traditional politics is commonly regarded to 
reinforce the elite’s control over political (and especially electoral) 
processes that encourages the dependence and subordination of the poor, 
and prevents the poor from exercising fully their rights as citizens. 
The common view that clientilism and traditional practices will 
continue to characterize Philippine politics draws support from (1) the 
continued prominence of known political dynasties in the Philippines; 
and (2) the slow progress in the development of a large enough 
middle-class and bridging the socioeconomic gap between the rich and 
poor. More recent writings however, appear to challenge the idea that 
one cannot expect meaningful changes in Philippine democracy and 
politics given the traditional clientilist practices spawned by prevailing 
economic inequalities. 
While conceding that the conduct of elections in the Philippines to 
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date remains unfair, dishonest and “less than democratic,” Franco (2000) 
for example, writes that regular elections nonetheless have had the effect 
of eroding the dominance of the elite by prompting intra-elite conflicts 
and aiding the rise of democratic opposition to elite rule. Furthermore, 
she notes that various grassroots citizens’ movements which grew out of 
the opposition to President Ferdinand Marcos’ authoritarian rule in the 
1970s and 1980s have undermined the elite’s hold on political processes 
and electoral outcomes in some provinces and strengthened the local 
populace’s capacity to participate in elections and community politics. 
Franco’s findings support the observation made earlier by Alejo, Rivera 
and Valencia (1996: 66) that the view that ordinary Filipino voters remain 
“unthinking dupes of the ideology of patronage and clientilism” appears 
too simplistic for analysis of current-day developments in Philippine 
politics. That changes which impinge on the political processes may in 
fact occur at the grassroot level also finds support in the findings of a 
recent study of the Institute of Philippine Culture (2004). This study 
showed that the poor deliberate on their votes and employ leadership, 
performance and moral criteria in selecting the candidates they vote for. 
The findings are in contrast to the somewhat stereotypical view that the 
poor vote only on the basis of personalism, familism or patronage, or 
simply sell their votes to the richest candidates, or vote chiefly on the 
basis of a candidate’s popularity or celebrity status. 
In one of his later articles on the conduct and outcome of the 
Philippines’ May 1998 elections, Sidel proposes likewise that beneath the 
seeming continuity in Philippine electoral politics (i.e., “same old faces or 
new generations of the same old families”) “may lie a little-noticed 
sea-change of sorts” driven “by the gradual process of capitalist 
development and concomitant shifts in the political economy of local 
bossism” (Sidel 1998: 32). Sidel is of the opinion that long-term changes in 
the economy are linking the fates of elected officials (mayors, governors 
and representatives) less to their ability to dispense favors, buy votes, 
maintain their supporters and political machineries and so forth, and 
more to their ability to promote new/emerging business interests in their 
localities from which politicians like themselves eventually draw their 
own support.                     
 Building on the foregoing studies, this paper also looks into related 
changes in Philippine political life that may be eroding the basis of 
clientilist and traditional politics. In particular, the paper seeks to 
examine changes in the background characteristics and composition of 
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elected local government officials (specifically, members of the House of 
Representatives, provincial governors and city mayors) and the 
implications of these on national politics. Earlier studies as those cited 
above suggest that various political and economic developments in the 
country are weakening earlier structures of social relations and the 
efficacy of the traditional tactics, methods and practices employed by 
(mostly elite) politicians to gain and perpetuate themselves in power. 
Similarly, this paper argues that broader sociopolitical and economic 
changes and related international developments are expanding the 
recruitment pool and altering the selection processes for local leaders, 
making the latter less elitist in background and composition and less 
predisposed towards clientilism and traditional politics.  
Politically, the more salient developments in the country are traced 
to its “re-democratization” period following the end of Marcos’ 
dictatorial rule in 1986, which restored regular elections and democratic 
processes. The period also opened up democratic space for various 
Marcos opposition groups and NGOs (as those mentioned by Franco 
above as spearheading citizens’ movements at the grassroots). The 1986 
regime change moreover, prompted a rewriting of the Philippine 
Constitution to safeguard democratic rule, curtail the continuing 
dominance of the elite few and broaden the participation of the citizenry 
in elections and public decision-making. To contain the perpetuation of 
political dynasties, the 1987 Constitution limits the terms of elected 
officials to no more than nine years (or three terms of three years each). 
Further, to enable various groups to compete in national and local 
elections, the 1987 Constitution also replaced the country’s earlier 
two-party system with a multi-party system and introduced a party-list 
system to increase the representation of some 12 identified sectors in the 
House of Representatives (These sectors are women, youth, elderly, 
handicapped, peasants, fisherfolk, labor, indigenous peoples, urban poor, 
overseas workers, veterans and professionals). 
In terms of the economy, the more important development is the 
country’s economic recovery program which began in the 1990s after 
years of economic retrogression or stagnation during the Marcos and 
immediate post-Marcos period. Since the beginning of the 1990s, 
Philippines has posted and sustained positive gains in GNP, although 
unlike prosperous neighboring countries in the region, it has yet to reach 
a 5% per annum growth rate in GNP. Nonetheless, one might expect the 
small but positive growth rates in recent years to transform the economy; 
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it, as Sidel (1998) suggests, has also modified the economic 
environment/context of Philippine electoral politics.  
Finally, mention must be made of ongoing developments in the 
international community which has induced governments worldwide to 
hew to more democratic and egalitarian ideals. Among these are some of 
the international conventions and agreements entered into by the 
Philippines with UN agencies and other intergovernmental bodies; 
commits the country to the alleviation of poverty, protection of human 
rights particularly those of social minorities, transparency, accountability 
and good governance practices. It is against this background of 
sociopolitical and economic changes as well as international 
developments that the paper will examine the characteristics and 
composition of locally-elected officials and how these refashion 
Philippine politics and democracy. 
II.  The Changing Composition of the House of 
Representatives 
Members of the House of Representatives, most of whom represent 
territorial districts within provinces, are the Philippines’ highest elected 
“local government officials.” At present, there are some 212 members of 
the House representing congressional districts. In addition, the present 
(13th) House has 24 so-called sectoral representatives who contested and 
won in the May 1998 elections under the party-list system, which as 
mentioned earlier was introduced by the 1987 Constitution to increase 
the representation of minority groups and special sectors in the House. 
Several reports issued by the Philippine Center for Investigative 
Journalism (PCIJ), which monitors various governance issues and other 
aspects of Philippine political life, reveal interesting trends in the 
background characteristics of legislators in Congress (and also the Senate) 
that may be less supportive of patron-client structures and traditional 
methods of getting elected and staying in politics. 
The first of such changes that effected the composition of the House 
is the decrease in number of representatives from big landed families. It 
should perhaps be noted here that compared to other countries in the 
region like Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and China, which were able to 
curb the power of landlords earlier in their histories through land reform 
programs or revolutions and under go rapid economic modernization, 
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the Philippines has had a long history of failed agrarian reform programs. 
The dominance of landlords in previous Congresses is widely 
acknowledged to have prevented the passage of any meaningful agrarian 
reform to reduce inequalities in Philippine economic and social life that 
gave rise to patronage and clientilism. As late as 1987-1989 or up to the 
8th Congress (the first to be convened after the end of the Marcos regime), 
the persistent presence and power of landlords rendered impotent the 
case for a comprehensive agrarian reform bill that would have radically 
redistributed ownership of agricultural lands from the country’s landed 
aristocracy to the actual tillers of the soil. Since then, however, there has 
been a consistent decline in the number of members of the House who, 
based on their statements of assets and liabilities, are owners of 
agricultural landholdings. A PCIJ report prepared by Sheila Coronel 
(2003) shows that the percentage of agricultural landowners in the House 
dropped almost 20 percentage points in the span of 10 years, from 58% in 
the 9th Congress (1992-1995) to a 39% minority in the 12th Congress 
(2001-2004). 
Though several members of the House are from prominent 
landholding families, they constitute a minority. Noteworthy is the 
ongoing diversification in the socioeconomic backgrounds of legislators 
which in turn reflects the ongoing transformation and renewed 
modernization of the economy. Following the economic transitions, the 
PCIJ report by Coronel shows how the Congress has become more open 
to people from the non-landowning class and exhibits more varied 
economic interests and family backgrounds. Even the families of the 
members of the House who come from the old landowning blocks are 
known to have diversified their economic operations to other sectors of 
the economy, as industry, trade or manufacturing. It is also no longer 
unusual for current-day legislators to maintain interests in several types 
of businesses. Table 1 below reveals that close to half (49%) of the 
members of the 12th House had business interests in property 
development and real estate; 32% in trading; 29% in agribusiness; 26% 
each in  banking/financial services and in hotel, restaurant and travel 
businesses; and declining percentages in several other types of economic 
enterprises. 
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Table 1 Percentage of House Representatives in the 9th, 11th and 
12th Congress Representing Various Economic Sectors 
Sector 9th House (1992-95) 
11th House 
(1998-2001) 
12th House 
(2001-04) 
Agricultural land 58% 42% 39% 
Agricultural Enterprises  32% 29% 29% 
Fisheries 15% 11% 8% 
Banking/Financial  Services 40% 29% 26% 
Media, Publishing and Telecommunications 11% 14% 15% 
Construction 11% 13% 8% 
Food Manufacturing/Nonfood Manufacturing 27% 28% 24% 
Trading 35% 34% 32% 
Transport, Shipping and Hauling 12% 15% 15% 
Property Development and Real Estate  53% 52% 49% 
Hotel, Restaurant, Travel and Leisure 21% 28% 26% 
Mining, Power, Oil and Energy 15% 13% 10% 
Logging and Wood-based Industries  8% 6% 6% 
Schools 7% 6% 4% 
Others 24% 25% 24% 
None declared 17% 15% 16% 
Source: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (2003). 
Consistent with the diversification in legislators’ sources of wealth, 
data taken from the Certificates of Candidacy of the newly-elected 
members of the 13th House (2004-2007) likewise shows that the present 
day legislators have had varying careers and occupations prior to their 
membership in the House of Representatives.   
Table 2 shows that other than the re-electionists (2nd/3rd termers) in 
the present House, there are 55 members (26%) who prior to their 
election to the House also served as government officials although in 
other positions or capacities. Of these, 12 occupied various positions in 
the Executive Branch or in National Government Agencies, while a larger 
number (38) previously worked with Local Government Units that 
spanned provincial, city, municipality and barangay (village) levels. 
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Table 2 Occupational Background of members of the 13th Congress 
(2004-2007) 
Worked with government as  
House Representatives 84  
Chief of Staff of Senator/Congressman 2  
Cabinet Secretary 1  
National/Presidential Consultants, Officers, Advisers 4  
Other National Officials (Administrators/Commissioners)  2  
PNP/Navy        2  
Officers-Regional Offices 3  
Provincial Governors 5  
Provincial Vice Governors 5  
Provincial Board Members 5  
Provincial Administrator 1  
City Mayor 1  
City Councilors 5  
Municipal Mayors 12  
Municipal Vice Mayors 2  
Barangay Captain 2  
Government Official (Not Specified)  3  
Total Government 139  
Worked outside of government as   
Lawyers 27  
Businessman/woman 19  
Medical Doctor 7  
Registered Nurse 1  
Housewife 1  
Media Professional (TV Host/News Manager/Publisher) 3  
Civil Engineer 5  
Professors/Deans 3  
Farmers  2  
Pastor  1  
Total Non-government 69  
No information 2  
All 210* 
Note: previous occupations from Certificates of Candidacy are available only for 
210 out of 212 district Representatives. 
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While it is not uncommon for a House Representative to have 
previously occupied the position of provincial governor, the data in Table 
2 indicates further that an increasing number of legislators are being 
recruited from lower-level positions in local government units: of the 
members of the current House, two were barangay captains, two were 
municipal vice-mayors, twelve were town mayors, five were city 
councilors, one was a city mayor, six were provincial board members or 
administrators and five were provincial vice-governors. 
Outside of government service, the two other professions from 
which House Representatives come from are law and business. The 13th 
Congress has 27 lawyers and 19 businessmen/women among its ranks. 
There are seven other members of the House who are medical doctors, 
five civil engineers, three professor-educators and three media 
professionals. In addition, the 13th House has a registered nurse, a 
housewife and a pastor/minister among its members.  
 Finally, the other data taken from the Certificates of Candidacy of 
members of the present House lend further support to the increasing 
heterogeneity in the composition of the House. In terms of age for 
example, the majority (42%) of today’s legislators are middle-aged (over 
44 years old but less than 60), and there are almost as many senior 
citizens 60 years old and over (29%) as there are younger members, 30 to 
44 years old (28%).    
In terms of civil status as well, it is interesting to note that even as 
expectedly, the majority of the House Representatives are married (79%), 
some 22 (or 10%) are widowed and 18 (or 19%) have never been married. 
Four members of the House even admitted that they were separated from 
their spouses (a status that members of the House of earlier periods 
would not have readily revealed). 
Table 3 below further shows that the 13th Congress continues to have 
more male members (180 males or 86%) and females account for not an 
insubstantial 30 seats or 14%. Figures also show that a substantial 
number of today’s Representatives (95 of them or 45%) were not born in 
the districts or provinces that they represent, although many of them 
trace their family’s origins to the places where they ran for office. One 
can argue that this “mobility” (not coming from or not being born in the 
same congressional district that one represents) lessens support for the 
continuity of traditional personalistic linkages between Representatives 
and their constituents. 
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Table 3 Selected Background Characteristics of Members of the 
13th House (2004-2007) 
Sex Age Civil Status Birthplace 
Male 180 25-29 1 Married 166 Same province  being represented  110 
Female 30 30-44 58 Widowed  22 Another province    95 
  45-59 89 Single 18 No Information  5 
  60 and over 60 Separated 4   
  No Information 2     
All 210 All 210 All 210 All 210 
Source: Certificates of Candidacy of proclaimed District Representatives (May 
2004 elections). 
Still another factor that has contributed to the increasing 
heterogeneity of the House has been the proliferation of political parties 
in the Philippines. Following the implementation of the multi-party and 
party-list systems in the last three elections, members of the current 13th 
Congress ran under the banner of several political parties that represent 
the country’s two oldest  parties—the Liberal and the Nacionalista Party 
of the pre-Martial law period (prior to 1972), the Kilusang Bagong 
Lipunan (KBL) set up by President Marcos to legitimize his authoritarian 
rule (1972-1986), the Labang Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) set up by 
followers of then presidential candidate Corazon Aquino to challenge 
Marcos in the snap elections of 1986 and a myriad of other administration 
and opposition parties and coalitions that were formed since then, 
including the Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC) set up by 
landlord-industrialist Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.; President Gloria Arroyo’s 
administration party, LAKAS, and the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang 
Pilipino (KNP), the party of recently defeated presidential candidate, 
actor Fernando Poe, Jr.  Table 4 presents the party affiliations and 
coalitions under which members of the 13th House ran for office: the 
largest number was from the LAKAS-Christian Muslim Democrats 
coalition (73), followed by those affiliated with NPC (43) and the Liberal 
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Party (28) while all other parties/coalitions have few Representatives in 
the House.  
Table 4 Political Parties and Coalitions under Which the 13th 
House Representatives Ran for Office 
Lakas 4 
Lakas-CMD 73 
Lakas CMD-UNA 1 
Lakas-CMD/BOKP 2 
Lakas-CMD-Padayon Pilipino Coalition 1 
Lakas-NPC  1 
Lakas-NUCD 1 
Lakas-NUCD-CMD 1 
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP 1 
Lakas-UMDP 1 
  
Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC) 43 
NPC-AIM 1 
NPC-Bakud 1 
NPC-Balane 2 
NPC-Ina 1 
NPC/Lakas/CMD 2 
NPC-UNA 4 
  
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) 10 
LDP Laban 1 
  
Liberal Party (LP) 28 
LP/Lakas/CMD  2 
  
Nacionalista Party (NP) 2 
  
Others 21 
  
No information 6 
  
All 210 
Source: Certificates of Candidacy of proclaimed District Representatives (May 
2004 elections) 
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Although the multiplicity of parties has contributed to the 
heterogeneity of the House, some have observed that the number of 
parties, alliances and coalitions competing in today’s elections are far too 
many to make any sense of the results of Philippine elections. Aquino 
(1998) for example writes that the formation of several parties is probably 
indicative of the fractiousness of Philippine society, and that the 
multi-party system, which gave rise to these many parties, did not bring 
about the development of political parties as mechanisms for articulating 
specific social principles, ideologies and orientations as envisioned in the 
1987 Constitution. Similar difficulties also surround the implementation 
of the party-list system, the mechanism envisioned by the framers of the 
1987 Constitution to mainstream the participation of Left-leaning groups 
and various citizens’ based movements and NGOs in electoral politics. 
Many had hoped that party-list organizations and representatives would 
provide the alternatives to the country’s trapos or tradpols (traditional 
politicians) and help transform the conduct of national politics. But the 
same kind of splintering and fractiousness is seen among party-list 
organizations. There are thus as many candidates for the Left as there are 
factions within the Left, and the same is true for the other party-list 
sectors (women, labor, etc.) where there are also as many candidates as 
there are sociopolitical or ideological divisions within the sectors. Partly 
as a result of their inability to unite their causes, party-list organizations 
have not garnered enough votes to fill up the 50 or so seats allotted for 
them in the House. The 13th House has fewer than 24 party-list/sectoral 
Representatives. Hence, while the increasing representation of diverse 
interests, views and ideologies in the House may augur well for 
Philippine democracy, as it suggests attempts to negotiate and 
accommodate by competing groups in the body politic, it is also 
acknowledged that this same multiplicity/diversity in the House 
represents a challenge to the country’s democratization progress. Time 
and again it has been observed that differences in the views and opinions 
of members of the House have paralyzed Congress and stymied its 
ability to arrive at some consensus or a shared sense of urgency to act on 
matters of national import. In turn, this has contributed to public 
frustration over Congress’ and government’s inability to solve the 
country’s problems and move forward. Consequently, each elected 
government or administration remains susceptible to continuing threats 
from the military and the country’s insurgency movements, as well as to 
direct people power demonstrations in the streets. This kind of political 
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dynamics that leaves the impression that not much has changed in 
Philippine politics. 
In addition to the above, there remain two other enduring traits in 
the personal backgrounds of Representatives which reinforce the view 
that Philippine politics continues to be dominated by the elite and 
tradpols - First, is the vast personal/family wealth of members of the 
House (with the exception of its poorer party-list members), and the 
second, is that the majority of the members of the House belong to or are 
descendents of the so-called political families or dynasties. In regard to 
the first, there is little question that the large majority of House legislators 
come from the country’s richest class, comprising both old and new 
wealthy classes. A 2004 PCIJ report noted that the assets of House 
legislators averaged PhP 28 million each in 2001 (the 12th House), 
reflected an increase from a far lower PhP 8 million each in 1992 (the 9th 
House). Given the tremendous wealth of the legislators vis-à-vis the rest 
of the population, it has been argued that members of the House hardly 
represent the people and their wealth simply allows them to maintain 
their patronage links and networks in their districts. Although there is 
some truth in this argument, it should perhaps be pointed out that in 
most countries political leaders tend to be naturally recruited from the 
economic elite and hence, it may be unrealistic to expect House 
Representatives to resemble their constituents in socioeconomic terms.  
But what appears more disturbing is the oft-repeated observation about 
how House Representatives enrich themselves while in office as a result 
of the large budgetary allocations for their positions and offices.  
Currently, each Representative receives some PhP 60 million annually as 
Priority Development Assistance Fund for their district/constituents and 
some PhP 250,000 monthly as compensation and allowances.   
Writing on House legislators earnings, Chua (2004) notes that the 
financial entitlements even surprise some legislators. This access to 
ridiculously large sums (referred derogatorily as pork barrel and perks) 
leaves representatives with unexpected surplus, which many probably 
use to extend favors and build alliances and networks so as to remain in 
power.  Interestingly, in recent months, as Philippines’ economic woes 
worsened, the clamor for the abolition of pork allocations for members of 
the House (and the Senate) has increased.  Savings from the legislators’ 
pork funds are envisioned to help balance the budget and service the 
country’s public debt.  The abolition of the pork is expected likewise to 
remove resources for patronage and traditional politics. While some 
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House Representatives (and Senators) have agreed to forego or 
substantially cut their pork barrel allocations, rather ironically, the more 
militant Left-wing party-list members of the House demand retention of 
their pork entitlements; though in the earlier years they had renounced 
this practice precisely because it perpetuated corruption and patronage.    
The second reason why many believe that trapos/tradpols continue 
to dominate the House is because a great number of house legislators 
come from political families or dynasties.  A news account (Manila 
Standard, 6 July 2004) that featured the 74 newcomers of the present 13th 
Congress, showed that about a fourth of them were members of political 
clans. The estimate is that closer to two-thirds of the House members 
(including 1st, 2nd and 3rd termers) belong to such families.  However, 
while many names in Congress are associated with political clans, this is 
the natural outcome of political families becoming the socializing or 
training ground for the new crop/generation of politicians, similar to 
lawyers, medical doctors or military men who likewise come from 
families with members engaged in the same trade or profession.  
Consequently, not a few of the members of the 13th Congress, like Juan 
Miguel Arroyo (son of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and grandson 
of the late President Diosdado Macapagal) and Teofisto Guingona III (son 
of former Vice-President Guingona) are 2nd or 3rd generation politicians, 
or are related to current or former members of Congress. Interestingly, 
the 1987 Constitutional provision that limits term of local officials to three 
terms has not exactly had the effect of curbing the perpetuation of 
political families. Rather it has encouraged both the tradpols and 
newcomers in Congress (and in other elective posts) to support the 
candidacy of a sibling, a spouse or a son or a daughter to the post they 
vacate on completion of their tenure. Hence, one observes same names 
and same faces in Congress and Philippine politics.   
However the fact that a large number of legislators belong to the old 
political dynasty and new political families, does not necessarily detract 
from the heterogeneity of the composition of the House, as described 
earlier. Present day, political families are diverse in their socioeconomic 
backgrounds, and in their political views and philosophies.  Newcomer 
Erin Tañada III for example, better known as a student leader-activist in 
his younger days, descended from former Representatives and Senators 
like Lorenzo Tañada (his grandfather) and Wigberto Tañada (his father) 
respectively - the country’s foremost nationalist and progressive 
(non-trapo) politicians.  Erin Tañada’s fellow neophyte, Juan Edgardo 
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Angara on the other, belongs to a newer political clan that rose from the 
country’s professional elite.  He is the son of Senator Edgardo Angara 
who entered politics only in the 1990s, after making a name for himself as 
a top lawyer and as former President of the University of the Philippines. 
Another newcomer is Robert Vincent Jaworski who represents the 
country’s still newer breed of celebrity-politicians; he is the son of former 
Senator Robert Jaworski who entered politics largely on the basis of his 
popularity as a basketball star.  Robert Vincent is also married to a 
fashion model-equestrienne-socialite, a descendent of the Cojuangco 
political dynasty of Tarlac. There is also the case of Henedina Abad, 
former Dean of the Ateneo de Manila Univesity - School of Governance, 
who has replaced her husband, Florencio, as Representative of Batanes. 
Florencio Abad, a civil society or movement leader during the Marcos 
years is considered a non-tradpol, although the Abads have dominated 
Batanes’ politics for years. 
 Undoubtedly, one can still recognize several names in the current 
House who have descended from the Philippines’ old landed political 
elites as the Cojuangcos of Tarlac mentioned above, the Lopezes and 
Ledesmas of Iloilo and Negros Occidental, the Floirendos of Davao, and 
indeed from the country’s known strongmen and feudal lords as the 
Remullas of Cavite, the Crisologos and Singsons of Ilocos Sur and the 
Duranos of Cebu.  
But even among this group of tradpol/trapo families, many have 
noted a generational shift in the values and mindsets, of the present-day 
descendants, from their feudal roots to more modern and liberal 
worldviews. Being younger and better educated, many of today’s 2nd and 
3rd generation politicians appear poised to make a name for themselves 
and transform the rather ugly and high-handed images of their families 
in previous years.  Joseph “Ace” Durano, of the notorious Durano clan 
of Cebu for example, is among the younger members of the 13th House 
whose credentials (34 years old and a magna cum laude graduate of the 
Ateneo College of Law) and ability to mobilize has so impressed the 
President that he has been asked to join the Arroyo Cabinet as its 
Secretary of Tourism.  On the other, Vincent Crisologo Jr., has returned 
to politics as a new member of the 13th House following years of 
incarceration at the National Penitentiary for his role in the burning of a 
town in Ilocos Sur where his father was once Governor, representative 
and undisputed warlord.  Vincent is now back in politics not as a 
representative of a district in his home province but of a district in 
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Quezon City, Metro Manila, and not as a son of the once powerful 
Crisologo clan but as a pastor/Minister of the Gospel. Similarily, Eva 
Singson Medina, a descendant of the Crisologos’ rival political dynasty in 
Ilocos Sur—the Singsons—is now the Mayor of the province’s capital city, 
Vigan. Like some other third-generation politicians, she has shown that 
she has more to offer her constituents than just her wealth and “strategic 
family connections;” she is credited for three major accomplishments 
namely: got Vigan finally inscribed in the UNESCO List of World 
Heritage Sites; regained Vigan’s status as a city; and revived Vigan’s 
economy and made the city a trade center of the Ilocos Region. 
 Finally, some of the legislative initiatives and political decisions and 
actions of today’s 2nd and 3rd generation politicians suggest that they are 
capable of challenging established economic and political interests 
though they themselves or their families are part of the ruling elite; cases 
as that of 3rd termer Nereus Acosta illustrates this. Nereus replaced his 
mother as House Representative for the First District of Bukidnon in 1995 
after finishing her three terms in Congress.  A Ph.D. degree holder in 
Political Science from the University of Hawaii, Nereus has built a 
reputation of being a strong advocate of environmental causes in the 
House.  He is credited for the formulation and passage of the Clean Air 
Act in 1999 amidst strong opposition from oil companies, manufacturing 
and transport industries and their ally-politicians in Congress.  In a case 
study of the dynamics of environmental policymaking in Marinduque, 
site of a major mining disaster in the 1990s, Wurfel (2004) describes how 
Representative Edmund Reyes, Jr., who likewise assumed his mother’s 
seat in the House, broke away from the tradpol practices and patronage 
politics of his lineage; even persuaded his mother and other local officials 
to go against corporate mining interests and to oppose the reopening of 
mining activities in the province that disregarded environmental 
regulations and did not give due consideration to health and livelihood 
sources of Marinduque’s population. There probably are more examples 
of similar “conversions” and generational shifts among the members of 
political clans.  But in general, the available evidence no longer warrants 
the easy stereotyping of rich politicians and political clans as solely 
concerned with the interest to perpetuate themselves in office. 
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III.  A Changing Breed of Provincial Governors and City 
Mayors 
There is no readily available data on the backgrounds of provincial and 
other local government officials from the Commission on Elections or the 
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), nor from the 
Leagues of Provinces, Cities and Municipalities. Nonetheless, profiles of 
a number of governors and mayors are available for provinces, cities and 
municipalities that have excelled and won various awards for 
outstanding program management or local governance from 
competitions sponsored by several groups and foundations, locally and 
internationally. In the country, the more important and better known 
awards are the Gawad Galing Pook (Award for Local Excellence), the 
Local Government Leadership Awards (LGLA), and similar awards for 
best performing provinces/local government units given by the Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung-Manila, UNDP-Manila, the Philippine Human 
Development Network and the National Statistical Coordination Board. 
For this part of the paper, background data for provincial governors 
and city mayors were obtained for those who made it to the Gawad 
Galing Pook’s Hall of Fame and those that won its 2003 Awards for 
Outstanding Programs and who likewise have been recipients of the 
LGLA awards. Even with these awards however, the data on the 
personal profiles of local executives are quite limited as both awards 
provide more information on the winning programs and achievements of 
local executives than on the local executives themselves. Nonetheless, the 
data obtained from these award programs reveal similar ongoing 
changes in the backgrounds, outlooks and behavior of local level 
politicians as those in the House. This is perhaps expected, since local 
officials are affected by the same sociopolitical and economic changes, 
and international developments that weaken structures of social-power 
relations supportive of clientilism and traditional politics. But more 
importantly, local government units (or LGUs) and their executives have 
benefitted from the devolution movement that culminated in the passage 
of the Local Government Code in 1991 which sought to increase the 
power and authority of LGUs relative to central/national government 
over administration of their areas. Also known as the Local Autonomy 
Law, the Code grants LGUs access to more resources and greater 
freedom to determine their development path in the hope that LGUs 
become self-reliant and more creative and efficient in their governance. 
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The move towards devolution has increasingly gained the support of 
many sectors, locally and internationally as attested to by the Gawad 
Galing Pook and the LGLA and the other local governance awards 
mentioned earlier. 
Briefly, the Gawad Galing Pook was established by the Asian 
Institute of Management and the Local Government Academy in 1993 
with a grant from the Ford Foundation to encourage and hasten the 
implementation of the Local Government Code. Galing Pook gives 
awards to the best run LGU programs in terms of how well these are able 
to generate/mobilize community support and involvement, and the 
programs’ viability and sustainability, as well as their efficient 
management and replicability. Since 1994, Galing Pook has honored 175 
programs, 90 under its Outstanding Program category and 85 under its 
innovative Trailblazing Program category. The LGLA on the other was 
established by the Center for Local and Regional Governance of the 
National College of Public Administration, University of Philippines in 
cooperation with other university-based centers/institutes as a 
complement to Gawad Galing Pook, which as noted above is more 
program- or project-based. The LGLA recognizes the role of local 
leadership in elevating local administration and program management to 
the level of a “best practice.” The LGLA uses seven criteria to evaluate 
candidates for its awards: these are transparency, accountability, 
participatory governance, rule of law, organization and management, 
stability and service delivery. Through raise in standards for local 
governance and public service, the foregoing (and other similar) local 
governance programs, awards and monitors have forced changes in local 
government administration and reshaped local politics towards more 
democratic and less traditional practices. It is for this reason that we 
might expect more palpable changes in the conduct of local than national 
affairs. 
Table 5 puts together the data on the local government executives of 
three provinces and three cities that have continuously excelled in 
Gawad Galing Pook competitions and have thereby entered the award 
program’s Hall of Fame. Piecing together the information on their 
backgrounds and their current reputations, it is interesting to note how 
old patterns seem to persist in local government politics even as new 
trends are on the rise. 
The first observation from Table 5 is that the two governors under 
whose terms the province of Bulacan has won the Galing Pook—Roberto 
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Pagdanganan and Josefina dela Cruz- fit in the non-trapo classification of 
politicians. Both do not come from established political families. Both are 
highly educated, and have worked as business executives prior to their 
entry into politics. Governors Pagdanganan and dela Cruz are known for 
their professional and managerial competence and innovative leadership. 
Bulacan has garnered six Galing Pook awards during their terms (three 
awards under each) for various programs including the reorganization 
and streamlining of the provincial bureaucracy, the preservation and 
promotion of Bulacan’s historical/cultural legacies, the improved 
delivery of health services and a most successful cooperatives program 
that has generated much employment and livelihood opportunities in the 
province. 
Like Governors Pagdanganan and de la Cruz, Governor Rodolfo 
Agbayani of Nueva Vizcaya is also a non-trapo local executive. He is a 
lawyer by training; has handled many human rights cases in his legal 
career and was also a Regional Trial Court judge prior to becoming Vice 
Governor and later Governor of his province in the early 1990s. During 
his stewardship, Governor Agbayani transformed Nueva Vizcaya from a 
backwater fourth class province to a first class province (the highest 
category of Philippine provinces in terms of revenues, fifth class being 
the lowest).  Under his leadership, Nueva Vizcaya also earned Galing 
Pook awards for many programs, two of which are for innovative 
environmental programs meant to guarantee the availability of Nueva 
Vizcaya’s natural resources in the next 30 years. 
Governor Rodolfo del Rosario of Davao del Norte on the other hand, 
fits the caricature of a tradpol in Philippine politics. He is very rich and 
comes from one of Mindanao’s foremost landowning families (the 
Floirendos). Now 70 years old, he is a political survivor and has been in 
politics for the longest time. He served as House Representative in the 
Martial Law Congress and also as Minister for Environment and Natural 
Resources under President Marcos. In 1987, he was voted Representative 
to the House where he stayed for three consecutive terms, before 
returning to the province as Governor in 1998. During his term, the 
province received many awards, the more significant ones being the 
Galing Pook award for his minimum basic needs approach and most 
outstanding local government unit award in local budget administration. 
He has also earned recognition as an outstanding local executive for 
initiating participatory governance projects, expanding health and 
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immunization programs, and mainstreaming gender and development 
programs, literacy programs and agricultural extension services.  
Husband and wife team Bayani and Maria Lourdes Fernando, 
former mayor and current mayor of Marikina City, respectively, 
represent yet another breed of local executives in the country. They do 
not come from established political clans although they are reputed to be 
rich being the owners of several businesses and establishments in 
Marikina. Like Governors Pagdanganan and de la Cruz of Bulacan, they 
are well educated and are known to be competent managers and 
executives. During their terms, Marikina has received several Galing 
Pook and other national and international awards for programs that are 
widely acknowledged to have transformed Marikina from one of Metro 
Manila’s more chaotic and blighted cities to now one of its cleanest as 
well as most orderly and progressive. The Fernandos are not known to be 
populists. Their style of leadership is based on efficient management and 
imposing discipline on the populace. For this, Bayani Fernando has 
earned the reputation of being rather dictatorial and authoritarian 
although his earlier performance as Marikina mayor earned him the post 
of Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority 
(MMDA); he was assigned the most daunting task of cleaning up 
(clearing up the sidewalks, collecting garbage, controlling traffic etc.) and 
transforming the National Capital Region into a more livable city, as he 
and his wife have done for Marikina City. 
Equally famous as a local executive and city mayor is Jesse Robredo 
of Naga City. He probably comes closest to people’s idea of the new 
alternative politician. He has earned degrees in Engineering and in 
Business and Public Administration and headed an integrated area 
development program in his region before becoming Naga City’s mayor 
in 1988, through 1998, and resumed this post again in 2001, to the present. 
During his several terms as city mayor, Naga garnered seven Galing 
Pook awards, the more notable of which are for programs that enhanced 
the productivity and efficiency of city government employees, 
computerized the city’s important activities and built its databases, and 
harnessed the use of ICTs for local governance. In contrast to Bayani 
Fernando’s “strongman” leadership style, Robredo is known for his 
“participative governance” and his ability to engage the public in local 
government affairs. He does not come from a political family and is not 
known to be rich. He won the prestigious Ramon Magsaysay Award for 
Outstanding Government Service in 2000.  
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Table 5 Gawad Galing Pook Hall of Fame Awardees 
Local 
Government 
Unit (LGU) 
Local 
Executive/s 
Age Sex Educational 
Background 
Occupational 
Background 
Previous 
Elective 
Positions held 
in government 
Bulacan 
Province 
Gov. Roberto 
Pagdanganan 
1988-1998 
58 Male MBA/Bachelor of 
Laws/ 
BS Chemical 
Engineering 
Senior 
Executive, 
Unilever-Phils. 
University 
professor 
OIC-Governor 
1986 
 Gov. Josefina 
dela Cruz 
1998-present  
49 Female BA Psychology/ 
BS Management 
Engineering 
VP for Finance 
and 
Administration, 
family business 
Vice Governor 
Provincial 
Board Member 
Municipal Vice 
Mayor 
Municipal 
Councilor  
Nueva Vizcaya 
Province 
Gov. Rodolfo 
Agabayani 
1995-May 
2004 
68 Male Bachelor of Laws Deputy Clerk of 
Court Judge 
Lawyer-private 
practice 
Vice Governor  
Provincial 
Board Member 
Municipal 
Councilor  
Davao del Norte 
Province 
Gov. Rodolfo 
del Rosario 
1998-May  
2004 
70 Male BS Business 
Administration 
EVP-family 
businesses 
Stockholder/ 
Vice-Chairman, 
other businesses 
House 
Representative 
1978-1986 
1987-1998 
Marikina City 
(Metro Manila) 
Mayor Bayani 
Fernando 
1992-2001 
50+ Male BS Civil 
Engineering 
President/CEO 
own/family 
businesses 
— 
 Mayor Maria 
Lourdes 
Fernando 
2001-present 
44 Female BS Hotel and 
Restaurant 
Management 
Master’s in 
Properties 
Management  
President-famil
y corporation 
— 
Naga City 
(Camarines Sur) 
Mayor Jesse 
Robredo 
1988-1998 
2001-present 
45 Male MPA/MBA/BS 
Industrial/Mecha
nical Engineering 
Program 
Director, Bicol 
River Basin 
Development 
Program 
Former City 
Mayor 
1988-1998 
Puerto Princesa 
City (Palawan) 
Mayor Edward 
Hagedorn 
1992-2001 
2002-present 
58 Male With college 
education 
Head of 
Security, 
Governor’s 
Office 
Former City 
Mayor 
1992-2001 
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The 6th Hall of Fame awardee is Puerto Princesa City which has won 
five Galing Pook awards during the terms of Mayor Edward Hagedorn. 
Compared to the other local officials above, Mayor Edward Hagedorn 
comes closest to the image of local officials as “local bosses” possibly 
because of his post as Head of Security for Palawan’s Governor before 
becoming Puerto Princesa’s city mayor in 1992, and his close association 
and friendship with deposed President Joseph Estrada in previous years. 
But like MMDA Chairman Bayani Fernando, Mayor Hagedorn is also 
known for his strongman leadership and effective governance style. His 
most successful programs have made Puerto Princesa the cleanest city in 
the Philippines (some residents brag it is cleaner than Singapore) and a 
model for environmental conservation and ecotourism. 
The same patterns as those observed among the Hall of Fame 
awardees may be seen in Table 6 which profiles the other provincial 
governors and city mayors of those LGUs that won the Gawad Galing 
Pook for Outstanding Programs in 2003. Again, one can see the 
caricatures of non-trapo politicians in the persons of Governors Erico 
Aumentado of Bohol and George Arnaiz of Negros Oriental and also in 
newcomer-to-politics Governor Hermilando Mandanas of Batangas. Both 
Governors Aumentado and Arnaiz are home (province)-grown 
politicians who attended college not in Manila but their own provinces 
and who entered local politics by serving first as provincial board 
members and vice governors prior to becoming governors. Governor 
Mandanas of Batangas also began his political career by chairing the 
Regional Development Council of his region before his election as 
governor in 2001. Under the leadership of Governor Aumentado, Bohol 
won a Galing Pook award in 2003 for the establishment of Multi-sectoral 
Coastal Law Enforcement Councils that have stopped illegal fishing 
activity in the province. Under Governor Arnaiz, Negros Oriental also 
won the Galing Pook for forging successful LGU-NGO partnerships in 
healthcare delivery; while Batangas under Governor Mandanas garnered 
the same award for the rehabilitation of a major river in the province. 
Some may consider Governor Joseph Marañon of Negros Occidental 
as a tradpol but only because he comes from a political family and has 
many relatives occupying different posts in local government. A brother 
is currently a member of the House of Representatives; a nephew is vice 
mayor and a son and a cousin are councilors of the city in the province 
where Governor Marañon himself began his political career as City 
Mayor back in 1992. But otherwise, the Marañons are not known to be 
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particularly rich or to belong to Negros Occidental’s old 
hacienda-owning elite. Governor Marañon’s province gained a 2003 
Gawad Galing Pook for a well-organized provincial disaster 
management team that serves as the nerve center of trained volunteers 
who are mobilized for disaster preparedness and rescue operations. 
The local executive in Table 6 who epitomizes descendance from a 
political dynasty in the country is Mayor Tomas Osmeña of Cebu City. A 
grandson of the late President Sergio Osmeña Sr., he is one of the third 
generation politicians of Cebu’s foremost political clan. Today he has a 
sibling, cousins, a nephew and other relatives in various government 
positions (from the Senate and the House of Representatives to the 
provincial and town governments of Cebu and other provinces). Like 
some of the latter day descendants of other political dynasties, he is 
changing the negative stereotypes earlier associated with tradpols and 
political dynasties. He is credited for the rapid economic transformation 
of Cebu in recent years, attracting new and foreign investments to the 
city, generating jobs and livelihood and boosting tourist arrivals to his 
city and province. His case probably best illustrates how local economic 
development also transforms leadership styles, roles and priorities of 
local politicians. Under Mayor Osmeña, Cebu City won a Gawad Galing 
Pook in 2003 for its initiatives in organizing local groups to respond to 
cases of domestic violence and gender-related concerns in their 
neighborhoods. 
As mentioned earlier, all the provincial governors and city mayors 
above are also recipients of the LGLA apart from several more 
recognitions from within the country and abroad. Some may argue that 
by focusing on multi-awarded local executives, this paper may be 
overstating the case for changes in Philippine politics away from earlier 
forms of patronage and power relations. But the argument can also be 
made that even among the non- or worst-performing LGUs and local 
executives, one is likely to note a similar trend towards increasing 
diversity in the background characteristics of local officials. Put 
differently, there probably are as many tradpols and non-tradpols (or 
traditional and new alternative politicians) among the worst-performing 
executives as there are among the outstanding performers. Thus, as in the 
House of Representatives, the varied backgrounds of local executives 
suggest a broad and diversified pool of local leaders and politicians and 
that entry to local politics is no longer the purview of the elite alone. 
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Table 6 Gawad Galing Pook 2003 Outstanding Program Awardees 
Local 
Government 
Unit (LGU) 
Local 
Executive/s 
Age Sex Educational 
Background 
Occupational 
Background 
Previous Elective 
Positions held in 
government 
Batangas 
Province 
Gov. 
Hermilando 
Mandanas 
2001-2004 
60 Male BS Commerce/ 
CPA/MBA 
Chairman, Regional 
Development 
Council-Region IV 
Supervisor, 
Auditing/ 
Accounting firm 
Executive Assistant 
to the VP, Far East 
Bank 
— 
Bohol 
Province 
Gov. Erico 
Aumentado 
2001-present 
64 Male Bachelor of Laws Lawyer House 
Representative 
1992-2001 
Vice Governor 
1988-1992 
Provincial Board 
Member 
1967-1980 
1984-1986 
Negros 
Oriental 
Province 
Gov. George 
Arnaiz 
1998-present 
49 Male AB Political 
Science 
Bachelor of Laws 
Secretary to the 
Town Mayor 
Lawyer-private 
practice 
Vice Governor 
1992-1998 
Provincial Board 
Member 
1988-1992 
Negros 
Occidental 
Province 
Gov. Joseph 
Marañon 
2001-present 
70 Male BS Commerce Rural Banking 
Director, National 
Federation of 
Sugarcane Planters 
Municipal Mayor 
1992-2001 
Cebu City Mayor Tomas 
Osmeña 
1988-2004 
56 Male BS 
Agro-Economics 
Graduate studies 
in Finance/ 
International 
Trade 
Executive/Financial 
Analyst-foreign 
firms 
City Mayor  
since 1988 
 
Other than the diversity in their backgrounds, another interesting 
observation about the country’s multi-awarded governors and mayors is 
the length of time spent in office. With a single exception, all are 
re-electionists: they are either on their second or third terms or have 
made a successful comeback after taking the mandatory three-year break 
between term limits. In brief, we see multi-awarded local executives 
being voted into office, getting re-elected, and being returned again after 
complying with the rules on term limits. This pattern is consistent with 
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the findings of the new report released by the National Statistical 
Coordination Board (NSCB) showing that “all governors of the 10 best 
performing provinces won re-election or were elected to other posts in 
the 2004 elections” whereas “only 50% of the governors of the 10 worst 
performing provinces won during the same polls in May this year” 
(Virola et al. 2004). The authors conclude “that good performance in a 
political office could win the trust of the electorate.” The NSCB assessed 
the performance of provinces using indices of good economic, political 
and administrative governance constructed from such data as the 
provinces’ per capita revenue, unemployment rate, poverty incidence, 
crime solution efficiency rate, campaign against graft and corruption, 
ratio of teachers and health workers to the population, electricity 
coverage and others. The NSCB findings suggest that voters are 
becoming more discerning of the leaders they vote into office. 
Finally, the narratives of local officials as those of the provincial 
governors and city mayors cited here suggest that the distinction 
between trapo and non-trapo politicians is blurring and may soon 
become meaningless. In part, this is so because of the generational shift 
noted among the latter-day descendants of trapo families and old 
political dynasties towards more democratic ways and orientations, 
while newer non-trapo politicians are themselves beginning to transform 
their families into political clans. On the part of the voters on the other 
hand, the trapo or non-trapo background or image of candidates no 
longer seems to matter as much in their choice of local executives as the 
latter’s performance and effectiveness. In turn, these trends indicate that 
politicians in the country can no longer rely solely on traditional methods 
and tactics (wealth, patronage, family connections, guns and goons) if 
they wish to remain in office. Ongoing changes in the economy and 
ever-increasing standards of effective local governance are forcing local 
government officials to behave in ways that are not just beneficial for 
themselves but also for their towns, cities and provinces. 
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5 
Democratic Consolidation and the 
Challenge of Poverty in the Philippines 
Cynthia Bautista 
I.  Introduction 
The paper reflects on democratic consolidation in the Philippines in the 
aftermath of authoritarian rule, especially focuses on the challenges 
poverty poses to the democratization project. The first two sections 
provide a background of the political developments in the country since 
its democratic transition in the mid-1980s while the third section zeroes 
in on the impact of poverty on the consolidation of democracy. Section 3 
mentions how poverty has figured in the movements that operate within 
the framework of competing states—Muslim secessionism and the 
Communist insurgency, but focuses primarily on its effects on electoral 
politics. 
Although the link between poverty, on the one hand, and the two 
armed movements and elections, on the other, are more nuanced than the 
apparent correlations suggested in Section 3, the paper nonetheless 
concludes that poverty remains a major obstacle to democratic 
consolidation. The congregation of hundreds of thousands of supporters, 
in December 2004, to grieve the untimely demise of Fernando Poe, the 
strongest contender for the presidency who claimed that incumbent 
president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo cheated at the May polls, eloquently 
demonstrates the potential threat of persistent poverty on democratic 
consolidation. Ironically, Poe’s poor supporters as well as media opinion 
makers drew a parallel between the death of former Senator Benigno 
Aquino, which catalyzed the democratic transition in 1986, and Poe’s 
death, which prompted the military to secure the Philippine Presidential 
Palace on the day of his burial because of intelligence reports about 
another people power uprising, this time drawn along sharper class lines. 
Therefore, unless poverty is alleviated, the hope of consolidating the 
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political gains of the last two decades and of substantiating formal 
democratic structures and institutions will remain unfulfilled. The threat 
of extra-constitutional transitions from one government administration to 
another, which is anathema to the rule of law that democracy requires, 
will continue to hang over the country’s head like Damocles’ sword.  
II.  The Philippines: A New Democracy in Asia? 
The four-day EDSA uprising in February 1986 marked the democratic 
transition in the Philippines. The assassination of former Senator Benigno 
Aquino at the international airport upon his return from exile in the 
United States in 1983 sparked a spontaneous protest; millions of 
people—many of them apolitical and unorganized—lined the streets on 
the day of the burial in a massive outpour of grief and moral outrage. The 
interim period between the 1983 assassination and the fall of Ferdinand 
Marcos in 1986 is characterized by organized protests by a broad 
coalition of social forces.  
The fire ignited by Aquino’s death was stoked by the public’s 
perception that Marcos, who was too confident of his power to win his 
way through the 1986 snap elections without having to negotiate with the 
opposition, robbed Senator Aquino’s widow of her victory at the polls.  
To register their protest, people massed up in the highway (EDSA) and 
fronted the military camps; also shielded key players of the military 
mutiny from the armed forces loyal to Marcos. The nonviolent civilian 
resistance cum military mutiny brought to an end fourteen years of 
authoritarian rule and catapulted Corazon Aquino to the highest post of 
the land.  
People Power I and the events leading to it, represent a deviation 
from the common pattern of democratic transition that characterize the 
new democracies of the 1980s and 1990s. Rather than proceed from a 
bargain process in which the autocratic regime participates, the country’s 
democratic transition involved outright replacement of a leader whose 
regime was not only authoritarian but also arguably oriented towards the 
benefit of particularistic groups—the family and cronies of Ferdinand 
Marcos. Unlike the overthrow of most intransigent personality based 
regimes1 by radical opposition, a moderate rather than a radical 
opposition supported by People Power led to the demise of authoritarian 
rule in the Philippines (Thompson 1995: 51, 106-107). 2
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Earlier, the radical and moderate opposition forged a united front 
against the Marcos dictatorship in anticipation of the 1978 interim 
legislative elections, which Marcos had initiated to project political 
normalization. The unity, however, was short-lived. It ended in a split, 
radical groups maintained their strategy of armed struggle and the 
moderates pursued non-violent protest and participation in the polls.3 
The refusal of the radical Left to participate in the snap elections in 1986 
and in subsequent events marginalized it from the coalition that took 
over the helm of government from Marcos. 
The “rainbow coalition” that managed the democratic transition 
consisted of groups with conflicting and often divergent 
interests—moderates with Leftist leanings, unaligned individuals or 
organizations, and politicians supported by a military force politicized 
under the Marcos regime. Its composition partly explains why the 
transition did not assume a revolutionary role and launch significant 
asset reforms.4 On the contrary, it appears to have merely restored the 
patronage politics of the pre-1972 regime, which public discourses 
labeled “democratic” only because elections were regularly conducted; 
complied with procedural democracy.5
In this earlier period (from 1946 to 1971), traditional political clans, 
who controlled the country’s policy-making institutions, successfully 
blocked equity-oriented reforms. Their client based politics relied on local 
power brokers to deliver bloc votes to national politicians in exchange for 
particularistic favors that included block on progressive legislation 
(Eaton 2003). It is significant that as in the period that preceded Martial 
Law, legislative positions in the reopened Congress were bagged by the 
country’s most powerful politico-economic elites. This constrained the 
involvement of other key players, thereby made the uncertainty of 
political outcomes- a key feature of democratic decision-making- a less 
likely trajectory (Przeworski 1991: 52).6 Vote buying practices and 
politically motivated violence that marred elections in the 
post-authoritarian phase bolstered the perception of a restored but 
unsubstantiated democracy.   
The restoration of electoral politics and the civil and political 
freedoms that allow for “contestation with participation” satisfy the 
minimalist definition of democracy (Przeworski 1991: 10). Insofar as 
Philippines met the procedural requirement of a democratic system, it 
qualifies as a new democracy. However, the return of traditional 
politicians including the Marcos family and of pre-1972 patronage 
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politics amidst persistent poverty and inequality highlight the 
weaknesses of the country’s political institutions. Political clans and 
personal networks supersede parties as the main form of political 
organization.7 Moreover, the prevalence of movements that ideologically 
represent competing states such as the secessionist Muslim movement 
and the insurgent Communist movement suggests that salient political 
forces push violent alternatives for resolution of political issues than 
democratic norms and procedures. Thus far, efforts to mediate between 
the state and secessionist movements or between the right and left have 
not led to the acceptance by conflicting parties of agreements to end 
conflict and of centrist principles that underlie democracy, which is 
universal citizenship, non-partisan public institutions, and an open 
public sphere.8 This situation has consequently constrained the 
consolidation of democracy in the Philippines.9    
III.  Completing Democracy or Deepening it?  
There is consensus in the literature that a consolidated democracy is a 
situation where political forces comply with the rules of the democratic 
process. It assumes that a nation’s constituency has so internalized 
democratic procedures and norms in social, institutional, and 
psychological life that no significant groups will consider pursuing goals 
outside the rules of the democratic game. In a consolidated democracy, 
therefore, contending political forces comply with the uncertain 
outcomes of processes that are determined solely by the interplay of 
democratic institutions. The existence of movements operating within the 
framework of competing states and the occasional threats of democratic 
breakdown due to attempted military coups in the last two decades 
reflects how far the country is from the ideal goal of democratic 
consolidation. 
While democratic consolidation is an end-state, regarding it as such 
leads to teleological arguments. It is, therefore, more useful for purposes 
of empirical investigation to view the consolidation of democracy as a 
process. There is confusion, however, over what this process entails.10 
Schedler offers a way out of the confusion by identifying at least five 
different processes addressed by democratic consolidation (Schedler 1998, 
as cited in Clark 2002: 64): (1) avoiding democratic breakdown (from 
liberal or electoral democracy to authoritarianism); (2) preventing 
democratic erosion (from liberal to electoral democracy); (3) completing 
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democracy (from electoral to liberal democracy); (4) deepening 
democracy (from liberal democracy to advanced democracy) and (5) 
organizing democracy (strengthening liberal democracy). The first two 
processes are geared towards regime survival while the last three 
advance the democratization project.  
In the aftermath of the democratic transition, political discourses in 
the country have located Philippines in the process of deepening 
democracy, which makes it more liberal, accessible, accountable, and 
representative. In Schedler’s frame, however, the country’s political 
imperatives would still include completing democracy or ensuring the 
protection of political rights and civil liberties along with constitutional 
constraints on state power and civilian control over the military. This 
process is hardly pointed out in the literature on democratic transition in 
Philippines, which seems to assume that civil and political rights are in 
place and, therefore, unproblematic.  
Although the restoration of political and civil liberties seems to have 
been achieved in the Philippines vis-à-vis incomplete democracies in 
Latin America (e.g. Nicaragua, Guatemala, Paraguay), there are 
indications that such liberties have not been fully restored. The recent 
spate of killings of journalists critical of politicians and corrupt practices 
in the outskirts of Metro Manila reveals that the press freedom, Filipinos 
proudly claim the media enjoys, is constrained by local politics and the 
weakness of the state to protect the fourth estate.11 The return of 
patronage politics and bosses who continue to engage in coercive 
practices through the maintenance of goons also shows the capacity of 
powerful and armed elements to stifle individual freedoms in the areas 
where they operate.12 It is, therefore, not surprising that while the 
Philippines is classified as “free” in the Freedom House’s rating of 
independent countries in 2004, its rating on civil liberties is lower than 
Taiwan and South Korea and is the same as the incomplete democracies 
of El Salvador, Paraguay and Nicaragua which are all classified as 
“partly free”.13
However, as far as public perception and political labels are 
concerned, Philippine is democratic. Voter turnout in elections has 
generally been high, with about 86% and 82% going to the polls in the 
1998 and 2004 Presidential elections, respectively.14 Contrary to 
expectations, voter turnout among the poor has been historically higher 
than among the affluent classes (Philippine Center for Investigative 
Journalism and the Institute of Philippine Culture 2004). Consistent with 
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this observation, various surveys have also shown that Filipinos across 
social classes regard democracy as the best political system for the 
country (Abueva 2002: 1-4; Bautista 1999: 29). The March 2002 East Asia 
Barometer Survey of the Social Weather Stations shows, for instance, 64% 
of respondents agree with the statement “democracy is always preferable 
to any other kind of government” and 18% disagree with the statement 
“under some circumstances an authoritarian government can be 
preferable to a democratic one”(Social Weather Stations 2002). Another 
independent survey conducted by the Pulse Asia, Inc. in the third quarter 
of 2001 corroborates the SWS findings. In the wake of the failed 
Oakwood mutiny of young military leaders, 62% still rejected the use of 
Martial Law as a solution to the country’s problem (Pulse Asia, Inc. 2003). 
Interestingly, however, there is also contradictory evidence that 
shows that the support of Filipinos for democracy seems less than that of 
citizens in the two other new democracies discussed in this 
volume—South Korea and Taiwan. Dalton and Ong’s paper on political 
aspirations and attitudes in several countries in the Pacific Rim reveals 
that only half of the Filipinos who responded to the 1995 World Values 
Survey15 were critical of army rule and about 64% were supportive of 
authoritarian rule, compared to South Koreans and Taiwanese (Table 1). 
The study further shows that the Philippines has lower score on two 
indices of support for democracy than South Korea and Taiwan.16
The discussion so far seems to suggest that the democratic transition 
resulted merely in the restoration of traditional patronage politics; that 
the Philippines has consolidated only an incomplete democracy (in the 
sense of the processes Schedler enumerated); and also, that the Filipino 
public is receptive to authoritarian rule. Democratization in the 
Philippines, however, is far more complex than what these observations 
reflect. To stop at these conclusions is to miss the gains achieved by a 
country that is simultaneously completing and deepening its democracy. 
Several developments, that have pushed the limits of the democratic 
agenda in the post-authoritarian period, nuance the location of the 
Philippines in Schedler’s processes: the remarkable growth of civil 
society since 1986 and constitutional changes that have opened 
possibilities for undermining patronage politics, ushering subtle changes 
in electoral politics among others.   
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Table 1 Attitudes Towards Democracy (% in agreement with 
statement) in East Asian Countries 
Statment Philippines South Korea Taiwan 
Having strong leaders govern without 
democratic institutions is good. 64 32 41 
A government by experts is good. 63 67 60 
Army rule is good. 51 16 16 
A democratic system is good. 83 85 85 
Source: Dalton and Ong (2002). The proportions for the first three statements in 
Figure 1 were transposed to show the % of respondents agreeing with 
the statements.  
IV.  Civil Society and Democratization  
Civil society17 in the Philippines is vibrant and robust. Owing to the 
Spanish and American colonial legacy of relatively weak states, the 
political space for civil society has been bigger than in other Asian 
countries. Institutions such as the highly influential Catholic Church, 
powerful business groups, popular movements ranging from religious 
communities to political movements, as well as resilient local warlords 
and political clans have historically enjoyed autonomy from state control 
(Rivera 2002: 2).18 The unique features of the development of civil society 
in the post-authoritarian period, however, are its varied composition, 
rapid expansion, development-orientation (of a critical mass of 
organizations) and their capacity to form loose political networks on 
issues that transcend ideologies and geographies.  
The last thirty years saw the expansion and rapid growth of civil 
society. It has come to include ideological groups that shifted from 
underground organization during the height of the anti-dictatorship 
struggle to development work in non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and people’s organizations (POs), politically unaligned NGOs 
that nevertheless address development concerns, coalitions among 
organizations sharing similar ideological premises, and the usual welfare 
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organizations, nonprofit educational institutions and civic and religious 
groups.   
In terms of growth, the number of non-stock, non-profit corporations 
registered at the Securities and Exchange Commission, a rough 
operationalization of civil society, increased by 4533 a year from 1980 to 
1993 and had a total of 58927 corporations that year (Miralao and Bautista 
1983). This figure ballooned to 152,535 in 2002 (Carino 2002: 71). Refining 
the figures further, to exclude non-stock corporations that do not qualify 
for membership in civil society, Carino estimates a total of 18,941 national 
NGOs, about 34,188 to 48,713 local NGOs, 71,135 POs accredited with 
government agencies, between 169 and 313 POs who have not touched 
base with government, 4057 NGO coalitions as of 2002, 40809 
cooperatives and from 21000 to 75000 non-stock corporations that belong 
to civil society (Carino 2002: 74-85). All told, civil society consists of 
organizations and coalitions estimated to fall roughly between 249,000 to 
497,000 organizations in 1997.   
Even so non-profit and voluntary organizations have proliferated in 
the Philippines since colonial times, the democratic space created by the 
1986 people power uprising enabled former activists to commit their 
organizational capacities to above ground development work and 
maintain a critical but collaborative stance towards the state. In fact, some 
of these activists found their way into the appointive Constitutional 
Commission that framed the 1987 Philippine Constitution; in fact nearly 
half of the members of the Commission had participated in mass actions 
in areas such as land reform, ethnic issues, and gender conflicts (Eaton 
2003: 19). Their social sensibilities account for Article II, Section 3 of the 
Constitution, which directs the state to “encourage non-governmental, 
community-based or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of 
the nation”. 
The development activists-turned-NGO workers have since 
struggled to combine the critical spirit that inspired their involvement in 
Left-leaning movements prior to 1986 with the professional demand to 
organize and provide services to their constituencies at the grassroots. 
The impact of their macro-perspective is apparent in the loose networks 
of organizations that are currently engaged in advocacy work that span a 
broad spectrum of issues from environmental degradation to peace and 
participatory democracy. They also paved the way for new forms of 
activism that is more inclusive of less politicized or ideologically oriented 
citizens. Apart from the usual reform movements, non-profit 
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organizations including neighborhood organizations and church groups 
such as the Couples for Christ have moved beyond religious activities to 
pursue programs that not only benefit communities but engage their full 
participation,19 a deviation from the dole out mentality that prevailed 
among civic and religious organizations before the early 1970s.  
The rapid growth of civil society since 1986 and the existence of a 
core of development NGOs facilitated mobilization for a major uprising 
that ousted President Joseph Ejercito Estrada from office in 2000. The 
immediate trigger for the ouster was a televised morality play; it 
unfolded the October 2000 disclosure by one of Estrada’s wealthy friends 
that he had received regular pay-offs as a virtual head of a national 
syndicate running an illegal numbers game. Months earlier, the business 
community had become increasingly restive over the rising incidence of 
corruption, cronyism and arbitrary decision making in government. The 
exposure of the allocation of gambling spoils introduced a criminal 
element to Estrada’s administration. It led to the televised impeachment 
proceedings against Estrada, which 9 out of 10 Filipinos followed as they 
would a telenovela.  
Indeed, organized elements of civil society were distinguishable and 
more clearly represented in People Power 2 or EDSA Dos than in People 
Power 1. Within days of the exposure, various civil society forces formed 
the Kongreso ng Mamayanag Pilipino II (Kompil II), a pluralist coalition 
of NGO networks (e.g. CODE-NGO), drawn from issue-based and 
sectoral coalitions (e.g. Freedom from Debt Coalition and the National 
Peace Conference), church-based organizations (e.g. Gomburza), Left 
political blocks (e.g. Bisig, Social Democratic Caucus, Sanlakas), party list 
groups (e.g. Akbayan) and individual citizens like former president 
Corazon Aquino. Similarly, organizations and movements of the national 
democratic Left, anti-Estrada politicians and known progressive 
individuals formed the Erap Resign Movement. Both the multi-sectoral 
networks mobilized huge support for the major rallies in the last quarter 
of 2000 (Bautista 2001: 5-6).20 Thus, when 11 senators, perceived to be 
among Estrada’s avid supporters, refused on the nationwide television 
show to allow the opening of a bank envelop that could identify the 
major character in the morality play as Estrada himself, the networks 
were able to mobilize and galvanize the people, who spontaneously took 
to the streets.   
There are divergent views on the role of People Power 2 or EDSA 
Dos in democratic consolidation. Among the middle forces, it is a 
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“picture perfect” manifestation of direct democracy or one that 
demonstrates the “power of citizens to hold accountable wielders of 
power to the highest legal and moral standards” (Carino 2002: 1). After 
all, the 1987 Constitution from this perspective institutionalized the recall 
of officials or the direct exercise of democracy. On the other hand, the 
international press was anxious that another extra-constitutional political 
succession after just fifteen years reveals the failure of procedural 
democracy since formal mechanisms could not resolve fundamental 
issues such as blatant corruption in public office. Moreover, legal scholars 
and justices feared that EDSA Dos had the potential of opening the 
floodgates to a series of people power acts that would further undermine 
institutional procedures and the fledging rule of law in the Philippines 
(Pangalangan 2002). 
No sooner had justices warned of this possibility did a third EDSA 
uprising occur barely five months after the Supreme Court administered 
the oath of office to the then Vice President, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. 
This time, the arrest and detention of Joseph Estrada instigated the 
uprising. His supporters insisted on Estrada’s reinstatement as the 
legitimate president of the country. Angered by the humiliating arrest of 
Estrada, they stormed the street of the Presidential Palace that resulted in 
a violent dispersal by the military. The third EDSA uprising as well as 
small-scale “people power” demonstrations by supporters of losing 
electoral candidates, including those genuinely rejected by a majority of 
their constituents and subordinates in companies who have axes to grind 
against their superiors underscore the importance of imbedding the spirit 
of people power institutionally.    
Constitutional Provisions and Democratic Deepening 
Despite arguments for the restoration of pre-Martial Law politics after 
the successful People Power I uprising in 1986, the 1987 Constitution is 
significant because it opened up opportunities to erode the power of 
political clans and leveled the political field. In the hope of a check on 
bailiwick building, for instance, the new Constitution sets term limits not 
just for the president but for legislators as well. Congressional 
representatives have up to three consecutive terms of three years each 
while senators may enjoy at the most two terms of 6 years each.  
More than two decades later, critics point to the efforts of the elite to 
circumvent the constraints posed by the new term limits. Rotation among 
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close family members of incumbents who have served the maximum 
term has become common among political clans. The fact that there is 
still no enabling legislation to give teeth to the anti-dynasty provision of 
the 1987 Constitution reinforces this practice. Hence, as documented by 
the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 7 out of 10 elected 
representatives in 1992 were members of traditional political families 
(Gutierrez 1994: 17). Moreover, about nine out of ten of them were 
millionaires. 
On balance, while the Philippine Congress in the post-authoritarian 
era has remained a stronghold of traditional political families, 
contemporary politics nevertheless reflects significant differences from 
that of pre-Martial Law days. For one, progressive, nontraditional 
politicians, some of whom hailing from families who have rotated 
positions among their members (Eaton 2003: 3), have emerged to 
improve the image of Filipino politicians. Miralao’s article in this book 
alludes to such development. Furthermore, Coronel-Ferrer argues that 
the new term limits have forced politicians to be more “mobile”, making 
“intra and inter-clan competition more intricate”. The new term limits 
have eroded to some extent the monopoly of local patriarchs over power 
in the areas where they operated. This is further compounded by 
divisions among extensions of traditional families and the rise of new 
political clans; thus, local and national elections have become very 
competitive and their outcomes less certain (Coronel-Ferrer 2004). The 
downside of this, however, is the tremendous expense entailed in 
electoral contests, makes it extremely difficult to democratize access to 
political posts.  
Apart from setting term limits, the 1987 Constitution is also 
remarkable for instituting, at least on paper, a party list system that 
allocates 20% of the 250 Lower House seats to new and smaller parties 
whose representatives would enjoy equal status with elected legislators, 
to be chosen on the basis of proportional representation. In the process, 
the system promised to broaden representation of marginalized sectors 
or political groups and enhance issue-based party politics. Since the 
passage of the party list law in March 1995, however, the development of 
the party list system has been stunted. This is due in large part to the way 
Congress designed the system.  
Eaton (2003) identifies three aspects that have constrained the 
meaningful participation of marginalized sectors (Eaton 2003: 6-8):  
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‧only parties or organizations that received more than 2%, 4% and 
6% of the party list votes cast nationwide were eligible for one, two and 
three of the available fifty seats, respectively, with none of the parties 
receiving more than 3% of the seats regardless of the number of people 
who voted for them. This is not only contrary to the principle of 
proportional representation, it also prevents a critical mass of 
reform-oriented party list members in Congress from pushing 
progressive laws  
‧beyond 1998, the top five traditional political parties who were 
barred from fielding party list candidates in the legislation drafted by the 
House Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reform are no longer 
prevented from capturing additional seats through the party list system. 
Thus, in the 2001 and 2004 elections, traditional political parties had an 
additional mechanism for gaining seats in Congress and  
‧the party list law imposes more stringent requirements on 
representatives of smaller parties than on those of single congressional 
districts. For instance, they were forbidden from changing political 
affiliations without losing their posts, a prohibition that does not apply to 
colleagues in Congress with geographic constituencies. 
The party list system, as designed by its enabling law, seems to have 
failed in fulfilling the promise of pursuing reform via legislation. The first 
ever elections of party list candidates in 1998 resulted in only 13 
organizations garnering at least 2% of the votes with only one group 
passing the 4% level. As a consequence, only 14 of the 50 seats were filled. 
Moreover, the process fragmented the more progressive NGO 
community, leaving them less open to concerted efforts to win seats to 
institute reform (Eaton 2003:8-9). 
The situation, however, is more nuanced than the cursory judgment 
that the party list system has failed. While the changes since 1998 are far 
from being impressive enough to make a dent in Congressional 
decision-making, the improvements are nevertheless significant. In 2004, 
for instance, 24 representatives representing 16 organizations including 
those of indigenous groups, Mindanao-based nontraditional parties and 
peasant groups were given seats, up by 4 from the 2001 figure of 20 
representatives representing 20 organizations. It is notable that despite 
the low number of representatives from politically progressive 
organizations such as Bayan Muna, (a national democratic group that 
once shunned elections as a reform strategy), Akbayan, Abanse Pinay 
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and Sanlakas, they have been able to project alternative positions on a 
number of critical issues since the media has vigilantly sought and 
disseminated their opinions on burning issues (Coronel-Ferrer 2004). 
The seats in Congress that have not been filled by party list 
representatives (26 after the 2004 elections) reflect the untapped space for 
the programmatic articulation of the interests of marginalized sectors. 
Apart from the weakness of issue-based politics in the Philippines 
relative to poverty-stricken countries in Latin America, the low 
utilization of this space is partly due to the lack of awareness of the 
Filipino voters about the existence of the system. In the two elections 
after the party list was instituted in 1998 and two weeks before the May 
2004 elections, only 44% of the respondents in Pulse Asia’s April 26-29 
survey have heard or read anything about it.21 As expected, the upper 
and middle classes were more aware of party lists than the lower classes. 
Finally, the 1987 Constitution promised to deepen democratization 
by decentralizing political power. The passage of the devolution act in 
1991 was, therefore, a significant development. Translating the promise 
of the Constitution into law, it transferred greater revenue and 
expenditure responsibilities to local government, also legislated on the 
participation of civil society in local decision-making. The outcomes of 
devolution are mixed. On the one hand, it affected the delivery of 
services that were once centralized (e.g. health) and made it vulnerable to 
the priorities of local officials. Worse, it reinforced bossism and the 
overwhelming dominance of traditional politicians in areas where civil 
society is weak. On the other hand, it led to remarkable developments in 
localities governed by forward-looking and willful political leaders. The 
Galing Pook Awards discussed in Miralao’s article in this book attest to 
the significant achievements of outstanding local executives that could 
not have been nurtured outside a decentralization framework.  
These gains notwithstanding, the implementation of the Local 
Government Code leaves much to be desired. Despite its goal to broaden 
participation, the Code has not succeeded in ensuring that its 
participatory goals are met; involvement of development NGOs that are 
autonomous of the state and traditional politicians is uncommon across 
the country’s geographic areas. Part of the reason is the power of local 
officials to accredit the NGOs that will participate in local councils. Many 
of the local executives comply with the letter of the law rather than its 
spirit, organizing NGOs that are usually led by their spouses. Moreover, 
in areas where development NGOs represent civil society in local 
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councils, policy decisions which they help formulate are generally 
recommendatory and do not bind politicians (Eaton 2003: 11).              
The implementation of Constitutionally-enshrined strategies for 
deepening democracy such as the devolution of powers and the 
institutionalization of the party list system depends to a large extent on 
the selection of reform-oriented and credible political leaders capable of 
mobilizing diverse resources and institutions and exercising state power 
to address fundamental social problems. Their election, in turn 
presupposes that procedural aspects of democracy are in 
place—structures for free and honest elections to give them a chance to 
be voted, the rule of law, basic civil and political rights, and civilian 
supremacy over the military, among others. On a more substantive level, 
it requires a political party system that is differentiated by ideological 
issues but not extremely polarized to render it unstable, and a political 
culture that nurtures critical and independent thinking among citizens 
and their meaningful participation in the affairs of the state.  
The party system in the Philippines continues to be dominated by 
personalities. Undifferentiated along principles and clear positions on 
national and local issues, it has reinforced patronage and the barter of 
compromises among politicians with otherwise competing interests who 
form coalitions solely for the pragmatic purpose of winning a plurality in 
elections. Against this backdrop, a major challenge according to 
Hutchcroft and Rocamora (Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2003: 285) is “to 
insulate structures from particularistic demands and to open them up to 
respond more effectively to collective pressures whose interests have 
long been marginalized”. This can only come through the “cultivation of 
stronger and more programmatic political parties”. The attainment of 
such desirable long-term goal will render the party-list system redundant 
and address one of its potentially adverse but unintended 
consequences—the ironic marginalization of the interests of the 
marginalized since the existence of party lists could provide an easy 
justification for the low priority given to the interests of the marginalized 
in the agenda of legislators.     
V.  Poverty and the Limits of Democratic Consolidation 
As to developing a democratic political culture in the Philippines, it is 
important to recall that democracy assumes the coexistence of a number 
of diverse ethnic, class and religious communities that might disagree in 
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their answers to the most basic questions of human life but are shaped by 
a political culture that supports the exercise of civic virtues, such as 
tolerance of differences, the disposition to resolve issues rationally, 
personal acceptance and attribution to others of responsibility for the 
actions of individuals who are only incidentally members of particular 
social classes, political clans or ethnic communities (Bridges 2001). The 
literature on democratization puts premium on the capacity of the 
middle classes to transcend the specificities and interests associated with 
their particular locations in society and to contribute to the development 
of such a civic culture.22 Relatively free from the imperatives of basic 
survival on the one hand, and maintaining the status quo to ensure 
capital accumulation on the other, they have the potential to more deeply 
inculcate the normative standpoints of liberal education and ideal 
dispositions proper to communities, global visions of life concepts and 
standards of achievement, cultural representations for the purpose of 
shaping civil identities (Bridges 2001), rationality and the rule of law. As 
such, they are the natural constituencies of democracy. 
The development of strong middle classes as harbingers of civic 
culture and backbone of civil society is one of the factors that mediate the 
observed relationship between economic growth and democracy in the 
literature. Focusing largely on the identification of the prerequisites for 
democracy, scholars have pointed to high levels of economic growth, the 
minimalization of socio-economic disparities and avoidance of extreme 
class polarization as among its significant preconditions (Clark 2002: 11). 
These factors presumably allow for the growth of the middle classes and 
foster civic cultures that nurture democracy. 
While identifying prerequisites represents a static approach to 
democratization, it is nevertheless instructive to note that the pervasive 
poverty of a significant segment of the population, the obverse of a 
growing economy with proper redistributive mechanisms, constitutes a 
major challenge to democratic consolidation. In their study of 141 
countries between 1950 and 1990, Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and 
Limongi identified a country’s per capita income, which indicates the  
affluence or poverty of its population as the best predictor of the survival 
of democracy (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi 2001: 137). 
Their findings suggest that where poverty is pervasive, democracies are 
likely to be unstable. 
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Table 2 Employed Persons by Major Occupation Group, 
Philippines 1975-1999 (%)  
Occupation Group 1975* 1985* 1997* 1999** 
Professional and Technical  5.5 5.9 5.9 6.0 
Administrative, Executive and     
Managerial 1.0 1.0 1.9 2.1 
Clerical and Related Work  3.8 4.2 4.3 4.5 
Sales 9.7 12.9 14.3 14.7 
Services 8.6 8.3 10.1 10.4 
Production, Transport, Equipment 
operators and Laborer 17.9 19.2 23.3 22.8 
Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, 
Forestry, Fishermen and Hunters 53.3 48.3 40.0 39.5 
Unreported Occupations 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sources: *1978 Statistical Yearbook; 1986 Statistical Yearbook; 1998 Statistical 
Yearbook. **http://www.census.gov.ph/1999/data/sectordat 
The Philippines transitioned to democracy in 1986 after 14 years of 
authoritarian rule without sustained economic growth and significant 
transformation of its social structure. Hence, the expansion of the middle 
classes has been exceedingly slow. Table 2 suggests that employed 
persons in occupational categories, roughly middle class, viz. 
professional and technical, administrative, executive and managerial 
work, clerical, sales and services, increased by only 5.3% from 32.5% in 
1985 or a year before the transition to 37.8% 13 years later in 1999. A 
reclassification scheme adopted by the National Census and Statistics 
Office resulted in an even lower estimate of employed persons in middle 
class occupations, 28.6%23 (Table 3). 
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Table 3 Employed Persons by Major Occupation, Philippines 2002 
(%) 
Occupation Group 2002 
Professional and Technical  5.5 
Administrative, Executive and Managerial 1.0 
Clerical and Related Work  3.8 
Sales  9.7 
Services  8.6 
Production, Transport, Equipment operators and Laborer 17.9 
Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, Forestry, Fishermen and Hunters 53.3 
Unreported Occupations 0.2 
Total 100.0 
Source: http://www.census.gov.ph/2002/data/sectordat 
The preponderance of employed workers in lower class occupations 
almost three decades after the democratic transition indicates the lay of 
the land as far as the class structure is concerned. The poverty incidence 
of Philippines compared to its neighbors and other selected countries in 
the region, portrays the social structure from another angle. By all 
indicators used in the 2004 Human Development Report of the United 
Nations Development Program, except for the proportion of the 
population living below $2 a day in which Indonesia is higher by 6%, the 
Philippines has the highest proportion of poor and undernourished 
people (Table 4). Figure 1 further show that the reduction of poverty 
incidence from 1961 to 1995 in the country was not remarkable at all in 
contrast to the steep decline in the proportion of poor people in 
neighboring Southeast Asian nations.  
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Table 4 Indicators of Poverty and Nutritional Deficiency for 
Selected Asian Countries (%) 
Country 
Population living 
below $1 a day 
(1990-2002)* 
Population Living 
Below $2 a Day 
(1990-2002)* 
Population Living 
Below National 
Poverty Level 
(1990-2001)* 
Under- 
Nourished 
People 
(1999-2001)* 
Indonesia 7.5 52.4 27.1 6 
Malaysia <2 9.3 15.5 － 
Philippines 14.6 46.4 36.8 28 
Singapore － － － － 
Thailand <2 32.5 13.1 19 
South Korea <2 <2 － － 
Source: United Nations Development Programme (2004). 
Note: * The Human Development Report registered the latest figures available for 
each of the countries it covered. It is quite likely that the values for the 
selected Asian countries are more recent than those for nations in other 
regions. 
 
 
Figure 1 Incidence of Poverty in Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand 
Source: Riggs (1997). 
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Compared to the new democracies featured in this volume, 
Philippines faces the unique challenge of surmounting the obstacles 
poverty poses to democratic consolidation. Pervasive poverty in a highly 
unequal society has provided justification for the goals and aspirations of 
secessionist and counterinsurgency movements operating with the 
framework of competing states. Their insidious effects are also palpable 
in electoral politics and consequently affect the country’s fragile 
democracy.  
1.  Poverty and Secessionist/Revolutionary Movements 
As mentioned previously, democratic consolidation in Philippines is 
severely constrained by the extra-constitutional challenge of militant 
social movements. Rivera argues that the unusual ability of secessionist 
and Marxist-inspired movements to be part of the broader process of 
democratic incorporation, through the formal creation of the 
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao and the party list system 
respectively (Rivera 2002), is an outstanding feature of the consolidation 
process. He noted, however, that the demands of these movements on 
behalf of the marginalized have not been fully incorporated as reflected 
in the persistence of armed conflicts. Culled from newspaper accounts 
from 1972 to 2004, Abinales and Ramos’s preliminary mapping of battle 
areas between Muslim separatists and Communists, on the one hand, 
and the government, on the other reveals not only the protracted nature 
of both the militant struggles but their continuing intensity as well 
(Abinales and Ramos 2004).         
The secessionist Muslim movement in the South is deeply rooted in a 
long history of struggle that goes all the way to the 16th century, when the 
Spanish government colonized the Philippine archipelago. However, the 
contemporary conflicts associated with the rebellion of the Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF) and later, of the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF), trace their roots to the migration of Christians 
from the northern islands to the Mindanao frontier, crowding out 
Muslims and the indigenous population from their ancestral domains. 
Encouraged by the state, the homestead movement coincided with 
government efforts to integrate Muslim Mindanao to the rest of the 
country through the systematic exploitation of its mineral and forest 
resources.24
The demographic, political and economic changes in Mindanao 
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eventually undermined the political accommodation between local 
Muslim politicians and the central government that had kept the peace 
until the 1960s. With a younger generation of Muslim intellectuals 
rejecting the political opportunism of their elders and fomenting a 
separatist struggle against brutal discrimination, the stage was set for 
war against the Philippine government that Mindanao scholars agree 
begun in December 1972. Although the Moro National Liberation Front 
has since been integrated into mainstream politics with the creation of the 
Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao in the 1990s, some of the 
issues that fomented armed conflict continue to persist. The Muslim 
leadership failed to address concrete development problems in Muslim 
Mindanao while former rebels were unable to adjust to “normal life”. 
Moreover, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, a fundamentalist religious 
movement that has unequivocally articulated its aim to establish an 
Islamic state, and the Abu Sayaf Group, which seems to have 
metamorphosed from an anti-MNLF force created by the Armed Forces 
of the Philippines to a kidnapping group, have escalated and sustained 
the rebellion.      
 The sense of marginalization of the Muslim communities in 
Mindanao finds justification not only in the social distance between 
Muslims and Christian due to the perceived discriminatory acts of the 
latter against the former group but in their economic conditions as well. 
Muslim Filipinos in Mindanao have been kept poor and continue to feel 
poor. The provinces that experienced the highest number of encounters 
between government forces and the Muslim liberation fronts after the 
1986 democratic transition tend to be poor. In fact, the Autonomous 
Region of Muslim Mindanao had a higher poverty incidence and lower 
per capita incomes than other regions (Monsod, Monsod and Ducanes 
2004: 131-132). More than half of its population is poor (Reyes 2003). 
Furthermore, the provinces with the lowest human development ratings 
are found in this region—Sulu, Tawi-tawi, Basilan and Lanao del Sur 
(Human Development Network 2002).25
The historical background, dynamics and issues connected with the 
Communist movement vis-à-vis democratic consolidation are discussed 
in Rivera’s article in this book. For purposes of this discussion, however, 
Abinales and Ramos’s preliminary geographic mapping of encounters 
between government and dissident forces under the New People’s Army, 
while limited by the media reportage of such battles, seems to suggest 
that the movement is relatively strong in areas near mountainous terrains 
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that have been the historical sites of peasant struggles before the 
democratic transition (e.g. provinces in Central Luzon). This finding is 
observed despite higher per capita incomes and human development 
indices in the base provinces of conflict-ridden areas. 26 On the other hand, 
there also seems to be a significant number of encounters in provinces 
with lower human development indices. 27
2.  Poverty and Electoral Politics 
In their concise and insightful account of the origins and evolution of the 
democratic deficit in the Philippines (i.e. the enormous need for 
responding to pent-up demands and pressures from below, as well as the 
capacity of the country’s democratic institutions to do so with any degree 
of effectiveness), Hutchcroft and Rocamora argued that the political 
institutions created by the American regime in the country are highly 
unusual in the annals of colonialism. Contrary to the tendency of colonial 
regimes not to create effective representative institutions and instead put 
major emphasis on the creation of powerful bureaucratic systems, “US 
officials gave far more attention to the creation of representative 
institutions than to the creation of a modern bureaucratic apparatus”. 
Moreover, “because US colonials not only held elections for elite political 
contestation but also established representative institutions with 
significant degrees of political authority, one finds the bizarre 
phenomenon of internally mobilized parties in a colonial state. Finally, 
because representative institutions emerged before the creation of strong 
bureaucratic institutions, the “depredation of patronage-seeking 
politicians” quite easily overwhelmed the Philippine 
bureaucracy.”(Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2003: 265) 
In an effort to co-opt the land-based elite, the American colonial 
government initiated indirect elections of local and provincial governors, 
fostered intra-provincial linkages and factions and created a solid 
national oligarchy. In the absence of strong bureaucratic institutions and 
political parties, the political culture the Americans encouraged in the 
process of strengthening the elite, which subsequent governments and 
political leaders later reinforced through a weak party system, was one 
based on patronage seeking. It is notable for instance, that most 
Philippine presidents elected since 1946 did not initially have working 
majority parties. In the few months after they were voted into office, 
however, members of the opposing party shifted their loyalty to the new 
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president for purposes of obtaining patronage and pork. Hutchcroft and 
Rocamora claim that disgruntled elements shifted their loyalties toward 
the end of a president’s term.  
Electoral politics in the Philippines evolved from a system confined 
to the local and provincial elite to popular elections, which is a common 
feature of contemporary Philippines politics.  As a consequence of this 
evolution and the reforms that came with it, the number of registered 
voters increased from 105,000 in 1907 to 1.6 million in 1935, 2.27 million 
in 1940 (Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2003: 268). The most recent 
presidential election in May 2004 registered a total of 43,000,000 voters. 
A change in the conduct of political campaigns accompanied the 
increase in voters. Until the 1950s, votes were obtained through the 
traditional linkages and networks of land-based patrons and clients.  
Ramon Magsaysay, former president of the Philippines who was much 
loved by the masses during his short-lived term, supplemented the 
traditional reliance on patron-client ties with direct campaign appeals. 
Thus, began the more significant involvement of the masses in election 
campaigns and eventually in determining electoral outcomes. Since 
Magsaysay’s innovation, politicians have had to woo the masses in 
colorful campaigns and some of them even buy the votes of the poor. 
With only about 7% to 11% of the electorate belonging to the upper 
and middle classes,28 the votes of the poor population in the 
post-Magsaysay era have been decisive in determining Philippine’s 
electoral outcomes. For this reason, most politicians have gone out of 
their way to cultivate the poor vote. They have not only supplied food, 
free medical care, funeral funds, basketball courts and other visible 
contributions during the campaigns, and transported poor voters to poll 
precincts in exchange for cash but also wooed potential voters in 
congested slum communities by postponing their relocation to other 
bailiwicks until after the elections, if they do so at all. Citing a columnist 
in a popular newspaper, Schaffer notes for instance that the Quezon City 
Council went as far as passing a resolution requesting a deferment of 
President Estrada’s order to relocate poor communities along creeks and 
rivers prone to flooding despite the obvious dangers of squatting along 
waterways (Cruz 2000, as cited in Schaffer 2001). 
Although national and local politicians since Ramon Magsaysay 
have campaigned with the masses, Joseph Estrada was the first 
Philippine president to ride on the votes of the poor. Aware of the 
potentials of class-based politics and being himself at ease with the poor, 
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he exploited the class cleavage in his campaigns. Moreover, he dropped a 
campaign strategy initially focused on the Metro Manila media and 
targeted the lower middle to upper class voters, Estrada like Magsaysay 
before him, engaged in face-to-face encounters with the masses in places 
where they congregated−in markets, bus depots and factories. More 
importantly, his sorties penetrated urban slum communities especially in 
Metro Manila that became his bailiwick. Later so, when Estrada was 
being questioned for his role in a gambling scam and his credibility 
rapidly eroded, Metro Manila’s urban poor remained loyal to him. An 
analysis of the E or very poor respondents in major cities, including 
Metro Manila showed a decrease in the net ratings for Estrada and was 
much lower than those obtained for the same class nationwide. However, 
for the E or poorest respondents, the net ratings for Estrada hardly 
changed between October and December, 2000 (Bautista 2001: 20). 
Estrada’s campaign relied on media-driven national name 
recognition, particularly a revival of his movies through mobile trucks 
that brought them to slum communities. Although the older voters in 
other cities were more inclined to vote for him- meshed the illusion of the 
characters he played (all of them cast him as Robin Hood or savior of the 
masses) with the reality of their lives, younger voters did not necessarily 
vote for Estrada. However, young and old voters among the poor in 
Metro Manila, where Estrada’s movies penetrated, voted for him. 
The overwhelming support Estrada obtained from the D and E 
classes in 1998, with eight out of ten D and E voters choosing him over 
other candidates, prompted the opposition to draft actor Fernando Poe Jr., 
“the King of Philippine Movies” and Estrada’s friend to challenge Gloria 
Macapagal Arroyo and seek the presidency. His loss to Arroyo and the 
fact that they were consistently the top vote getters in urban and rural 
areas led analysts to conclude, based on the May 2004 Social Weather 
Stations Exit polls, that there was no masa or clear blocks of class-based 
votes (Carizo 2004; Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism 2004). 
Moreover, both Poe and Arroyo garnered more support from rural voters 
than those living in urban areas while the other candidates obtained 
significant shares of the urban, particularly the Metro Manila vote. 
Analysts interpret this trend to mean that urban-based voters are less tied 
by moral or political bonds to local leaders and think on their own; they 
analyze the candidates and decide on their choices based on information 
they get from media and from their own experiences, thus are “market 
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voters”. 
While the 2004 elections did not reveal a clear class-based voting 
pattern, vote shares from each class equally divided between Fernando 
Poe and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, the class factor cannot be dismissed 
easily when the support of the poor to former basketball player and to 
movie actors are compared with that of other classes to the same 
candidates. Figures 2 and 3, based on the results of Pulse Asia’s 26-29 
April 2004 survey and the 10 May 2004 SWS Exit Polls (Virola 2004),29 
reveals the following observations:  
‧Fernando Poe in 2004 received almost the same proportion of 
votes across social classes as Joseph Estrada in 1998, showing the 
continuing appeal of actors to the poor. Note that since the SWS Exit Poll 
underestimated Poe’s votes by 5.6%, he could have obtained higher votes 
from the E class. 
‧Like Estrada, Poe’s support among the E voters in Metro Manila 
(about 30-60% of Metro Manila is slum) is much higher than his support 
from other cities. 
‧Robert Jaworski, a basketball star who appealed to all classes and 
won a senatorial seat in 1998 dramatically lost in the last elections; 
suggests that track record is important to voters regardless of class.   
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Figure 2 Votes for Estrada in 1998 and Fernando Poe in 2004 by 
Social Class (%) 
Source: Social Weather Stations, Inc. 
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Figure 3 Votes for Jaworkski as Senator 1998, 2004 (%) 
Source: Social Weather Stations, Inc. 
The above observations reflect to some extent the thinking of the 
poor. A study on the poor vote, conducted by the Institute of Philippine 
Culture two months before the May 2004 elections, questions the 
preconceived notions about a “dumb” or “unthinking” masa vote. Based 
on 16 focus-group discussions in selected urban and rural poor 
communities across the country in March and April 2004, the researchers 
conclude-  
‧The poor rank education, experience, platform and track record as 
among the most important criteria for choosing candidates; 
‧Poor do not necessarily have high regard for the wealthy and 
powerful; they value idealistic notions of leadership qualities such as 
piety, helpfulness, sincerity and responsibility; 
‧Poor voters do not necessarily prefer celebrities; many said they 
value educational qualifications but that they were suspicious of those 
with superior education. They said experience and good intentions more 
than compensate for   lack of a college education; 
‧Media, the family, the church and political parties, in this order, 
are the most important sources of influence in the choice of candidates; 
‧Cash may be accepted from a candidate who distributes money 
but this does not necessarily ensure vote for the candidate (Philippine 
Center for Investigative Journalism and the Institute of Philippine 
Culture 2004) 
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The findings of the Institute of Philippine Culture’s (IPC) research 
prior to the 2004 presidential elections resonate with some of Shaffer’s 
observations in the wake of the violent dispersal of Estrada’s poor 
supporters who stormed the presidential palace on May 1, 2001 to protest 
the arrest of their leader and force his restoration as the country’s legal 
president. Drawing from interviews with a random sample of registered 
voters in four areas of Quezon City’s largest and poorest 
barangay—Barangay Commonwealth30, Shaffer’s sensitively chronicled 
views from below regarding democracy, class relations and elections 
(Shaffer 2001). Following is a sample of these views: 
‧A major problem with Philippine democracy is that the poor are 
not shown kindness or respect and that the rich do not listen to the poor; 
‧The law in the country is for those who have money; 
‧The experience of not being listened to leads to feelings of insult 
and indignity. Even small acts of class ridicule took on big meaning to 
protesters gathered in EDSA Tres (3) to protest Estrada’s arrest. 
‧The poor feel that Estrada is one of them. He is perceived to be for 
the poor. This explains why they are behind him in spite of the 
allegations of corruption and plunder leveled against him. 
‧In terms of electoral politics, the moral calculus of the respondents 
is to choose candidates whom they perceive to be caring, kind and 
helpful and who respect their fellowmen. “Good politics” is politics of 
consideration and kindness; “bad politics” is politics of callousness and 
insult. Shaffer notes that these notions differ from the good politics for 
the upper and middle classes, which is the clean politics of transparency; 
while dirty politics is the politics of the “rag-like corrupt politicians”. 
‧Vote selling by the poor is more complex than a simple exchange 
of money or goods. The poor who accept money have mixed set of 
motives for doing so, economic hardship being among the paramount 
reasons. Many of Shaffer’s respondents think voting for a candidate who 
offers money is ill-advised because the candidate will need to recoup that 
money through graft and corruption. Many who are offered money turn 
it down and those who do accept for one reason or another do not 
necessarily vote for the candidate. Interestingly, whatever their reasons 
for accepting money, many people do so still feeling a kind of moral 
unease.  
Both IPC and Shaffer’s study are valuable because they provide 
glimpses into the thinking and rationality of the poor, grounded in the 
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realities of their conditions. They remind the middle and upper classes 
that the chasm between their worldviews and those of the poor, which 
could only be bridged by enabling the latter to share the fruits of 
development, poses potential threats to the stability of the abstract 
democracy the upper and middle classes hope to substantiate. The 
untimely demise of Fernando Poe Jr. in December 2004, three years after 
EDSA 3, dramatized this point. The outpour of support from legions of 
poor people who went to Poe’s wake and walked with him to his burial 
site was reminiscent of the moral outrage in the wake of the assassination 
of Senator Benigno Aquino Jr.31 Apart from reflecting their respect for a 
man whose personal and screen character they identified with, their 
numbers, the attempts of segments of the unorganized segments of the 
opposition to politicize Poe’s burial, the fortification of the presidential 
palace purportedly in response to intelligence reports about the planned 
EDSA 4 uprising, and the unverified rumors of a violent takeover after 
the beloved actor’s burial that spread across Metro Manila’s grapevine, 
all attest to the fact that the poor is a potential political force if class lines 
are clearly drawn. 
VI.  Concluding Remarks 
The May 1, 2001 uprising at the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA 3) 
by the poor and the “great unwashed”,32 that ended with their massing 
up at the presidential palace only to be dispersed by the military, doused 
water on the euphoria of the 1986 and 2000 peaceful people power 
revolts supposedly led by the middle classes. Had Poe’s burial, similarly 
composed of ordinary folks from the poor classes, resulted in EDSA 
Quatro or EDSA 4 on December 22, 2004, it would have provided an 
eloquent argument for the adverse effect of poverty on the prospects for 
democratic consolidation and stability. It would have justified the fear of 
the international media and political analysts that extra-constitutional 
threats to duly elected governments in the Philippines undermine 
institutional democracy and the rule of law. 
The third EDSA revolt and the fourth had it occurred, highlight the 
need to clarify the meaning of people power as a manifestation of direct 
democracy at work.  Although EDSA 1 and 2 on the one hand and 
EDSA 3 on the other, assume similar forms—the massing up of people to 
express their dissatisfaction with or rejection of existing governments, 
they are distinguishable from EDSA 3 by their aspiration to be imbedded 
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institutionally. In the spirit of democratic consolidation, “people power 
expects to eventually become a relic of the past as its energies are 
channeled to the onerous task of building democratic and accountable 
institutions, never again to be called upon to resolve divisive political 
issues” (Bautista 2001: 34). In the end, the democratization process will 
have to give prominence to rule-based governance through periodic 
elections and much stronger representative institutions vis-à-vis 
mass-based politics which by-pass formal processes. How to ensure 
quality outcomes so that Filipinos would regard elections as a 
meaningful and “sacred rite of democracy” and stop listening “elsewhere 
for the peoples’ voice” (Pangalangan 2002) in their hearts is a major 
challenge amidst forces that constrain the substantiation of democracy.  
Apart from clarifying the spirit of people power, EDSA 3, being 
constituted by some segments of civil society organizations, has also 
contributed to the process of clarifying the operational meaning of civil 
society. Where there, for instance, two civil societies represented by 
EDSA 1 and 2 on the one hand (upper and middle class-constituted 
societies) and EDSA 3 (the civil society of the poor), on the other? Did 
EDSA 3 constitute an expression of civil society considering its violent 
outcomes? Is civil society homogenous or unitary in its demands, goals 
and ethical values or is it an arena of coalitions of like-minded 
organizations as well as the “realm of contradictory desiderata of 
particular interests?” (Carino 2002: 4-5) These are some of the questions 
that have helped further refine the meaning of civil society. 
But perhaps the more significant contribution of EDSA 3 and the 
subsequent threat of a post-Fernando Poe uprising by the actor’s avid 
supporters to contest the legitimacy of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s 
presidency, and the current thinking about the consolidation of 
Philippine democracy is to reiterate and highlight some of the challenges 
poverty poses to the democratic agenda. Pressures from a significantly 
poor population add to the democratic deficit that the weak Philippine 
state has to respond to in order to incorporate into the rules of the 
democratic game the movements that recruit the poor and speak in their 
name. Moreover, in a country characterized by the dominant influence of 
media on electoral outcomes,33 the recurrence of cinema themes 
revolving around the class divide that resonate with the lived 
experiences of the poor, and the highly personalistic politics of the 
country, the poor Filipino image for whatever justifiable reasons, might 
continue to reinforce the selection of ambitious political leaders mainly 
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from the media and entertainment industries who project compassion 
and kindness, regardless of their competence and political will to address 
the nagging 19th and 20th century problems that plague 21st century 
Philippines—unsustained economic growth marked by boom and bust 
cycles; extremely modest poverty reduction of 0.65 percentage points 
annually from 1985 to 2000 amidst the rising magnitude of poor people; 
increasing income inequality even after the democratic transition in 1986; 
and a population (constituted by a majority belonging to the lower class) 
that will double in 30 years, among others.34
Notes 
1. While Marcos’ nation-building discourse, which he used to 
legitimize authoritarian rule, promised to create a new society 
through a developmentalist state, his regime suffered in comparison 
to the economic achievements of Park Chung-Hee in South Korea 
and Lee Kuan-Yew in Singapore. Crony politics, among other factors, 
undermined Marcos’s articulated intentions for the Filipino nation. 
For a comparison of Park Chung-Hee and Ferdinand Marcos, see 
Hutchroft (in press). 
2. This is not to say that the Left did not contribute to the process that 
led to the February 1986 people power. At the forefront of the 
anti-Marcos struggle, the Left did not only raise the ante against 
Marcos, it also contributed to building organizational capacities that 
made mobilization much easier in 1986. For a discussion of the Left 
vis-à-vis the Aquino assassination and people power, see Weekly, K 
(2001: Part 2) and Abinales (2001b). 
3. The enmity between activists aligned with the national democratic 
movement and the social democrats (SDs) is well known. National 
democrats regarded SD’s as moderate clerico-fascists or anti-Marcos 
reactionaries “out to derail the revolution through its pseudo-radical 
alternative”. SDs, on the other hand, feared the extremism and 
totalitarian tendencies of the national democrats. See Abinales 
(2001a:136-141). 
4. See for instance, Reidinger (1995). For an analysis of factors that 
contributed to the failure of the Aquino administration to implement 
substantive land reform. In his introduction to The Senate Said No: A 
Four-Year Record of the First Post-EDSA Senate (Salonga 1995: 3-4), 
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former Senator Jovito Salonga, noted that President Aquino “did not 
have a legislative agenda of her own to which she was deeply 
committed. Cabinet members had their own thoughts but they were 
divided on a number of issues. Her position, for example, on the 
foreign debt problem was ambivalent in the beginning precisely 
because of the sharp divisions in her Cabinet. As regards 
comprehensive agrarian reform, she left the more controversial 
aspects of the program for Congress to settle and enact…on local 
autonomy and decentralization, the President did not initiate any 
move that would stir the ranks of congressmen who were, 
understandably, more interested in turf and patronage. Perhaps it 
was too much to expect remarkable, if not earthshaking, acts from a 
president who was, for the most part engaged in the life-and-death 
struggle to defend herself and the new democratic government 
against the assault of the right, the left and the secessionists.” 
5. See for instance the restoration of the Lopez family in McCoy (1994: 
513-516) and Anderson (1988: 3-33). 
6. Democracy is accordingly a system of governance in which the rules 
by which political decisions are made with uncertain outcomes 
because as many political voices as possible are heard. 
7. Interestingly, the situation of political parties in Latin American 
countries, which are as poor, if not poorer than the Philippines, is 
quite different. Parties spanning the range of ideological differences 
from left to right matter in political outcomes. If at all, their problem 
is how to develop centrist politics to resolve issues created by the 
polarization between leftist and rightist political parties. See Barnes 
(1998). Polls also reveal party affiliation still shape public opinions. 
8. The importance of centrist principles for the development of political 
democracy is underscored in Barnes (1998). 
9. The insignificance, if not absence of salient political forces that 
propose alternatives for resolving issues to democratic norms and 
procedures, is at the crux of a common definition of a democratic 
political system as one where “democracy is the only game in town”. 
See Rivera (2002) for a discussion of Philippine-based movements 
working within a frame of competing states and democratic 
consolidation. 
10. For a discussion of the theoretical issues associated with the concept 
of democratic consolidation and the usefulness of a rational-choice 
argument in theorizing about it, see Clark (2002: 60-83). 
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11. As of this writing, at least 56 journalists are reported to have been 
killed in the last few years leading major newspapers to monitor the 
progress in the investigation of their cases. 
12. For an excellent discussion of patronage and coercive politics in the 
Philippines see Sidel (1999). 
13. Freedom House assesses the political rights of citizens in 
independent countries (right to vote and compete for public office 
and elect representatives who have decisive votes on public politics) 
and their civil liberties (e.g. freedom of expression, assembly, 
association, education and religion) through fact-finding missions. 
Countries are given a score of 0-4 for each of ten questions on 
political rights and for 15 questions on civil rights. Countries are 
then classified as “Not Free” when their scores are between 0-33; 
“Partly Free” when they are 34-67 and “Free” when they score from 
68 to 100. Their political rights and civil liberties are subsequently 
given a score on a scale from 1 to 7 where 1 is the highest and 7 the 
lowest. On this scale, the Philippines obtained a ranking of 3; Taiwan 
and South Korea have a score of 2. See Freedom House (2004). 
14. The Social Weather Stations, Inc.’s estimate based on its exit polls, 
which used as weights the number of registered voters in each of the 
79 provinces and 19 cities/towns where the sample was drawn, is 
81.8% (Mangahas 2004). The lower voter turnout in 2004 was partly 
due to the disenfranchisement of voters as a result of confusion 
regarding the implementation of a different system of registration.  
It is important to note that voter turnout can be a meaningful 
indicator of progress or lack thereof on some dimensions of 
democratization in hybrid regimes (Barnes 1998). 
15. The World Values Survey (WVS) is a collaborative effort of more 
than 80 countries to date which conduct identical surveys every five 
years to achieve cross-country comparisons. The Social Weather 
Stations conducts the WVS surveys for the Philippines. Each survey 
has a sample size of 1200 voting age adult respondents. Multi-stage 
probability sampling was used to select respondents. The 
Philippines was divided into four major study areas (Luzon, Visayas, 
Mindanao and the National Capital region) each having a sample 
size of 300 (Sandoval and Guerrero 2002). 
16. The index of support (democratic versus undemocratic views) is 
based on responses to the four statements in Table 1. Another index 
of support was developed from responses to the following 
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statements that reflect a variety of features attributed to democratic 
systems: 
? The economy runs badly in a democracy 
? Democracies are indecisive and have too much quibbling 
? Democracies encourage disorder 
? Democracy may have problems but it is better than any other 
form of government. 
For both scales, the researchers verified whether the four items 
form a common dimension and then added the scores after changing 
the polarity of the democracy items to create a summary index of 
support for democratic principles. The scores ranged from 1 
(anti-democratic) to 4 (pro-democratic). The authors believe that 
ascertaining attitudes towards democratic versus authoritarian 
principles is a more robust measure of commitment to democratic 
rule. The researchers used data from the third and fourth wave of the 
surveys—1995 and 2000.  
17. The concept of civil society metamorphosed from its Hegelian and 
Marxist roots as society (which excludes the economy) minus the 
state to the Gramscian hegemonic conception of civil society as lying 
between the economic structure and the state with the 
counter-hegemonic potential of its intellectual elements to a triadic 
paradigm of the state, civil society and the market. See Shaw (1999). 
At least three notions of civil society prevail: a more inclusive 
definition of civil society as the voluntary non-profit sector or NGOs; 
an exclusive view which looks at civil society as the realm outside 
political parties where individuals and groups aim to “democratize 
the state and redistribute power rather than capture it in a traditional 
sense” and another more inclusive view which includes various 
national and regional groupings with a contestation of narratives. 
See Kaldor (2002: 11). See also David (1997). This paper adopts the 
inclusive view proposed in Carino (2002: 21-22) that excludes 
markets and corporate types in the non-state, non-market space. 
18. For a detailed documentation of civil society development from the 
pre-colonial to the post-1986 period, see Carino (2002: 27-60). 
19. The successful nationwide Gawad Kalinga program of the Couples for 
Christ comes to mind. Inspired by the worldwide Habitat for 
Humanity project and the participatory models that emanate from 
the development community, this group has helped Filipinos living 
in slum areas build the houses of their neighbors and eventually 
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construct a community. They have recently helped rebuild homes in 
areas devastated by the typhoons in the last quarter of 2004. 
20. This article provides a detailed narrative of the People Power 2 
uprising. 
21. http://pulseasia.newsmaker.ph/pulseasia/images/tbl_aw_pref_pl 
_sys.gif 
22. The capacity of the middle classes to transcend social divides is 
illustrated eloquently in the case of Malaysia where there seems to 
be a gradual shift from the politics of ethnicism to the politics of 
developmentalism (concern with growth). While developmentalism 
is till perceived in ethnic terms, the ethnic lenses are much less 
pronounced today than in the 1960s and the 1970s. The changed 
psychology is attributed to the growth of the Malay middle class 
which has helped foster a new climate of accommodation (Abdul 
Rahman Embong 2001a, 2001b). 
23. The occupational structure of the Philippines excludes overseas 
Filipino migrant workers. If this group is included in the estimates of 
the middle classes, their size might be bigger considering the 
following distribution of OFWs by occupation: 
 Distribution of Overseas Filipino Workers by occupation and year (%) 
Year ProfESSIOnal/ managerial Clerical Service 
Others 
(viz. production) 
1992 28 3 32 37 
1993 25 3 35 37 
1994 31 3 35 31 
1995 23 2 38 37 
1996 20 3 41 36 
1997 23 2 35 40 
1998 26 3 37 34 
1999 27 2 35 36 
2000 31 2 36 31 
2001 38 3 36 23 
2002 37 3 34 26 
Source: Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (2002). 
24. The discussion on Muslim Mindanao draws from Abinales’ brief 
synthesis of the literature including his own writings on the topic. 
25. The indicators for calculating the Human Development Index 
include life expectancy at birth (years); basic enrolment ratio (%), 
high school graduate ratio (%--for HDI-1), functional literacy rate 
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(%-for HDI-2) and real per capita income (pesos for HDI 1); real per 
capita income (PPP US$) for HDI-1). 
26. The tentative conclusions in this paragraph, which will be validated 
statistically as soon as the researchers validate and qualify their data 
with insights from resource persons, are drawn from a tabulation of 
reported encounters by province. The author is grateful to Abinales 
and Ramos for giving her access to their dataset. 
27. The English version of this article would have benefited from a 
statistical analysis of provincial scores along an index of armed 
conflict in the post-transition period (1986 to 2004), poverty 
incidence and the human development index of the province in 2004 
as well as a comparison of the encounters from 1972 to 1985 and 
from 1986-2004. 
28. While cognizant of relational rather than quantitative measures of 
class stratification along the model of Weber and Marx, Filipino 
social scientists generally construct an image of the class structure 
from indirect measures of income and status. The two most 
reputable opinion polling institutions in the country use housing 
characteristics to classify respondents into four categories: AB, C, D 
and E, where AB constitutes the upper class and C the middle class. 
D and E are the lower classes. D is further subdivided into those who 
own the lot of their homes and those who do not. A Pulse Asia 
survey in 1998, 10% of the population of voting age belonged to the 
ABC classes; 18% were from the poorest class and 72% were from the 
D class. Of the D group, 43% were from the upper lower class (with 
lots) and 29% to the lower D. A similar survey in 2004 estimates 
about 8% in the ABC classes, 64% in the D class and 28% from the E 
class. 
29. Romulo noted that both surveys fared well at the national level in 
predicting the winners. Both surveys were within 1% of the actual 
percentage of votes received by GMA; SWS and Pulse Asia 
underestimated the percentage of votes for FPJ by 3.2 and 2.2 
percentage points respectively although the Exit Poll’s estimation 
was off the mark by 5.6. 
30. Quezon City, with a population of about 2 million people is one of 
the cities in Metro Manila. Close to half of its residents live in poor 
communities. The barangay is the smallest administrative unit in the 
Philippines. 
31. The estimates range from several hundreds to more than a million 
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people. Depending on their sympathy for Fernando Poe Jr., 
witnesses of both the Poe and the Aquino burials claim that the 
death of the leader they have affinity with mobilized more people 
than the other. Commenting on political pronouncements regarding 
the parallelism between the Poe’s burial and that of Aquino, 
sociologist professor and media columnist Randolf David (David 
2004) noted that while the crowds were comparable and both could 
be portrayed as heroic figures, their similarity ends there. Ninoy’s 
funeral was a political event that acquired religious meanings; FPJ’s 
funeral in contrast was a religious moment that acquired political 
undertones. Ninoy’s political symbol gained stature from the 
spiritualization of his death; his greatness has survived the failure of 
EDSA. FPJ as a cultural icon stood to lose everything from the 
politicization of his death. His star would have dimmed if his funeral 
sparked an EDSA IV. 
32. The term is used by Shaffer (2001) in a sensitive and insightful 
analysis of EDSA 3. 
33. There are indications from the 2004 elections, however, that the 
electorate from the lower classes has become more discerning of the 
pitfalls of the politics of personality (Gloria, Tabunda and Fonbuena 
(2004: 13). 
34. In a report to the Canadian International Development Agency, 
Reyes (2003) noted that the Philippines has not performed well in 
terms of poverty reduction. Poverty incidence has decreased by only 
9.7% or an average of 0.65 percentage points annually from 
1985-2000.  The Gini coefficient increased from 0.4466 in 1985 to 
0.4818 in 2000. 
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Political Parties and Democratic 
Consolidation in Korea 
Kie-Duck Park 
I.  Introduction 
Many factors like those of political economy, constitution, economic 
ideologies, social movements and electoral systems affect the 
consolidation of a democratic regime. Political parties and the political 
party system are also regarded to be very influential factors.  
Both democracy and consolidation are broadly defined in both 
minimalist and maximalist terms. Minimalists regard a political system to 
be democratic if political leadership changes peacefully through elections. 
It is best depicted by “institutionalizing uncertainty” (Przeworsky 1991: 
14),1 and “polyarchy” (Dahl 1971). Maximalists, on the other hand, 
emphasize the substantive elements of democracy. These elements 
include the mass public’s control of the government and the guarantee of 
an individual’s ideal life. 
Since both minimalist and maximalist definitions are not easily 
sharable definitions in one way or another, Juan Linz’s argument could 
be accepted as a commonly acceptable definition of democracy. He 
defines democracy on the basis of whether a political system allows basic 
freedoms, puts all effective political offices as the subjects of competition 
and includes all community members into the preference contestation.2 If 
we place Korea along a regime spectrum, with authoritarian and 
advanced democracy on two ends of the spectrum, and “electoral 
democracy” and “liberal democracy” respectively between the two 
extremes (Schedler 2001: 151), Korea will probably be somewhere 
between electoral democracy and liberal democracy (or “polyarchy”). In 
other words, from a non-maximalist stance, Korea can be regarded as a 
member of the family of democracies.  
Since the transition to democracy in 1987, democratic consolidation 
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has been a concern of Koreans mainly because they experienced two 
breakdowns of insufficient democracy in the early 1960s and 1970s. Social 
scientists as well as average Koreans are not confident enough of 
institutional democracy; rather call for substantive elements to be rooted 
in the community for the nascent democracy’s consolidation. Political 
parties are the most critical actors, which lead and even determine overall 
political actors’ behavior and attitude and formulate procedural rules 
resolving conflicts within their bounds. Therefore, political parties and 
the party system are regarded as crucial institutions for democratic 
consolidation (Diamond 1999; Pridham 1990). 
This paper will analyze Korea’s party politics in the context of 
democratic consolidation. In carrying out this research, I will discuss 
related theories to develop an analytical framework. This will be 
followed by analyses of the relationship between parties and the state, 
inter-party relationships, and the interlocking of parties and society 
respectively. 
II.  Understanding Democratic Consolidation and Political 
Parties 
Democratic consolidation has been discussed as a process “centering 
around institutionalization and legitimization of democratic process” 
(Pravda 2001: 4). Conceptually, however, democratic consolidation has 
been discussed and defined with many “polysemic” (O’Donnell 2001: 
116) and “nebulous” (Pridham 1990: 8) words and concepts and is yet to 
be defined properly, both academically and practically. 
Political regimes, regardless of type, can endure when they produce 
good performance. If a democratic regime is to perform well, it should 
secure governability through legitimacy and development of efficacy and 
effectiveness (Linz 1978: 16-23). Performance, in turn, is fed back to 
governability. As long as a regime performs well, it is hardly possible for 
the performance-based regime to breakdown. Even if the regime’s 
performance were poor, the regime would last as long as particular 
dynamics leading to regime breakdown are successfully deterred. 
Here we can draw two methodological aspects of democratic 
consolidation: its quality and a way to approach to it. If we take the 
qualitative aspect of democratic consolidation, definitions of democratic 
consolidation, as mentioned above, diverge along “low level” (or 
minimalist) and “high level” (or maximalist) qualities. The minimalists 
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see consolidation as a state that keeps the democracy from slipping into 
authoritarianism (Pasquino 2002: 230). Thus, minimalist theorists, 
including Valenzuela (1992: 7) and Schedler (2001: 161), think that 
consolidation is complete if the authority is established and if major 
political actors, including the elite and the public, “expect the democratic 
regime to last well into the foreseeable future.” Scholars differ on 
“foreseeable future,” Huntington, for example, sees it as less than a 
decade.3 In order to meet this expectation of duration, elections and their 
surrounding freedoms should be institutionalized. 
Even democracy in high level consolidation does not guarantee 
anything, neither governability nor performance. That is because certain 
political phenomena are the contingent outcome of interactions among 
the relevant actors in accordance with the rules set and institutions. For 
minimalists, the uncertainty of no guarantee does not consist of any 
dissatisfaction with procedural democracy. This is quite different from 
the qualitative discontent of Shin (1994) with procedural democracy, 
which does not guarantee stability or survival of the regime. In addition 
to Shin, many scholars and most activists are not happy with the simple 
existence or duration of procedural democracy for a certain period of 
time. This is adequately addressed by the question, “Why have … 
persisting democracies not become consolidated?” which was raised by 
Diamond (1999: 71) on the basis of empirical observation.  
The concept or phenomenon of democratic consolidation is 
polysemic and nebulous. Proponents of high-level consolidation begin 
their argument with stipulation on how the new democratic rule can 
become “effective” (Croissant 2002: 10). Becoming “effective” is clearly of 
a tenuous nature. In-depth understanding of conceptualization of 
high-level democratic consolidation encloses even more dubious 
concepts like “deepening,” “habituation,” “internalization” and “taking a 
deep root” (Pravda 2001: 4). Those who advocate these concepts with 
regard to consolidated democracy, take into account such qualitative 
elements as mass participation, deliberation and egalitarianism. 
Furthermore, scholar’s addition of normative convictions to their 
conceptualization adds to the ambiguity. Thus, any definition of 
democratic consolidation is no more than a tentative understanding as 
long as it contains this nebulous ambiguity; no democracy in this regard 
will ever be “fully” consolidated. Therefore, “it is quite understandable 
that authors who support such a notion of democratic consolidation are 
highly reluctant to extend the “certificate” of democratic consolidation at 
Asian New Democracies: The Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan Compared 
 
 
130 
all” (Schedler 2001: 162). This is why Schedler (2001: 161) urges to restrict 
the use of the two “negative” notions: “avoiding democratic breakdown 
and avoiding democratic erosion.” 
Now we turn our attention to how to approach democratic 
consolidation. The meaning of democratic consolidation, as Schedler 
(2001: 150) argues, depends on our “empirical view points” and our 
“normative horizons”; thus varies in accordance with the contexts and 
the goals we have in mind. Schedler classifies democracy in a four-fold 
manner along a regime spectrum, from authoritarianism to electoral 
democracy to liberal democracy and finally to advanced democracy, and 
characterizes this as the approach to democratic consolidation (Schedler 
2001: 152). Those who analyze regimes from qualitatively superior to 
inferior types, equate democratic consolidation with avoidance of 
“regression,” “erosion,” “slow death,” “quick death” or “breakdown.” 
This is a negative notion of democratic consolidation. Those who 
inversely look from inferior to superior democracies equate democratic 
consolidation with “deepening” or “completing” democracy. This is a 
positive notion.  
In between these two notions is the neutral usage of democratic 
consolidation; it calls for more than institutionalization of basic ground 
rules that is “institution building,” which implies constructing all 
organizations that make up the characteristic infrastructure of liberal 
democracies, including the political parties, party system, three branches 
of government and systems of interest mediation (Schedler 2001: 158). 
Political parties and the party system are thus integral to democratic 
consolidation.  
For theorists of democratic consolidation, long-term regime 
sustainability is the principal concern. Institutions and actors of 
democratic systems are the factors that affect sustainability. Among the 
actors, political parties are the most critical collective actors who can 
mobilize political, economic and other resources for the realization of 
their political goals. This is because political parties as the most powerful 
actors and strategic vehicles control, moderate and integrate all forms of 
various actors’ participation (Hungington 1968; Morlino 1987: 25). 
Analysis of the functions of political parties in Korea vis-à-vis 
democratic consolidation necessitates a working definition of 
consolidation. Using the working definition of democratic consolidation, 
developed by Linz and Stepan (2001: 95), Korean experience can be 
discussed on three levels  behavioral, attitudinal and constitutional.4 
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Behaviorally, a democracy can be evaluated as consolidated if no 
meaningful actors strive to secede or establish a non-democratic regime. 
Attitudinally, a democracy is consolidated if a strong majority of the 
people, despite any problems or dissatisfaction with the current situation, 
support democratic procedures and institutions as the best regime 
alternative. Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated if the 
people spontaneously accept  i.e. legitimate  the resolution of conflict 
within the bounds of democratic legal and institutional process. In a 
similar vein, Diamond (1999: 65-71) discusses consolidation in 
normative/belief and behavioral dimensions on elite, intermediate and 
mass public levels. 
In this paper, political parties is taken, like by Diamond (1999: 66-67), 
as the key collective actors who facilitate robust legitimacy involving a 
shared behavioral and attitudinal commitment to the specific rules and 
practices of a country’s constitutional system. To avoid shortcomings of 
minimalist democracy, delegative democracy, political institution and 
political party in particular should be strong enough to function in a 
benign manner. That is because in the political process, political parties 
are supposed to provide people with legitimate means to input interests 
and interact with others, and they ultimately bring about better 
governance in a legitimate way. In this regard, political parties are 
“agents” of interests input as well as “channels” for participation. They 
are not only “the most powerful actors” but also simultaneously 
“strategic vehicles” for the actors. 
Political parties and their functions with regard to democratic 
consolidation can be discussed on three levels: their relation with the 
state, relation among themselves, and their relation with the society 
(Pridham 1990: 26-38). Political parties have a special position in 
consolidation since they formally monopolize elite recruitment, electoral 
candidate nomination and the legislative branch of the state in the form 
of access, in representative democracies. Therefore, the functioning of 
political parties, in the form of their relationship with the state, will be 
discussed first by analyzing spoils of the monopolies, and their effects on 
and contributions to the democratic regime. 
If political parties are organizations representing people’s interests 
and ideological orientation, there must be heterogeneity in parties and 
party system based on the diversity of the people. Which party or a 
group of parties controls the legislative branch, the executive one or both 
of them really matters. The ideological and policy orientation of parties, 
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their internal organization, the power relationship among them, and the 
character of competition among them will be analyzed thereafter. These 
characteristics of parties and inter-party relationship will be discussed in 
the second section. 
Political parties are intermediary organizations especially between 
the state and the society. So, how societal sectors are represented by 
political parties, how the parties are rooted in society, and whether the 
political parties promote social integration are the questions to be 
answered in this paper. Whether the election facilitates the functioning of 
parties, and how they are evaluated by the people are also analyzed. This 
relationship between parties and society will be discussed in the third 
section. 
This paper views parties as the key collective political actors that 
facilitate legitimacy along with the categorization of interactions among 
relevant political actors, namely political parties, the state and society. 
Even though the state and society have developed more direct contact 
through internet communication systems recently, political parties are 
still the most important intermediaries between the state and society. In 
the following parts, I will discuss the relationships between parties and 
the state, among parties, and between parties and the society in the 
respective sections. 
III.  Political Parties and the State 
Political parties can influence the consolidation of a democratic regime in 
relation to the state. Their influence on the consolidation process will be 
discussed along with their roles in the political system. The roles might 
be system-supportive or anti-system. In implementing the 
system-supportive roles, some parties could presume a leading role as 
government parties and others as opposition. How parties legitimate the 
system and, at the same time, how the pro-system opposition parties 
behave, are within our interest. 
Parties’ intermediary role has been changed to that of service 
institutions with the support of the state (Katz and Mair 1997). As service 
institutions, parties have new political goals like professional politicians 
equipped with managerial technology and efficiency. Parties depend on 
state finances for their capital-intensive electoral campaigns in the form 
of subsidies and access to mass media. The “cartel parties” incorporated 
by the state and their competition becomes contained accordingly. 
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Government parties are in a better situation than their opposition 
counterparts in terms of patronage benefits, access to media and resource 
allocation. So the disparity between parties and the distance of parties’ 
roles from their expected ones are the barometers of democracy and 
democratic consolidation as well. 
Through some indicators of a “cartelized party system” developed 
by Katz and Mair (1997: 109-114), like capital intensiveness of electoral 
campaign, managerial skill as a basis of party competition and privileged 
access to state-regulated channels of communication, and the allocation 
of positions, favors and patronage (Blondel and Cotta 1996), we analyze 
the current situation of Korea’s party system, its democraticness and 
ultimately its impact on democratic consolidation. 
Election campaigns are very costly in Korea as in other countries. 
Since the 1987 democratization, campaign styles have changed from mass 
rallies and direct vote-buying to purchasing TV hours. Legislation of 
political finance law has been less than effective until the 2002 
presidential election. Virtually all parties and candidates violated the law 
by reporting only a partial amount of campaign costs despite receiving 
soft money from industries and individual capitalists. Given the 
dominant influence of regional politics, national elections both 
presidential and National Assembly elections, are decided by candidates’ 
birthplace, affiliation to a party strong in a particular region and districts, 
in case of congressional elections. Nevertheless, access to financial 
resources is still important in districts where effects of regionalism are 
minimal. 
The government party and its members outplay their opposition 
counterparts in raising funds. This disparity has been more or less 
checked by each party’s ideological orientation and possibility of 
winning. In the 2002 presidential election, opposition candidate Lee 
Hoi-Chang was known to clearly outspend the government party’s 
candidate, Roh Moo-Hyun. This was because Mr. Lee and his Grand 
National Party (this reads as Hannaradang in Korean, has no equivalent 
Chinese characters, and means “Political Party of the Great Nation”) 
represented business interests, and was expected to win the election by a 
comfortable margin. Despite the limitation of campaign finance and less 
than enthusiastic organizational support from his party, Roh won the 
election with devotional staff and supporters along with effective 
campaign strategies in the high-tech age of the Internet and cell-phone.  
The 2004 general election was a watershed that divided Korea’s 
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electoral behaviors. The high-tech campaign skills, such as utilization of 
internet communication cut campaign costs drastically. Resolution of 
voters not to be dragged into fraudulent campaigns and strict law 
enforcement by the National Election Commission and national 
prosecutors relatively neutralized the power of money.  
TV campaign vía debates and buying advertisement slots have been 
the most effective mode of electoral campaign since the 1987 
democratization and the 1997 presidential election in particular. 
Candidates of major parties were treated relatively equally by media. The 
candidates enjoyed the government-paid TV and radio time and 
participated in TV and radio debates. Fundraised money and 
government subsidies were also paid for TV and radio slots. In addition, 
media instinctively traced major candidates. Although the current bias in 
media access against minor candidates was seriously discriminatory, 
media access was readily and fairly provided to candidates who had 
good chances to win.5 This gap was bridged by universal access to the 
Internet. However, internet illiteracy among elderly voters and delayed 
reform of electoral laws are areas of difficulty for minority parties, 
newcomers and even average voters. 
If elections are to provide proportionate representation of social 
groups, discrimination of minority parties, their candidates and 
independent candidates would result in unjust representation of 
underprivileged groups and also in less chance of win for newcomers. 
Repeated reformat of election-related laws is an attempt to make political 
and campaign finance transparent; provides more subvention, broadens 
channels for fundraising from various sources, allocates more TV time 
and improves the report system. These reforms were legislated by 
initiative of the congressmen from major parties, and therefore, 
discriminates the minority parties and their candidates, newcomers and 
independents. This remains as a source of loss of legitimacy of the 
electoral system, especially in light of the wide-range egalitarianism that 
flows in Korean culture. 
In a presidential system, the relationship between parties and the 
state, which is represented by the government, could be narrowed to that 
between ruling party and the government. General elections in Korea, 
since the 1987 democratization, have repeatedly produced a sort of “split 
governments,” which refers to the failure of the president’s party in 
securing the majority of the congressional seats. If the president intends 
to secure the majority in the National Assembly, s/he has two choices: 
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increase the number of assemblymen affiliated with his/her party or 
makes a coalition with some of the opposition parties. Presidents usually 
chose the former option by “inviting” opposition party members or 
independents to the government party. President Kim Dae-Jung chose 
both the options.6 This usually resulted in political stalemates 
accompanied by fierce opposition of the biggest opposition party. The 
public also perceives this as illegitimate.  
The policy connection between the government and the ruling party 
is expected as one of the party goals in order to implement their policies 
by taking seats in the government. As Kwak (2002: 423) points out, 
patronage can be a crucial means for both parties and the government in 
exerting influence on each other.  
The presidential-type governments in Korea are not enforced by 
constitution to appoint ruling party congressmen to any positions in 
cabinet. But the president is permitted to do so by the constitution and 
other laws. Many cabinet positions and positions of the presidential office 
are filled by members of the ruling parties.7 Positions in public 
enterprises are the most remarkable spoils allocated to the contributors of 
the presidential election in one way or another. Since the 1997 economic 
crisis and concurrent reforms, many positions have been filled by trained 
business managers. However, the positions are still utilized as rewards 
for the appointees’ previous contribution or as incentives for their future 
cooperation. This results in inefficiency of public enterprises. Although 
patronage in this regard could work as cement bridging the government 
and the ruling party, we don’t know in whose favor the exchange of 
positions and royalty/contribution is balanced. Nevertheless, what we 
can say with regard to the “cartelized party system” is that there is some 
evidence of its characteristics in Korea’s party politics. The symptoms of 
the cartelized party system are growing: as of September 2004, key 
government positions like prime minister and ministers of unification, 
social welfare, and culture and tourism were filled by prominent 
politicians of the ruling party. 
The party-government consultant meeting could be exploited by the 
ruling party to exert its agenda on the government policymaking process. 
Under the Roh Moo-Hyun presidency, this consultant meeting is not held 
anymore due to the president’s farce posture pretending to restrain from 
exerting his influence onto the ruling party. 
 As long as the National Assembly is the legislative branch, the 
assembly’s prime objective is to propose bills. However, given the limited 
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knowledge and expertise of congressmen, there is a descending trend in 
the number of bills proposed. Currently, many newcomers of the ruling 
party competitively propose reformist bills regardless of their chance of 
passing through the congress.  
There are no anti-system political parties in Korea. Ten members of 
the newcomer Democratic Labor Party were elected for the first time in 
the April 2004 general election to represent the labor sector with the 
expectation that they would moderate the radical unions. Even though 
they are generally system supportive, occasionally they are pushed, 
primarily by two factors, to join the militant union demonstrations on the 
streets. One is their failure to constitute a “congressional negotiating 
body” due to a limited number of affiliated assemblymen.8 Another is the 
hardliner policy of their mother organization, the Korean Confederation 
of Trade Unions (KCTU). In addition, some factions and individual 
members of the ruling Uri Party (meaning “Our Party” and the full name 
reads as “Our Open Party”) adopted more hardliner policies. They, for 
example, supported the decision made by the Presidential Committee for 
Fact Finding about Suspicious Death to make reparations to the former 
North Korean spies, who were tortured to death by government officials, 
for “their contribution to democratization.” Even though this radical 
departure from Korea’s traditional politics was blocked by other 
government organizations, it still constitutes a destabilizing 
phenomenon. 
IV. Inter-Party Relationships 
Three factors characterized Korea’s party politics from the 1987 
democratic transition to Roh Moo-Hyun’s inauguration: (1) personality 
based parties, which were organized, nurtured and controlled by 
prominent political figures, were the main actors in party politics; (2) 
they were basically dependent on regional support; (3) conservative 
ideological and policy orientation. The pluralist electoral system of 
single-member districts along with these three factors decides the nature 
of the party system. 
“Three Kims,” namely Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Kim 
Jong-Pil, developed their leadership during Park Chung-Hee’s 
authoritarian period and organized their own parties on the basis of 
exclusive control of political resources and their constituents’ enthusiastic 
cult-like support. Roh Tae-Woo, a remnant of Chun Doo-Whan, inherited 
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Chun’s party. Each of them had loyal supporters in their regional 
strongholds and each party had a conservative ideological orientation 
with minor differences.9 The regional basis of voting behavior of the 
constituents produced a moderate multi-party system despite 
“Duverger’s Theorem.”  
Two issues are pertinent to the institutionalization of the electoral 
system: the nature of party system and representation of social groups in 
the Congress. The ruling parties have intended to form various types of 
party systems (whichever was advantageous to them) on the basis of the 
pluralist electoral system principle. Despite the election engineering by 
government parties, the parties almost always failed to win the majority 
of votes in general elections, with only one exception in 1967 as we can 
see in Table 1. Therefore, various measures in regard to district size and 
electoral formulae have been mobilized in order to transform the 
minority votes to a congressional majority. 
The plural electoral system favors both the ruling party and its main 
opposition. The two biggest parties together won less than half of the 
votes cast in two elections (1954 and 1960), and won more than 70% of 
the votes in four elections of 1958, 1967, 1971 and 1973, until the year of 
democratization (1987). This means that the “electoral party system” has 
changed from a multi-party system in the early years, to a two-party 
system in the Park Chung-Hee period, to a moderate multi-party system 
with three or four parties in recent years. In the two most recent elections, 
the two biggest parties collected almost three-quarters of the total valid 
votes. Thus, the party system pendulum is swinging towards the 
two-party direction. 
With the growing number of politically significant parties, the ruling 
party became more concerned with securing a majority in the National 
Assembly. The most effective measure was the use of the “national 
district”. The national district system has been in use since the 1963 
election (with highly-skewed formulae favoring the government party), 
and has usually helped the government party win the simple majority 
votes.10 People did not vote separately from the vote for the 
single-member districts for the national district. Instead, votes cast for 
candidates running in the single-member districts were counted for the 
party-lists until the 2000 election. Given the share of votes won by the 
ruling party, its share of seats won in the national districts is skewed in 
favor of the party.11
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Table 1 Congressional Elections in Korea 
Percentage of Votes (Seats) Won by Party 
1st Party 2nd Party Others 
Election 
Year 
Term 
(Years) 
Size of 
District 
(Seats) 
Turnout Rate
(%) 
Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats 
1948* 2 1 95.5       
1950* 4 1 91.9       
1954 4 1 91.1 36.8 56.2 7.9 7.4 55.3 36.4 
1958 2 1 90.7 42.1 54.1 34.0 33.9 23.9 12.0 
1960 1 1 84.3 41.7 75.1 6.0 1.7 52.3 23.2 
1963 4 1 72.1 33.5 62.9 20.1 23.4 46.4 13.7 
1967 4 1 76.1 50.6 73.7 32.7 25.7 16.7 0.6 
1971 2 1 73.2 48.8 55.4 44.4 43.6 6.8 1.0 
1973 6 2 73.0 38.7 66.7 32.5 23.7 28.8 9.6 
1978 3 2 77.1 31.7 62.8 32.8 26.4 35.5 10.8 
1981 4 2 78.4 35.6 54.7 21.6 29.3 42.8 16.0 
1985 3 2 84.6 35.3 53.6 29.3 24.3 35.4 22.1 
1988 4 1 75.8 34.0 41.8 19.3 23.4 46.7 34.8 
1992 4 1 71.9 38.5 49.8 29.2 32.4 32.3 17.8 
1996 4 1 63.9 34.5 46.5 25.3 26.4 40.2 27.1 
2000 4 1 57.2 39.0 48.7 35.9 42.1 25.1 9.2 
2004** 4 1 60.6 38.3 50.8 35.8 40.5 27.4 8.7 
Source: National Election Commission Website: http://www.nec.go.kr/ 
Note: * The congressional elections were held with little development of political 
parties.  
** In this election, congressmen from the national district were elected by 
party-list vote. The percentage of votes is counted only from the party-list 
vote. 
 
The two-member-district system was adopted in four elections for 
two purposes favorable to the ruling party: (1) to secure representation 
from the capital city, which is politically symbolic12 and (2) to win at least 
one seat in each of the local districts by dividing the opposition parties. 
Given its organizational and financial endowment, the ruling party could 
win the most or at least second most votes in each district. Due to the 
combination of the two systems, i.e. the national district and the 
two-member local districts, the government party won the majority of 
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congressional seats with less than the majority vote. A disparity of each 
district’s population size was another factor that favored the ruling party 
because the ruling party faired better in rural districts, which have 
smaller population but the same number of representatives compared to 
the urban districts.13
Only in 1967, the government party won the majority of votes cast, 
as shown in Table 1. Until the 1985 election, the government party won 
the majority of congressional seats (averaging 61.5%) with less than 40% 
of votes in 10 elections. The largest disparity was in the 1978 election 
when the ruling party won almost two-thirds (62.8%) of congressional 
seats with popular votes 1.1% less than the biggest opposition party 
(31.7% vs. 32.8%).  
In the case of the ruling party’s winning the most congressional seats, 
the second biggest party has won the proper share of seats while the 
government party has benefited by winning extra seats, exceeding its 
proper share, due to the electoral system bias. What needs to be 
emphasized is that the deep-rooted regionalist voting behavior diluted 
the electoral system’s effects.  
However, the ruling party failed to secure the congressional majority 
in elections between the years 1988-2000. This post-democratization 
phenomenon was caused by the multi-party system, which consisted of 
regional based parties. This “split government” might open a window of 
opportunity for consensus-oriented political behavior despite worries of 
a declining sense of responsibility in politics under the majoritarian 
oriented political system. 
Despite the appearance of a multi-party electoral party system, 
Korea has maintained a de facto two-party congressional party system. 
Even when third parties emerge to exercise a casting vote in case of 
rivalry between the ruling party and its main opposition, the government 
party has recovered congressional majority through merger with other 
parties or invitations of independents and congressmen of opposition 
parties. This is possible because ideology and policy orientation are 
secondary to winning office and power. Korean political parties’ 
preoccupation with particular rewards and patronages, and lack of 
interest in questioning policy orientation promoted “intra-categorical, 
including intra-class, rivalry on the one hand, and inter-categorical, 
including inter-class, cooperation on the other”, as in Philippine 
politics.14
In order to maintain the parties’ functional mechanism and allow 
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them to compete effectively against their opponents, each party has to 
satisfy to some degree the personal needs of its leaders and followers, as 
well as the needs of the various social strata they represent. Therefore, 
both groups of parties, which are all catch-all parties that do not exclude 
any ideological factors, identically speak for everybody and ultimately, 
for nobody. The moderate multi-party system operates in a two-party 
system way in Korea. 
The supposed Sartorian advantage of a two-party system in which 
“the parties compete centripetally, soft-pedaling cleavages and playing 
the game of politics with responsible moderation” (Sartori 1976: 191-192) 
did not occur, mainly because Korean politics is not ideological. That is, 
the two parties or two groups of parties are virtually identical moderate 
parties, and the floating voters are also moderates mainly because ultra 
nationalistic and ideological groups are completely excluded from the 
political system. The existence of floating voters contributes to the 
fraudulent “machine politics” aspects of the system.  
In the early years of independence, anti-system social sectors and 
parties threatened the regime. But the threats from inside were overcome 
with the end of the Korean War. Up until 1997, political parties, which 
were contained by narrow ideological boundaries, competed and fought 
against each other fiercely but centripetally for the scarce resources and 
attractive positions. In order to win the “democracy vs. anti-democracy” 
confrontation, parties cooperated with ideologically close ones and made 
“connected” coalitions, or, at times merged into a stronger party.  
The Kim Dae-Jung government was a transitional government in 
some ways. Overall party politics took on a similar pattern as in the 
previous governments. But, it touched on North Korea related issues 
which was a taboo. The predominantly conservative behavior of 
politicians and parties gave way to calls for development of better 
relationship with North Korea and opening up politics to the progressive 
elements of the society. Civil society and NGOs in particular were 
actively invited by the government party to broaden its support base.  
When Kim Dae-Jung was elected as president, thanks to the 
“disconnected-coalition” with the ideologically distant ULD (Union of 
Liberal Democrats), his party NCNP (National Congress for New 
Politics) held slightly more than a quarter of the total Assembly seats. 
Even with his coalition partner, the ULD, the government coalition 
controlled only about 45% of the seats. Even during the short involuntary 
and popularly enforced honeymoon period, the opposition party that 
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controlled the majority tried to reject the president’s choice for prime 
minister, while it reluctantly cooperated with the government to pass 
reform bills under the pressure of the 1997 economic crisis. The 
government party’s active “invitation” of opposition congressmen to 
switch camps, mostly via covert threats of punishment for their past 
illegal activities like those of power abuse, corruption and human rights 
violations, has resulted in a loss of popular support. The ruling NCNP 
has been disproportionately checked from inside by the coalition partner, 
which enjoys casting votes. 
Korea’s political terrain has been affected by a series of changes since 
the election of Roh Moo-Hyun as the president. The 2002 presidential 
election was the watershed event dividing party politics from the past in 
Korea. When he was inaugurated, he led a small number of his close 
supporters to come out from the Millennium Democratic Party, the 
NCNP’s successor, to organize a new government party, the Uri Party. 
After incorporating the nation’s most progressive element, he ran a series 
of risky political gambles in order to win the forthcoming 2004 general 
election. The most dramatic gamble was the intentional 
impeachment-inducing election law violations. The congressional 
election was held during the impeachment trial at the Constitutional 
Court, which was filed by a two-thirds majority in the congress. His 
power and authority as president were suspended during the trial. This, 
along with the “save-the-president” crusade by the government-run TV 
station, turned the political tide to the government party’s advantage. 
The party won the election to secure a congressional majority, 151 out of 
total 299 members. 
Under the umbrella of this congressional majority led by 
progressive-hardliners, a variety of deviant political behavior, activities 
and incidents occurred. For one, is the crusade for “cleansing the 
history”; this has irritated the nerves of the opposition party and whole 
conservative sectors in the country. Ceaseless political conflicts make 
journalists busy. Such incidents, like the Presidential Committee for Fact 
Finding about Suspicious Death, and seemingly unsuccessful 
negotiations with the United States to reduce its military presence on 
Korean soil, have made the public uncomfortable and insecure. 
Centrifugal political conflicts among political parties and between 
progressive and conservative sectors in the public are also primarily 
initiated either by the president himself or by the hardliner sectors of the 
ruling bloc. A kind of ideology-based politics began to take place in 
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negative ways. The result is a sharp descent in support not only for the 
ruling party and the president but also for other political parties. As of 
July 4, 2004, only 25.7% of the people supported the President and 27.1% 
for the ruling Uri Party, compared to its rival Grand National Party’s 
29.5% (Munhwa Ilbo Daily News 2004.07.06). 
V.  Political Parties and the Society 
Political parties are intermediary organizations between the state and 
society. If various social interests are to be represented in the political 
process, as Diamond (1999: 75-76) argues, political parties are required to 
secure “stability in their bases of support, ongoing linkages to social 
groups and forces, and the ability to adapt to social changes and to 
incorporate new actors.” In this section, in the spirit of Pridham (1999: 
27-28), some issues are discussed: how far political parties have carried 
their system legitimating function into the public arena, how the parties 
have related to interest groups and social movements, how the parties are 
well-rooted in society and perform a role of social integration, whether 
elections are taken normally and work legitimately as instruments to 
represent and input people’s interests into the state, and how the parties 
are evaluated by the people. These issues will be discussed by sorting 
them into two parts.  
1.  System Legitimization by Facilitating People’s Participation 
Political parties’ role of system legitimization can be discussed both in 
terms of their relationship with the state and their relationship with 
society. Political parties legitimating the political system should promote, 
among others, people’s participation in the system. This necessitates an 
examination of the people’s participation in policy/law formation and 
their implementation/execution level, and participation in elections 
Generally, parties have not effectively represented the interests of 
the people in the legislative, policy and political process. The ruling party 
has been no more than an agent of the president and his government in 
Korea; the opposition party has virtually been a spoiler of the ruling 
party’s political agenda. Policy/legislation processing has exclusively 
been for winning the competition for office and power. Furthermore, 
Korean elections are taken in accordance with voters’ primary social 
identity rather than a reflection of the social structure and policy 
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preferences of social sectors. As a result, people’s interests, ideological 
orientations and policy preferences have not been effectively addressed 
through elections 
Due to the inefficiency of the parties, the civil society organizations 
have emerged to replace the party. The organizations’ policy advocacy, 
which oversee political processes, focus on parties’ activities and crusade 
for the mobilization of the people, are counted on by the people. More 
people began to see these organizations as replacements to the parties in 
representing them. As a result, political parties are desperate to allure 
civil society organizations to become their allies and, concurrently, not be 
cornered by the organizations. In order to allure the civil society 
organizations and the people to support them and party politics as a 
whole, parties are seeking reform measures to attract people’s interests.15
Koreans’ political participation through elections is rather limited 
than full-fledged. In this regard the parties, as major actors which field 
their candidates in the elections, and party politics are experiencing crisis. 
As we can see in Table 2, turnout rates are the highest in the presidential 
elections, the second in the National Assembly elections and the lowest in 
local elections. If we review the turnout rates in a different way, we can 
find that turnout rates in all of the three elections have declined with time. 
Even the Internet system has not meaningfully promoted people’s 
participation in elections yet.16 In comparison with other countries, the 
descending trend is not unique to Korea. Nonetheless, the trend can be 
interpreted as alarming, since Koreans are hardly finding parties to 
deserve their support; thus are more disinterested and more cynical 
towards political parties and party politics as well.17 This cynicism, along 
with a very limited number of party members who pay the party 
membership fee, demonstrates how the parties are shallowly rooted in 
society. Even though the Internet could facilitate people’s participation in 
politics, it has neither meaningfully promoted people’s participation in 
the election (Yun 2003) nor promoted two-way communication between 
political parties and civil society (Kwak 2001).18 Insufficient ideological 
identities of political parties also aggravate people’s voting behavior 
based on regionalism (Park 2001).  
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Table 2 Voter Turnout Rates since the 1987 Democratization 
Dates of Elections Presidential Elections National Assembly Elections Local Elections* 
1987. 12. 16 89.2   
1988. 04. 26  75.8  
1991. 03. 26   Less than 60# 
1991. 06. 20   Less than 60@ 
1992. 03. 24  71.9  
1992. 12. 18 81.9   
1995. 06. 27   68.4 
1996. 04. 11  63.9  
1997. 12. 18 80.7   
1998. 06. 04   52.7 
2000. 04. 13  57.2  
2002. 06.13   48.8 
2002. 12. 19 70.8   
2004. 04. 15  60.6  
Source: National Election Commission Website: http://www.nec.go.kr/ 
Note: * Local elections are including gubernatorial, provincial assembly, mayoral 
and municipal assembly elections.  
# Municipal Assembly Election only. 
@ Provincial Assembly Election only. 
 
Nevertheless, political parties are still the dominant political actors 
who monopolize the authority of fielding candidates in elections and 
ultimately control the legislative branches, not only at the national level, 
but also at the provincial level.19 Political parties have competitively 
adopted a so-called “citizen-participating competitive nomination 
system” in order to enhance people’s participation and ultimately to 
increase people’s support for them since the 2002 presidential election. 
This is not a full-fledged democratic nomination process; it is quite 
limited but still the first small step towards practicing a better democracy. 
During the campaign for the 2004 general election, efforts of the 
concerned authorities, including the National Election Commission, the 
police and the public prosecutors, kept the general election very clean 
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and fair.20 Koreans’ cynicism towards elections, if not towards the parties, 
dramatically lessened. A series of succeeding reforms in electoral system 
and party politics will make Koreans accept elections and political parties 
as indispensable to the consolidation of Korean democracy. Because both 
the parties and the people know this well, political parties are trying to 
reform themselves in spite of the short-run obstacles drawn both from 
inside and outside. Providing better opportunities for minority groups, 
including women and handicapped citizens, to be represented in their 
party lists for the national district is one of the reforms. 
2.  The Relationship with Interest Groups and Social Movements 
As long as politics is about the allocation of social values, conflicts among 
actors for this allocation are political. Political parties are the major actors 
in the conflicts and, concurrently, the only channels in the political 
process that seek resolutions to conflicts. If the parties are to contribute to 
the consolidation of democracy through resolution or peaceful 
management of the conflicts, they should function as channels through 
which conflicts are brought into the political process on the one hand and 
as the concerned parties of the conflicts by competing only with other 
political parties on the other. Thus, parties should be organized by their 
policy/ideological orientations, which serve as guidelines for the 
channeling and for the competing.  
Up until the Kim Dae-Jung presidency, interests groups such as 
unions and business associations were forbidden by law from organizing 
their own political parties or being involved in politics through 
financial/organizational aid to parties. Each of the parties has pretended 
to represent all interests. As a result, every party virtually remained as 
catch-all parties until the great compromise between the government and 
the unions (the latter’s political rights in exchange for their restraint on 
exercise of economic rights, including wage hikes) was reached. As 
discussed in the previous section, for parties with virtually identical 
ideology/policy orientation, policies and ideologies are second to 
winning office and power; political parties of this kind fostered and 
amplified conflicts among interests rather than resolved them. 
With the grant of legal permission, the KCTU (Korean Confederation 
of Trade Unions), one of the largest unions, organized its own party, the 
Democratic Labor Party, in order to represent labor’s interests. The party 
ultimately won 12 seats out of a total of 299 to emerge as the third largest 
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congressional party in Korea after a series of defeats in the previous 
presidential and congressional elections.21 They drew much more media 
attention than expected on the basis of their share of congressional seats. 
Even though no parties declare to be the sole representative of business 
interest, leading parties have represented the business interest relatively 
well. Although the volatile behavior of the ruling Uri Party’s 
assemblymen at times disguised the party’s orientation as ultra 
liberal-progressive, the Uri Party has not inflicted structural damages on 
the business interest yet. They are myopic to disguise themselves as 
quasi-populist. Some of the party’s policies and some of its members are 
criticized as “socialist” and/or “pro-North Korea” by the conservative 
sectors. But with time the party and its members have adopted more 
pragmatic and realistic stance. All in all, the DLP’s entrance into congress 
and the ruling Uri Party’s deviant political style and policy/ideological 
orientation are the signals to the onset of new politics in the country. 
With democracy deepened, the movement circle that encompassed 
activist organizations fighting for democratization during the 
authoritarian period has disappeared. They are practically replaced by 
the civil society organizations or NGOs. Given the vested interests of the 
political parties as organizations and agents that monopolize the 
congress and the political process, the emergence of advocacy NGOs is 
quite uneasy to the parties. Since Kim Young-Sam presidency, civil 
society organizations are subsidized by the government in order to 
develop strategic cooperation for political reforms. However, the Kim 
Young Sam government was not so successful mainly due to the 
imbedded conservative element in his party.  
Kim Dae-Jung and his parties (strategically reorganized or renamed 
political groups that supported him in order to adjust to the new political 
environment) were more successful in attracting the NGOs because they 
remained relatively intact from the remnants of the authoritarian regimes. 
Kim Dae-Jung recruited key aides from the movement circle during the 
authoritarian period and mobilized leaders of the civil society 
organizations since the 1987 democratization. He incorporated the 
leaders to many political parties which he created, reorganized or 
renamed. After being sworn into the presidency, President Kim Dae-Jung 
dramatically raised the government subsidy to NGOs in order to secure 
their support. Virtually all NGOs, except for perhaps the two most 
influential organizations, CCEJ (Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice) 
and PSPD (People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy), accepted the 
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subsidy and were cooperative to the most progressive government, until 
then. President Kim Dae-Jung also sought quasi-populist alliance with 
the civil society organizations in order to win the most congressional 
seats in the 2000 general election.22 However, his party failed to win 
either a majority of total congressional seats or the most seats. 
Nevertheless, he kept himself from going populist way for two reasons: 
(1) he could form a congressional majority by recovering the alliance with 
ULD, other minor parties and independents, (2) he was not able to win 
the majority support from the people because of the deep-rooted 
regionalism, which cornered him as the perennial minority leader (Park 
2002: 64-67).  
The Roh Moo-Hyun government succeeded the Kim Dae-Jung 
government, is regarded as more progressive. The new power elite of the 
Roh government represent the former student activists who fought 
fiercely against authoritarianism through the “grand democratic coalition 
line”; characterized by strong nationalism and a strategy of putting the 
class struggle aside until the “national contradiction” is resolved.23 Their 
legacy of nationalism and the delayed awakening for “class 
contradiction” situates them in the ultra-leftist and even pro-North Korea 
camp, by the people. This elite group is now the dominant power in the 
National Assembly and in the presidential office; not as ruling party 
members but as a group by the same “code.”  
The civil society organizations, which have a closer political line 
with the new ruling elites than the major opposition parties, remain to be 
co-opted. As a result, the government-NGO relationship is not likely to 
evolve toward a “governance model,” which assumes autonomous civil 
society and its equal relationship with the state (Lee 2001). The civil 
society organizations influence the politics and policy processes without 
legal/procedural legitimacy. In this regard, the civil society organizations 
suffer the people’s suspicion of being a bastion of “delegative 
democracy” and, at the same time, agents of the ruling bloc. In either case, 
political parties become less powerful and more alienated from the 
political process. 
VI.  Conclusion 
The currently ruling party, as a whole, and its individual members have 
irritated the nerves of the conservative camps, which are still the 
mainstream political forces. Political conflicts and the concurrent 
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stalemates have reduced support rates for political parties in general, and 
the ruling party and the president in particular. Despite these issues, 
there is no sign of a radical departure from the democratic way of life, 
like a military coup d’état,24 in the country. 
Since the 1987 democratization, no anti-regime political parties have 
developed. All political parties have put their interests in the democratic 
competitions, namely elections. Losers spontaneously comply with the 
results of competitions with the expectation to win later on.25 The 
newcomer, Democratic Labor Party, also participated in the democratic 
competition though at times it joined the street demonstrations organized 
by their radical mother organization.  
The political party system is a “closed party system” in which only 
the government parties have exclusive access to the patronage and spoils. 
Many reform measures, including the partial opening of the candidate 
nomination process to the public, tight control of political finance and 
introduction of the genuine national district with party-list proportional 
election, has made party politics more democratic, transparent and stable 
than before.  
However, the reform measures are either initiated or pressed to do 
so by voters, the popular sector and civil society. Thus, the political 
parties are not the reformers who work for the consolidation of 
democracy in Korea. They are the beneficiaries of various reforms, which 
are led by voters and the civil society organizations. Even though the 
omni-directional reform drives by the ruling Uri Party currently resulted 
in a bit of centrifugal competitions among the political parties, they are 
not centripetally competing against each other. If the parties as a whole 
would strive for implementing rational reforms, they would not remain 
as simple beneficiaries of reforms initiated by the people and civil society. 
They will become contributors to the consolidation of democracy. 
Nevertheless, since democratization, political parties have mobilized 
such strategies of expediency as reshuffling the existing party system 
through changing party names, merger with other parties and invitation 
of congressmen from outside as the best winning election strategies 
rather than developing/executing good policies. Such strategies mostly 
deprive bases of retrospective voting from voters in elections. This would 
possibly make the political parties simple electoral machines and could 
ultimately damage the very raison of existence of the parties. 
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Notes 
1. According to the minimalist definition of democracy by Adam 
Przeworski, institutional democracy is an institution which would (1) 
be accepted by the relevant political forces, (2) allow some free 
interplay, a limited but open-ended competition among interests, 
and (3) evoke spontaneous compliance, that is, absorb the relevant 
political forces as participants willing to subject their interests to 
uncertain competition and to accept the outcomes (Przeworski 1988: 
9). 
2. According to Linz (1975: 182-183), a regime can be regarded as 
democratic “when it allows for the free formulation of political 
preferences, through the use of basic freedoms of association, 
information and communication, for the purpose of free competition 
between leaders to validate at regular intervals by nonviolent means 
their claim to rule … without excluding any effective political office 
from that competition or prohibiting any members of the political 
community from expressing their preference.” 
3. Samuel Huntington presumes “two-turnover” of power between 
political parties as an indicator of democratic consolidation 
(Huntington 1991: 266-267). 
4. According to Linz and Stepan (2001: 95), “behaviorally, a democratic 
regime in a territory is consolidated when no significant national, 
social, economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant 
resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a 
non-democratic regime or by seceding from the state.” “Attitudinally, 
a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public 
opinion, even in the midst of major economic problems and deep 
dissatisfaction with incumbents, holds the belief that democratic 
procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern 
collective life, and when support for antisystem alternatives is quite 
small or more-or-less isolated from pro-democratic forces.” And 
“constitutionally, democratic forces alike become subject to, and 
habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the bounds of the 
specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new 
democratic process.” 
5. Kwak (2002: 415-419) demonstrates many evidences of 
discrimination of minority party candidates.  In the real world, 
arithmetical equality is usually snatched by the commercialized 
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sense of the efficiency of the mass media. 
6. Former president Kim Dae-Jung was elected with his party member 
congressmen occupying slightly more than a quarter of the total 
number of congressmen. He could win the election by forming an 
election coalition with the third largest party. He, as promised, 
appointed congressmen and other persons recommended by the 
coalition partner to several cabinet positions. 
7. For example, during the 13 years between 1988-2001, 6 out of 15 
prime ministers (or 40%), the same number of the Ministers of 
Finance and Economics, and 11 out of 18 Ministers of Government 
Administration and Home Affairs were members of the ruling 
parties (Kwak 2002: 424). 
8. The Democratic Labor Party had only 12 congressmen, 8 members 
short of constituting a congressional negotiating body. 
9. Korea has developed a political party system with a narrow and 
conservative ideological spectrum.  This is mainly due to the 
division of the country in accordance with the ideological 
orientations into two parts, South Korea and North Korea. 
10. Size of the national districts varied randomly. Either a certain 
number of seats or a proportion (one half or one-third) of the total 
single-member districts’ seats were elected from the national district.  
Two-thirds or one-half of the total seats elected for the national 
district were allocated to the ruling party and the remaining seats to 
the other parties proportionally. Only recently have the seats of the 
national district been distributed to parties by their share of the total 
votes for national districts with party-lists separately cast from for 
the single-member districts.  
11. The share of seats distributed to the ruling party, which were 
derived from the popular vote, are as following: 50% of seats from 
33.5% of votes in 1963, 61.4% from 50.6% in 1967, 52.9% from 48.8% 
in 1971, 100% from 38.7% and 31.7% in 1973 and 1978 respectively, 
66.3% from 35.6% and 35.3% in 1981 and 1985 respectively, 50.7% 
from 34.0% in 1988, 53.2% from 38.5% in 1992, and 39.1% from 34.5% 
in 1996. See, Shin (1996: 200), Chosun Daily News (1992: 16-30) and 
The Sejong Institute (1996: 64). 
12. The government party hardly won any seats in the capital city until 
the 1971 election, and it, in turn, caused legitimacy problem for the 
party. 
13. Regionalist voting behavior has diluted the effect of urban-rural 
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disparity since the 1988 election. 
14. In the Philippines, such political behavior is possible because “in the 
perpetual contest over the allocation of particular rewards, the 
intense rivalry takes place among those who are most alike, not 
between those who differ from each other in their attributes and 
needs” (Landé 1968: 736). 
15. For more internal reforms by each of the Korean political parties, see 
Thornton (2004: 35-39). 
16. Quite differently from the expectation, the Internet effects on 
elections and real politics are not so crucial.  The Internet system 
still neither exerts significant influence as a media of new delivery or 
opinion maker nor was so successful in creating new political 
participation. The widespread use of Internet activities does not 
always mean an increase of political use of the Internet (Yun 2003) 
17. Generally as much as almost 50% of the people do not support any 
political party. This percentage is kept low when the new 
governments are just inaugurated in and rises to the highest point 
either when the governments are suffering impotence of lame-duck 
or when the general election is approaching and so parties are 
engaged in dog-fighting for collecting votes.  For example, during 
the Kim Dae-Jung government, the percentage reached to as high as 
61.4% (The Jong Ang Ilbo 2000.02.02). During the Roh Moo-Hyun 
presidency, the percentage of the people reached to 50% as early as 6 
months since his inauguration (The Jong Ang Ilbo 2003.08.21) as the 
support rate for the president’s performance was sliding from 72.1% 
in one month after inauguration, 43.1% after four months and 37.7% 
after six months (Munhwa Ilbo Daily News 2003.08.18). 
18. Kwak (2001) also argues that the information put on the Internet by 
the parties seems to be shared openly but the Internet seems to fail to 
be utilized to promote for parties’ transparency, openness, party 
accountability and responsiveness. 
19. Candidates for all executive and legislative positions are now fielded 
by the parties in Korea. But until the local election of May 2006, 
elections for aldermanship of municipal assembly were held 
independently from political parties. So no alderman can be 
affiliated to any political parties for keeping municipal politics away 
from politicking. Given that mayoral candidates are fielded by 
political parties and also that most of the strong alderman candidates 
were unofficially endowed by National Assemblymen sharing the 
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alderman candidates’ districts, the claimed justification loses its 
ground. 
20. For more information on the electoral and political finance reforms 
and their implementation in the Korea’s 2004 general elections, 
please see Thornton (2004: 29-35). 
21. Union members voted as ordinary Korean citizens, who usually 
identify themselves by their primary attachment such as region.  
Therefore, candidates fielded by the Democratic Labor Party failed to 
collect far less votes than its membership size. Out of the DLP’s 12 
elected Assemblymen, only 2 were elected from the single-member 
districts and the remaining 10 were from the national districts with 
party-list proportional election in the 2004 general election.  
22. President Kim Dae-Jung and his party leaders implemented three 
strategies in order to win the election: (1) the president endorsed 
NGO activism of blacklist and blackballing movement, (2) the ruling 
camp has tried to attract civil society activists by reshuffling the 
ruling party, the NCNP (National Congress for New Politics), into a 
new one, the MDP (Millennium Democratic Party) and (3) the 
president and his government began to prioritizing welfare 
programs under the banner of “productive welfare” in attempt to 
regain support from the sectors that were marginalized up until then 
(Park 2000: 414-416). 
23. The activist line was quite different from their rival student activist 
group, who were advocating “class conflict” first. The nationalist 
group found the source of Korea’s structural social problems in 
neo-imperialism, and so the urgent problems to them were “nation 
conflict”. 
24. A major general in charge of an army division command argues that 
military coup d’état is permanently impossible in Korea on the five 
grounds: (1) wide-spread of internet communication system and cell 
phones do not permit the junta to plot any successful coup, (2) 
extreme traffic jam in the metro-Seoul area would virtually block out 
the military vehicles’ advance to the power center located in 
downtown even if they are mobilized to gather in a particular place, 
(3) the junta would not be able to block the people from 
communicating each other only by controlling the conventional mass 
media, and so they would fail to justify their coup through 
controlling the conventional communication channels, (4) the 
military is the least developed sector in Korea differently from the 
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conventional wisdom that a coup d’état could be successfully 
launched by the military when it is the most developed sector in a 
society, and (5) the military themselves are those who know the 
above four facts best (Monthly Joongang 2004: 149). 
25. Political actors would put all their interests on democratic 
competitions repeatedly only if the outcome of the democratic 
process remain within two limits: on the one hand, some groups do 
improve their material situation as a result of their participation in 
the democratic competition, either in terms of policy outputs or by 
acquiring new positions, and, on the other hand, the improvement 
does not systematically alter the original balance of power among 
the participants in the competition. If the democratic competitions 
keep going, the democracy is a consolidated regime. For the similar 
argument, please see Przeworski (1991: 14). 
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Limited Democratization and 
the Future of Democracy in Korea 
Kwang-Yeong Shin 
I.  Introduction 
On March 12, 2004, for the first time in the parliamentary history of South 
Korea, President Roh Moo-Hyun, a former human rights lawyer, was 
overwhelmingly impeached by 193 to 2 and his presidential power 
suspended in the National Assembly. It was the consequence of 
long-standing political maneuvering by the opposition party, begun in 
February 2003 when Roh Moo-Hyun took office. The Opposition party 
that had earlier reined in power for more than 30 years did not accept the 
loss, with narrow margin, in the two consecutive presidential elections of 
1998 and 2002 well. Furthermore, the opposition parties were a majority 
in the National Assembly, thereby exercised strong veto power to rebuke 
major political reform policies launched by Roh. In fact, the impeachment 
of President Roh Moo-Hyun symbolizes the contentious politics 
developed in the post-authoritarian period; this was the outcome of the 
mode of democratic transition in Korea.  
The mode of democratic transition in Korea was regime change by 
transaction.1 Unlike the cases of Portugal and Eastern Europe (Bermeo 
1999: 123-125), the democratization movement succeeded in enabling the 
transition to democracy but failed to break down the old regime. The 
transition was a political transaction between the ruling elites and the 
opposition elites who were not core actors in the process of struggle for 
democracy. Unique to Korean transition to democracy is the split of 
opposition elites that resulted in the continuance of the old regime as an 
outcome of political transaction, seen in the newly institutionalized 
presidential election. This was a critical juncture that triggered reactive 
sequences in the post-authoritarian politics.  
Asian New Democracies: The Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan Compared 
 
 
158 
The accumulation of reactive sequence after 1987 demonstrates three 
distinctive features of post-authoritarian politics in Korea, which are: (1) 
the hold of conservative power bloc, which maintained and exerted 
strong power over the trajectory of new democracy. (2) contentious 
politics wherein chicken game developed as the dominant form of game 
due to the strong authoritarian power bloc (3) key role of the civil 
movement organizations, and not political parties, in the newly 
democratized society because political parties, entangled in the chicken 
game, did not mediate and coordinate different interests of social groups.  
This paper will examine the origin and development of the 
contentious politics that culminated in the impeachment of the President 
in March 2004, through an analysis of democratic transition and 
consolidation in Korea,. The Korean case testifies that the mode of 
transition affects the trajectory of political development, as it shapes the 
matrix of the political game, transforms the political agenda, and limits 
institutional reform. Even after 17 years, since its transition to democracy, 
Korean politics continues to remain an untouchable arena-unaccountable 
to the populace and disconnected from the civil society. Spelling out the 
political dynamics that resulted in the contentious politics in an extreme 
way, this paper shows that the mode of transition to democracy might 
exercise much stronger impact on the nature of democracy than expected, 
in the post-authoritarian society.  
This paper consists of four parts. The first part deals with the 
uniqueness of the mode of transition to democracy in Korea. Despite high 
levels of popular mobilization and violent protests against dictatorship, 
democratic reform was restricted and fragmented The limited democracy 
was the outcome of the controlled democracy by the incumbent ruling 
elites; old guards seized power for almost 10 years after the mass struggle 
for democracy in 1987. The second part addresses the paradox of 
democratization that resulted in limited democracy wherein 
authoritarian political parties utilized the democratized political 
environment to survive; they made a grand conservative coalition that 
included major newspapers, business groups and ultra rightist social 
groups. The third part discusses the changing society and its impact on 
Korean politics. The monopoly of public opinion by conservative 
newspapers has significantly eroded due to the rise of alternative 
resources of information such as Internet and television. Rapid 
development of information technology and information service 
contributed to the mobilization of the powerless in the election. The last 
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two elections demonstrated warfare between Internet and printed 
newspapers and warfare between the young and the old generations. The 
last part discusses the impact of the impeachment of the President on 
Korean politics. The general election that occurred during the 
impeachment showed fundamental shift in power dynamics of the 
National Assembly, the ruling minority party became the majority party 
and the opposition parties experienced setback. Due to the backlash of 
the impeachment, the liberal reformist party outnumbered the 
conservative opposition parties and the leftist party entered the National 
Assembly for the first time since 1956.        
The Korean case provides a good platform to address the issue of the 
mode of transition to democracy and its impact on the path of political 
development. Due to the incomplete break with the authoritarian past, 
the conservative political party continues to exert power to nullify 
leadership of the newly elected president, by means of intense 
contentious politics in which policy debates are set aside and personal 
instigations prevail. Thus party politics is a chicken game that has given 
rise to political cynicism among the ordinary citizen.  
II.  The Mode of Transition to Democracy in Korea 
Transition to democracy in Korea has four phases wherein different 
agendas emerged as national issues and involved different actors. The 
first phase was the continuation of the rule by the authoritarian regime, 
legitimated by the formal procedure of competitive presidential elections 
in 1987. The democratization struggle in June 1987 changed the rules of 
game in politics but failed to change the political actors who controlled 
the executive power. Due to the split of the opposition candidates 
between Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Young-Sam (usually they were called as 
two Kims),2 Rho Tae-Woo of the Minjung Dang(the Democratic Justice 
Party), the former military general who was the key personnel of the 
Chun Doo-Hwan regime, won the presidential election in December 1987 
with only 35.9% of votes in December 1987.3 As the pro-democracy voters 
were divided into two equally large groups, the former general Roh 
Tae-Woo could fish in the troubled water with almost one third of total 
voters. The failure to change the authoritarian regime resulted in panic 
among social groups and political activists committed to the struggle for 
democracy. 
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It significantly deterred the democratic transition in two ways. 
Firstly, the dictatorial regime regained its damaged power by formal 
legitimacy confirmed by the Presidential election, one of the core 
institutional feature of formal democracy. Authoritarian regime 
maintained power and used political leverage to counter popular 
demand for radical reform. Secondly, the opposition movement lost the 
momentum for a while because the long struggle for democracy proved 
to be a failure due to personal rivalry between the two opposition leaders. 
Although the civil society opposition movement was well developed 
during the anti-military dictatorship struggle, it did not develop its own 
political organization to purse its political agenda. The defeat of the 
opposition parties demoralized the opposition movement in general. In 
addition, Roh Tae-Woo initiated party mergers with Kim Young-Sam, 
one of the key opposition political leaders, and Kim Jong-Phil in order to 
overcome the minority status of the ruling party in the National 
Assembly. It was a political strategy by Roh to counter pressure for 
democratic reform from civil society.4 Kim Young-Sam considered party 
merger to be the best strategy to become Presidential candidate, in the 
next election in 1992; while as leader of the third largest party he did not 
have a chance to win the presidential election and so considered 
leadership of the newly merged party as the best strategy to win the 
election. Because Kim Jong-Phil was the leader of the smallest 
ultra-rightist political bloc, he also considered the party merger as a good 
opportunity to expand power of conservative forces. The formation of 
Minjadang (the Democratic Liberal Party) was a political earthquake that 
transformed the nature of political game and deepened the cleavage 
between the political society and the civil society.  
The second phase was the period of the Kim Young-Sam 
government- the first civilian government. For the first time in more than 
30 years a civilian candidate won the Presidential election in 1992. Kim 
Young-Sam led the majority ruling party formed by party merger in 1990; 
the majority in the ruling party, however, were politicians from the 
former authoritarian party.5 Further, although he begun his tenure as 
President with massive reforms, he quickly abandoned the attempt 
within three months owing to pressure from business, which became 
considerable in the second half of 1992. Thus, legal and institutional 
structure of the authoritarian regime was maintained during the Kim 
Young-Sam’s tenure. 
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The most controversial issue was the reform of labor relation law 
(hereafter LRL) that was legislated under the martial law in 1980, in the 
aftermath of the brutal oppression of the Kwangju Uprising for 
Democracy by the army ordered by Chung Doo-Hwan. The first attempt 
to revise this law-LRL bill passed by the National Assembly in 1988- was 
vetoed by President Roh Tae-Woo. The second attempt to revise the LRL 
was initiated by the Minister of Labor in Kim Young-Sam’s government 
in 1992. However, President Kim Young-Sam postponed the revision as 
the business launched a capital strike- stopped new investment- and the 
national economy rapidly deteriorated (Shin 2003). Membership of 
OECD in 1996 made revision of LRL inevitable; since the OECD 
stipulated the basic labor codes for all members.6 However, the revised 
LRL passed by the National Assembly was worse than the old one as 
conservative members of the ruling party changed the bill submitted by 
the government in favor of chaebol. This provoked a general strike right 
after the announcement of the passage of the bill in the National 
Assembly. The general strike across the nation and people’s support for 
the strike forced Kim Young-Sam’s government to revise LRL again in 
early 1997. Thus, it took almost 10 years to revise the oppressive labor 
laws, after the democratic transition began in 1987.   
The third phase, begun with Kim Dae-Jung’s victory in the 
Presidential election of 1997; this resulted in regime change as the ruling 
party that governed Korea for more than 30 years transferred power to 
the opposition party. The regime change, however, was incomplete with 
regard to two things- First, Kim Dae-Jung’s political coalition with Kim 
Jong-Phil, the ultra rightist political leader, to beat the ruling party 
candidate, Lee Hoi-Chang. After the election, the coalition severely 
curtailed the room to maneuver for Kim Dae-Jung; led to ideological 
discord and eventually separation of the two Kim’s. Second, the 
conservative party, which became the opposition party after the 
Presidential election, still controlled the National Assembly as a majority 
party and utilized the parliament to attack Kim Dae-Jung. Lee Hoi-Chang 
who lost the election continued as leader of the conservative party and 
remained a vehement critic of Kim Dae-Jung. Thus state capacity was 
considerably weakened by the presence of a strong opposition party in 
the National Assembly.  
The five-year term of the Kim Dae-Jung’s government was marked 
by personal condemnations of the President and frontal attack of 
government’s policy as the conservative mass media coordinated the 
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propaganda warfare. Major conservative newspapers, which supported 
Lee Hoi-Chang in the presidential election in 1997, cooperated with the 
conservative politicians to debase the new civilian government.7 The 
extreme hostility between the ruling party and opposition party 
developed from 1998 onwards; the final result of the party politics was 
the dominance of the “chicken game” in which cooperation was least 
favored and consistent confrontations was the dominant strategy in the 
National Assembly.8  
Furter, Kim Dae-Jung failed to bolster support from labor unions 
and the popular sector because he pursued neo-liberal reforms as 
demanded by the IMF (International Monetary Fund). As a result, a large 
number of his former supporters withdrew support for President Kim. 
Conflicts between the government and labor intensified, as in case of the 
strike staged by the Daewoo Motor Company Union in January 2001. 
Workers in Daewoo Motor Company called for the strike to demand 
withdrawal of the company’s plan of mass layoff and selling out to 
General Motors (GM). The Daewoo strike was the test case to check the 
effectiveness of workers’ struggle against the neo-liberal policy during 
the economic crisis. The KCTU, the Democratic Labor Party, and many 
other social movement organizations supported the strikes. The brutal 
oppression of the strike by the riot police signaled the end of cooperative 
relation between labor and the state. The tension between the state and 
labor as well as between labor and capital became more overt and more 
intense since the Kim government did not alter its neo-liberal economic 
policy.  
The fourth phase began with the Rho Moo-Hyun government. Roh’s 
victory in the Presidential race was dramatic since it was widely believed 
that Lee Hoi-Chang would win the elections given the low rating of Kim 
Dae-Jung and the disarray in the New Millennium Democratic Party.9 
Further, while Kim Dae-Jung’s popularity had declined owing to his 
political inability to carry out reform, Lee Hoi-Chang had got increasing 
support from the people in 2002. Many indicators from national polls in 
late 2001 strongly showed that Lee would win the Presidential election in 
2002.10 Nevertheless, Roh Moo-Hyun beat Lee Hoi-Chang by a narrow 
margin. The larger participation of the younger generation in the voting 
than previous elections suggested the support Roh Moo-Hyun drew from 
the younger generation; the results are also considered as the victory of 
the young generation over the old generation.  
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Roh Moo-Hyun however proved to be the weakest President in 
Korean political history, since his political power was shaky with 43 
supporters out of 299 in the National Assembly. He formed his own 
party, the Uri Party; thus disconnected from the old political guards of 
the New Millennium Democratic Party who were reluctant to accept Roh 
Moo-Hyun as the Presidential candidate of the party. Rho Moo-Hyun 
was a politician without much support within the party; this did not 
affect his candidacy in the Presidential elections because of the 
introduction of the primary system as a method of selection of a 
presidential candidate within the party.11 Roh garnered support from the 
voters simply because he represented the reformist social bloc though he 
was a minority in the party. Moreover, the opposition party and 
conservative social groups controlled the National Assembly and 
delegates of the opposition party controlled almost all local governments. 
Business and mass media were more conservative than any other sectors 
in Korea. In short, Conservative power bloc besieged Roh Moo-Hyun and 
his party. Voters who supported Roh Moo-Hyun were largely young 
people who did not have organized power resources.  
Despite a weak power base, Roh did not compromise with the 
conservative parties, rather intended to breakdown the old political 
system by prosecution of corrupt politicians and businessmen involved 
in illegal political funding as well as by introduction of reform-oriented 
economic policies. In particular, he carried out the investigation of 
campaign fund of the last presidential election; this was a threat to the 
opposition party that still controlled the National Assembly. Roh also 
broke from the New Millennium Democratic Party and formed his own 
party, the Uri Party. The two opposition parties were now much larger 
than the Uri Party in the National Assembly. Further, investigations 
revealed, in early 2004, crimes committed by the opposition parties and 
that made the opposition party, the Grand National Party, desperate to 
find a way out to avoid political disaster before the general election in 
April 2004. In cooperation with the New Millennium Democratic Party, 
the Grand National Party claimed the investigations to be a politically 
oriented strategy to liquidate the opposition parties; it chose 
impeachment of President Roh as a way to get out from the possible 
political nightmare.       
The 5-year term for President owing to the negotiation between the 
military regime and the opposition has generated political change every 5 
years; it has set the parameters for competition and affected the efficacy 
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of political campaign. Nevertheless, the consequence of the first 
democratic election triggered sequential chain of reactions and 
counter-reactions among political parties. The political development in 
the post-authoritarian era shows that the path dependence on the initial 
set of conditions of the first stage of transition to democracy strongly 
affected the next stage of political development. The upshot of sequential 
democratization is the establishment of limited democracy as a form of 
democracy and contentious politics as the content of democracy in 
Korea.12 
This limited democracy, in which authoritarian legacy continued 
and new rules of game were not fully institutionalized, resulted in 
vehement conflicts over the pathways of democratization. Democracy 
itself is a contentious concept in the sense that it has too many different 
connotations and sometimes those connotations are diametrically 
opposite. While the minimalist approach to democracy concerns 
procedural democracy such as free election, freedom of speech and 
freedom of thought, the maximalist approach concerns social and 
economic democracy as the core elements of democracy. Despite free 
elections of President and Congressmen, the new democracy in the 
post-authoritarian era has not been institutionalized to fulfill the basic 
political demands of the people. As Choi Jang-Jip argues, democracy 
after democratization, as the end result of the sequential change of 
political institutions and party politics, was degradation in the quality of 
democracy (Choi 2002). As the political parties including the opposition 
parties wanted political change only to the extent to which their interests 
were fulfilled, social movement organizations attempted to mobilized 
people to reform politics from outside. Thus, with the development of the 
contentious politics, the cleavage between the political society and civil 
society has been wider than ever before.     
III.  Dual Transition under the Limited Democracy 
In the late 1990s, Korea experienced dual transition. The first part of dual 
transition was the transition of power from the authoritarian party to the 
opposition party, for the first time since 1961. The power shift was 
historic since Kim Dae-Jung, the new president, was the symbol of 
political opposition for more than 30 years. The second transition was the 
replacement of the authoritarian labor law by the democratic labor law. 
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Labor law reform was one of the most contested issues of 
democratization- a stubborn legacy of the authoritarian regime, which 
was strongly resisted by the business (Shin 2003). 
Political power shift took place in the third phase of the democratic 
transition in 1997. Although Korea experienced democratic transition in 
1987, the prolonged rule of the ruling party for 10 years made it hard to 
radically transform institutions and practice developed under the 
authoritarian rule. Thus, even in the process of democratic transition, 
authoritarian personnel were entrenched in the major institutions and 
exercised power to resist the pressure for democratic reform from the 
civil society.  
It took 10 years for the opposition candidate, Kim Dae-Jung to win 
the presidential election in 1997. Kim Dae-Jung’s attempt to reshuffle the 
state bureaucracy and the oppressive state apparatus faced intense 
resistance from the elite bureaucrats and high officials in those 
organizations, most of whom were recruited by the previous government 
and were still loyal to the former ruling party. Strong resistance from the 
bureaucrats severely curtailed state capacity to execute pro-democratic 
reform  
The most significant attempt to overhaul the authoritarian legacy 
was transformation of the oppressive state apparatus in 1998. Kim 
Dae-Jung’s attempt to reorganize government organizations including 
the former Korea Central Information Agency (KCIA) that was the core 
instrument for oppression of political activists was challenged by 
defiance of the dismissed. Dismissal of key personnel who were actively 
engaged in oppression of the democratic movement, led to legal suits 
against the order officials used legal procedures to protect their interests. 
This symbolizes a case of stubborn resistance by the authoritarian force 
against democratic reform through utilization of the appeal procedure- 
newly allowed in the democratic society. This was the paradox of 
democratization- authoritarian power bloc efficiently took advantage of 
the new democracy to falter democratic reform. Given the minority status 
of his party, Kim Dae-Jung experienced organizational limitation in the 
state apparatus and political inability in maneuvering the political game 
in the National Assembly. 
Labor reform, the second part of the dual transition under Kim 
Dae-Jung, was also restricted mainly due to the economic crisis and 
Kim’s own ideological orientation. With the help of IMF’s bailout 
program, Kim Dae-Jung introduced neo-liberal reform policy to 
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overcome the economic crisis triggered by the foreign exchange crisis in 
1998. The implementation of the policy measures suggested by the IMF,13 
had immediate impact on employment and poverty-led to rise in 
unemployed workers and rapid expansion of the poor. Even though the 
newly revised labor law enhanced workers’ rights, the economic 
condition endangered job security of workers as it allowed companies to 
dismiss surplus labor power. Almost 100 thousands of workers were 
dismissed per month in 1998. In practice, workers’ citizenship guaranteed 
by the labor law had nothing to do with security of workers. Legal rights 
did not have any substance for workers. Kim Dae-Jung’s neo-liberal 
economic policy threatened the labor movement and labor began to 
challenge the neo-liberal economic policy. The relationship between Kim 
Dae-Jung and labor unions turned hostile and this led to wane in support. 
Kim Dae-Jung failed to make a coalition for pro-democracy reform with 
the largest organized social force in society. As a result, he faced 
challenges from both conservatives and progressives.  
The limited democracy resulted in three distinctive phenomena in 
the Korean politics. First, the culture of conflict that developed as 
quarrels and fights between political parties became routine in the 
National Assembly. The conservative majority party, to regain support 
from the people, used old tactics to blame Kim Dae-Jung government to 
be communist government. In the past, the authoritarian regime utilized 
the anti-communist ideology to oppress anti-dictatorship movement. 
National Security Law that was legislated during the authoritarian 
regime had been applied to prosecute political opponents by the 
authoritarian regime. Several conservative politicians of the former ruling 
party frequently denounced President Kim Dae-Jung as a communist.14 
To debase the leadership of Kim Dae-Jung, with the help of conservative 
newspapers, the opposition party consistently accused him of corruption 
and pro-North Korea attitude. Policy debate was a remote reality in 
Korean politics of the 1990s.  
The accumulated outcome of nasty party politics was political 
cynicism among ordinary citizens. The decreasing rate of participation in 
voting displays the political cynicism developed by the people. The 
voters’ participation in the presidential election continuously decreased 
from 1987 to 2002, 89.2% in 1987, 81.9% in 1992, 80.7% in 1997, and 70.8% 
in 2002 respectively. The voting rate in the general election also dropped 
sharply from 1988 to 2004, 75.8% in 1988, 71.9% in 1992, 63.9% in 1996, 
57.2% in 2000, and 60.6% in 2004.15 The decreasing voter turnout rapidly 
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undermined the stability of the new democracy in Korea. Contrary to the 
image of Korea as an over-politicized nation, Korea experienced the crisis 
of democratic institution with decreasing political participation.      
Second, a culture of struggle developed in the labor politics as labor 
unions desperately defended union members from the threat of layoff. 
Labor built organizational resource with the formation of the 
independent center for labor movement in 1995; the KCTU (Korea 
Congress of Trade Union) was established following the severe 
oppression of the state in 1995. Contrary to the KFTU (Korean Federation 
of Trade Union), the KCTU represents independent and democratic labor 
unions mostly formed during and after the host summer strike in 1987. 
While the workers were not fully empowered by the old labor law, 
workers’ struggle to organize impacted on the revision of the already 
revised labor law in the early1997. However, the working class did not 
have its own political parties. The working class parties or leftist parties 
were formed in the 1990s. But they failed to get significant votes to enter 
into institutional politics. Without political power resource, labor unions 
relied on strikes to accomplish their demands. Labor militancy was a 
consequence of structural constraint on the workers and democratization 
provided more opportunity to voice their grievances. 
Contrary to labor militancy in Korea, political power of labor was 
severely limited and less important in the 1990s. Even after democratic 
transition began, political exclusion of workers was exacerbated by 
strong regionalism. Regionalism was reinforced by the military regime to 
mobilize support from Youngnam region, which was the native region of 
three authoritarian presidents, Park Jung-Hee, Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh 
Tae-Woo. The support base of the parties was differentiated across 
regions. Because both the ruling party and the opposition party 
preoccupied voters from different regions, political parties that 
proclaimed to be progressive parties or party for workers could not 
penetrate into the vote banks. As electoral competition got tighter, the 
new party experienced harder obstacles to overcome regionalism. Only 
with the proportional vote system introduced in 2004, the Democratic 
Labor Party, formed in 2000, could get 10 seats.16 It was the first entrance 
of the leftist into the National Assembly since Cho Bong Am, the leader 
of the Progressive Party, who was sentenced to death in 1956.  
Third, social movement has rapidly developed and shaped the 
public discourse in 1990s. As democratic transition proceeded, new forms 
of social movement, called as “citizen’s movement,” that had different 
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orientations, different participants, and different strategies emerged. 
Major citizen’s movement organizations were formed in the early half of 
the 1990s that recognized the collapse of Eastern European countries and 
the necessity of new forms of social movement, different from the 
pro-democracy movement of the 1980s.17 While the anti-dictatorship 
social movement of the 1980s in which students were major actors aimed 
at toppling down the regime by violence, citizen’s movement in the 1990s 
aimed at social and political reform by civil society mobilization. In 
addition, leadership of the citizen’s movement organizations consists of 
professionals such as professors, lawyers, religious leaders etc. Contrary 
to the burst of the discourse on radical revolution among radical social 
scientist in the 1980s, the academic discourse on civil society dominated 
across different disciplines including social science and humanity in the 
1990 (Youn 1999). The plethora of the discussion of the civil society was 
directly linked to the rise of citizen’s movement in the 1990s.18 
Social movement organizations established in the 1990s have played 
an important role in mobilizing citizen’s interests in public issues. While 
political parties have been involved in political strife and contributed to 
the rise in political cynicism, social movement organizations consistently 
awakened the political concerns of the ordinary citizen. Furthermore, 
they have replaced the role of political parties in making public agenda 
and submitting reform bills to the National Assembly. However, the 
National Assembly dominated by the conservative party automatically 
turned down bills by carrying them over to the next session.19 In order to 
exert pressure on political parties, social movement organization utilized 
mass media to make some issues important public discourses. Discursive 
capacity as well policy making capacity became important assets of social 
movement organizations. Social movement organizations have agenda 
setting capacity-they criticize state’s policies, mobilize public attentions 
on the issues, and provide alternative policies. While political parties are 
perceived to be corrupt, social movement organizations were accepted as 
public interest and social reform agents. Thus, empowerment and 
development of social movement organization benefit from 
underdevelopment of party politics. Social movement organizations in 
South Korea are “quasi-political parties” in that they are do similar work 
as political parties and exercise much larger political influence on public 
opinion than political parties of the late 1990s.  
Social movement organizations contributed to the revision of labor 
law in late 1996 and early 1997. Regardless of their particular interests in 
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social issues, varieties of social movement organizations made a grand 
coalition against the retrogressive revision of the labor law in December 
1996. While labor unions and workers called for strike to defend their 
immediate interests, citizen’s movement organizations engaged in the 
protest to defend workers’ rights as human rights. Though occasionally, 
citizen’s movement organizations have been in conflict with labor unions, 
citizen’s movement have largely contributed towards expansion in the 
scope of worker’s rights and political space for labor unions by 
enhancing the consciousness of human rights and social consciousness 
among ordinary citizen.  
IV.  Changing Society and Transformation of Politics  
Traditionally, politics is considered as the realm of politicians, 
unaccountable to the civil society, in Korea. Mass media is believed to be 
the link between politicians and citizen. Mass media exercised social and 
political power over the people with their monopoly of information. De 
facto coalition of conservative politicians and major newspapers has been 
the foundation of conservative power bloc in the 1990s. Although 
alternative newspaper, Hankyeoreh, was established in 1989, the three 
major newspapers, supporting conservative party, shared more than 75 
% of newspaper market (Joong-Ang Ilbo 2004.07.16). They wielded 
monopoly power but their power is rapidly decreasing due to the 
expansion of Internet as an alternative media. The ratio of households 
that subscribe to newspapers dropped down to 43% in 2004 from 60% in 
2000. In particular, the share of three major newspapers reduced from 
41% to 31% (Joong-Ang Ilbo 2004.07.16). 
The sharp depreciation in readership of newspapers represents two 
related social changes in Korean society that significantly affect the 
politics- First, many people obtained information from the Internet rather 
than newspapers. As digitalization of information and expansion of 
information networks proceeded, newspaper became an old media. 
During the foreign currency crisis, the government initiated expansion of 
infrastructure of information industry by supporting information 
technology and information service. Almost 70% of households had 
installed the fast Internet network at the end of 2002- the highest rate for 
household installation of ADSL in the world (Financial News 2004.08.24). 
Internet users were estimated to be almost 20 million in 2000, 53.4% of 
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the total population, aged from 7 to 59 in August 2000 (E-trend 2000). 
Second, generation gap became much larger than before with the 
development of information technology.  A report on the index of 
information divide indicates that compared with the people in the 10s, 
the index of information of the people was 110.5 for the 20’s, 46.8 for the 
30’s, 27.5 for the 40’s, and only 8.6 for the 50’s (The Korea Center for 
Information Culture 2000: 214). Thus, younger generations get more 
information from Internet and television. The supremacy of print media 
over visual images seems to have ended. The boom of cinema and mobile 
Internet represents the new trend that is sharply different from the old 
one- those familiar with information technology and information from all 
over the world are view political openness and attitude differenty from 
those with static and localized information. Internet transformed the 
matrix of payoff among the participants in collective action by making 
the cost of participation almost nothing. Collective action through 
Internet is much easier than before because locality and time constraints 
do not matter anymore.  
The Presidential election testified the strength of digital generation 
as those who were not in power from the conventional sense got a new 
instrument to mobilize common interests. The winning of Roh 
Moo-Hyun was possible due to the strong support from the young 
generation. The young generation utilized Internet and mobile phone to 
mobilize power by translating virtual power into “real paper stones”. 
Internet messengers and mobile phones were used by the civic 
movement organization as well as unorganized young voters to 
encourage voting (Kim 2004). Since the generation gap turned out to be 
the largest in the Presidential election in 2002, it can be called a war 
between newspapers and Internet, and between the old generation and 
the young generation. 
The winning of Roh Moo-Hyun made possible the consolidation of 
democracy by liberal reform. Roh Moo-Hyun positioned himself as an 
independent liberal democrat, represented social forces that supported 
liberal democracy and distanced from the leftist or progressive camp. 
Though the conservative party blamed him for being a left-leaning 
radical, his policy orientation was far from those of the leftist parties of 
Europe and Latin America. He followed a path of transition from limited 
democracy to liberal democracy. However due to the minority status of 
his party in the National Assembly, his liberalist reforms were resisted by 
the conservative opposition parties. Confrontation between the ruling Uri 
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party and the opposition parties has further intensified with the unison 
of the two opposition parties to impeach President Roh Moo-Hyun.   
The impeachment was a political episode in that the most unpopular 
politicians initiated to topple down President Roh Moo-Hyun, who was 
no so popular either. In the beginning of his term, President Roh freely 
pursed his own political reform to expand social support but was 
stubbornly resisted by the two opposition parties. Due to the minority 
status of the ruling party in the National Assembly, he could not avoid 
hostile confrontation with the two opposition parties- the Grand National 
Party that was the former ruling party that originated from the military 
dictatorship, the largest party in the National Assembly and the New 
Millennium Democratic Party that was the former ruling party during 
the Kim Dae-Jung Government. Roh Moo-Hyun formed the Uri Party 
with his own supporters from the New Millennium Democratic Party as 
soon as he became the President. Most of the members of the Uri Party 
were reform oriented political and social groups relatively free from 
regional political bases. The Uri Party became the minority ruling party 
with the third largest number of congressmen, whereas the New 
Millennium Democratic Party became an opposition party with the 
second largest numbers of congressmen.  
From the beginning of his rule, Roh Moo-Hyun’s political reform 
measures instigated debate and the stalemate over political reform 
diminished his popular ratings. Owing to his stubborn attitude towards 
the opposition party and the poor economic performance of the first year 
of presidency, Roh Moo-Hyun significantly lost people’s support that 
was the only base of his power. Change in foreign policy orientation 
towards the U.S. also damaged his popularity during the first year of his 
5-year term.  
The opposition parties utilized the opportunity to overturn the 
reform and took advantage of it for the coming general election. The 
opposition party denounced the investigation as attempts to destroy the 
opposition party and considered the investigation as a political 
conspiracy by the Uri Party. Rather they blamed the President for 
involvement in illegal political fund raising; the two opposition parties 
frequently disclosed the scandals in which family members of Roh 
Moo-Hyun were involved. This was an intense and desperate game of 
chicken, in which opposition parties did not recognize existence of the 
minority ruling party as a legitimate counterpart of the political game. 
They sought impeachment of President Roh Moo-Hyun. While citizens 
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wanted thorough investigation of illegal political fund cases, the 
opposition parties wanted to avoid the possible fallout of the 
investigation.  
Roh Moo-Hyun did not compromise with the opposition parties 
after they submitted an impeachment bill to the National Assembly; the 
bill was passed by 193 to 2, congressmen of the Uri Party were blocked in 
the session for impeachment. This event stirred up people’s 
condemnation and rage against the opposition parties. Candle light 
demonstration took place on the main street of Seoul for several weeks. 
The general election during the impeachment period displayed the 
backlash of the voters against the two opposition parties. The Uri Party, 
the third largest party, became the majority party and increased its seats 
from 43 to 152; the Grand National Party got 121 seats, reduced by 12 
seats and the New Millennium Democratic Party was almost dissolved 
with only 9 seats. Those who led the impeachment process were all 
defeated. The impeachment resulted in transformation of party politics 
and restructured party system in the National Assembly. The 
impeachment of President Roh Moo-Hyun ended up with the victory of 
Roh Moo-Hyun over the opposition parties.  
The new development of the general election in 2004 was the rise of 
the Democratic Labor Party with 10 seats, 2 seats from local elections and 
8 seats from proportional election. In the proportional votes, the 
Democratic Labor Party received 13% of votes that was evenly 
distributed across the nation.20 The entrance of the leftist party in the 
National Assembly will not change the political culture immediately but 
the strong base of the Democratic Labor Party will promote policy 
competition based on political orientation. The so-called “color debate”, 
debate on communist orientation of the ruling party (conservative party 
continuously mobilized the anti-North Korean sentiment to attack the 
ruling party and President Roh, accused that the policy orientation of the 
ruling party was left biased.21) will be weakened as the genuine leftist 
party were represented in the National Assembly.  
Another new development was the change in composition of the 
National Assembly. Newly elected congressmen comprised 187 out of 
299, 62.5 % of the congressmen. New congressmen replaced almost 70 % 
of the congressmen. The proportion of reelected congressmen in the 17th 
general election was far lower than previous general elections. They were 
29.4% in 2004, 52% in 2000, and 44.3% in 1996 respectively. It indicates 
that voters wanted fundamental change in the National Assembly by 
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rejecting old politicians. Because of the long tradition of contentious 
politics, however, it is not predictable whether newly elected 
congressmen will show the changed political culture and practice or not.  
Due to the lower popularity of Roh Moo-Hyun and the 
intensification of rivalry among the possible presidential candidates 
within the Grand National Party, an opposition party, the confrontation 
between the Uri Party and the Grand National Party has been 
accentuated in the National Assembly in fall of 2004. After the retirement 
of Lee Hoi-Chang, the leadership of the Grand National Party was not 
stable. Competition was intense among the potential candidates for the 
next presidential election within the Grand National Party. This factor 
also limped party politics since each potential candidate and his or her 
faction competitively chose confrontational strategy to deal with 
President Roh and the Uri Party. Thus, the inspection of the 
administration conducted by the National Assembly in 2004 became a 
political platform for slander by the opposition party members. The 
opposition party has repeatedly accused Roh and the Uri Party for being 
leftist or communist party. The chicken game that was established in the 
Kim Dae-Jung’s government became a dominant form of party politics in 
Korea.  
V. Concluding Remarks 
Transition to democracy is complex and unpredictable wherein final 
outcome cannot be predetermined. However, we could delineate the 
pathways of democracy in the post-authoritarian regime, by taking into 
account the mode of transition to democracy. The Korean case shows that 
transition to democracy by transaction and the contingent political 
factors during the critical juncture led to the establishment of limited 
democracy and the development of the contentious politics that 
culminated in the impeachment of President Roh Moo-Hyun in 2004.  
While there has been much more complex political dynamics 
involved in the process of democratization in Korea, the initial conditions 
set the structural constraints that led to the development of particular 
institutional arrangement and of political culture. Narrative discussion of 
the Korean case shows that the sequences of actions and reactions that 
have occurred in the last 17 years were sequences of events that were 
characterized by previous conditions. The development of chicken game 
Asian New Democracies: The Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan Compared 
 
 
174 
as a dominant game in the party politics was a product of the transition 
to democracy by transaction in which old ruling party continuously 
exercised control over the process of democratization. The disruption of 
the trajectory of contentious politics was possible because of change in 
society. The general election in 2004 reflected new social cleavage among 
generations and new social trends that developed in the information 
society. The future of democracy in Korea thus depends on the impact of 
social change on party politics. While civic movement and labor 
movement have been key actors in challenging conservative politics, the 
political influence of voters via Internet have begun to play an important 
role in affecting the party politics. Nevertheless, it is hard to expect that 
the near future of Korean democracy will be fully exempt from the 
authoritarian legacy and will reflect a mature democracy since political 
leaders and political parties have not been accountable to the people after 
the election. It is hard to expect that a new political game will be invented 
and a new political culture will emerge in the near future. Thus, social 
movements outside the political institution should play a more important 
role than before to promote political reform and consolidate the new 
democracy in Korea.   
Notes 
1. The mode of transition to democracy by transaction refers to the 
creation of new rules of the game by negotiation between the ruling 
elites and the opposition elites wherein the ruling elite strategically 
accommodates to the pressure from the opposition. See Munck and 
Leff (1999: 198-203). 
2. In the Korean politics, instead of two Kims, three Kims are widely 
used in the popular discourse to indicate three leading politicians 
who have the same last name, Kim. They are Kim Dae-Jung, Kim 
Young-Sam and Kim Jong-Phil respectively. 
3. Two leading opposition leaders comprised 51.4% of the total vote 
with 25.9% for Kim Dae-Jung and 25.9% for Kim Young-Sam. 
4. Jang-Jip Choi called it “full scale transformation strategy” to totally 
transform the power matrix in the political society to react the 
pressure from the civil society. See Choi (1996). 
5. Minjungdang was formed by Chun Doo-Hwan who led the military 
coup in 1980 and became president of the 5th republic. 
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6. The labor relations law made under the martial law prohibited the 
union’s political activity and third party involvement in union 
activity and enforced the enterprise union as a unit of union 
organization. 
7. Chusunilbo, Dongailbo and Choong-Ang Ilbo, leading newspapers 
in Korea, supported Lee Hoi-Chang, the candidate of the ruling 
party, during the presidential election in 1997 and led the opposition 
to the Kim Dae-Jung government after the election. 
8. A player sticks to the tough strategy to hurt another player in the 
chicken game since the tough strategy is considered to be the most 
efficient strategy to get the supports from the people. When both 
players stick to the same tough strategy, the outcome is the worst 
one in which both players are most seriously hurt. See Dixit and 
Skeath (1999: 110-112). 
9. The popularity of Kim Dae-Jung was so high for the first year of his 
term. According to the national opinion polls, more than 80% of the 
voters supported Kim until February 1999. After that the popularity 
of Kim dropped down to 38.7% in December 2000 even when he 
received the Nobel peace prize. 
10. Gallup polls showed that Lee could beat any candidates from the 
New Millennium Democratic party in December 2001 with a large 
margin. For example, Lee was supposed to beat Roh Moo-Hyun by 
47.4% to 31.3%. While the support of Grand National Party was 
56.6%, the support of the New Millennium Democratic Party, the 
ruling party, was only 17.0% in December 22, 2001. See Gallup Korea 
Data Base. 
11. Because the New Millennium Party was so unpopular, Chung 
Dong-Young, one of the presidential candidates of the party in 2001 
and the Minister of Unification in the Roh Moo-Hyun government in 
2004, proposed the primary system to get concerns of the people, 
allowing citizens’ participation in the process of selection of the 
presidential candidate. In the past, the party leader chose the 
presidential candidate of the party by his own decision. 
12. Limited democracy refers to the policy in which elected 
governments exercise governance power but comprehensive 
citizenship is seriously restricted. The definition of limited 
democracy is different from that suggested by Collier and Levitsky. 
See Collier and Levitsky (1997). 
13. The IMF demanded four reforms: the labor market reform to 
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increase labor market flexibility, liberalization of the financial sector, 
the reform of the governance structure of chaebols by restricting 
group owner’s managerial power, and privatization of the public 
sector. 
14. Chung Hyung-Keun, a former KCIA high official for his lifetime, 
became a congressman of the conservative party and frequently 
charged Kim Dae-Jung of being involved in the communist activity. 
15. Due to the impeachment of President Roh Moo-Hyun, the voter 
turnout in the 2004 general election increased by 3.4% from 57.2% in 
2000 to 60.6% in 2004. Considering the political importance of the 
impeachment, in fact, the voting rate was much lower than expected. 
Voter turnout in Korea is much lower than those of the old 
democratic countries. For instance, England, one of the old 
democratic countries, has 74.9% of voter turnout and Sweden has 
much higher voter turnout, with 85.4% in the 1990s. Germany, a 
relatively new democracy in Europeans countries had 79.9% of voter 
turnout in the 1990s. See http://www.idea.int/voter_turnout/ 
voter_turnout1.html 
16. According to the new voting system in 2003, a voter can cast two 
votes in the general election; one for a candidate in his/her region, 
another for a party he/she likes. 
17. The Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), the first citizen’s 
movement organization started in 1989, announced the necessity of a 
new social movement that would address concrete interests of the 
ordinary people such as rent, housing price, drinking waters etc. The 
People’s Solidarity for People’s Democracy (PSPD), formed in 1994 
with more progressive orientation than the CCEJ, declared that 
procedural democracy failed to have real impact on the life of 
ordinary people and the quality of life could be enhanced by 
participatory democracy. The Korean Federation of Environment 
Movement (KFEM), formed in 1993 as a federation of eight 
environment movement organizations, addressed the anti-pollution 
movement as an urgent issue for the life of the people. Contrary to 
new social movement organizations in the West, these organizations 
are general social movement organizations that deal with all kinds of 
social and political issues from corruption by bureaucrats to human 
rights of minorit. 
18. In social science in South Korea, the discourse on the civil society 
became the dominant discourse among progressive scholars. 
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Citizen’s movement was discussed with respect to the concept of 
civil society. See Yoo and Kim (1992). 
19. According to the law of the National Assembly, bills deliberated in 
the session automatically aborted. Therefore, it has been frequently 
used tactic for congressmen not to deliberate some bills during the 
session to reject them. 
20. The Democratic Labor Party was the mostly favored political party 
among the secondly favored political parties. 
21. The authoritarian regime utilized the anti-communist law to oppress 
political dissidents and the red complex prevailed among the old 
generation. 
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Human Rights as a Qualifier and a Catalyst 
for Korea’s Democracy 
Hyo-Je Cho 
I.  Introduction 
Was there any discussion of human rights in Korea prior to 
democratization of political opportunity structures in the late 80’s? 
Curious as this question may seem one could be forgiven to assume that 
in the pre-democracy era there were only human rights struggles usually 
for civil and political rights, as an antithesis to oppression, rather than 
any conscious attempt to construct a human rights discourse. Hence, in a 
sense talk about human rights is a post-democratization phenomenon 
where relationship between human rights and (il)liberal democracy 
remains complex and problematic (See Beetham 1999; Donnelly 2002; 
Zakaria 2003). More so, since perspective on human rights in the 
post-democratization period may no longer be monolithic and singular, 
the question needs to shift from the existence of human rights to the 
nature of human rights and its interactions with the democratic reality. 
Though seemingly straightforward, this question needs to address the 
conscious attempts created and pursued by actors of human rights 
themselves not just in a contingent but in a pro-active manner as well. It 
is also recognized that the human rights discourse has increasingly come 
to the fore as leading idea of civil society and democracy in Korea (Beer 
1991; Cho 2003; Shaw 1991). Therefore, the examination of the discourse 
from human rights actors’ perspective will have important ramifications 
for the trajectory of Korea’s democracy and civil society. Bearing in mind 
these considerations, I will first review some of the literature on human 
rights discourse in the country, then empirically examine the discourse 
from the perspective of key human rights actors, and finally seek to 
identify the implication of the human rights discourse on the “new” 
democracy of contemporary Korea.     
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II.  Literature Review 
Human rights situation in Korea has been hotly debated in the 
international community, particularly in the U.S. in the 1970s (Kim 1985). 
However, it was in the 1980s that the problem drew much wider 
attention from around the world (e.g. International League for Human 
Rights and the International Human Rights Law Group 1985; Amnesty 
International 1986; Asia Watch Committee 1986, 1987). The decade of the 
80’s saw a catalogue of human rights violations in an unprecedented 
scale; the Kwangju massacre was the central symbol of that period’s 
repression. The characteristics of 1980s’ Korea in human rights terms 
could be summarized as the “almost complete denial of civil and political 
rights” (Asia Watch Committee 1986) in an absolutist authoritarian state. 
The National Security Law was the pillar of state coercion, along with a 
heavily distorted and arbitrary legal process. The victims, those who bore 
the full brunt of the draconian rule, were students, workers, intellectuals, 
journalists, as well as opposition politicians. The discourse, if any, of 
human rights in that period was no more than very basic needs to secure 
meager statutory protection for human rights. 
The “resistance discourse” of the human rights movement was 
inexorably tied with the real or perceived influence of the United States 
on Korea’s situation (e.g. U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs 1986). 
The reason being the widely held belief that the U.S. was the most 
important nation in the world which possessed concrete policy leverage, 
for example the U.S military and economic assistance and military 
presence in the region put pressure on the Korean government to 
improve its human rights record (Ranard 1980). For the U.S. it was 
probably not possible, particularly under the Carter Administration 
which preached human rights diplomacy, to turn a blind eye to rights 
abuse of the Park regime; said to have the worst human rights record 
among the U.S.’s bilateral defense treaty allies. However, after the 
Kwangju incident, diplomatic leverage was felt to have declined 
(Gleysteen 1986) despite expectations from Korean dissidents for U.S.’s 
firmer intervention on the ground situation-this was a form of crude 
human rights discourse of the era. With the passage of time, after 1987, 
an alternative view emerged that the achievement of a degree of human 
rights was largely due to people and particularly civil society groups’ 
arduous struggle, based on their own human rights belief, and that the 
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track record of American human rights diplomacy in Korea was “mixed” 
at best (Steinberg 2001).  
Hsiung’s (1985) study of human rights discourse in East Asia 
presented a standard analysis that the “consensual” human rights system 
of the region, contrary to that of the west, highly valued economic 
development as economic rights; thus avoided confrontation and 
“politicking” of human rights. This culture-bound thesis is however 
rebutted; Shaw (1991) argued that timeless and abstract account of 
human rights in Korea, not anchored by empirical analysis, was incorrect 
and unacceptable. Prominent among Shaw’s findings was a negative 
connotation attached to the anti-colonial, nationalistic discourse in 
promoting human rights, which was also echoed in Robinson’s (1991) 
study of nationalism during the colonial times. In the same volume Beer 
(1991) noticed that human rights ideas were closely integrated with 
popular political consciousness and international human rights principles 
were rooted in political parlance in Korea. In a comparative study of 
human rights in Korea, Japan and Taiwan, Neary (1998, 2002) 
emphasized the importance of legal and social environment for human 
rights. He argued that political development and abolition of National 
Security Law were critical preconditions for the furtherance of human 
rights in Korea.  
Steinberg (1996) stressed that the implicit assumption of the U.S.’s 
influence on human rights in Korea had completely come to an end, 
urged Koreans to shift their human rights focus from mere responsive to 
a pro-active new discourse. Through an examination of the origin of the 
National Security Law from the perspective of “national security 
ideology”, Park (1997) argued that the security ideology was embedded 
in the idea of developmental state- on which the political raison d’etre of 
South Korea had been founded. Lee (1999) offered an analysis on how the 
previously dominant civil and political human rights discourse was 
radically transformed to a new discourse based on socio-economic rights 
after the Asian financial crisis in 1997/8. Aasen (2001) drew attention to 
the significance of peace and stability in the Korean peninsula as the most 
viable foundation for human rights for both North and South Koreans, 
perhaps adding support to the view that rights-enabling environment, i.e. 
North-South détente, could be as much important in human rights 
promotion as seeking a posteriori remedy for specific rights violations. 
Cho (2002) took the view that while the list of human rights agenda has 
radically expanded in the recent years, the influence of human rights 
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“realists” did not wane. Civil society, according to Cho, is the site 
wherein controversies over human rights are fought and new standards 
evolve. There are different perspectives on solutions for improvement of 
human rights. While institutionalists like Kwak (2002), foresee a greater 
role for the National Human Rights Commission, others like, Neary (2003) 
insist that progressive political transformations through effective political 
protest should form the backbone for any substantial improvement of 
human rights in Korea, particularly from an economic sense. 
 This limited survey of existing literature on human rights discourse 
in Korea reveals some of the recurrent themes on the subject. First of all, 
human rights discourse is essentially a responsive one, contingent on 
political, social and legal environment. This leads to the view that, with a 
few exceptions, human rights discourse is fairly homogeneous in each 
political period. Cultural explanation for human rights discourses are 
prevalent, in which collective rights and responsibilities as opposed to 
“individual” rights are conventionally taken for granted. Many assume 
that human rights discourse in Korea was, at least up until recently, 
closely tied with American foreign policy. Important dichotomies are 
usually maintained between the state and the opposition, and it is 
generally argued that anti-colonial, nationalistic tendency of civil society 
and social movement may not always be in congruence with human 
rights.   
III.  Selection Criteria and Methods 
Following the above sweeping overview, it is now pertinent to devise a 
method to further our understanding of human rights discourse in 
contemporary Korea. Through identification of converging and diverging 
strands within the existing human rights discourse, one may acquire a 
more discernible and empirically guided snapshot of human rights in the 
country.  
For this, instead of categorizing the contemporary human rights 
discourse by selectively examining some topical and/or legal aspects of 
human rights, for instance the controversy surrounding the National 
Security Law or workers’ rights, an “agency-oriented” approach is to be 
adopted. The agency-oriented research will enable us to comprehend the 
distinctly constructed human rights discourse from the perspective of 
key human rights actors themselves. For our purpose, four 
“agency-actors” from the state, public space, political society and civil 
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society have been selected as broadly representing the wide gamut of 
policy and epistemic community of human rights. Although by no means 
should they be seen as the representatives of all human rights actors in 
the country, there is no doubt that they are important actors who lead, 
generate, propagate, and most of all, make an impact on human rights on 
account of their strategic position and accessibility to key institutions. 
First, in the space of “state”, the National Human Rights Commission of 
Korea has been chosen for it is the single most important, permanent 
state organ on human rights of the nation. Second, in the “public” space, 
the Korea Democracy Foundation has been at the forefront in 
disseminating the idea of democracy and human rights through 
documentation of the democratization struggles, and research on ways to 
promote democratic and human right values. Third, in the space of 
“political society”, the ruling Uri Party has been selected, since it is 
certainly the most influential political body occupying a vantage point in 
law-making process to impact on the trajectory of human rights 
institutions and practices. Finally, in the space of “civil society”, 
Sarangbang Group for Human Rights is selected for it is generally seen 
not only as a renowned human rights organization with a formidable 
track record of human rights struggle, but also as a major source of 
radical human rights discourse.  
Aside from these formal sectoral criteria for selecting our research 
targets, the four agency-actors have also been drawn on the assumption 
that they may be inclined to approach human rights questions from a 
distinctive perspective compatible with their own practice and activity in 
the human rights field. Therefore, the way each actor engages with 
specific human rights issue can be taken as reflecting their characteristic 
interpretation of human rights. So it may be assumed that by inspecting 
the differing conceptualization of human rights of these organizations, a 
relatively balanced overall view of human rights discourse in today’s 
Korean society could be achieved. 
If a particular “discourse” involves the totality of language, thought, 
knowledge and action, then the attempt to discern the contemporary 
human rights discourse of major public and private actors should 
encompass as varied an aspect of each actor’s work as possible. But to 
operationally concentrate our enquiry to a manageable size a set of 
limited criteria modified from Gewirth’s scheme (1982) has been adopted 
for this research. The criteria includes five main elements that identifies 
(1) the holder of rights; (2) bearer of duty; (3) the object of rights; (4) 
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grounds of justification of rights and 5) if and how the rights are 
exercised. To identify these elements a standard technique of content 
analysis will be employed, critically examining each actor’s statute, 
mission statement, manifesto, platform, mandate, recommendation, press 
releases, event proceeding, etc. The study will particularly, focus on the 
last three, since all but Sarangbang Group came into existence after 2001.  
IV.  Contours of Human Rights Discourse 
National Human Rights Commission of Korea 
The National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK) was created 
in 2001 following the recommendation of the National Human Rights 
Commission Act (Law No. 6481), passed through the National Assembly 
earlier that year. As the premier state agency responsible for human 
rights issues, the establishment of the NHRC was hailed as a major 
breakthrough in placing human rights agenda at the heart of 
government’s public policy.  It was conceived and advocated after the 
1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, by the concerted 
efforts of rights activists, victim support groups, lawyers and academics. 
The Commission has rapidly established itself as the preeminent official 
body for safeguarding the human rights in the country. The organization 
is a full state agency with a considerable degree of autonomy, both in 
statute and in practice. In theory the Commission is not under direct 
control of any of the administrative, judiciary or legislative branches of 
the government, hence is an “independent state institution”. The 
Commission’s quasi-judiciary function means that it can independently 
investigate and remedy human rights abuse and discrimination. 
According to the NHRC Act the purpose of the Commission is three-fold: 
establishment of the basic order of democracy; protection and 
enhancement of individuals’ human rights; and furtherance of the 
dignity and respect of the individual. There are four basic functions of 
the Commission (1) the capacity to propose alternative policies of human 
rights by studying and making recommendations; (2) education and 
public awareness; (3) investigation and remedy of human rights abuse 
and discrimination; and (4) collaborates and coordinates on human rights 
issues, domestically as well as internationally. Among these the 
publication of policy recommendations, usually accompanied by 
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investigation of cases of human rights abuse and discriminatory practice, 
is generally regarded as the most basic and integral work of the NHRC. 
This study therefore examined all official recommendations including 
disciplinary and urgent executive measures, made by the Commission 
during the period between its foundation in November 2001 and the first 
half of 2004. 
Of the 202 cases of recommendation the largest group of “right 
holders” (43.9%) turns out to be prisoners, detainees and those under 
police investigation. The result appears to be in congruence with the 
NHRC Act itself, where human rights abuse against those in “detention 
or protective facility” features prominently as its main objective. This is 
followed by a mixed group, over one third of all cases, of ordinary 
citizens, civil protesters and patients who have grievances on the basis of 
various human rights and/or discriminatory measures. Migrant workers, 
disabled persons, youths and civil servants also form a distinctive group 
of rights holders.  
An overwhelming majority of duty bearers for human rights 
violation are identified to be the state agencies. Official bodies 
performing law enforcement functions such as prosecution, police, 
immigration office, prison and detention center remain the single largest 
“duty holder” group to promote and protect human rights (56.9%), with 
other state organs such as the legislature and local governments 
occupying some 40%. A small but interesting group, which is viewed as 
holding duty for rights, includes such private actors as hospitals, schools 
and even the voluntary organizations like YMCA. In the latter’s case the 
Commission issued a recommendation to change the internal gendered 
discriminatory policy within the organization.  
Not surprisingly, the content of rights identified by the 
recommendations reflects the stated objective of the NHRC, i.e. the 
investigation and remedy of human rights abuse and discrimination. In 
the recommendations the proportion of cases on human rights abuse 
amounts to 60.8% and those on discrimination amounts to 30.8%. The rest 
includes cases of incoherent or arbitrary application of existing rules and 
regulations, and necessity for improved practice through, for instance, 
human rights education. Humanitarian considerations and appeal to 
human dignity also comprise a small part of human rights contents. 
In most cases, the rights advocated by NHRC can be justified by 
reference to specific, and in some cases multiple, source(s) of human 
rights. The most frequently quoted ground of human rights in the 
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Commission’s recommendation is the nation’s Constitution (69.2%), 
followed by laws concerning human rights and law enforcement such as 
the Penal Code and NHRC Act (37.7%). Other domestic statutory 
measures such as labor laws or law on special crimes are also cited (10%). 
It is worth noting that international human rights instruments such as 
International Covenants on Human Rights, Standard Minimum Rules for 
Prisoners and the UN Code of Conduct for law enforcement personnel 
are mentioned as a reference of human rights, but not as frequently as 
one would have anticipated (10%). A humanitarian ground has been 
cited in a small number of cases. Since the NHRC’s recommendations are 
usually a response to a petition by the “rights holder” it may be assumed 
that the rights holder actively seeks after rights, in the case of the NHRC 
recommendation.  
Apart from this “responsive” dimension of the Human Rights 
Commission, there have been a few “pro-active” decisions and general 
“announcements of intention”, which may or may not be within the 
statutory remit of the NHRC. A number of cases with regard to past 
human rights violations fall into this category. These include, for example, 
special “remedial” legislations on civilian massacres in and around the 
Korean War in 1950-3, suspicious deaths allegedly perpetrated by the 
then military regime, rehabilitation of those involved with clandestine 
military operations against North Korea after the War, arbitrary 
“corrective” boot camps of the early 1980s, and unaccounted deaths of 
soldiers on active duty. Moreover, the NHRC has made some politically 
sensitive recommendations like, objected to the much publicized 
anti-terrorism act in the wake of 11 September 2001, called for the 
abolition of an administratively-run additional sentencing system under 
the Social Protection Act and provided a skeptical interpretation of the 
proposed national educational information system on the ground of 
students’ right to privacy. The raft of dissenting views pinnacled in its 
open “opinion”, expressed in March 2003, against the war on Iraq; an 
unprecedented move for a state body and was subjected to thinly veiled 
attacks from inside and outside the government. 
Korea Democracy Foundation 
The Korea Democracy Foundation (KDF) was founded on the 
recommendation of the KDF Act (Law No. 6495) that entered into force in 
2001. The establishment of the Foundation publicly recognized, though 
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long overdue, the contribution of the democratic struggle on the 
country’s socio-political development. The KDF is a part of the important 
series of measures concerning the democratization drive of the past, 
which included, inter alia, the Commission for Democratization 
Movement Activists’ Honor-Restoration and Compensation (2000) and 
the Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths (2000). 
Democratization movement, according to the KDF Act of 2001, refers to 
the “activities related to reinstating and promoting the nation’s freedom 
and rights against the authoritarian rule which had infringed upon the 
basic rights of people guaranteed in the Constitutions of the Republic of 
Korea since 1948.” (Public Law No. 6495) On the basis of this proposition 
the KDF was founded to commemorate the democratization movement, 
to engage in activities to promote democratic values, and, thus contribute 
to the development of democracy. More specifically, among the 
objectives of the Foundation are- establishment of the Democracy 
Memorial Hall, research on history of democratization, restore historical 
sites on pro-democracy struggle, and sponsor commemorative events for 
human rights and democracy. Created under the aegis of the government 
the KDF is a special “public corporate body”, registered with the 
administration and partially funded by the central and local 
governments. 
Compared to NHRC’s closely defined and legally bounded 
definition of human rights, KDF’s definition of human rights may be best 
understood as inextricably embedded in the general discourse of 
democracy. This makes the kind of categorical analysis, not least the 
quantitative explanation, as used for the NHRC somewhat inappropriate. 
For this research KDF’s 137 available items of public announcements, 
press releases, and event descriptions between 2002 and July 2004 have 
been examined. The result shows that the most prominent group of 
“right holders” seems to be the “people”. There is an indication that the 
category “we the people” is supposed to be a natural unit of right holders 
as expressed in democratic ideals. In some context the term “people” 
denotes the nation itself, while in other cases people are regarded as 
“minjung”, the masses, who aspire for national liberation and social 
transformation. In still other cases the notion embraces the entire national 
population of North and South Korea. A slightly less frequent, but 
equally important, category of right holders for KDF are the activists, 
those who were involved in the pro-democracy struggle. This group also 
includes victims of injustice and human rights violations of the past. In 
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contrast to this “collective” notion of right holders is the important 
treatment to some individuals as test cases for the human rights 
discourse; viable parts of the country’s fledgling democracy. Among 
these is the case of Song Du-Yul, the exiled scholar residing in Germany 
who, upon returning to South Korea in 2003 after several decades, was 
arrested, tried and subsequently acquitted for the alleged collaboration 
with North Korea. Other groups of right holders the KDF has been 
concerned with are Iraqi people and migrant workers, to name but a few. 
The bearers of duty, held accountable for human rights protection by 
the KDF is also a varied group like the right holders. The first duty bearer 
is the state, includes the legislature, the executive and the local 
government. The law enforcement agencies, the prosecutor in particular 
are regarded as the primary duty groups with regards to “rectification of 
the past history”. In KDF’s understanding the political authorities in both 
North and South Korea are equally responsible for stability in the Korean 
peninsula, which is a precondition for the two peoples’ right to peaceful 
co-existence. Directly related to this, a heightened awareness on a 
possible armed conflict in the peninsula, as part of the America-led global 
war on terrorism, has prompted the KDF to repeatedly proclaim the duty 
of the powerful nations, particularly the U.S., to refrain from the use of 
force and to protect the smaller nations’ right not to be subject to external 
intervention. The emphasis on this aspect of duty bearers has become 
increasingly critical after the Iraq War, which was in turn directed against 
Korean government not to give support to the U.S. in the latter’s effort to 
enlist military help of the allies. Further, the KDF views the neo liberal 
global capitalism as the chief violator of people’s socio-economic rights, 
thereby reinforced the case for the state’s essential duty of protection of 
the deprived. Finally, the KDF’s ongoing efforts to conserve and make 
relevant the past history has an implicit dimension that the people in 
general are to some extent duty bearers, they commemorate and enliven 
the spirit of pro-democracy struggle for today’s society. 
There is little doubt that the notion that human rights are part and 
parcel of the nation’s democratic development in a collective sense has 
influenced the content of rights described by the KDF. The standard 
“individualistic” version of human rights such as the freedom of 
conscience and right to due legal process is firmly supported, as is the 
insistence that the human wrongs of the past should be rectified and 
historically redeemed. In this regard the call for the abolition of the 
National Security Law is seen to have a double objective, i.e. an appeal 
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for the classic liberal case of human rights as well as a move to correct the 
past history. A particular emphasis has been placed in the importance of 
preserving memory as right to “righteous history” of the nation’s 
democracy. Furthermore, the all-embracing bracketed rights such as the 
right to peace, freedom, liberation, independence, and an anti-war stance 
has been conjoined with the somewhat “nationalistic” rights rhetoric. For 
example, the sovereign right to self-determination and right to “national 
survival” in the face of outside interference may be a logical justification 
for the drive for dialogue with, and humanitarian concern for, North 
Korea. 
The question of the ground/source of human rights as interpreted 
by the KDF should be placed in a proper perspective, given the 
Foundation’s dual role as an executioner of democratic heritage and an 
advocate of human rights. On the one hand the “democratic and 
universal” values of liberal democracy have been reaffirmed as an 
undoubted source of human rights. In tandem with this are the 
affirmation of multilateral values such as international law, United 
Nations and the global public conscience, the support for natural rights 
in a Lockeian sense, and concern for humanitarian principles. On the 
other hand, the necessity for correcting the past wrongs is justified on 
grounds of “reparative justice”. Finally, the inter-Korean agreements on 
cooperation have been cited as a legitimate source for the right to 
national self-reliance. It could be said that all these rights have been as 
much exalted by the KDF as have been actually exercised by the right 
holder themselves. 
The Uri Party 
The Uri Party (UP) or “Our Open Party” is a splinter political group of 
the Millennium Democratic Party, the minority ruling party during the 
presidency of Kim Dae-Jung (1998-2003). After the MDP candidate Roh 
Moo-Hyon was inaugurated as the president in early 2003, the 
long-standing intra-party feud between the pro- and anti-Roh factions 
escalated into a point where the pro-Roh faction deserted the MDP en 
masse to found the UP in the late 2003. The general elections in April 2004 
saw the nascent UP securing a slim majority of 152 seats in the 299-strong 
National Assembly. Now as the ruling party of the county the UP 
dominates the parliament in which the main opposition Grand National 
Party (121 seats) and other small parties including the trade 
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union-backed Democratic Labor Party make up for the rest. The 
significance of the 2004 election is that for the first time in several decades 
the legislative hegemony has shifted from conservative to liberal forces, 
with the UP at the helm of the change. The UP was elected, in large 
measure, on a progressive and pro-human rights platform. Further, close 
to 50 UP parliamentarians, approximately one third of the party’s 
lawmakers are former dissidents and have been student activists; thus 
are sympathetic to human rights ideal and practice. 
To examine the UP’s perspectives on human rights a number of 
official documents between November 2003 and July 2004 have been 
analyzed. They include the party platform, basic policy framework, 
election manifesto and party legislative proposals. Apart from a handful 
of documents specifically devoted to human rights most materials 
relevant to human rights are positioned within a broader policy 
perspective with some implication for human rights, thereby quantifying 
the research outcome seems somewhat impractical. Unsurprisingly the 
main group of right holders in the UP’s perspective is the general 
electorate. This group is supposed to possess right to good governance, 
basic constitutional rights such as freedom of assembly and association, 
and right to healthy environment. The general electorate is then divided 
into some special outreach sub-groups: economically vulnerable groups 
such as the unemployed, and people in and under poverty line, socially 
discriminated groups- women, the disabled, foreign migrant workers and 
deprived children, and those under detention or criminal investigation. 
As befitting for a party of “national peace and reconciliation” the UP’s 
platform indirectly suggests that famine stricken North Koreans are also 
“right holders” in the sense that they are entitled to humanitarian aid. 
Extended from this logic is a claim that the whole Korean nation has a 
right to peace and co-existence. Departing from the traditional domestic 
focus of party policies in Korea the platform and basic policy framework 
of the UP have asserted that people in the developing world have right to 
international solidarity and goodwill in their quest for development.  
As a political party vying for power the UP has insisted that they are 
indeed trustworthy duty bearers who can fulfill the promise of rights for 
the electorate. This is of course performed through legislation and by 
their influence on the government, as the ruling party. As has been the 
case with the wide range of rights upholding programs of the UP, the 
task of implementation of human rights policies is entrusted to the 
administrative departments such as Ministry of Justice including the 
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incarceration authority, and ministries of welfare, gender equality, labor 
and employment, etc. According to UP’s view, the North and South 
Korean authorities are equally responsible and thus are “duty bearers” in 
the maintenance of the peninsula’s stability and peace. It has also been 
maintained that international financial institutions such as Asian 
Development Bank should bear some responsibility in assistance to 
North Korea, for the latter’s effort to rebuild the country’s economy. 
Finally it is presumed, though implicitly, that the entire society should be 
held responsible for preservation of their environment for the present as 
well as future generations. 
The sheer scope of human rights policies aspired by the UP is 
testimony to its more liberal position, compared with the Grand National 
Party. The human rights agenda of the UP covers a whole range of rights, 
i.e. from civil and political to socio-economic rights, and beyond. Civil 
and political rights under the UP’s policy frame encompass various legal 
rights to due processes, basic civil rights, rights of prisoners, legal aid, 
stringent measures for crimes against humanity, and rights to active 
political participation. Also high on the agenda are firm pledges on 
welfare policy such as improvement of national basic subsistence, public 
housing provision, health care, and maternity care. Counter-measures 
against widespread discriminatory practice have been highlighted, for 
example, gender equality and the disabled. The election manifesto also 
hinted on the adoption of an anti-discriminatory legislation. The 
emphasis on “sustainable development” further meant that economic 
policy would be bound by considerations other than pure economic 
calculation, at least on principle. The amendment bill to the National 
Human Rights Commission Act, proposed by a group of UP 
parliamentarians, suggests that in the future all major public policies will 
be subject to “impact assessment” in terms of human rights. Together 
with the party’s stance on North-South Korea dialogue, peace in the 
peninsula is almost equated with the rights of two peoples. It is 
interesting to note that developing countries are seen to be entitled in 
equal measures to democracy, “market economy” and human rights.  
Alongside the customary list of “grounds” for human rights, i.e. the 
Constitution and NHRC Act, the UP cites legal principles such as 
equality before the law and judicial precedents such as Constitutional 
Court rulings as major sources of rights. Consensus based on “liberal 
democratic order” and on “universal” values has also been referred to as 
foundation of human rights. In addition, the justification of equal 
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treatment for the disabled is based on a “rights” vocabulary, as on 
“citizenship” on which a more inclusive society is founded. It should be 
remembered that in relation to the North Korean question, two Koreas’ 
“brotherhood” and humanitarianism are emphasized as a source of 
national rights. In order for developing countries to achieve its fair share 
of achievement, the UP sees international solidarity and multilateralism 
as two foundational pillars of a more just world. These and other list of 
human rights promised by the UP may be more declaratory (or even 
rhetorical) than substantial, but the expression of aspiration harbors some 
potential for future implementation of human rights. Critics rightly argue 
that the UP has not committed resolutely enough to crucial human rights 
issues as the abolition of the National Security Law, which is the ultimate 
litmus test on the substantiveness of the UP’s human rights credential. 
Sarangbang Group for Human Rights 
The Sarangbang Group for Human Rights (SGHR) was formed in 1993 by 
a group of human rights activists led by Seo Jun-Shik, himself a former 
prisoner of conscience. Mr Seo had been imprisoned during the most part 
of the 1970s and 1980s for his unauthorized visit to North Korea and for 
his subsequent refusal to renounce his socialist belief. From the first year 
of its existence, the group has published and distributed a human rights 
newsletter through facsimile transmission, which is still considered an 
essential media for human rights community in the country. The SGHR 
has vigorously campaigned for improving prison conditions, abolishing 
the National Security Law, advocating children’s rights and establishing 
the National Human Rights Commission, to name but a few. Other works 
pioneered were drawing attention to the importance of international 
solidarity and holding the annual human rights film festival (since 1996, 
now part of the national cultural landscape. An affiliated but 
independent body, the Institute for Human Rights Movement was later 
set up to study human rights and to train human rights defenders. The 
SGHR is an activist-oriented organization that depends on a core of 
highly devoted volunteers. Unlike conventional organizational 
mechanisms, the Sarangbang Group has no hierarchical structure, and all 
“regular” staff activists represent the group collectively. 
This research reviewed a total of 55 documents enacted during July 
2001 and June 2004. The study examined different kinds of materials such 
as public announcements, policy discussion papers, press releases, 
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investigation reports, joint position papers and open letters. Simple 
records such as translation of international human rights standards have 
been excluded from analysis. The scope and coverage of rights discourse 
of the SGHR are very wide and far-reaching. For example, the right 
holders Sarangbang Group has been closely associated with those under 
penal detention, psychiatric ward, or police investigation. It should be 
noted that the SGHR is one of the very earliest rights groups in Korea 
that advocated humane treatment of prisoners regardless of their status 
as political prisoners or common criminals. The Group was also involved 
with a staunch campaign for legitimate legal process such as the banning 
of arbitrary police stop-and-search on the street. People with minority 
status on account of conscientious objection, sexual orientation, or 
disability have recently been included in the SGHR’s list as important 
right holders. The SGHR has also been at the forefront in highlighting the 
rights of children and students in society, particularly n context of the 
prevalence of competitiveness for academic achievement and draconian 
school disciplines. Renowned for its fierce criticism of capitalism, the 
SGHR considers less privileged economic stakeholders such as irregular 
workers, trade unionists, shantytown dwellers, and migrant workers as 
major holders of social rights. Furthermore, people in Iraq are viewed as 
victims of war, hence “deprived” right holders, as are North and South 
Koreans who suffer from America’s perceived belligerent stance in 
Korean peninsula. In Sarangbang’s interpretation civil society actors and 
rights groups, as proxies for general population, are de facto right 
holders themselves in their demand for a proper functioning of 
government agencies, particularly the National Human Rights 
Commission.  
The main duty bearer in Sarangbang Group’s view is the state; the 
National Human Rights Commission therefore should bear full 
responsibility for safeguarding the nation’s human rights. The duty of 
protecting children’s rights is understood to fall on the state, teachers and 
school authorities particularly with regard to imposition of regulations. 
The duty to protect underprivileged economic groups is reserved as 
much for the state as for the private employers, those running private 
care homes and the capital. The SGHR holds that the United States is a 
“failed” duty bearer with regard to restriction of its military might in the 
world that is increasingly being transformed to a community of “national 
security” states. In this sense, international society and the United 
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Nations are two of the important duty bearers for maintenance of peace 
and “survival rights” of small states. 
Literally, the SGHR is concerned with a whole variety of content of 
rights- civil and political rights such as freedom of conscience and 
expression, due process of law, right not to be subject to torture, right to 
be informed, right to privacy, right to remain silent during interrogation, 
and freedom of association and assembly. In this context the problem of 
the National Security Law has come under intensive scrutiny and is 
subject to a vigorous campaign for its abolition. There is a widespread 
sense in the human rights community, with the SGHR at its center, that 
the NSL case is a testing ground for Korea’s democracy. As has been 
explained, concern for prison conditions has led the SGHR to successfully 
obliterate the distinction between “deserving (political) prisoners” and 
“undeserving (common) prisoners”. The right to life has been combined 
with the right to food, which in turn has been cited as a major human 
rights concern for North Koreans. This position has led Sarangbang 
Group to declare that mutual recognition of existence by North and 
South Korea should comprise an important precondition for human 
rights of the entire Korean nation. Economic and social rights focus on 
various labor issues, irregular migrant workers, and national subsistence 
scheme, right to housing and right to health. It should be borne in mind 
that socio-economic rights are conceptualized as an inalienable guard 
against neo-liberal onslaught of the marginalized in society. The 
Sarangbang Group has lately taken a firm anti-war stance as a vital 
component of securing a people’s basic right to “existence”. The SGHR 
called for direct democracy measures such as people’s “right to recall” 
lawmakers when President Roh Moo-Hyon faced impeachment motion 
in the National Assembly in early 2004. Discrimination based on sexual 
identity are criticized both on the basis of equality and “citizenship” 
rights. The Sarangbang Group has played the role of fierce watchdog 
against the National Human Rights Commission; has called for 
accountability, transparency, and anti-bureaucratic openness. 
The grounds for rights in Sarangbang Group’s understanding are as 
diverse as they are universal. International human rights standards, as 
well as United Nation’s various instruments, are firmly established as the 
primary source of human rights. National Constitution, Constitutional 
Court rulings, laws on specific domains such as labor related statutes, 
NHRC Act, and Penal Code are also regarded as the basis of human 
rights. Humanitarianism, peace, and anti-war doctrine also comprise a 
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foundation on which human rights must be built. Bearing in mind that 
the Group has always considered itself as part of the whole social 
movement, it is perhaps not surprising that “genuine” democracy and 
democratic reform are also understood to be foundational principles of 
human rights. Basic Agreement Documents between North and South 
Korea is a source frequently cited for the nation’s collective rights. It 
seems that behind all the justifications for human rights lies a basic 
assumption that human dignity and rights are naturally given, 
inalienable and inviolable. Lastly, the Sarangbang Group’s contribution 
to human rights may be found as much in the impressive array of human 
rights concerns as in the Group’s uncompromising struggle for people’s 
empowerment, for example, human rights activity based on the needs of 
the right holders themselves. This aspect of “rights exercise” highlights 
the characteristic view of human rights activism of Sarangbang Group.  
V.  Discussion 
As has been analyzed so far the four selected agency-actors have both 
common and distinctive conceptualizations of human rights which, put 
together, may comprise the contour of human rights discourse in Korea. 
Each domain in Gewirth’s scheme has considerable variations in the 
definition and understanding of human rights concept. For example, in 
case of rights holders, apart from differences in emphases for particular 
groups or aspects within like civil and political rights, categorical 
differences in defining them exist. Apart from individuals and some 
minority groups, such notions as “the people”, “minjung”, “the Korean 
nation”, economically and socially deprived people, and those in 
developing world are cited as legitimate rights holders. In response to 
this, duty bearers are just as much diverse: not only governmental 
agencies and the legislature, but private actors, U.S., international society, 
U.N., international financial institutions and North and South Korean 
authorities are all included in this category. In terms of content of rights, 
all target agency-actors appear to actively support internationally 
recognized civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. Some 
“third generation” rights such as rights to sustainable development and 
self-determination are juxtaposed with the much extended solidarity 
rights including right to “national survival”. Reparative justice and right 
to “righteous history” are included in the human rights list, as are right 
to peace in Korean peninsula and right to reject war as a precondition for 
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people’s existence. Sources of human rights seem to broadly follow the 
legal positivistic tradition including domestic statutes and Constitution, 
and international human rights standards. It is noteworthy that some 
normative values such as universal democratic order, equality principle, 
humanitarianism and citizenship are also regarded as foundations of 
human rights. All four organizations of our examination indeed seem to 
support the notion of proactive exercise of rights through, for example, 
petition to the NHRC or empowerment and participation in democratic 
process. In sum, human rights discourse of the examined agencies can be 
roughly summarized as follows: a “liberal legal” discourse of the 
National Human Rights Commission; a “national democratic” discourse 
of the Korea Democracy Foundation; a “liberal institutional” discourse of 
Uri Party; and a “radical universal” discourse of Sarangbang Group (See 
Table 1).  
Salient features of this analysis illustrate that although the human 
rights discourse of each actor reflects the overall parameter of their 
missions and mandates, they all give full credence to the “liberal” notion 
of human rights, thereby validate Neary’s (2002: 97) observation that a 
“liberal consensus” may be in the process of development among human 
rights groups in contemporary Korea. It is particularly noteworthy that 
the so-called “Asian” value debate (e.g. Bauer and Bell 1999) had never 
been actively engaged in Korea neither by the authoritarian governments 
nor by the opposition. Rather, it was on national security grounds that 
the past dictatorial regime justified its reservations on human rights, 
against which the pro-democracy camp employed the classic liberal line 
of defense for human rights. But this classic liberal universal human 
rights concept, civil and political rights in particular, has been quickly 
extended to a wide range of socio-economic rights and, further, to an 
even wider notion of “national” rights to peace and survival, within a 
decade or so. Also significant is the fact that all four actors seem to 
consider themselves as part of broader social and human rights 
movements in civil society, which could be traced back to the colonial 
times in cases like Hyongpyongsa (Equity Society) in the 1920s (Kim 
2003). For example, even the National Human Rights Commission, 
supposedly constrained by statutory remit, ventured into a public 
rallying cry for “anti-war and peace” ostensibly against the government’s 
official policy, thereby aligning itself with social and human rights 
movements in the public. On the whole human rights discourse in Korea, 
on top of its liberal democratic common-denominator, is deeply steeped 
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Table 1 Comparison of Key Human Rights Actors’ Discourse 
 NHRC KDF UP SGHR 
Rights 
Holders 
－prisoners & 
detainees 
－ordinary citizens 
－migrant workers 
－the disabled 
－youths 
－the people 
－Korean nation 
－”minjung” 
－pro-democracy 
activists 
－individuals 
－migrant workers 
－Iraqi people 
－the general 
electorate 
－economically 
vulnerable 
groups 
－socially 
discriminated 
groups 
－North Koreans 
－Korean nation 
－people in 
developing 
world 
 
－prisoners & 
detainees 
－minorities 
－children & 
students 
－economically 
vulnerable groups 
－North & South 
Koreans 
－Iraqi people 
Duty 
Bearers 
－law enforcement 
agencies 
－legislature 
－local government 
－private actors 
－law enforcement 
agencies 
－legislature 
－North & South 
Korean 
authorities 
－U.S. 
－Uri Party 
－government 
－North & South 
Korean 
authorities 
－international 
financial 
institutions 
－entire society 
 
－state 
－National Human 
Rights Comm. 
－U.S. 
－international 
society 
－U.N. 
Contents －various human 
rights abuses 
－discrimination  
－freedom of 
conscience 
－due legal process 
－reparative justice 
－right to 
“righteous” 
history 
－right to 
self-determinatio
n 
－right to the 
nation’s survival 
－civil & political 
rights 
－economic, social, 
cultural rights 
－sustainable 
development 
－policy impact 
assessment on 
human rights 
－peace in Korean 
peninsula  
－civil & political 
rights 
－economic, social, 
cultural rights 
－anti-neoliberalism 
－abolition of 
National Security 
Law 
－mutual 
recognition of 
North & South 
Korea 
－peace & anti-war  
 
Grounds －Constitution 
－Penal Code 
－NHRC Act 
－international 
human 
rights standards 
－humanitarianism 
－democratic, 
universal value 
－liberal 
democracy 
－natural rights 
－international 
human 
rights standards 
－humanitarianism 
－Constitution 
－NHRC Act 
－Constitutional 
Court rulings 
－liberal 
democratic 
order 
－citizenship 
－international 
solidarity 
－humanitarianism 
 
－equality principle 
－Constitution 
－Penal Code 
－NHRC Act 
－international 
human rights 
 standards 
－citizenship 
Exercise －petition 
－recommendation 
 
－commemoration 
－exaltation 
－pledge 
－declaration 
－empowerment 
－social movement 
Nature of 
Discourse 
－”liberal legal 
positivistic”  
－”national 
republican” 
－”liberal 
institutional” 
－”radical 
universal” 
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in egalitarian, nationalistic, and republican tradition of social movements 
of the country, perhaps making a way for social constructionist 
perspective of human rights, in particular historical, social and economic 
environment (e.g. Stammers 1993, 1995, 1999). The conflation of these 
“radical” discourses is likely to continue to weave a distinctive human 
rights narrative in Korea in a unique fashion. 
The implications of this characteristic human rights discourse for 
Korea’s democracy are many-fold. First, the radical human rights 
discourse has played a major role in defining and assessing the degree of 
democratization in terms of rights-upholding legislation and practice. 
The example for this “qualifier” role includes drives to abolish the 
National Security Law which is widely seen to be the obstacle to fuller 
democracy in Korea (Cho 2002; Neary 2002), or attempts to find truths for 
the past human rights violations in order to achieve more just historical 
perspective. For instance, at the time of writing, controversies both over 
the NSL and over the attempt to “rectify” the past historical “distortion” 
and human rights violations in the 20th century have become 
increasingly critical public debates. The National Human Rights 
Commission announced a recommendation on 24 August 2004 to 
unconditionally abolish the NSL, the first such move for a state agency in 
history. This “qualifying” role of human rights for the nation’s 
democratic progress is expected to sustain the debate over the task of 
“democratizing” democracy. In addition, the influence of human rights 
discourse in offering criticism against neo-liberal, pro-capital economic 
policy has helped inject an element of democratic control mechanism into 
the predominant free market ideology, thereby acting as a “catalyst” for 
Korea’s democracy. The double role of qualifier and catalyst for 
democracy may be the most important contribution of the human rights 
discourse in contemporary Korean society.  
Second, related to the first, the contours of human rights discourse in 
contemporary Korea clearly indicate that it has been taking a 
“maximizing” path, compared to the individualistic “minimizing” 
conception of human rights of the west (e.g. Donnelly 1998, 2002). The 
maximizer’s comprehensive or “compossible” human rights discourse 
(Freeman 2002) may reflect the social movement’s perceived utility of 
human rights concept as an “all-inclusive” idea for social progress (e.g. 
Hsiung 1985: 23). However, this tendency may prove to be a double 
edged sword. On the one hand, the maximizer’s human rights discourse 
could help ensure that the milieu of “progressive” democracy in Korea 
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since 1987 will continue to be unabated for the time being. Moreover, an 
unintended corollary of this “compossible” human rights discourse may 
lead to the glossing over of the finer gradation of possible differentiation 
between progressivism and conservatism in politics, economics and 
social agenda. By preempting the feasible combination of different 
ideological positions, for example economic progressivism combined 
with social conservatism, the project of “coherent and consistent 
progressivism” in full spectrum may be achieved much faster in Korea 
than could have otherwise been possible. On the other hand, while a 
human rights discourse based on minimizing conception lends itself to 
an absolute/normative claim for rights above and beyond the politicking 
of the day, the maximizing conception of human rights may inevitably 
run the risk of losing the absolutist claim as well as inadvertently 
complicating the decision-making process of public policy. Therefore, 
reconciliation of these two diverging ideas of human rights will likely 
remain a thorny issue in the politics of human rights in Korea.  
Third, the increasing frequency and widening focus of rights-based 
discourse in politics could squeeze out maneuvering space for 
representative democratic politics, which in turn may help accelerate the 
“adversarial” political process (e.g. Campbell 2004). This is contra 
evidence to Hsiung’s (1985) assertion that human rights discourse in East 
Asia is characterized by its consensus-based system. As a result, we may 
witness a society that has directly leapt forward to a fairly vibrant civil 
society-led participatory democracy to some extent, bypassing the 
deepening process of more formal liberal representative type of 
democracy. A downside to this is that the adversarial right-based 
discourse in politics could inadvertently exacerbate the ongoing process 
of militant manifestation of interest group politics (Cho 2004) and 
proliferation of direct action, where pursuit of interests often tends to be 
disguised in the rhetoric of ‘rights talk’ (e.g. Glendon 1991).  
Fourth, it is undeniable that the promotion of human rights in Korea 
has been closely intertwined with the implicit “idealist” tradition of 
American foreign policy. According to this traditional view the benign 
role of the U.S. influence on the development of human rights in Korea 
was largely unquestioned, in spite of its subtle “imperialistic” undertone. 
This view may result in a logical conclusion that as an important 
stakeholder in Korean peninsula the U.S. has a “duty” to actively seek 
ways to promote human rights of Korean people, and to intervene if 
necessary. The role seems to have been a dominant assumption of both 
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Koreans and Americans until the mid-1980. Many Korean human rights 
advocates, democratic political leaders, or students in 1985 are said to 
have argued that “a policy of active human rights advocacy would 
enhance the prospects for a peaceful democratic transition of power in 
Korea and thereby serve the U.S.’s security interests” (Asia Watch 
Committee 1986: xxvi, my emphasis). But the changed landscape of 
human rights discourse in contemporary Korea, with Kwangju massacre 
at its epicenter, means that the role of U.S. is no longer unreservedly seen 
as a much sought-after mentor and an enabling partner for democracy 
(Steinberg 1996), rather more as a little overbearing external power 
imposing its will on the less enthusiastic ally, this being particularly the 
case under the Bush Administration. So, the argument goes, the U.S now 
has a duty to refrain from intervening in Korean domestic political affairs 
and in intra-national dialogue between North and South Korea. This 
means that the perceived American duty in Korea has shifted from the 
former’s positive to negative role. Nowhere has this been more evident 
than, for example, in the objection by human rights community including 
some Uri Party members of the U.S. Congress’ recent bill on North 
Korean human rights (The Korea Times 2004). This reversal of duty 
bearer’s role for U.S. should have a direct impact on South Korea’s 
democracy, inter-Korean relationship, and political changes in North 
Korea. 
Last but not least, the establishment of human rights as a component 
principle of politics will have important implications for the fledgling 
“national” democracy in Korea. Given the fundamental nature of human 
rights as a tenet of the “cosmopolitan” project (Held 1999), the 
“mainstreaming” of human rights means that the inherently international 
nature of human rights will play an increasingly extended role in the 
national politics (e.g. Ishay 2004). This has already been the case in Iraq 
War when Korean government’s decision to dispatch combat troops to 
the war-torn country had to face all-out protests of civil society in 2004 on 
the basis of a global anti-war consensus. Furthermore, the international 
human rights agenda with a global social policy dimension is likely to be 
highlighted in Korea as has been illustrated in, for example, the case for 
the rights of migrant workers. 
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VI.  Conclusion 
This paper has looked at the human rights discourse in contemporary 
Korea from a number of key actors’ perspective. By doing so, it is hoped 
that more objective discernible contours of human rights discourse have 
emerged, which in turn will have profound impact on the trajectory of 
Korea’s ongoing democracy. The study, however, has some limitations: 
first, the selection of key actors for examination is by no means accurately 
representative, excludes new human rights actors such as radical feminist 
groups which have arrived in the scene more recently; second, the 
respective discourse of selected actors inevitably reflects, and is confined 
by, their own organizational mandate; and third, the examined materials 
have different purpose and usage, for example quasi-legal documents as 
well as NGOs’ ad hoc publicity products, which lack a concomitant level 
of analysis, thereby making the comparison somewhat incoherent.  
Nevertheless, this essay has sought to fill the gap in existing 
literature by presenting rough snapshots of human rights discourse from 
the important human rights stakeholders’ own perspective. From that we 
have acquired the view that the human rights discourse in contemporary 
Korea is largely “syncretic” in composition. These somewhat disparate 
elements are juxtaposed with each other in human rights discourse, 
providing continuity and discontinuity at the same time. For example, 
“old” collective rights discourse which was justified on Confucian 
grounds in the past may be totally different from the “new” collective 
rights discourse whose orientation is based not on the notion of cultural 
but of political collectivity. But it may well be that the discourse based on 
“cultural” collective rights provides the fertile ground in the first place 
for the emergence of the later “political” collective rights. It should not be 
forgotten, however, that there is indeed a core set of more or less 
“liberal” human rights concepts within the array of heterogeneity, thus 
partially qualifies Shaw’s earlier finding that monolithic consensus on 
human rights did not exist in Korea (1991: 5). The liberal discourse, 
though not yet firmly established, nevertheless seems to be more 
prevalent in the domain of human rights movement than in others such 
as labor or peace movements.       
At a very basic level, it is true that constitutional politics can 
guarantee the protection of human rights in the long term (Beer 1991), 
but the direction of causation between the two can be taken in either way. 
For example, as has been shown in the presidential impeachment crisis in 
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2004 it was radicalized human rights discourse that helped sort out the 
situation in favor of popular settlement. Nowhere will this practice be 
more powerful than in Korea where the social movement-type discourse 
has continued to reconstruct the idea of human rights (Stammers 1999), 
thus the social movement-led human rights discourse is a norm rather 
than an exception. Therefore, it should be significant enough that politics 
in Korea has been, and is being, determined, driven and reconstituted by 
radical human rights discourse with potential implications for the 
hegemonic milieu of “progressive” democracy in the years to come. 
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PART IV 
                                                        
Taiwan 
9 
Civil Society and Democratization in 
Taiwan: 1980-2005 
Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao 
I.  Introduction: A Short History of Civil Society in 
Taiwan 
Since the early 1980s, Taiwanese politics has undergone far-reaching 
changes in both the way it is practiced and how its relations with civil 
society are structured. Regarding the former, it has evolved from 
authoritarian rule, which allowed little if any input from the grassroots, 
into a liberal democracy and a vibrant and demanding civil society. 
Regarding the latter, there has been great growth in the size, functions 
and realms of concern of the newly established NGO sector in civil 
society. This paper will demonstrate that these twin changes are not 
independent but are interactive: civil society in the form of numerous 
social movement-oriented NGOs of the 1980s was a vital force in the 
gradual loosening up of the state’s domination of the society that helped 
bring about the lifting of almost 40 years of martial law in 1987, and the 
subsequent transformation and consolidation of democracy; in turn, the 
process of democratization has legitimated the NGO sector’s protests and 
helped it to continue to grow. This paper will also analyze in depth the 
workings of the NGO sector as it has developed since the 1980s as well as 
how it changed its relationship with the new democratic regime after 
2000. 
Suppression of Civil Society under Authoritarianism: 1950s-1970s 
Under the political authoritarianism and martial law regime of the 1950s, 
1960s and 1970s, Taiwan had no genuine civil society that could have 
engaged in any legitimate or genuine state-civil society dialogue or 
exchange. The then-ruling Kuomintang (KMT) practiced “state 
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corporatism” and had a Department of Social Affairs in its party 
apparatus to control and monitor all civic and social organizations and 
groups. No autonomy in a political sense was granted to existing 
“non-governmental” or civic organizations. No new civil membership 
associations could be established without prior investigation, and almost 
all social associations were under government surveillance. Existing civic 
and social organizations in that period were de facto bureaucratic arms of 
the KMT party-state; in practical terms they were parts of the vertical 
chain of command. No free and autonomous horizontal linkage and 
networking were permitted among civil social associations, particularly 
politically sensitive civil organizations such as labor unions, farmers’ 
associations, student groups and cultural and intellectual societies. In the 
strict sense of how civil society and NGOs are defined today, at that time 
there was no real civil society or NGO sector. Many so-called civic and 
social organizations were established by the KMT in order to pre-empt 
any real grassroots, not-for-government civil organizations and to extend 
the party’s penetration into every sector of Taiwanese society.  
As for the formation of foundations at that time, only rich and 
powerful or politically well-connected individuals and corporations were 
in a position to establish charitable organizations to assist the poor and 
needy. No other socially or politically significant reform agenda was 
considered. Therefore, charity-oriented foundations could not have 
issued any demands for reform to the authoritarian state, nor could they 
be viewed as a part of a viable civil society. 
Alongside the suppressed and monitored local civic associations and 
foundations, there existed a transplanted Western sector of philanthropic 
organizations and middle-class social clubs. This foreign sector was, to 
some extent, the only “real” non-governmental set of civil institutions at 
that time. However, these social organizations and clubs were, again, 
focused on non-political or de-politicized charitable causes and welfare 
activities. Among them, the most notable transplanted philanthropic civic 
groups were church-related organizations such as World Vision (WV) 
and the Christian Children’s Fund (CCF). Transplanted, urban 
middle-class social clubs such as the Junior Chambers of Commerce (JC 
International), Rotary Club, Lions Club and Kiwanis represented another 
spectrum of Taiwan’s early depoliticized civil society. The co-existence of 
suppressed local civic groups and the transplanted foreign charity and 
social friendship-oriented social organizations best characterizes the 
overall nature of the non-existence of Taiwanese “civil society” in the 
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period prior to the late 1970s. 
The Rise of Social Movements and the Emerging Civil Society of 
the 1980s 
Taiwan’s transition to democracy began in 1980. This transition can be 
divided into several phases. From late 1980 to June 1987, Taiwan began a 
process of gradual liberalization coinciding with increasingly 
emboldened opposition political forces and citizen protest movements on 
social issues. With the impending lifting of martial law, July 1987 saw an 
unsteady opening up of democracy with then-vice president Lee 
Teng-Hui’s confirmation as president following the death of President 
Chiang Ching-Kuo. The period from July 1988 until the first change of 
government in March 2000 saw a complete transition to democratic rule. 
Since that time, Taiwan has been in a period of democratic consolidation 
(Hsiao and Koo 1997; Hsiao 2001).  
Beginning in 1980, Taiwan began to witness the mobilization of a 
true civil society as represented by a sequence of social movements and 
civil protests, many of them very contentious in nature and demanding 
various concessions from government. Throughout these phases, social 
movements and their organized NGO advocates played a very significant 
role in facilitating, fostering, creating and protecting Taiwan’s 
democratization. NGOs advocating change and reform have grown in 
number considerably since 1980, their causes covering a wide range of 
areas including consumer protection, labor and farmer rights, 
environmentalism and nature conservation, gender equality, minority 
identity, human rights, urban housing and the preservation of Hakka 
culture.  
What is striking about the emergence of Taiwan’s social movements 
is that, from initiating issues and setting agendas to establishing and 
mobilizing NGOs, everything has been of local origin and free of direct 
foreign intervention. Ever since Taiwan lost the China seat at the United 
Nations in 1971, its diplomatic isolation has meant that there have been 
no contributions from UN-related governmental or non-governmental 
organizations to the activation and mobilization of local civil society and 
NGOs. All the credit must go to grassroots organizations – a clear sign of 
localization and indigenization of NGO initiatives.  
The emergence of mobilized social movements and a nascent NGO 
sector has profoundly changed state-civil society power relations in 
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Taiwan. The democratizing KMT party-state culminated in succession to 
the presidency by the opposition Democratic Progressive Party in 2000, 
as well as in its securing a greater position of power in the Legislative 
Yuan in 2001; both events coincided with formal legitimacy and 
considerable autonomy for Taiwanese civil society and its many NGOs. 
Civil Society, NGOs and Democratic Transformation from the 
1990s 
Civil society as manifested in the variety of active NGOs in Taiwan has 
both benefited from and assisted in the transition to and consolidation of 
democratization. The rapid growth of advocate NGOs and social 
movements in the 1980s has been matched since 1990 by the growth of 
many service-providing NGOs and new kinds of civil organizations. It 
can be said that Taiwan today has a very robust NGO sector. It has also 
seen qualitative change. Taiwan’s NGOs have become pluralistic and 
diversified, with NGOs of all types founded to meet new demands 
generated from social and political change. For example, many social 
movement organizations, think tanks and corporate foundations have 
changed their orientation in response to Taiwan’s massive political and 
societal transformation since the 1980s. There are two contextual factors 
that can explain the growth of and changes in Taiwan’s civil society and 
its NGO sector in the last two decades. 
Taiwan’s political liberalization has been very much conducive to 
the growth, expansion and pluralistic development of civil society and 
non-governmental organizations. Many “underground” civil 
organizations were self-initiated and self-organized by various social 
movements and civil protest interests after the early 1980s to exert 
pressure on the then authoritarian state. Once martial law was lifted in 
1987, many more associations and foundations were quickly established 
by various active individuals. It can be argued that the early wave of 
social protests and movements was the facilitating force behind Taiwan’s 
political liberalization from the early 1980s, while the later wave of social 
movements and their formalized NGOs were the result of the 
institutionalization of democracy since the late 1980s. With the demise of 
authoritarianism, political obstacles restricting the development of free 
association and expression in civil society have been dramatically 
removed. Moreover, the political opposition, in its struggle against the 
authoritarian regime, further legitimized the role of civil society and 
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NGOs as reformers. NGOs have not only been recognized and 
legitimized, but are also viewed as a necessary safeguard for a healthy 
and mature democratic political system. 
Social and economic factors have also contributed to the impressive 
development of the NGO sector. The spread of public education, in 
particular the development of higher education, enhanced and awakened 
the general public’s social consciousness and led to the demand for a 
better political system and society. Overall economic affluence has freed 
the general public from worry about basic material needs and has 
allowed them to pursue other things, among them social and political 
reforms. The public’s freedom of access to the mass media and other 
sources of information and increasing opportunities to travel abroad 
have also equipped many citizens with knowledge and skills, allowing 
them to become better organized in voicing their demands.  
Finally, as witnessed in Taiwan’s many organizations promoting 
social reform, intellectuals and the new middle class have played a 
crucial role. Many were trained and educated in the West, and this “new 
knowledge class” has served as a catalyst for the injection of many global 
values and as a facilitator for the emergence of an activated civil society 
and well-established NGOs (Hsiao 2000a). At present, civil society is 
truly represented by these formalized NGOs of all descriptions. 
II.  A Portrait of Taiwan’s Institutionalized NGOs 
A Typology of NGOs 
There are several ways to classify today’s NGO sector in Taiwan. First, 
based on the broad objectives and strategies they employ, NGOs can be 
classified as part of the social movement sector or advocate NGOs, or as 
part of the non-social movement sector or service-providing NGOs. 
Under this scheme, it can be said that while the majority of NGOs in 
Taiwan are service providers, the advocate NGOs are a relatively new 
constituent of Taiwan’s NGO world and have played a crucial role in 
making democracy possible. Though service-oriented NGOs as a whole 
were not established with the clear objective of promoting specific social 
reforms, many service-providing civil institutions and organizations have 
also, in recent years, adapted their objectives to focus on emerging social 
concerns. In doing so, they moved beyond their traditional charitable 
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activities and social/friendship functions. Since the 1990s, both advocate 
and service NGOs have developed further, resulting in a convergence 
through the sharing of a common “new reformism” while also diverging 
to serve a wide variety of functions and making Taiwan a better society 
for all.  
In terms of a general organizational typology, Taiwan’s NGO sector 
can also be divided into membership-centered civil associations and 
endowment-centered foundations. As of 2004, the number of 
membership associations had increased to almost 20,000, including all 
types of political organizations, a more than 50% increase on the 1990s. 
Among existing membership associations, more than 70% were 
established in the 1980s and 1990s. This clearly reflects the social 
dynamism of Taiwan’s mobilized civil society. Social services, public 
interest and charitable organizations alone account for almost 30% off 
these, while academic, cultural and international associations together 
account for more than 40%. 
By 2004 there were nearly 3,000 foundations, about 75% of which 
were established from the 1980s. Over 70% are privately funded, about 
25% are funded by private corporations and the remainders are mixed or 
governmental foundations. This sector is therefore clearly dominated by 
newly established, non-governmental foundations supported either by 
private, individual donations or by corporate bodies. It is noteworthy 
that an increasing number of corporate foundations have been 
established since the 1980s. Their increasing importance in Taiwan’s 
NGO sphere reflects the growing involvement of the private business 
community in a resurrected civil society and its growing concern with 
public affairs. As with the membership association sector, philanthropic, 
welfare and charitable foundations rank as the top categories, followed 
by public interest research, education, culture and arts, international 
cultural exchanges and social activism. Moreover, with few exceptions, 
most of Taiwan’s foundations are operating foundations rather than 
grant-making foundations. Because of this unique feature, Taiwan’s 
foundations are not so distinguishable from what are normally defined as 
membership civic associations. The difference between foundations and 
associations in Taiwan lies only in a legal definition, not in their nature or 
activities (Hsiao 2000b; 2003). 
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The Institutional Framework 
Each membership-oriented NGO is required to register as a legal body 
with the appropriate supervising government agency and undergo an 
administrative review and a procedure of approval. The Civic Code is the 
legal basis for specific regulations governing the establishment and 
operation of NGOs. There is a separate Civil Organization Law which 
stipulates the required permits and application procedures. A minimum 
of 30 founding members is required to establish a membership NGO, 
which must then go through an internal review process by the state 
bureaucracy. A national association needs to apply to the Ministry of the 
Interior, while a local association must approach a local government’s 
Bureau of Social Affairs before obtaining approval from the city or 
county government. 
Applications for establishing an endowment-oriented foundation 
tend to be more complex, in that each one must be approved by the 
ministry or bureau that administers the functions the foundation is 
concerned with. All thirteen ministries and agencies of the Executive 
Yuan, Taiwan’s central administrative body, issue their own 
“Regulations for the Establishment and Supervision of Foundations” as 
legal and administrative guidelines. Provincial, county and municipal 
governments can also approve and supervise foundations. At present, to 
set up a foundation, an endowment of at least NT$30 million 
(approximately US$937,000 at the 2005 exchange rate) is required by most 
central government bodies. There is a ban on public officials with 
supervisory duties taking up trustee or board member positions on a 
foundation in order to avoid conflicts of interest. The issue of how and 
when endowment funds are used is also subject to legal restrictions. For 
example, according to the most recent regulations, no more than half of a 
foundation’s endowment may generally be transferred into real estate, 
bonds or stocks. 
The Income Tax Law provides that educational, cultural, public 
interest and charitable associations and foundations – if established in 
accordance with Executive Yuan regulations – are exempt from paying 
income tax on their own income and the income of their subordinate 
operating units. It also grants special tax deductions or credits to 
individuals who make a deductible donation to non-profit civil 
organizations of up to 20% of his or her annual gross consolidated 
income (Feng 1999).  
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What makes Taiwan’s NGO sector unique is not how it is governed, 
but how it works. Many associations and foundations were conceived by 
groups of individuals in pursuit of similar ideals, and they see that 
establishing membership associations is the best way to do so. However, 
some wish to use an organization as a personal vehicle, and if they have 
the financial means, they will establish a foundation, which can have a 
limited membership. This way they do not jeopardize control of the 
foundation by having too many members. This option is open only to the 
wealthy, however. Therefore, for those who lack the necessary funding 
required for setting up a foundation, the option is a membership 
association. In addition, as indicated above, the actual management and 
operation of many foundations are similar to those of membership 
associations, since the great majority of Taiwan’s foundations are in fact 
operating foundations rather than grant-making ones. Finally, many 
religious groups, schools, hospitals and performing arts groups have 
registered themselves as foundations in order to enjoy tax benefits, 
though their legal qualifications are rather controversial. 
III.  Characterizing Taiwan’s Civil Society: Autonomy, 
Advocacy and the Influence of NGOs 
Two key features of NGOs and any civil association in the democratic 
world are the enjoyment of legal recognition or protection and autonomy 
vis-à-vis the state. In Taiwan today, NGOs and civil associations can 
readily gain legal status; NGOs no longer need to be “underground” to 
guarantee their autonomy and independence.  
A survey of 250 NGOs in the Taipei metropolitan area was 
conducted by the author in early 2000 in order to understand the current 
circumstances of civil organizations in a time of democratic consolidation. 
A total of 194 membership associations and 56 foundations were 
surveyed, of which the following six types of NGO were included: 
economic (9), religious (13), friendship (48), academic/professional (57), 
advocacy/social movement (30) and welfare (92). More than 75% of the 
NGOs in the study had been established since the 1980s, and about a half 
(50.8%) were set up in the 1990s (see Table 1). This further highlights the 
fact that Taiwan has since the 1980s entered an unprecedented phase of 
great social and political change, and the rapid growth of civil 
associations and NGOs is clear indicator of social pluralism and political 
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liberalization at a time of great transformation. 
Table 1 History and NGOs 
Established in Associations Foundations Total（%） 
Before 1949 13 0 13 （5.2%） 
1950-1959 7 1 8 （3.2%） 
1960-1969 14 2 16 （6.4%） 
1970-1979 18 6 24 （9.6%） 
1980-1989 39 23 62（24.8%） 
1990-1999 103 24 127（50.8%） 
Total 194 56 250（100%） 
Note: 16 NGOs provide no answers. 
Table 2 Size of NGOs 
 Associations（%） Foundations（%） Total（%） 
1-19 8（3.8%） 21（36.8%） 29（11.0%） 
20-49 29（14.1%） 19（33.3%） 48（18.3%） 
50-99 27（13.1%） 9（15.8%） 36（13.7%） 
100-199 29（14.1%） 0（0%） 29（11.0%） 
200-499 49（23.9%） 2（3.5%） 51（19.4%） 
500-999 20（9.7%） 1（1.8%） 21 （8.0%） 
1000- 44（21.4%） 5（8.8%） 49（18.6%） 
Total 206（100%） 57（100%） 263（100%） 
Note: 3 NGOs provide no answers 
Membership associations tend to be large in size, with more than 
50% boasting more than 200 members and 24% between 200 and 499 
members, while 21% were large associations with more than 1,000 
members. In contrast, foundations tend to be small in size, with 70% 
having less than 50 personnel, and of these 37% had less than 11. 
Obviously, membership-based associations are large in size while 
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endowment-based foundations are much smaller. 
It was also found that the majority of NGOs were made up of 
members with professional and middle class backgrounds, while their 
services are mainly delivered to the general public. This class difference 
between service provider and service recipient suggests that the urban 
middle and professional classes are at the core of Taiwan’s “new 
reformism” initiated by NGOs since the 1980s. One can also characterize 
Taiwan’s NGOs as a continuing manifestation of today’s force for social 
reform.  
Of all NGOs, the largest number identify themselves as “cultural and 
educational organizations” (44.0%), followed by “social and community 
service groups” (39.1%), “professional organizations” (27.4%), 
“organizations to protect socially disadvantaged groups” (26.3%), 
“charitable and welfare institutions” (24.8%) and “academic and research 
associations” (23.3%). The order of these organizational identities 
represents the social functions and expectations of Taiwan’s NGOs: with 
increased professionalism comes the promotion of social education, 
cultural and welfare activities and the protection of disadvantaged 
groups and classes. 
Table 3 Self-characterization of NGOs Function (multiple choices) 
 Associations Foundations Total（%） 
Charitable Welfare 42 24 66（24.8%） 
Educational 84 33 117（44.0%） 
Protecting socially disadvantaged groups 56 14 70（26.3%） 
Self help 41 4 45（16.9%） 
Research-academic 51 11 62（23.3%） 
Professional 60 13 73（27.4%） 
Protest-pressure group 26 4 30（11.3%） 
Friendship 55 1 56（21.1%） 
Social-community service 85 19 104（39.1%） 
N 208 58 266（100%） 
 
Nearly 80% of the NGOs surveyed organized regular activities, of 
which public seminars, lectures and training courses were most common, 
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followed by activities like the publication of magazines, books and 
newsletters, exchanges and cooperation with local and overseas NGOs, 
and the provision of social and community services. This finding is quite 
consistent with the fact that in a democracy, NGOs by and large adopt 
reformism as their primary goal.  
According to the survey, private donations were the most important 
source of all NGO financing (71%), followed by membership dues (65%) 
and income generated from NGO activities (38%). Financial assistance 
and subsidies from the government, by comparison, were relatively small 
and insignificant, though 31% of NGOs still claimed to have received 
government support. One can therefore assert that Taiwan’s NGOs have 
already, to a large extent, become independent of government economic 
control. It is not the state, but rather the public and the citizenry, 
especially the rising middle classes, who stand behind and beside the 
NGO sector.  
This does not mean that Taiwan’s NGOs have been financially 
independent of the public sector; it does mean, however, that the 
government can no longer domineer NGOs through financial and 
economic manipulation. In fact, 29% of the NGOs surveyed had an 
annual budget of less than NT$1 million (US$30,000), while 13% had an 
annual budget of between NT$1 million and NT$2 million and 10% a 
budget between NT$2 million and NT$3 million, which amounts to a half 
of NGOs in the sample having a budget of less than NT$3 million (less 
than US$100,000). There is a sharp difference between the financial 
circumstances of membership associations and foundations: about 20% of 
foundations had an annual budget of more than NT$50 million (US$1.6 
million), but more than half of the associations’ budgets were less than 
NT$2 million (US$60,000). This financial gap has also created the public 
image of “poor associations” and “rich foundations”. In the 
government’s eyes, foundations are seen to be more credible because of 
their financial endowments and organizational capabilities.   
The issue of autonomy for NGOs should be looked at in relative 
terms; for an NGO to be “autonomous” does not indicate total separation 
from the state. It was found that 31% of the core leaders of Taiwan’s 
NGOs were in fact elected officials, while 23% of the leaders had run for 
public office. Those officials are elected; the impetus therefore was 
always from the bottom up rather than from the top down. Aspiring 
politicians at central or local levels sometimes need to use NGOs as a 
springboard into electoral politics. NGOs are not subject to control by 
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people in political circles, but are, rather, a medium or field in which 
these people can cultivate social prestige and political influence. 
Autonomy  
For a NGO to be genuinely autonomous, administrative and financial 
decisions should be free from any interference from outside forces. With 
this criterion in mind, the data from the survey found that Taiwan’s 
NGOs are quite independent in various accounts. For example, there was 
virtually no control over the decisions of personnel by any single family – 
only 2% reported this problem – while as few as 4% admitted that there 
were close family and kin ties within the decision-making core. Only 11% 
were financially established by a single business or corporation, and 21% 
were originally set up by government funding. All of this tends to 
indicate that in Taiwan today, no significant interference on the part of 
family, business or government can be detected in NGO decision-making 
processes.  
One way for an NGO to avoid being dominated by outside forces is 
to develop horizontal networks with other like-minded NGOs to the 
greatest extent possible. It was found that as many as 63% of NGOs 
interviewed claimed to have had such inter-organizational cooperation 
with other Taiwanese NGOs. Also, about 30% had developed exchanges 
and networking with international NGOs and local businesses on various 
joint projects. Only 13% said that they had cooperated with political 
parties. It can be asserted that Taiwanese NGOs have quite successfully 
built up inter-organizational resource linkages with other local or 
international NGOs, and even with the business sector to a lesser extent.  
It is easy to understand why cooperation between NGOs and 
government has been limited. In the past, under authoritarian rule, any 
NGO “cooperation” with government or the KMT meant that it was 
being controlled or dictated by political power. Now, even in a new 
democracy, the basis for trust between NGO and government is still quite 
weak. NGOs do not have full confidence in government, and the 
government is still not comfortable working with NGOs.  
The survey found that in the mind of NGO leaders, relationships 
between NGOs and governments of different levels had been mixed. On 
the one hand, 46.2% of NGOs interviewed still criticize current laws and 
regulations as unsuited to the reality of civil society, and 32% contended 
that central government officials are authoritarian and bureaucratic in 
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dealing with them. On the other hand, 38% considered the central 
government to be cooperative with civic associations, and 25% thought 
the government respected the professionalism of civil organizations and 
would even listen to their policy input. 
This ambivalence is also true in regard to NGO-local government 
relations: 41% and 29% viewed the relationship as “cooperative” and 
“respectful”, while 30% and 24% thought it to be “out of touch with 
reality” and “bureaucratic”. 
All the above leads us to conclude that NGO-government relations 
have gradually changed in favor of NGOs, though they do still face the 
legacy of past authoritarianism. 
Advocacy  
In Taipei, a sense of reformism is quite prevalent among the NGO sector, 
as found in the survey finding that 74% of NGO leaders claim “we 
should improve social conditions through gradual reform”, while only 
9% insist on complete reconstruction and 7% maintain that “we should 
keep the status quo and resist any radical change”. For example, 51% of 
NGOs surveyed were more inclined to take the view that “we should try 
hard to narrow the gap between the poor and the rich”, 65% agreed that 
“environmental protection is necessary to prevent Taiwan from being 
polluted”. Also, 38% of respondents were ambivalent on the issue of 
whether individuals or government should be more responsible for the 
general conditions relating to livelihood, and 44% felt that a balance was 
needed between the emphasis on public participation and government 
efficiency. 
In the spirit of advocacy, Taiwan’s NGOs have very much stressed 
their role as advocates of social reform. As found in the survey, the most 
popular approaches to performing this role were in the forms of 
“engaging in dialogue with government officials” (29.3%), “proposing 
recommendations to the government” (24.8%), “organizing seminars on 
policy issues” (22.2%), “signing petitions” (20.7%), “calling press 
conferences” (17.7%) and “staging sit-ins or rallies” (12.8%). All were 
more or less moderate in attitude but diverse in style. It was also found 
that more than a quarter of NGOs surveyed had participated in protests 
or other advocacy activities, and that more than 60% had even sought 
support from other civic organizations in performing these activities. 
Such actions were expected to “bring about new ideas” (43.2%), “present 
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charitable activities” (33.8%), “develop concern for public issues” (28.2%), 
“change government policies” (25.6%), “envision further social reform” 
(10.9%) and “enhance civic consciousness” (9%). 
Influence 
Besides being autonomous and advocacy-driven, Taiwan’s NGOs have 
been influential in shaping government policies and public life. 
From the surrey findings, at present more than half of all NGOs 
identify their primary objectives as “monitoring government policies” 
and “lobbying on laws and regulations”. About a quarter said they had 
participated in the decision-making processes of government. Their more 
concrete influence on government included “consultation with 
government agencies” (33.8%), “monitoring policy implementation” 
(17.3%), “discovery of social problems and policy issues” (15.4%), 
“changing the attitudes of officials” (15.4%) and “lobbying on public 
policy and legislation” (14.7%). 
In the end, exactly one half of NGO leaders disagreed with the 
statement that “government officials do not care about NGO opinions”, 
while another 42.5% seemed to be of the opinion that “government 
officials still do not take NGOs seriously”. 
As for social influence, NGOs claimed they had “provided direct 
services to needy individuals and social groups” (58.3%) on the one hand, 
and “educated the public” (57.1%) on the other. They also maintained 
that the social impact of NGOs includes “caring for disadvantaged social 
groups” (38.0%), “promotion among the public of new ideas and new 
values” (36.8%), and “extension of social services and promotion of 
public participation” (32.7%). Therefore, it is quite evident that NGOs in 
democratic Taiwan have already enjoyed policy and social influence. 
However, another new phenomenon has occurred in relations 
between some of the advocate NGOs and the DPP government. These 
former allies have had difficulties in adjusting their interactions. To be 
fair, the DPP government has been trying hard to realize its promises as 
soon as possible on campaign platform issues relating to labor, welfare 
and the environment. But due to unfavorable political relations with the 
opposition KMT and People First Party (PFP) and its own inexperience, 
the government has not performed well enough to meet public 
expectations since it came to power in 2000. 
Advocate NGOs for labor, social welfare and the environment have 
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often found themselves at odds with the DPP administration on policy 
issues. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that labor, welfare and 
environmental NGOs have criticized the regime for being unable to 
deliver on its promises or initiate a progressive policy vision. Relations 
between advocate NGOs and the state could be characterized as 
precarious and tense a year after the DPP came to power. The 
administration was quite aware of the dilemma and tried to resolve the 
problems in the hope of renewing its progressive alliance with the NGOs 
by accommodating their demands without jeopardizing its new 
coalitions with other sectors of society.  
This emerging issue in NGO/civil society-state relations is still in 
development and should have a bearing on the course of Taiwan’s 
democratic governance. 
IV.  The Changing Landscape of State-Civil Relations in a 
New Democracy: 2000-2005 
In 2000, Taiwan witnessed an unprecedented party rotation, with the 
opposition DPP winning the presidential election for the first time. Such 
great change also impacted on relations between two erstwhile allies 
during the periods of political liberalization and democratization – the 
DPP and social movements or advocate NGOs. In the past, especially 
before 1996, many social movement groups developed a strategic 
partnership with the DPP on various protest issues ranging from labor, 
social welfare and women’s and minority interests to nuclear power and 
the environment. They formed a sort of political coalition and supported 
each other on many fronts vis-à-vis the authoritarian KMT regime.  
However, the stronger the DPP became, the more difficult it became 
to figure out its real priorities on policies relating to the above issues. The 
compromising nature of party politics and executive-legislative 
interaction soon occupied the DPP’s attention as it moved toward 
consolidating state power through electoral politics. The DPP was forced 
to de-radicalize itself following the institutionalization of competitive 
elections in the phase of democratic consolidation after 1996. Therefore, 
the DPP, the biggest opposition party until 2000, had gradually changed 
its stand and was no longer committed to many causes that social 
movement groups and advocate NGOs had long pursued. In fact, 
between 1996 and 2000, relations between some advocate NGOs and the 
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DPP had already turned sour and some tension was detectable. Leaders 
of advocate NGOs and social movement organizers began to criticize the 
DPP for scaling down some of its social agenda in exchange for winning 
more votes. 
The precariousness of the situation became even more evident after 
the DPP took power. The political strategies of the DPP became more 
cautious and pragmatic. It began to reconsider its political and social 
priorities and, as a result, its relationship with the former allies in the 
advocate NGO sector changed. In spite of the fact that during democratic 
consolidation the NGO sector, in general, has been quite autonomous 
vis-à-vis the state and has continued to support new causes and exert 
influence on various policy matters, some advocate NGO relationships 
with the DPP government have faced tests and challenges. The overall 
pattern of “partnership” that developed between civil movements and 
the DPP opposition movement gave way to a different pattern in the 
post-party-rotation years between 2000 and 2005: advocate NGOs began 
to act as “guardians” for the DPP administration.  
Stories on the changing relations between advocate NGOs for labor, 
social welfare and the environment (including the anti-nuclear agenda) 
and the DPP government are used below to illustrate this development. 
Labor NGOs and the DPP Government 
The DPP has long identified its party platform with the interests of the 
working class and has engaged in many protests and rallies on behalf of 
anti-KMT labor unions. One especially powerful faction of the DPP, New 
Tide, has a long history of cultivating a class base in labor movements. 
However, since the DPP came to power, the party’s introduction of 
various controversial labor policies has disillusioned many former NGO 
allies. It started when the DPP failed to deliver on a campaign promise to 
reduce working hours. Labor unions criticized the DPP for giving in to 
business interests. The DPP had also promised to liberalize labor union 
regulations by allowing civil servants and teachers to organize their own 
unions, but by May 2002, when Labor Union Act amendments were 
approved, these two groups of professionals were still not permitted to 
join a union.  
The DPP government also pledged to create 100,000 jobs for 
Aborigines and handicapped groups, but so far the implementation of 
this policy has not been satisfactory to labor NGOs. On the labor 
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insurance pension program, the DPP also promised to increase 
allowances for elderly workers, but the Council of Labor Affairs would 
not agree to make such a commitment. 
With collective discontent brewing among labor union organizers, 
5,000 workers were mobilized to protest on the streets of Taipei on May 
20, 2002, the second anniversary of the DPP government’s inauguration. 
Labor union activists and labor NGO leaders criticized their former ally 
for betraying them and not properly protecting labor interests as had 
been promised. The National Federation of Labor Unions even released a 
highly critical report on Chen Shui-Bian’s performance in regard to labor 
policy. From time to time since then, labor movement leaders and union 
organizers have made critical comments on labor policy.  
Between 2000 and 2005, the labor NGOs’ relationship with the DPP 
was quite tense as labor unions condemned the DPP for losing its 
idealism. 
Social Welfare NGOs and the DPP Government 
The idea of the “welfare state” has been supported by the DPP as a 
political platform for two decades. In every major election, the DPP has 
been on the front line arguing for more comprehensive and progressive 
social welfare policies and programs for different groups and classes, 
especially disadvantaged social groups (Hsiao and Lin 2000). Indeed, 
while in opposition, the DPP was successful in placing the welfare issue 
onto the national policy agenda: It had pressured the KMT to be more 
responsive to policy demands from welfare NGOs. 
Nevertheless, under pressure from an economic slump, the new DPP 
administration was forced to respond to broader challenges from 
business and pro-business fractions by proclaiming an unpopular 
“economy first, welfare postponed” strategy in late 2000. It immediately 
faced tremendous negative reaction and criticism from welfare NGOs for 
betraying the ideal of the welfare state. 
The welfare administration and policy coordination mechanism 
under the new government was also ineffective in the eyes of many 
welfare NGOs. The NGOs and their advocates regularly voiced 
grievances, complaining that the DPP was treating them and activist 
organizations as “captive voters”. It is true that in the first year of DPP 
rule, most welfare NGOs adopted an understanding attitude toward the 
government and did not challenge its welfare policies because they were, 
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after all, former allies, and the NGOs thought the state needed a bit of 
time to figure out policy initiatives. However, as time went on, the 
government failed to convince the NGOs that it could deliver on its 
welfare promises in the short term. Many welfare NGOs became 
impatient and unhappy with the DPP administration and began to adopt 
a critical attitude toward their former allies. They requested a private 
meeting with the premier and demanded the state act positively and 
formulate more satisfactory welfare policies. 
Finally, on the eve of the second anniversary of DPP rule in May 
2002, the government organized a National Social Welfare Conference in 
which welfare NGO leaders were invited to engage in policy dialogue 
with state officials and scholars. The government used this occasion to 
assure the NGO leaders that it was committed to a social welfare 
platform and intended to enact a national pension system. However, it 
also tried to explain that because of the economic downturn, increasing 
difficulties in allocating budget funds to social welfare programs were 
inevitable. After the conference, more than 100 resolutions were reached, 
but many controversies remained unsettled. Most welfare NGOs and 
welfare movement organizers were not satisfied with the result and 
remained skeptical, declaring that they would continue to take a watchful 
approach to the government’s welfare policy. 
Environmental NGOs and the DPP Government 
Taiwan has witnessed three streams of environmental movement since 
the 1980s, and in each stream there has been a variety of environmental 
NGOs. Among the three types of collective action for the environment 
(the anti-pollution movement, the nature conservation movement and the 
anti-nuclear movement), the anti-nuclear movement had developed a 
more direct alliance with the opposition DPP over the years. The DPP 
also adopted the anti-nuclear movement’s agenda as its platform. Despite 
this, the party has not succeeded in halting construction of the 
controversial Fourth Nuclear Power Plant, which was strongly supported 
by the KMT. 
When the DPP came to power, it was widely expected to take action 
on the nuclear power plant issue, so it did. In October 2000, the 
government announced it would stop construction of the plant 
immediately and instead build a “No-Nukes Family Land” for Taiwan. 
However, resistance from the opposition KMT and pro-nuclear business 
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interests was very strong. It caused political cleavages between the ruling 
party and the opposition parties and between environmental NGOs and 
business interests. Finally, in February 2000, the DPP government was 
forced to withdraw its earlier decision to halt construction for the sake of 
restoring political stability. It was a painful decision for the DPP, and it 
was an even greater setback for the anti-nuclear movement. 
The environmental NGOs were very angry at the DPP and criticized 
it for compromising its stand on nuclear power. A large rally of more 
than 20,000 anti-nuclear activists and concerned citizens and politicians 
was held in February 2002, demanding that a referendum resolve the 
dispute. 
Like other advocate NGOs, the environmental NGOs felt that the 
DPP had sold them out by giving up its “no nukes” stand so easily. The 
NGOs’ protests and public attacks were very embarrassing to the new 
government because a former ally had turned into an energetic critic. In 
some ways, the February 24 demonstration was not only a collective 
action against the nuclear power plant, nor even just an attack on the 
DPP’s nuclear policy; it was also an open expression of the collective 
grievances and discontent of advocacy NGOs and social activists in 
general, who felt the DPP government had failed to keep its word. 
The most recent incident along these lines was an open statement by 
more than fifty environmental NGOs on Earth Day 2005, which singled 
out ten environmentally unfriendly policies that Taiwan had to confront. 
The coalition pointed out that the DPP government was to blame for the 
controversies (Taiwan Environmental Information Association 2005). 
V.  Conclusion 
From this discussion of the evolution of civil society, NGOs and 
democratization and their current interaction in democratic governance 
in Taiwan, the following general propositions can be drawn. 
First, the development of Taiwan’s civil society in the form of 
institutionalized NGOs can be divided into three phases. In the 1950s, 
1960s and even the early 1970s, bona fide and autonomous civil 
society/NGOs were by and large nonexistent. They were either 
suppressed by the authoritarian state or became parts of the structure of 
KMT state corporatism. The only real NGOs outside KMT control were 
charitable social welfare-oriented NGOs and the middle-class 
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social/friendship networking organizations transplanted by Western 
philanthropic organizations.  
Since the early 1980s, the environment for civil society and NGOs 
has changed dramatically, allowing for many active and autonomous 
NGOs to become established entirely on the basis of local initiative and 
resources. The social movement NGOs established in this period 
facilitated and fostered Taiwan’s democratic transition and transformed 
the power relationship between the state and civil society. Taiwan’s NGO 
sector stands apart from those in most other countries in that it was based 
on local issues and grew on indigenous resources with no direct 
international or global NGO intervention.  
In the 1990s, many of Taiwan’s locally formed civil groups and 
institutionalized NGOs became more regional and global in their outlook 
and networking. Both service-providing and advocate NGOs have 
extended their activities to the Asia-Pacific region, in some cases to the 
entire world. Owing to political tensions across the Taiwan Strait and 
Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation, the regionalization and globalization of 
Taiwanese NGOs received no assistance from the government. What 
characterizes the path to globalization of these NGOs is its genuinely 
non-governmental nature. 
Second, the emergence and development of all kinds of NGOs and 
civil forces have been the product of local social needs. Very little was 
transplanted from abroad or simply franchised out from other 
international NGOs. Therefore, NGOs have been “local” in character 
from the very beginning and required no localization, unlike many 
NGOs in Southeast Asia in recent years. Furthermore, many Taiwanese 
NGOs have taken the paths of regionalization and globalization in 
changing their outlook and developing external linkages. This can be 
viewed as a unique Taiwanese experience.  
Third, civil society, especially social movements and advocate NGOs, 
has played the dual role of facilitating and consolidating democracy in 
Taiwan between 1980 and 2000. During the phases of liberalization and 
democratic transition, advocate NGOs contributed to the making of the 
new democracy by challenging the authoritarian KMT regime and 
fostering the possibility of change. In the period of democratic 
consolidation, NGOs of all varieties deepened Taiwan’s democratic base 
by exercising institutional influences and providing input as part of the 
process of democratic governance. Today, NGOs and civil organizations 
are legally protected and enjoy a high degree of autonomy and a certain 
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level of legitimate influence through their advocacy functions. This 
situation may not so different to that in other democratic countries in the 
Asia-Pacific region, but in Taiwan it is most vivid. 
Fourth, another new phenomenon has occurred recently in relations 
between some of the advocate NGOs and the democratic state. The 
NGOs and the DPP have experienced difficulties in adjusting to each 
other’s new status. To be fair, the DPP government has been trying hard 
to quickly deliver on its campaign promises relating to labor, welfare and 
the environment. However, due to unfavorable political relations with 
the opposition KMT and PFP alliance and its own lack of experience and 
sophistication, the DPP government has not performed too well and has 
met with public dissatisfaction since coming to power in mid-2000. 
Advocate NGOs for labor, social welfare and the environment have 
frequently found themselves at odds with the government on various 
policy issues, particularly labor NGOs. Welfare and environmental 
NGOs began to criticize the new regime for being unable to deliver on its 
promises or initiate progressive policy. The emerging relations between 
advocate NGOs and the state can be characterized as precarious and 
tense since then. The DPP has been quite aware of this dilemma and has 
attempted to renew its progressive alliance with them by accommodating 
their demands without jeopardizing its interests that lie in other sectors 
of society.  
The political landscape in which NGOs/civil society and a new 
democratic state interact is still in the making, but it will certainly have a 
significant bearing on the course of democratic governance in Taiwan. It 
can also be noted that what is happening in Taiwan is also taking place in 
two other new democracies: South Korea and the Philippines. Therefore, 
it would be of great significance to compare NGO/civil society and state 
relations in the post-democratization era in these new democracies in the 
Asia-Pacific region. 
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Taiwanese Nationalism and 
Democratic Values 
Mau-Kuei Michael Chang 
I.  Setting the Background for the Research Question 
This article asks in what way nationalist inclinations relate to democratic 
values in Taiwan and whether the rise of Taiwanese independence 
sentiment positively or negatively correlates with democratic values. It 
also explores the impact of class and ethnic backgrounds on the 
relationship between nationalism and democratic values. It asks which of 
nationalism, ethnic background and class background is the most 
important in shaping democratic values. 
Most studies have shown that the rise of Taiwanese identity as a 
distinct national identity was very important in forging the 
democratization movement (Wachman 1994; Wu, J. 1995; Wang 1998; 
Chang, M. 1994; Chu and Lin 1996). The general line of argument 
maintains that the underlying factor in Taiwan’s democratization is 
“ethnic cleavage” between Taiwanese and Mainlanders, which began to 
form roughly from between 1945 and 1947. During Taiwan’s Martial Law 
era (1949-1986), people of Taiwanese background – the earlier settlers of 
Taiwan – were more likely to support the opposition movement in 
opposing the ruling Guomindang1 and the authoritarian government. 
After the formation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986, 
they were also more likely than other groups to support the DPP.   
The Mainlanders are known as “recent settlers” (since 1945) in 
Taiwan. The majority came with the Guomindang when escaping the 
communists after the Guomindang army lost the mainland to the CCP in 
1949. Many Mainlanders had been Guomindang loyalists before the party 
stepped up “indigenization” in the early 1990s. The indigenization of the 
Guomindang (from the 1990s to 2000) was steered by former party 
chairman and former ROC president Lee Denghui2 (Chang 1994). This 
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development forced some of the loyalists to leave and form other political 
parties, the Chinese New Party in 1994 and the People First Party in 2000 
(Chang 2004). 
The DPP has suggested that the authoritarian Republic of China, the 
Guomindang and Mainlanders all came from “outside” Taiwan. They 
form an “outsider’s regime”, privileged with political and cultural power 
that could be imposed on the land and the Taiwanese people. With the 
rise to power of the DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (the TSU)3, old 
Guomindang loyalists and Mainlanders have been presented as 
untrustworthy, inclined to national unification with Beijing and disposed 
to selling out the Taiwanese people. 
The DPP has held the central government since winning the 
presidency in 2000. The DPP’s leaders and its allies, including former 
president Lee Denghui and the TSU, have consistently hailed the rise of 
Taiwanese national self-assertion as the greatest of democratic 
achievements (Zhou 2001). The terms “indigenization”, “Taiwanization” 
and “democratization” are thus used interchangeably. Through 
democratization, people can now imagine a new country that they feel 
genuinely attached to, though not always to everyone’s satisfaction. This 
dissatisfaction may come from the lingering institutional legacy of the 
previous regime, including the ROC Constitution, the national title and a 
variety of symbolic representations of the country. 
However, attempts to equate Taiwanese national identity and 
democratic activism are questioned from time to time. For instance, 
critiques suggest that the Guomindang, not the DPP, initiated the course 
of democratization. After all, they say, it was Jiang Jingguo who started 
the process of liberalization in 1986 (Tsang 2000; Chu 1992). Taiwanese 
are also Chinese, they insist; Mainlanders are not from an “outside” 
country. The “national identity” issue and the dichotomy of Taiwanese 
and so-called outsiders are just pretexts played up by political 
demagogues to gain majority support by splitting the people and to pit 
Taiwanese against Mainlanders along phony ethnic lines. They also 
criticize Taiwanese nationalism and its normative claims as parochial, 
ethnocentric and harmful to democracy (Shi 1995; Huang 1995). 
Critiques of the non-democratic nature of Taiwanese nationalism 
rely on the use of various political discourses. Some are from the 
traditional leftist camp, which argues that nationalist politics is based on 
a false consciousness that hides the real confrontation between capitalists 
and the working class (Chen, G. 1994). Some are from the traditional 
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liberal camp, which upholds that ethno-nationalism is essentially a 
pathway to fascism and xenophobia and is a menace to individual 
equality and freedom (Jiang 1998). Others are from the sexual libertarian 
camp, which argues that nationalism, male chauvinism and middle-class 
moral conservatism form a tripartite system of domination (He 1994; 
Wang 2000). 
In the literature on democracy and nationalism in the West, scholars 
are inclined to hold a skeptical viewpoint on the compatibility of 
nationalism and democracy. The term “nationalism” has developed a bad 
reputation in the creation of bloody conflicts and massive warfare 
throughout most of the history of Europe as well as post-Cold War 
turmoil in other regions (Isaac 1976). It often finds itself next to the terms 
ethnocentrism, racism, xenophobia, fascism and, as the worst example, 
genocide (Ignatieff 1994). Except for some notable exceptions (such as 
Haas 1997; Tamil 1993), scholars in the West usually have a negative 
standpoint on nationalism. For instance, international leftists think the 
“nation” threatens the solidifying of class interests among workers 
(Hobsbawm 1990). The younger leftists falling for today’s “post-ism” 
atmosphere in Western academic communities find nation or nationalism 
a suitable target for deconstruction exercises, and trash them as 
pseudo-phenomena that suppress diversity and genuine liberty (Bhaba 
1990; Chatterjee 1993). Right-wing advocates of globalization, on the 
other hand, argue for the “withering” of the nation since it cannot hold 
on against the rise of the “trans-nation” and economic necessities 
embedded in global competition. For them, the functions of the nation 
and the nation-state will be, and should be, transformed or minimized by 
this process of “globalization” (Ohmae 1995). 
Data Set, Methods and Procedures 
This study asks if can we answer the preceding questions empirically: 
What is the relationship between Taiwanese nationalism and democratic 
values? 
The data set is from a national sample collected by a team of 
researchers from August to October 2003.4 The sample has 2,016 cases, 
with the information being collected in face-to-face interviews. The 
following procedure was followed in exploring the research question: 
(1) Construction of the concept of “democratic value”. 
(2) Construction of the concept of “nationalism”.  
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(3) Operational definition of the concepts of “class background” and 
“ethnic background”. 
(4) Establishing zero-order relation(s) between the “democratic 
value” and “nationalism”. 
(5) Use of model testing techniques to examine multivariate relations 
affecting zero-order relations between the “democratic value” and 
“nationalism”. 
II.  What are Democratic Values? 
I propose to look at this question from two angles; first, from the 
conventional liberal model, which values freedom of expression, tolerance 
for different political opinions and the preference for elections over 
efficiency – upholding citizen participation. There has been a long line of 
studies on this subject, notably originating with de Tocqueville’s views 
on American democracy, then from Stouffer (1955), Almond and Verba 
(1963, 1989), Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus (1982) and Inglehart (1990). I 
shall call this notion the “basic democratic value” in this study.  
The second angle is from the universal citizenship model, which 
argues for equal and non-discriminatory treatment for new immigrants. 
Here, we are not dealing with minority or ethnic issues, but with new 
settlers and issues of foreign nationalities residing in the country. The 
opposite of universal citizenship in this study can be said to be a 
“xenophobia tendency”, implying the stereotypes, unwarranted fears 
and discrimination associated with new immigrants. This dimension is 
somewhat related to the liberal model, but the liberal model is more 
abstract and about internal differences, while the universal citizenship 
model is more practical and about internal differences relating to people 
that can be labeled as “recently from outside”. This tendency is not so 
frequently discussed in the literature on democratic values. It is also 
explored empirically here for the first time in relation to Taiwan. For the 
sake of clarity and brevity, in the following this dimension of values is 
called a “xenophobic tendency＂ , and covers the fear and negative 
attitudes expressed toward new immigrants.  
The variable “Basic democratic value” is defined by and constructed 
with the following two items taken from the survey: 
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(1) Some people say: “The government should forbid [i.e. disallow 
public actions in expressing] speeches that are harmful to the country” 
(an item measuring tolerance and freedom of expression). 
(2) Some people say: “The most important thing in the development 
of local areas (difang such as sub-county districts) is efficiency; the 
holding of democratic elections is not important” (an item measuring 
motivations for democratic participation through preference of elections 
over efficiency or vice versa).  
Respondents were asked to answer on a four-point scale from 
“strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. Simple addition was applied for 
combining the two scores into one measurement for the “basic 
democratic value”. Figure 1 presents the distribution of the measurement 
for “basic democratic value”, with “conservative” on the left and 
“democrat” on the right, with scores ranging from 2 to 8.  
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Figure 1 The “Basic Democratic Value” 
Note: Summation of two sets of scores on (1) freedom of expression and (2) 
values of election. 
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Table 1 Basic Democratic Value and Level of Education 
Democratic Values 
 
Con Mixed Demo 
Sum 
EDUC     
0~5 
 
 
86 
46.7% 
 
 80 
43.5% 
 
18 
9.8% 
 
 184 
100.0% 
9.6% 
6~11 
 
 
305 
49.7% 
 
234 
38.1% 
 
 75 
12.2% 
 
 614 
100.0% 
 32.0% 
12~15 
 
 
278 
33.3% 
 
328 
39.3% 
 
229 
27.4% 
 
 835 
100.0% 
 43.6% 
16+ 
 
 
 65 
23.0% 
 
105 
37.1% 
 
113 
39.9% 
 
 283 
100.0% 
 14.8% 
Sum 
 
 
734 
38.3% 
 
747 
39.0% 
 
435 
22.7% 
 
1916 
100.0% 
100.0% 
Note: X2 = 136.802, df=6, p< 0, Gamma coefficient =0.327, p< 0. 
We used a simple cross-tabulation method to examine the 
contingency correlation between the “basic democratic value” and level 
of education. It has been well documented in the literature that higher 
levels of education are linked to tolerance and participation. This is 
because abstract democratic values are largely acquired through political 
socialization, and civic education in particular. Hence, the higher the 
level of education, the more likely a person will acquire positive 
democratic values.  
Table 1 shows the cross-tabulation results. The “basic democratic 
value” measurement is represented in three categories: conservative (2, 3, 
4), mixed (5) and democratic (6, 7, 8). According to our classification and 
definitions, the general population can be divided into three sub-groups: 
conservative (38.3%), mixed (39.0%) and liberal (22.7%). Conservatives 
express more tolerance for harmful speeches while accepting the 
compromising of freedom of expression in the national interest. They are 
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less motivated to engage in political participation, while preferring 
efficiency in local development to processes of electoral politics.  
Liberals are the opposite: they include those with a higher degree for 
tolerance, who support freedom of expression and who value the 
political process over and above administrative efficiency. 
The results confirm our hypothesis that the “basic democratic value” 
and education level are positively correlated (Gamma coefficient 0.327, 
p< 0). This means that we can accept the construct of “basic democratic 
value” as a criterion variable. 
Turning to the general citizenship model, we measured attitudes 
toward new immigrants. The concept of “xenophobic tendency” is 
defined by and constructed with the following two items from the 
survey.   
People have different views on new groups of people settling in 
Taiwan. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
(1) “The government spends too much money on helping people 
from outside Taiwan”. (Based on a five-point scale: strongly agree, agree, 
neutral, disagree, strongly disagree), 
(2) Do you think the number of people settling in Taiwan should be 
increased or decreased? (Based on a five-point scale: large increase, 
moderate increase, no change, moderate decrease, large decrease).   
It should be noted that when speaking about “new immigrants” in 
Taiwan, people tend to think about guest workers and women from 
Southeast Asia. The size of the first group is restricted to about 320,000. 
Its members are given a three-year work permit, renewable for three 
years. The second group is women who immigrate to Taiwan through an 
arranged marriage. Their number has been rising in recent years. The 
government has begun spending a certain amount of money on the new 
immigrants, such as on language-training and adult-education classes. 
The spouses can choose to become citizens after seven years, but guest 
workers must return to their home countries.  
This study applied a simple addition method to these two items. The 
distribution of “xenophobia scores” ranges from 2 to 10. The histogram in 
Figure 2 shows a distribution with two modes, “3” and “6”. We can 
divide the distribution into three categories of xenophobia: “strong” (2, 3, 
4), “medium” (5, 6, 7) and “weak” (8, 9, 10). In short, the higher the score, 
the lower the degree of xenophobia. An intuitive understanding of a 
“strong” xenophobic tendency is conceiving of new immigrants as using 
too many public resources and that the number of new immigrants 
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should be decreased. As we explained above, these conceptions are 
normally without foundation since the government in fact has spent very 
little on helping new immigrants. Guest workers themselves are not 
allowed to stay in the country beyond a specific time. The opposite of 
“strong xenophobia” is “no xenophobia”, which refers to people with a 
better grasp of the real situation and who generally approve of 
introducing new immigrants and providing them with adequate 
resources. 
 In Table 2, “xenophobic tendency” is cross-tabulated with level of 
education. This study hypothesizes that the level of education should 
negatively correlate with xenophobia. That is, the higher the level of 
education, the less likely a person is to be xenophobic. However, since 
our score for xenophobia is arranged in a way such that a higher score 
indicates a lower xenophobic tendency, we should expect a “positive” 
correlation coefficient between the two variables. After cross-tabulation 
and contingency analysis, our hypothesis was supported (Chi-square 
value 67.89, p<0; Gamma coefficient 0.242, p<0).  
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Figure 2 Xenophobic Tendency 
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Table 2 Xenophobia Tendency by Level of Education 
Xenophobic tendency 
 
Strong Medium Weak 
Sum 
EDUC     
0~5 
 
 
   82 
51.9% 
 
   65 
41.1% 
 
  11 
7.0% 
 
   158 
100.0% 
 9.6% 
6~11 
 
 
 231 
41.8% 
 
 269 
48.6% 
 
 53 
9.6% 
 
  553 
100.0% 
 33.7% 
12~15 
 
 
 219 
30.6% 
 
 430 
60.1% 
 
 66 
9.2% 
 
  715 
100.0% 
 43.5% 
16+ 
 
 
  40 
18.5% 
 
 159 
73.6% 
 
 17 
7.9% 
 
  216 
100.0% 
 13.2% 
Sum 
 
 
 572 
34.8% 
 
 923 
56.2% 
 
 147 
9.0% 
 
 1642 
100.0% 
100.0% 
Note: X2 = 67.890, df = 6, p<0 Gamma = 0.242, p< 0. 
Table 2 sketches the overall tendency of the public in stereotyping 
and “disliking” new immigrants. According to our definition of 
“xenophobic tendency”, which was supported by our preliminary 
correlation analysis, we found that 34.8% of our sample belonged to the 
“strong xenophobia group” and 9.0% had “no xenophobia”. More than 
half, or about 56.2%, were in the middle with ambivalent attitudes. 
III.  What is Nationalism?  
Scholars have developed various methods to explore national identity 
issues and conflicts in Taiwan. Two common ways are the use of 
self-identification or the tongdu (unification versus independence) 
spectrum. The future of Taiwan’s national status is also useful in 
deciphering national identity. In this study, I propose to use two items to 
construct a simple and intuitively sensible notion of “Taiwanese 
nationalism”. They are: 
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(1) On future relations between Taiwan and China, some support 
Taiwanese independence, while others support unification with the 
mainland. Which one of the following do you most agree with? (A 
“future” item) 
a. Declare independence as soon as possible 
b. Maintain the status quo while moving toward independence 
c. Maintain the status quo indefinitely 
d. Maintain the status quo while moving toward unification 
e. Unify with the mainland as soon as possible 
(2) Some have argued that a plebiscite should determine Taiwan’s 
future, whether that involves unification or independence. Do you agree 
or disagree that a plebiscite should be used? 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Disagree 
d. Strongly disagree 
The first item is frequently used to study attitudes on Taiwan’s 
future in the context of cross-strait relations. The responses range from 
“immediate independence” to “immediate unification” with the rest of 
the responses spread in between. It is therefore a measurement based on 
a paired opposition between “independence” and “unification”.  
The second item is a test of support for the Taiwanese independence 
platform via plebiscite. The Taiwan independence movement has long 
argued for a plebiscite as the (extra-) legal means (and a human right) – 
originating from the assumption of “self-determination” – to transform 
the current political system and change Taiwan from the ROC to a new 
and independent nation-state. A plebiscite is a democratic notion, for it 
would legitimize a country through public consensus and based on the 
principles that all people are equal, and that all should have the right in 
deciding on their future. But the quest for self-determination can bring 
along a terrifying scenario: a simple “50% +1” majority vote can turn the 
whole nation into another nation. Also, in gloomier terms, the PRC has 
threatened to wage war against Taiwan if this should ever happen. This 
has therefore been an ambivalent, contentious and highly charged issue 
in Taiwan’s recent politics.  
In this article, strong Taiwanese nationalism is assumed to be a point 
of convergence for two positions: (1) future independence (including 
both “immediate” and “gradual”) plus (2) support for a plebiscite 
(including “strongly agree” and “agree” responses). People who opt for 
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both independence and a plebiscite belong to this category. The results 
show that about 31.4% of the population can be defined as supporters of 
Taiwanese nationalism (see Table 4). 
And, unlike other studies that use “unification” as the other end of 
the response spectrum, this paper uses “anti-independence” as the 
opposite to Taiwanese nationalism. This group of people includes two 
categories in Table 3: the first is those who “strongly disagree” with using 
a plebiscite to determine Taiwan’s future, while the second is those who 
“disagree” with using a plebiscite and those who opt for unification with 
China. Therefore, this “anti-independence” group will include both 
“unificationists” and “non-unificationists” who oppose a plebiscite. 
About 18.9% of the population can be defined as belonging to this 
anti-Taiwanese independence group (see Table 4). 
 
Table 3 Taiwanese Nationalism 
Taiwan’s future 
 Independence 
now 
Independence 
later 
Indefinite 
status quo 
Unification 
later 
Unification 
now 
Sum 
Plebiscite       
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
60 
34.3% 
37.3% 
3.3% 
70 
40.0% 
11.8% 
3.8% 
20 
11.4% 
3.3% 
1.1% 
21 
12.0% 
4.9% 
1.1% 
4 
2.3% 
10.5% 
0.2% 
175 
100.0% 
9.6% 
9.6% 
Agree 
 
 
 
83 
9.3% 
51.6% 
4.5% 
358 
40.3% 
60.3% 
19.6% 
286 
32.2% 
47.0% 
15.6% 
144 
16.2% 
33.6% 
7.9% 
18 
2.0% 
47.4% 
1.0% 
889 
100.0% 
48.6% 
48.6% 
Disagree 
 
 
 
16 
2.5% 
9.9% 
0.9% 
149 
23.1% 
25.1% 
8.1% 
262 
40.6% 
43.1% 
14.3% 
208 
32.2% 
48.6% 
11.4% 
11 
1.7% 
28.9% 
0.6% 
646 
100.0% 
35.3% 
35.3% 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
 
2 
1.7% 
1.2% 
0.1% 
17 
14.3% 
2.9% 
0.9% 
40 
33.6% 
6.6% 
2.2% 
55 
46.2% 
12.9% 
3.0% 
5 
4.2% 
13.2% 
0.3% 
119 
100.0% 
6.5% 
6.5% 
Sum 
 
 
 
161 
8.8% 
100% 
8.8% 
594 
32.5% 
100.0% 
32.5% 
608 
33.2% 
100.0% 
33.2% 
428 
23.4% 
100.0% 
23.4% 
38 
2.1% 
100.0% 
2.1% 
1829 
100.0% 
100.0% 
100.0% 
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Table 4 Taiwanese Nationalism by Ethnic Background 
Taiwanese nationalism 
 
independence middle Anti-inde 
Sum 
Hoklo 
 
 
466 
36.8% 
 
612 
48.3% 
 
190 
15.0% 
 
1268 
100.0% 
71.3% 
Hakka 
 
 
69 
25.3% 
 
151 
55.3% 
 
53 
19.4% 
 
273 
100.0% 
15.4% 
Mainlander 
 
 
24 
10.1% 
 
120 
50.6% 
 
93 
39.2% 
 
237 
100.0% 
13.3% 
Sum 
 
 
559 
31.4% 
 
883 
49.7% 
 
336 
18.9% 
 
1778 
100.0% 
100.0% 
Note: X2 = 113.431, df = 4, p< 0, Contingency coefficient = 0.245, p<0. 
Table 4 tests the relationship between ethnic background and our 
construct of Taiwanese nationalism. If the construction is valid, then we 
should find a contingency correlation between Taiwanese nationalism 
and “ethnic background”. It has been found in numerous studies that the 
“Hoklo” ethnic group is more likely to support Taiwanese independence, 
while those with Mainlander background are more likely to support 
unification (or “anti-independence” in our study), and that the “Hakka” 
ethnic group should be between the two.  
This hypothesis is supported by our analysis in Table 4 (Chi-square 
113.431, p<0; C=0.245, p<0). According to our definitions of Taiwanese 
nationalism and anti-independence, we find that for Taiwanese 
nationalism those respondents with a Hoklo background had the highest 
percentage (36.8%) among the three. Hakka respondents were the second 
highest (25.3%), while respondents of Mainlander background had the 
smallest figure (10.1%). For the “anti-independence” category, the 
rankings reversed. Hoklo respondents had the lowest percentage (15.0%) 
of those opposing independence (the anti-independence category), while 
Mainlander respondents were the highest (39.2%). Hakka background 
respondents again fell in the middle (19.4%) of the two groups.  
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Also, according to our classification scheme of Taiwanese 
nationalism, the “middle-ground” respondents took up about half of the 
sample (49.7%). These were the “middle-of-the-roaders” who maintain a 
pragmatic view. For instance, about 64% of this group support 
“maintaining the status quo indefinitely and not changing it”. In addition, 
about 17% of these supported “independence later” but declined the 
option of a plebiscite to determine Taiwan’s future. Another 16% 
supported “unification later” but accepted the use of a plebiscite.  
IV.  The Relationship between the “Basic Democratic 
Value” and Nationalism 
This project began by examining the relationship between democratic 
values and nationalism. We will now explore the relationship between 
Taiwanese nationalism and one of the concepts of democratic values, the 
“basic democratic value”. Table 5 includes four statistical models that 
examine this relationship. Model 1 is about the zero-order relationship 
between the two constructs. To explore other factors that might have an 
impact on this zero-order relationship, “ethnic background”, “class 
background” and “education level” are introduced in Model 2, Model 3 
and Model 4 respectively.  
In Model 1 of Table 5, preliminary analysis of the zero-order 
relationship between the “basic democratic value” and “Taiwanese 
nationalism” affirms that “strong Taiwanese nationalism” does lower a 
respondent’s mean score on the “basic democratic value” when 
compared with the “anti-Taiwanese nationalism” group (b = -0.252, 
p<0.001). “Anti-Taiwanese nationalism” also increases the mean score for 
the “basic democratic value” when compared with the other two groups 
in question.  
In other words, this finding indicates that people who have a strong 
sense of Taiwanese nationalism can be less tolerant and less motivated to 
engage in political participation than the anti-independence respondents. 
Impact of ethnic background: In Model 2, after “Taiwanese 
nationalism” is considered, “ethnic background” has no significant 
impact. When using Mainlanders as a comparison group, the Hoklo 
group has no net effect on the “basic democratic value”. The Hakka may 
be more conservative than Mainlanders (b = -0.217, p<0.022), but adding 
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“ethnic background” to the model in sum cannot increase the model’s F 
value or the total amount of variance.  
Impact of Class Background: For a definition of “class background”, 
please refer to Figure 3. We define class background in terms of the 
respondents’ occupations. “Upper class background” refers to those with 
professional and administrative status. “Middle class background” refers 
to (1) semi-professional and (2) clerical, sales and skilled workers. 
“Working class background” refers to semi- and non-skilled workers, 
farmers and fishermen. 
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Figure 3 Class Background 
Note: Upper class: professional, administrative; Middle class: (1) semi- 
professional, (2) clerical, sales and skilled workers; Working class: Semi 
and non-skilled workers, farmers, fishermen; We use husband’s class 
status to estimate housewife’s class status. 
In Model 3, when “class background” is introduced into the model, 
the trend as a whole is improved (F change = 16.137, p<0). The zero-order 
and negative relationship between Taiwanese nationalism and the “basic 
democratic value” is sustained. “Class background” also contributes to 
the variance of the “basic democratic value”. In comparison with the 
working class, people of upper class background increase the mean score 
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of the “basic democratic value” (b = 0.405, p<0), while a middle class 
background increases the mean score as well (b = 0.267, p<0). A working 
class background (including both non- and low-skilled workers, farmers 
and fishermen) can be more conservative than the other two classes when 
Taiwanese nationalism is considered simultaneously.  
If we compare the b values for the different sets of independent 
variables, it is fair to conclude that class background is of even greater 
importance to this process than Taiwanese nationalism.  
Impact of level of education: In Model 4, education level is added to 
test the zero-order relationship. The impact of level of education looks 
similar to that of the variable “class background”. On the scale from level 
one (less than six years of education) to level four (college graduates and 
above), the higher the level, the higher the mean scores (b = 0.271, p<0). 
The general results from Table 5 affirm that (1) “ethnic background” 
(in Model 2) adds little or no value to the zero-order relationship, but (2) 
“class background” (in Model 3) and (3) “education level” (in Model 4) 
add significant value to the zero-order relationship between the “basic 
democratic value” and Taiwanese nationalism. However, when we add 
both “class background” and “education level” at the same time to the 
model, it cannot sustain a significant test of the F change.6 
We thus conclude that scores on the “basic democratic value” can be 
suppressed by strong Taiwanese nationalism. This suppression holds 
even if we consider ethnic background, class background and education 
level individually. But Taiwanese nationalism is, overall, less important 
than class background or education level. In contrast, class difference and 
difference in level of education both have a greater impact on the “basic 
democratic value”. 
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Table 5 Regression of the “Basic Democratic Value” on Taiwanese 
Nationalism, Ethnicity, Class and Education 
Independent variables b( s. e) beta Adjusted R2 F change sig. 
Model 1 ( N=1761) 0.006 6.045 0.002 
Strong T-N1 -0.252 (0.073) -0.110   0.001 
Middle T-N -0.131 (0.068) -0.062   0.056 
Constant 4.934 (0.058)    0.000 
    
Model 2 ( N=1761) 0.008 2.649 0.071 
-0.223 (0.076)    0.003 Strong N-T 
Middle N-T -0.110 (0.069) -0.098   0.110 
-0.135 (0.077) -0.52   0.081 Hoklo2 
Hakka -0.217 (0.095) -0.58   0.022 
Constant 5.044 (0.080)    0.000 
    
Model 3 ( N=1548) 0.026 16.137 0.000 
-0.222    0.005 Strong T-N 
Middle T-N -0.121    0.100 
0.405    0.000 Upper class3 
Middle class 0.267    0.000 
Constant 4.712 (0.074)    0.000 
    
Model 4 ( N=1809)5 0.050 85.341 0.002 
Strong T-N 
Middle T-N 
-0.161 (0.072) 
-0.043 (0.066) 
-0.070 
-0.020 
  
0.025 
0.517 
Education4 0.271 (0.029) 0.214   0.000 
Constant 4.144 (0.102)    0.000 
Note: (1) Using “anti-Taiwanese nationalism” as the comparative (omitted) group. 
(2) Using “Mainlander” as the comparative (omitted) group. 
(3) Using “working class” as the comparative (omitted) group. 
(4) Education: (1=0~5; 2=6~11; 3=12~15; 4=16+). 
(5) Model 5 includes “class background” after “education”. The model does 
not apply when ΔF=1.930 (p<0.145). 
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V.  The Relationship between Xenophobic Tendency and 
Nationalism 
In this section we will continue to examine the other dimension of 
democratic values: xenophobia and its relationship with Taiwanese 
nationalism.  
Table 6 includes a list of step-wise model tests. In Model 1, a 
preliminary analysis of the zero-order relationship between “xenophobic 
tendency” and “Taiwanese nationalism” indicates the following: the b 
coefficients imply the direction of the relationship: the stronger the sense 
of Taiwanese nationalism, the stronger the xenophobic tendency, but the 
model does not attain statistical significance for this conclusion.  
To explore other factors that might have an impact on this zero-order 
relationship, Model 2 with “ethnic background”, Model 3 with “class 
background” and Model 4 with “education level” are examined 
individually.  
The results indicate that Taiwanese nationalism repeatedly failed to 
exert a significant effect on “xenophobic tendency”. On the other hand, 
ethnic background, class background and level of education level all had 
a significant effect on “xenophobic tendency”.  
This finding called for a different set of model tests. In Table 7, “class 
background” is selected as the key variable for testing a zero-order 
relationship. In Model 1, class background exerts a significant effect on 
“xenophobic tendency”. When compared with “working-class 
background”, “upper-class background” has the highest mean score of 
the three, (b = 1.120, p<0.000) and was therefore lacking in “xenophobic 
tendency”. The “middle class” has a mean score higher than the 
“working class” (b = 0.560, p<0.000), while the “working class” has the 
strongest xenophobic tendency.  
This relationship persists when we add “education level” and 
“ethnic background” to the following models. Since adding “ethnic 
background” and “education level” in Model 3 does not explain the 
variance of “xenophobic tendency”, we should overlook Model 3 for our 
research purposes. Model 2 serves our purpose here. Notably, the impact 
of level of education is significant, even when “class background” is 
considered.  
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Table 6 Regression of Xenophobia on Taiwanese Nationalism, 
Ethnicity, Class and Education 
Independent variables b( s. e) beta Adjusted R2 F change sig. 
Model 1 ( N=1504)  0.001 1.419 0.242 
-0.221 (.136) -0.058   0.106 Strong T-N1 
Middle T-N -0.100 (.128) -0.028   0.436 
Constant 5.284 (.110)    0.000 
    
Model 2 (N=1504)  5.158 0.006 
-0.154    0.273 Strong T-N 
Middle T-N -0.044    0.730 
0.335 (0.148)    0.023 Hoklo2 
Hakka 0.579 (0.180)    0.001 
Constant 5.565 (0.153)    0.000 
    
Model 3 ( N=1326)  0.048 34.149 0.000 
Strong T-N 
Middle T-N 
-0.050 (0.147) 
-0.066 (0.138) 
   
0.732 
0.631 
Upper class3 
Middle class 
1.183 (0.157) 
0.621 (0.106) 
   
0.000 
0.000 
Constant 4.650 (0.138)    0.000 
    
Model 4 ( N=1549)  0.037 60.926 0.000 
Strong T-N 
Middle T-N 
-0.072 (0.134) 
-0.008 (0.125) 
   
0.592 
0.944 
Education4 0.430 (0.055)    0.000 
Constant 4.021 (0.189)    0.000 
Note: (1) Using “anti-Taiwanese nationalism” as the comparative (omitted) group. 
(2) Using “Mainlander” as the comparative (omitted) group. 
(3) Using “working class” as the comparative (omitted) group. 
(4) Education: (1=0~5; 2=6~11; 3=12~15; 4=16+). 
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Table 7 Regression of Xenophobia on Class, Education and 
Ethnicity 
Independent variables b( s. e) beta Adjusted R2 F change sig. 
Model 1 ( N=1358)  0.042 30.982 0.000 
1.120 (0.155) 0.205   0.000 Upper class 
Middle class 0.560 (0.104) 0.155   0.000 
Constant 4.695 (0.075)    0.000 
    
Model 2  0.051 13.582 0.000 
0.812 (0.176) 0.148   0.000 Upper class 
Middle class 0.410 (0.112) 0.112   0.000 
Education 0.248 (0.067) 0.113   0.000 
Constant 4.615 (0.162)    0.000 
    
Model 3 0.053 2.464 0.085 
Upper class 
Middle class 
0.800 (0.176) 
0.399 (0.112) 
0.146 
0.109   
0.000 
0.000 
Education 0.238 (0.068) 0.109   0.000 
Hoklo 
Hakka 
-0.256 (0.153) 
-0.411 (0.186) 
-0.063 
-0.083   
0.095 
0.027 
Constant 4.447 (0.223)    0.000 
 
VI.  Conclusion and Discussion  
Democratic values have many dimensions. This study has constructed 
two dimensions for democratic values: (1) the “basic democratic value”, 
and (2) xenophobic tendency. The first dimension derives from 
conventional knowledge in studies on democracy. It is an abstract idea 
about tolerance and participation. The second dimension is a new 
experiment on the study of xenophobia, attitudes toward new 
immigrants and the values that originate in universal citizenship.  
Are they always coherent? This study has not tested this question 
directly. But from our initial findings, the two dimensions have very 
different distribution patterns. The “basic value” is more evenly 
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distributed as a bell-shape, centered on the middle, while xenophobia is 
bipolar, skewing toward stronger xenophobia. 
The research question this study posits concerns the relationship 
between nationalism and democratic values. This analysis shows that 
strong Taiwanese nationalism does suppress the “basic democratic 
value” but does not increase a “xenophobic tendency”. 
But why does Taiwanese nationalism suppress the “basic democratic 
value”? There are two possibilities. The first involves our new 
conceptualization of Taiwanese nationalism. Previous studies have relied 
on the assumption of a paired opposition between “independence” and 
“unification”, two opposing nationalistic tendencies, one new and one 
old. But this study interprets the paired opposition as “Taiwanese 
independence” and “anti-independence”; the conflict in national identity 
in Taiwan today does not always involve one vying to replace the other, 
or the assertive new identity fighting the old Chinese nationalism. 
Instead, democratic ideas and rhetoric can oppose the rise of 
pro-independence nationalism. In other words, anti-independence 
respondents must rely on a greater appreciation of the “basic democratic 
value” to battle against pro-independence nationalists.  
Second, Taiwanese nationalism has been always risky, inviting 
suppression from different sorts of “authorities”. In the past, the threat 
came from the authoritarian ROC. Taiwanese nationalism was strictly 
forbidden and classed as treasonous. Today the threat comes from the 
PRC in the form of military invasion and economic sanctions. In 
retrospect, Taiwanese nationalism has always been a less “secure” 
political notion. Today it comes with additional perceptions of fear. For 
instance, Taiwanese nationalists fear that Taiwan will lose out to the PRC 
in economic and political competition. They fear that Taiwan will be 
isolated from the rest of the world, and that China will invade if Taiwan 
is weak.   
When fear becomes the dominant perception of a national reality, 
tolerance lowers and participation in democratic processes is reduced as 
a result.  
This study also finds that class background and level of education 
are more influential than Taiwanese nationalism in influencing the “basic 
democratic value”. This finding conforms to many existing studies on 
civic values elsewhere in the world. The “basic democratic value”, as a 
civic value, is largely acquired and internalized through education. The 
upper class, or the more educated, tend to be more well-to-do and have 
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greater social capital – including influence through participating in 
democratic processes.    
As for the second dimension of democratic values, the xenophobic 
tendency, this study finds that Taiwanese nationalism has little to no 
effect on it. This should not come as a surprise. If we think of Taiwanese 
nationalism as a narrow worldview that seeks to maximize its own 
interests while devaluing the interests of others, especially those of new 
immigrants, we should think again. The data we have obtained and 
analyzed has contradicted this suggestion.  
This study finds that a working-class background is probably the 
most influential factor in the creation of a xenophobic tendency, with a 
low level of education the next most influential. By comparison, 
Taiwanese nationalism is not at all important.  
This tells us that xenophobia is a prejudice associated with 
misconceptions toward new immigrants, misconceptions that are 
embedded in lower social status and a lower level of education. This 
finding is consistent with other findings in Western countries where there 
are significant numbers of immigrants.   
Lastly, we find that the level of education is important in 
strengthening the “basic democratic value” and suppressing a 
xenophobic tendency, and that class background is also important in this 
regard. The upper class (and sometimes the middle class) is more likely 
to hold democratic ideas and less likely to be xenophobic than the 
working class, who are also fighting for their interests as part of the 
process of globalization in contemporary Taiwan.   
Notes 
1. This paper uses Pinyin for Chinese characters. Guomindang is written 
as Kuomintang in the modified Wade-Giles system. 
2. Also written as Lee Teng-Hui in the modified Wade-Giles system. 
3. The TSU was formed in 2001. It is relatively small, but very strong in 
advocating Taiwanese nationalism against China and its domestic 
competitors. Its “spiritual leader” has been former president Lee 
Denghui. 
4. The project title is “General Social Survey, Wave4-4: Nationalistic 
Identity”. It is also a part of the larger cross-national study on 
national identity, coordinated by the International Social Survey 
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Program (ISSP). The project is funded by the National Science 
Council of Taiwan. The research team includes Chang Yinghua, 
Chang Mau-Kuei, Wu Nai-Teh, Chiang Yi-Hua, Hsiau A-Chin, Hong 
Yun-Tai, Luo Shi-Hong and Tu Su-Hao. The Center for Survey 
Research at the Academia Sinica provides valuable technical 
assistance and resources in administering the collection of data.   
5. For the purposes of this research, housewives were categorized 
under the status of their husbands. 
6. This is reasonable to expect. Class background should correlate 
highly with level of education based on our construction of the 
concepts. 
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Taiwan's Party Realignments in Transition 
Chia-Lung Lin and I-Chung Lai 
I.  Introduction 
There was an acceleration of the democratization process in Taiwan after 
the founding of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 
1986. During the final years of Chiang Ching-Kuo’s presidency 
(1986-1988), several liberal political reforms were adopted. Martial law 
was lifted, as was a ban on certain media organizations. The way was 
opened for the establishment of new political parties. After Lee Teng-Hui 
succeeded Chiang as president and chairman of the Chinese Nationalist 
Party (Kuomintang, KMT), Lee continued to push for reforms of 
Taiwan’s legislature. Since 1993, legislators had been elected directly by 
the people. Thus, an environment of party competition had started to 
emerge and multi-party politics became the main focus of political 
development. The first direct presidential election in 1996 enhanced this 
process. 
The major features of Taiwan’s politics are its multi-party 
competition, the evolution of a multi-party system and issues of party 
alignment. During the twelve years between 1992 and 2004, there were 
seven elections at the national level (three presidential and four 
legislative) and six at the local level (for mayors and councilors of cities 
and counties). These frequent polls have cultivated a political link 
between the political elites and the general public. They have also had the 
effect of politically mobilizing civic society as a whole. Based on these 
features, some analysts characterize Taiwan’s democratization process as 
“election-driven democratization” (Lin 2000). 
These different kinds of elections, whether local or national, have not 
only become the center of political attention, but they have also become 
integral parts of the formation of the political elites’ agendas. Election 
results have also become a useful measure with which to gauge the 
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political sentiment of civic society. Political elites tend to adjust their 
decisions according to the latest election results. The political 
struggle/negotiation between the ruling and opposition parties was often 
also reviewed by the elites through their relationship with the election 
calendar. Though there are other factors that have also impacted on 
political developments, the election itself has become the genuine center 
of public political concerns. It is a recognized fact that the election shapes, 
molds and defines the majority of Taiwan’s routine political activities. 
This short paper will first describe the development of Taiwan’s 
multi-party system after the presidential election of 2000. We shall 
provide an explanation for this development based on the evolution of 
three factors: the issue of voter preferences and concerns (the social 
cleavage), the mechanism of the electoral system (rules of election games) 
and the choices of the political elites (elite strategy). After examining the 
evolution of these factors, we will look at some of the election results to 
see how they interacted with each other. Armed with these observations, 
we will sketch possible trajectories for Taiwan’s multi-party system, 
especially since the legislative elections at the end of last year. 
II.  What Has Happened since the 2000 Presidential 
Election? 
The multi-party system has experienced significant changes since the 
presidential election in 2000. Adding to the ruling DPP and the 
opposition KMT and New Party, two parties came into existence.  
Firstly: James Soong, who split from the KMT and did extremely 
well   as an independent candidate in the 2000 presidential election, 
formed a political party of his own, the People First Party (PFP). 
Absorbing mostly New Party supporters and some dissenting KMT 
legislators, the PFP did well in the legislative elections of 2001 to become 
the third largest political party.  
Secondly, after his expulsion by the KMT following the 2000 
presidential election, former president Lee Teng-Hui formed a new party, 
the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), in July 2001. This party also did well 
in the legislative elections of 2001 by gaining 13 seats and about 8% of the 
vote.  
Thirdly, the New Party became seriously marginalized. If its 
performance in the legislative elections of 1998 was disastrous, its 
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marginalization after the 2000 presidential election sealed its fate. In the 
2001 legislative elections, the New Party continued its free fall by gaining 
only one seat.1 That lone New Party legislator later opted to register as an 
independent. Thus, there is presently no New Party representation in the 
Legislative Yuan. 
So, after the 2001 legislative elections, there were four major political 
parties. The DPP, with 87 seats, was the biggest, followed by the KMT (67 
seats), the PFP (45 seats) and the TSU (13 seats). The rest of the seats (13) 
belonged to independents.2 
The four parties later formed two coalition blocks. The DPP and TSU 
formed the ruling coalition, which is loosely known as the pan-green 
camp. The KMT and the PFP formed an opposition alliance, loosely 
known as the pan-blue camp. Since neither the pan-greens (100 seats) nor 
the pan-blues (112 seats) held an absolute majority, the independents 
held the votes that determined the outcome of bills tabled in the 
legislature. Because the pan-blue camp is just one seat short of an 
absolute majority, the ruling pan-green coalition often found itself 
fighting an uphill battle. 
In the 2004 presidential election, the battle was fought between the 
pan-green and pan-blue camps. The TSU did not have a presidential 
candidate, and chose to support the incumbents, President Chen 
Shui-Bian and Vice President Annette Lu. The KMT and PFP united to 
form a single ticket. Former KMT Chairman Lien Chan and PFP 
Chairman James Soong were nominated as the presidential and vice 
presidential candidates. Thus, the presidential race of 2004 had nearly the 
same set of candidates as in 2000. The result saw Chen reelected by the 
smallest of margins, despite the fact that KMT and the PFP contested the 
elections on a united ticket. 
Chen’s re-election was significant in several ways. Firstly, it was the 
first time that the pan-green ticket had been able to obtain majority 
support from the electorate. Knowing that the best performances of the 
DPP in the past had been between 40% and 43% of the vote, this victory 
helped the DPP to end the stigma that pan-green supporters belonged to 
a minority and could only win through a three-way contest. 
Secondly, compared to the share of the vote he received in the 
previous election, Chen increased his support by an average of 11%, 
which was evenly distributed throughout almost all of the cities and 
counties.3 Many commentators described this outcome as an indication 
that pro-independence sentiment had secured the majority’s vote. 
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III.  Understanding the Dynamics of Election Cycles 
Since an election acts as a de facto institutional link between political 
elites and the masses, the next step is to know what kind of dynamics are 
formed through this connection. We believe that this can be done by 
identifying behavioral patterns in elite-mass interaction in the election 
cycle (Lin 1999).  
At first, the political elites decide if they will join a race by seeking 
party nominations. After the nomination process ends, elites not 
nominated by their own party will ponder if they should continue to run 
for office. At this time, the first wave of party realignments will occur if 
elites not nominated by their parties decide to run by themselves.  
After the parties settle on their nominations, the next stage is to set 
up campaign themes. The choice of these issues will affect the campaign 
agenda as well as the mobilization of voters. This is also the period when 
the public starts to make its own voting choices. 
After the election and with the emergence of new winners, it is 
common to witness the formation of new political coalitions or alliances. 
This is the period when the second wave of political realignments occurs. 
These are the processes that define the new multi-party system. 
The following plot is a diagram depicting the elites-masses 
interaction dynamic in the election cycle. 
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 Figure 1 Electoral Competitions and the Development of Party Systems
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IV.  Explaining the trends 
In order to explain these dynamics, we shall observe three structural 
factors that continue to affect the outcome of the elections, and 
consequently the trajectory of the development of the multi-party system. 
The first factor is voter preferences on various issues, their level of
importance and the parties’ positions on those issues. The second factor is 
election regulations: Rules for the election will constrain or encourage
certain political calculations, which will induce the development of 
 
 
c rt The
third factor is the decisions made by the political party elites: The elites
will make decisions based on their perception of public sentiment and 
mbination of these factors shapes the 
o r party identification from 1993 to 1999, we 
 as been in continuous decline, dropping from 
n of elections, about 60% 
to 65% of voters formed reliable party identifications. 
 in party identification after the 2000 presidential 
ertain pa y systems and breed a certain culture of party politics.  
 
their need to sustain power. The co
multi-party system to a significant extent. 
Political Demography  
The political demography of Taiwanese society can be analyzed through 
voter party identification and their preferred issues. Information on party 
identification can tell us about the future development of parties, the 
strength of their political support and the prospects for new parties. It 
detects where the major political cleavage lies and what its relationship 
with the parties is. The combination of these factors can give us a fairly 
clear outlook of the current political landscape. 
Party Identification 
Observing the trend in v te
found that while the KMT h
39.5% (February 1993) to 28.7% (February 1999), the DPP has been on a 
steady rise, up from 14.1% (February 1993) to 23.2% (February 1999). In 
the meantime, the New Party, composed of KMT defectors and 
established in 1993, has had ups and downs. After reaching its peak of 
12.4% in 1996, it saw support slip to 5.9% in 1999 (Lin 2000).  
By combining these factors, we also find that after 10 to 15 years of 
the democratization process and the competitio
There was a change
election. According to opinion polls conducted by the United Daily News 
two weeks and eight weeks after the presidential election, DPP 
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supporters rose in number by 6% (from 23% to 29%) while the KMT 
figure dropped by 4% (from 19% to 15%). As for the newly established 
PFP, it rose to 21%, higher than the KMT at that time.4 A closer look 
shows that most of the PFP identifiers came from the ranks of former 
KMT and New Party supporters. 
Since then, the DPP has continued to top all parties in terms of party 
iden
 KMT 
has 
rty were on the opposite 
pendence/unification divide, they were able to 
 involving anti-corruption or anti-“black gold”7 
tification, at a range of 25% to 30%. The PFP took second place 
(18%-21%) until the end of 2002, when the KMT bounced back to replace 
the PFP.5 The PFP then stayed in the 10% range. The trend for the
been the reverse of the PFP. As for the TSU, its party identification 
ranged from 3% to 7%. If we put the DPP and the TSU on the one side 
(the pan-green camp) and the KMT and PFP on the other (the pan-blue 
camp), each side gained about 30% to 35% of support. This leaves around 
30% of the population as uncommitted voters.6 
Issues of preference 
National identity and anti-corruption are the two most dominant issues 
for Taiwanese voters. Public impressions of the positions of major 
political parties on these issues are important in attracting voter support. 
For example, in 1999, the perception of the different party positions on 
the issue of national identity (in order of pro-independence to 
pro-unification) was DPP, KMT and the New Party. As for class 
identification, the perception was that both the DPP and the New Party 
were more or less the representatives of the middle and the lower classes, 
while the KMT was identified as representing the upper classes.  Thus it 
is apparent that while the DPP and the New Pa
spectrum of the inde
collaborate on issues
politics. 
After the 2000 presidential elections, the New Party was 
marginalized. Former president Lee Teng-Hui founded the TSU and 
James Soong established the PFP. These changes introduced a new 
playing field for political competition. Under the leadership of Lien Chan, 
the KMT started to backpedal from Lee Teng-Hui’s centrist position by 
taking a more pro-unification stance. Lee Teng-Hui also shifted from his 
former position by taking a harder line supporting independence. Since 
the PFP inherited many former New Party supporters because of James 
Soong’s own Mainlander background, the PFP was also considered a 
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pro-unification party. Now it is the DPP that is shifting back to take the 
middle position. As a result, in 2002 voter perception of the parties on the 
issue of national identity now saw the TSU and the DPP standing for 
inde
p.  
 
at would 
pendence and the KMT and PFP leaning towards unification.   
However, there are also significant changes in the public attitude 
toward national identity: It now leans more toward independence. 
According to an opinion poll conducted by the United Daily News in 
December 2004, the survey showed that close to 50% of people identified 
themselves as “only Taiwanese”, with 40% clinging to dual identity – that 
is, Taiwanese-Chinese. People who identified as “only Chinese” dropped 
to lower than 10%. This reversed the results of the 1992 survey.8 
Apparently, the center of public attitude on the issue of national identity 
has shifted towards the “Taiwanese/pro-independence” side. 
If we combine the shift of public attitude toward the 
Taiwan/pro-independence side with the relative re-positioning of the 
major parties, the advantage appeared to fall with the pan-green cam
As for the issue of class identification after 2000, the trend shows that 
fewer people perceived the DPP as the party of the lower social strata. 
Since Lien Chan is widely seen as an extremely wealthy man and often 
aloof from the general public, and that James Soong cannot change his 
image of deep involvement in “black gold” politics, the KMT and the PFP 
are still viewed by voters as parties closer to the “rich” and the “black”.  
The Constraints Imposed by Taiwan’s Electoral System  
Taiwan has a unique electoral system. For the presidential election, no 
absolute majority of votes is required for the successful candidate. If there 
are more than two candidates, the phenomenon of “strategic voting” 
occurs.  
The three-way 2000 presidential race is a classic example of strategic 
voting. Up against Soong and Lien, Chen played safe by focusing on 
corruption. He also tried to minimize the possible negative impact 
associated with the party’s pro-independence position, which had yet to 
receive majority support at that time. While Soong and Lien were busy 
attacking each other, Chen’s “make no mistakes” approach earned him
dissenting votes from both camps (mostly Lien supporters) th
edge him toward victory.  
Circumstances were thoroughly different for the 2004 presidential 
election. Needing an absolute majority, Chen took advantage of the 
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changed public position on national identity and made it the key issue in 
the campaign. His campaign style was also more daring and aggressive, 
very
f seats in a given constituency. 
 Usually the bigger the party and the 
larg
and bigger in 
size,
arties to appeal to the extreme side of the 
ideo
 different from the steady and calm image he displayed in the same 
election four years ago. These different approaches demonstrated how 
the competition induced by the electoral system had determined the 
strategies of the political elites.  
Legislative elections, however, are conducted through the single 
non-transferable voting system that encourages intra-party competition, 
that is, candidates in the same party run against each other as well as 
other parties for a number o
Before we discuss how the single non-transferable vote, 
multi-member district system affects and intensifies intra-party 
competition, let us briefly review how the system influences party 
decision-making. According to Gary Cox’s research, success in this 
system depends on a party’s ability to manage two issues. First, it must 
nominate an optimum number of candidates. Second, it must coordinate 
distribution of the vote evenly across candidates to maximize the number 
that can be elected (Cox 1997). 
er the constituency, the more effective party coordination is. This also 
indicates that the system favors the ruling party due to its ability to 
utilize government resources.  
Later, we will see that when the KMT was in power 
 it was more successful in running the right number of candidates 
and was more effective in optimizing its “elected seats to vote-share 
ratio”. Earlier research comparing the DPP with the KMT demonstrates 
similar findings (Lin 1998).  
This phenomenon is most apparent in the 2001 legislative election, 
when the KMT was pulled in opposite directions by both the PFP and the 
TSU. Many of the supporters of the latter parties were former KMT 
members. Also, some subtle competition was apparent between the TSU 
and the DPP in the traditional pro-independence voting block because 
the TSU had positioned itself more toward the pro-independence side. 
This system encouraged small p
logical spectrum to obtain a foothold. It also made it more difficult 
for the parties in centrist positions because it was difficult for them to 
defend that position in the campaign. 
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The Strategies of Party Elites 
The third and crucial factor is the strategies of political elites. It is the 
interaction of competing elites that generates political dynamics, 
mobilizes voters and possibly creates party realignment before or after 
elections.  
Take the 2004 presidential election as an example. Based on the 
results, it could be argued that the outcome was the fruit of Chen’s 
strategy highlighting national identity as the key campaign theme and 
Lien and Soong’s failure to promote class as a central issue.  
gn began, pan-green versus pan-blue 
 32% to 35% each, with the 
tioned earlier, public attitudes on national identity had 
app
ferendum”.  
The
o be effective agents 
of a
ntial election, Lien and Soong claimed there were 
irreg
Right up until the campai
identification was deadlocked in the range of
pan-green camp lagging slightly.9 Thus, it was impossible to rely solely 
on traditional pan-green supporters to win the election. It was important 
to find the right issue to broaden the support base.  
As men
arently shifted toward the Taiwanese/pro-independence side, which 
gave Chen the advantage and left the Lien-Soong ticket in a defensive 
position. Chen had made the obvious decision to go after this issue, and 
it was done most effectively through pursuing a “peace re
 failure of Lien and Soong to base their campaign on class and 
anti-corruption themes was an error of omission, as they could have 
exploited the perception that Chen stood for social disenfranchisement. 
But this failure was understandable, because Lien and Soong carried a lot 
of “black gold” baggage. They could only struggle t
n anti-corruption banner. This combination of Chen’s advantageous 
position on national identity and Lien and Soong’s strategic failure 
decided the outcome. 
Another factor is the decision by former president Lee Teng-Hui to 
form the TSU for the 2001 legislative elections and position himself on the 
pro-independence side of the identity spectrum. The TSU fought an 
effective first fight by appealing to pro-independence sentiment in voters. 
This in effect freed the DPP and enabled Chen to adopt a more middle of 
the road approach on the issue.  
V.  Present Developments and Future Prediction 
After the 2004 preside
ularities and called for the election to be annulled. The KMT and the 
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PFP also initiated months of protest right up until the day of the 
presidential inauguration on May 20. At the time, this seemed to have 
lost them support. A July survey showed the DPP with 28.9% support, 
the KMT with 21.3%, the PFP with 10.2% and the TSU with 6.7%. It also 
showed uncommitted voters amounted to 21.7% of the electorate.10 
Personally, Lien and Soong secured less than 10%. This was well below 
ayor and 
ction protests. The TSU seemed to be in the 
posi
ned one seat overall.  
Chen’s figure as well as that of Ma Ying-Jeou, the Taipei City m
a rising star in the KMT. 
Because previous legislative elections had intensified intra-party 
competition, the shrinking support for the pan-blue camp reflected a 
much more severe struggle within it. A number of opposition party 
members deserted to run on an independent ticket. It seemed almost 
inevitable that another round of party realignments would take place.  
Conventional wisdom suggested that the KMT would lose seats at 
the end of 2004. The PFP might have been expected to lose a lot more due 
to intensified intra-party competition and the lack of a charismatic leader 
other than its chairman, whose reputation had been badly damaged in 
the post-presidential ele
tion of making the biggest impression, the DPP was also expected to 
make gains. The pan-green camp was largely expected to gain a majority 
in the legislature.  
The 2004 Legislative Elections  
However, the result of the elections was unexpected. The DPP won 89 
seats, the KMT won 79, the PFP won 34, while 12 seats went to the TSU. 
The New Party secured one seat, while the remainder was picked up by 
independents. The pan-green camp had a total of 101 seats against the 
pan-blue camp’s 112, which meant that the pan-green camp’s 
representation did not significantly increase, nor did the pan-blue suffer 
a predicted drop. The blue-green divide was almost unchanged: the 
pan-green camp gai
Interpretation of the Result 
Numerous accounts have been given on the 2004 legislative elections, 
especially on why the green-blue divide did not follow the pattern of the 
presidential election eight months earlier. Outside observers in particular 
were expecting that an increased vote for Chen would lead to a bigger 
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vote for the pan-green camp. Some arguments suggest that the pan-green 
camp was over-confident and that the DPP did not mobilize as effectively 
as it should have. For their part, fearing that the pan-blue camp would 
collapse if it lost too many seats, supporters were highly motivated to 
FP alliance also put a lot of effort into stop the bleeding. The KMT-P
mobilizing support.  
However, the share of the vote seems to point to a very stable 
pattern. The following table shows the election results for each party in 
1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004. In 2004, the DPP received 35.72% (up from 
33.4% in 2001) of the vote. The KMT received 32.83% in 2004 (up from 
28.6% in 2001). The PFP only received 13.9% (down from 18.6%) and the 
TSU was stagnant at 7.79% (down slightly from 7.8%). The results of the 
1998 and 1995 legislative elections are also shown in the table. 
 
Table 1 Share of the Vote in the Legislative Elections from 1995 to 
2004 
 DPP TSU* KMT PFP* 
1995 33.2%  46.1%  
1998 29.6%  46.4%  
2001 33.4% 7.8% 28.6% 18.6% 
04 35.72% 7.79% 32.83% 13.9% 20
Source: C al Election Commission. entr
Note: *The PFP and the TSU were established after the 2000 presidential election. 
The table sho at the pa  camp’s share of the overall vote 
has very stab out 46%. The DPP has but has 
not crac  the 38% r. The estab d take away 
some votes from the KMT, but this loss was com ted for by the 
return of New Party voters. The electoral system s to rein he 
influence of the i ual candi but not t  and an 
legis
ws th n-blue
been le – at ab  grown steadily, 
ked  barrie lishment of the TSU di
pensa
 tend force t
ndivid date he party,  this c
also be seen in the table.  
The result also shows just how severe intra-party competition can be. 
The number of votes gained by the KMT and lost by the PFP in the 2004 
lative elections are almost identical, while no significant increase or 
decrease for the DPP or the TSU occurred. This is more evidence that 
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under the present electoral system, legislative elections are more about 
intra-camp competition (green versus green, blue versus blue) than 
competition between camps. In fact, it can be argued that the difference 
in nomination strategies between the camps is closely related to the 
outcome of the 2004 legislative elections. The pan-blue camp’s 
conservative nomination strategy worked, while the pan-green camp was 
over-confident and nominated more candidates than its voting pool 
could afford. The following table shows the number of seats and share of 
the vote for each party in the 2001 and 2004 legislative elections. 
 
Table 2 Number of Seats and Share of Vote in Legislative Yuan in 
2001 and 2004 
 DPP TSU KMT PFP 
2001 87 (33.4%) 13 (7.8%) 68 (28.6%) 46 (18.6%) 
2004 89 (35.72%) 12 (7.79%) 79 (32.83%) 34 (13.9%) 
Sour : Central Election Commission. 
the DPP, 4 103 for the KMT and 65 for the PFP. The 
pan-green camp (169 in total) had a smaller vote-share pool but 
nominated more c ates than the pan-blue c 168 in to It is 
not surprising, ther  camp did not perfo
A si rgumen ounte 001 electi
ering and Party Realignment 
The
pse 
 tried 
 end, 
ce
The number of candidates for each party in the 2004 poll was 129 for 
0 for the TSU, 
andid amp ( tal). 
efore, that the pan-green rm well. 
milar a t can be m d for the 2 legislative on.  
Post-Election Political Maneuv
 result of the 2004 legislative elections revived the KMT, frustrated 
the DPP and put the PFP and the TSU in a worrying position. The DPP 
initially tried to form a new partnership by moving closer to the PFP, 
believing that it might be able to take the advantage of friction between 
the PFP and the KMT in the legislative campaign. The TSU also sent 
signals that it would re-consider its partnership with the DPP and that it 
would not be an automatic ally. Fearing that its alliance might colla
and that it would lose the chance to control the legislature, the KMT
hard to prevent the emergence of PFP-DPP cooperation. In the
DPP-PFP cooperation, after some flirting among the leadership of both 
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parties, did not come about.  
However, pending revision of the electoral framework and the 
possible emergence of a two-party system,11 some legislators in the two 
smaller parties contemplated whether they should join the bigger parties 
while they had time in order to sustain their political careers. The 
experiment of DPP-PFP cooperation was unsuccessful because PFP 
Chairman James Soong was not able to entice the party to go along with 
him. Also, the fact that Ma Ying-Jeou was elected chairman of the KMT in 
August 2005 weakened Soong’s ability to control PFP legislators. 
No such defection occurred within the TSU, partly due to the fact 
that
Cha
 the smaller parties are feeling pressure on whether they 
o, it 
tical 
 the party’s “spiritual leader”, Lee Teng-Hui, was still very influential. 
However, facing a dilemma similar to the PFP, the TSU seemed to put 
their faith in the 2005 county and city mayoral elections. They hoped to 
capture one or two counties or cities to sustain the party’s base as well as 
its bargaining power with the DPP. The intensifying of TSU-DPP friction 
in the coordination of candidates for these elections reflected this 
thinking.  
nges to Election Rules and Their Impact on Party Politics 
In May 2005, Taiwan confirmed changes to legislative electoral rules, 
effective from the next election. The rules cut in half the number of 
legislators, who are to be elected in a single-district, single-seat system. 
There are still problems of implementation to overcome before the 
changes take shape. One big issue is how to redraw electoral boundaries. 
Though we do not know how redistricting bargaining will play out, 
legislators in
should retain their party allegiance. No matter what they choose to d
seems obvious that Taiwan is moving toward a two-party poli
system. With elections for president, county and city mayors, and now 
the legislature all reinforcing the trend, the political cleavage along the 
blue-green divide will be consolidated.  
Taiwan is now in a period of transition to the single-district, 
single-seat system. The trajectory of party realignment seems to 
consolidate the blue-green divide and make it more difficult for 
cooperation across it. However, since the new system will probably 
produce more middle-of-the-road politicians, political differences 
between the pan-blue and pan-green camps will probably gradually fade 
as time goes on.  
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VI.  Conclusion 
In this brief article, we analyzed the evolution of the multi-party system 
through observation of the dynamics of elections. We attempted to 
understand these dynamics in terms of the elites-masses interaction in 
the election cycle. We then highlighted three factors that could affect 
election dynamics: voter structure, constraints imposed by the electoral 
system and the strategies of the political elites. On voter structure, we 
described the political demographics of voters in terms of party 
identification and issue preferences. We found out that after twelve years 
of multi-party competition, over 60% of people established a firm party 
es that concern the public, national identity and 
 extremely well in the Taipei City mayoral 
election at the time. It is believed that the rise of Ma has revitalized 
KMT among pan-blue supporters. 
ecember 2004. In 
identification. On issu
class/anti-corruption are dominant. A party’s or a candidate’s position 
on these issues is central to his or her prospects.  
However, reforms to the electoral system will change the way parties 
interact and strategize. The old system’s intra-party competition for 
legislative elections will be transformed in 2007. It is also expected that 
smaller parties will find it more difficult to survive. How this will affect 
party realignment remains to be seen, but it will certainly be a 
complicating factor. 
Notes 
1. Data provided by Central Election Commission for the 2001 
legislative elections. 
2. This is the composition before May 20th, 2004. Since then, some DPP 
legislators have become political appointees in the cabinet. 
3. TVBS post-election result analysis, March 21, 2004. 
4. From the surveys conducted by the United Daily News on April 1, 
2000 and June 12, 2000. 
5. Ma Ying-Jeou scored
the 
6. Analysis by the Poll Survey Center of the Democratic Progressive 
Party Headquarters, August, 2004. 
7. “Black-gold politics” refers to a political agenda influenced by 
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oney. constituents or companies. “Black gold” refers to m
8. Survey published by the United Daily News in D
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Referendum: A New Way of 
Identifying National Identity 
Yung-Ming Hsu, Chia-Hung Tsai and Hsiu-Tin Huang 
I.  Introduction 
In Taiwan’s 2004 presidential election, each voter received three 
ballots — one for the presidential and vice presidential election and two 
for referenda. However, the opposition parties — the Kuomintang (KMT) 
led by then-chairman Lien Chan and the People First Party (PFP) led by 
Chairman James Soong — argued that the referenda violated the 
Referendum Law and denounced them as a campaign strategy. 
Defending the legitimacy of the referenda, the incumbent Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) and its ally the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), 
claimed that the results of the referenda would represent the inclination 
of the people and that approval would send a clear message to the rest of 
the world, including China, on national defense. The referenda therefore 
symbolized sovereignty and an underlying national identity. Although 
there were no political parties or candidate names printed on the 
referendum ballots, the vote was highly partisan and ideologically 
driven.  
We chart the two forces affecting national identity in Taiwan as 
shown in Figure 1. After experiencing diplomatic crises and threats from 
China, the political psychology of the Taiwanese people has become 
more distanced from the international environment. Therefore, one 
exogenous effect on national identity has decreased. On the other hand, 
an endogenous effect from democratization itself may increase. Every 
election involves the question of who is eligible to vote and who will gain 
a mandate, which as a result strengthens identity as a member of a nation. 
We therefore assume that the referenda held in 2004 not only granted 
people the right of initiative and direct legislation but also further 
expanded Taiwanese sovereignty.  
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Figure 1 Exogenous and Endogenous Forces of National Identity 
 
In this paper, we trace the issue of national identity in Taiwan and 
establish a connection between this issue and the referenda. We also 
show how the referenda as a democratization process interacted with the 
international environment and propelled national identity. Finally, we 
propose that most people who identify themselves as both Chinese and 
Taiwanese will vote in future referenda. We therefore suggest that the 
referendum is a contributor to national identity.  
II.  Historical Background of National Identity and the 
Referendum  
The referendum issue in Taiwan dates back to 1895, when Japan took 
over Taiwan after signing a treaty with China. The Chinese already in 
Taiwan resisted Japanese rule, fighting for liberty and political 
participation as the Japanese improved Taiwan’s infrastructure as part of 
its designs on Southeast Asia. It is said that Taiwanese began developing 
a national identity fighting against the Japanese. Chinese culture and 
heredity, however, supported a Chinese identity, thus China’s 
resumption of power in 1945 was welcomed by the locals.  
Shortly after this, the population became upset because of inflation 
and corruption. Compared to the Japanese colonial government, the 
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administration from China seemed ineffective in managing infrastructure. 
On the other hand, the Chinese officials were concerned that ordinary 
people wanted the Japanese to come back. They also assumed that 
nationalism should override demands for political participation, 
especially at a time that the KMT was defending its hold over China 
against the Communists (Lai et al. 1994). 
Conflict erupted when two officials tried to confiscate cigarettes on a 
Taipei street: the woman selling the cigarettes was wounded and a man 
nearby was shot. The event led to a fierce nationwide protest and chaos 
resulted. To suppress the uprising, the Chiang Kai-Shek administration 
sent troops to Taiwan, collecting thousands of suspects and executing 
many of them without trial. It is widely believed that the February 28 
Incident, or the “228 massacre,” spawned the Taiwanese independence 
movement because it magnified the difference between Taiwan and 
China in terms of customs and civil rights.  
A witness to the chaos of the late 1940s, Liao Wen-Yi, son of a 
wealthy family in central Taiwan, flew to Japan and called for a plebiscite 
to decide whether Taiwan should be placed in trust with the United 
Nations. He proposed that Taiwan should seek self-government free of 
KMT rule because the island incorporated various ethnic groups, 
constituted a distinct ethnicity and because Taiwanese were entitled to 
self-determination like any other nationality under the control of an 
enemy state. His theory inspired the independence movement and 
eventual opposition parties, which adopted a “self-determination” 
formula to address the sovereignty problem. On the one hand, this 
expressed hostility toward China, which claimed Taiwan as a renegade 
province. On the other hand, it was a nation-building process that 
defined citizenship in terms of national identity instead of ethnic 
background (Wu 2001). 
In the 1980s, the growth of social movements began to generate other 
types of referenda. Grassroots activists repeatedly supported the use of 
referenda, usually at the local level, to rally residents against 
environmentally unfriendly industrial projects. Such grassroots activism 
has led to a series of local referenda (Appendix 1), though they have been 
regarded as consultative referenda without legal imperative. For instance, 
wary of pollution produced by the fifth naphtha cracker plant, the 
residents of Houching in the southern city of Kaohsiung used a 
referendum to show their opposition to the plant. On May 6, 1990, over 
66% of the people who voted opposed the project. While not recognizing 
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the referendum itself, the government began negotiations with residents 
and promised to control pollution as a precondition for launching the 
plant.  
Thereafter, local governments joined the environmental movement 
to hold referenda when residents opposed major construction projects. 
There have been 13 out of 18 cases in which local governments 
themselves organized referenda as a means of asserting their will against 
the much more powerful central government, or for subdivisions to resist 
the county government. The DPP-led county and city administrations 
used this tactic as a form of opposition to the then KMT-controlled 
central government.  
The second type of local referenda demanded new projects to boost 
economic development (five cases), of which three were initiated by local 
governments. The most recent of these was in September 2003, in which a 
local association in Pinglin, Taipei County, backed by the township’s 
leaders, demanded the opening of a ramp into their town from a nearly 
completed freeway. Of the 60% of people who cast a vote, 98% voted 
“yes.” The environment minister insisted that the result of the 
referendum could not second-guess an environmental impact assessment, 
but eventually he resigned in frustration over the matter.  
In the 1990s, the democratization of Taiwan deepened further. The 
KMT abolished martial law and its related institutions, and all of the 
seats in the Legislative Yuan were open to popular election. This progress 
in democracy reinforced the call for referenda. The DPP attempted to 
revitalize Liao Wen-Yi’s idea that Taiwan could use a referendum to 
decide the sovereignty of Taiwan and join the United Nations under the 
name “Taiwan”, which was strongly opposed by China. The KMT 
charged that the DPP was risking people’s lives by introducing the 
plebiscite, but the DPP argued that people have the right to decide on 
national affairs, including the nation’s name, flag and anthem, regardless 
of the opinions of other countries. Sensing wariness toward the China 
threat, however, the DPP maintained that a “self-determination” 
plebiscite would be held if Taiwan’s status were changed. DPP Legislator 
Chai Trong-Rong drafted a referendum law in 1993 and argued that a 
referendum on Taiwan’s sovereignty status would help it join the United 
Nations.  
Since opposition to the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant had been a core 
DPP policy, the rise to power of the DPP in 2000 raised hopes among 
referendum proponents that a national poll on the plant could be held 
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and that further referenda could finally solve the sovereignty problem. 
Under pressure from former DPP chairman Lin Yi-Hsiung, who opposed 
the nuclear power plant and called for a referendum on the issue, 
President Chen Shui-Bian pledged a consultative referendum that would 
not have to touch on issues such as national identity and 
“self-determination”. Chen’s move eventually resulted in the making of 
the Referendum Law and the holding of the following two “defensive” 
referenda. 
III.  The Making of the Referendum Law 
Upon Chen’s pledge to produce a referendum law, the KMT-PFP alliance 
was fiercely critical, arguing that the use of referenda was a strategy to 
benefit Chen in the presidential campaign and that a referendum law 
would override the Constitution as it gave the public the right to initiate 
direct legislation. Moreover, the KMT-PFP alliance warned that a 
referendum could alter the cross-strait status quo and cause a conflict 
with China. Also, a referendum would cast a shadow over Taiwan’s 
foreign relationships, especially with the United States and Japan. In 
addition, some said, it would be too costly to hold a referendum. From 
the perspective of the DPP, however, the referendum law simply 
implemented the public right to initiate or abrogate a law; it had nothing 
to do with the presidential campaign. Moreover, the public should hold a 
referendum to express its general opinion on Chinese claims that Taiwan 
is part of China.  
There were four notable versions of the referendum law, stressing 
different perspectives on the issue as a whole. Legislator Chai 
Trong-Rong’s version emphasized civil rights and national identity; the 
issues of national title, anthem, flag and boundaries could be put to the 
people. The Legislative Yuan version upholds the democratic values of 
the referendum, but it confined its use to only legislation on public policy. 
The DPP’s version pronounced the goal to be the protection of basic 
human rights and the right to take part in the political process. To avoid 
abuse of the referendum by the administration, the KMT’s version said 
referenda should be initiated by the public and then examined by the 
Legislative Yuan. The issues covered by referendum should also, the 
KMT said, be restricted to “[public] rights, duties, national policies, 
government organizations, important political issues, and the issues 
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which the Constitution could not solve, such as Taiwan’s official name or 
its being officially nominated in international organizations” (Chen 1999). 
Long before the debate on the referendum in Taiwan, US President 
George W. Bush visited Beijing on February 21, 2003. In his conference 
with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, Bush declared that the United States 
would not encourage cross-strait tension, and the Taiwan issue should be 
solved peacefully. Seeking a commitment from the US to the cross-strait 
relationship, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Washington on 
December 7, and claimed that China would not tolerate Taiwanese 
independence promoted by separatist activities through a referendum. 
He stressed that China interpreted the “status quo” as only one China 
existing and that Beijing had sovereignty over Taiwan. Furthermore, 
China had long opposed referenda in Taiwan because such votes could 
be held on Taiwan’s independence from the People’s Republic of China 
(Dumbaugh 2004: 12). Bush then declared that the US government’s 
policy is “one China” based upon the three communiqués and the 
Taiwan Relations Act, and that the US opposed any unilateral decision by 
either China or Taiwan to change the status quo.1 
Before the new legislative session in September, a remarkable social 
movement took place. The Alliance to Campaign for Rectifying the Name 
of Taiwan held a demonstration in Taipei on September 6. A parade of 
50,000 independence activists was staged throughout the capital to 
express support for the demand that the nation’s name be changed to 
“Taiwan.” The leader of the alliance, former president Lee Teng-Hui, 
emphasized that the Republic of China no longer existed and Taiwan was 
not part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) either. Taiwan needed a 
whole new national identity. 
The Legislative Yuan finally passed a politically charged referendum 
bill on November 27. The DPP successfully had Article 17 placed in the 
bill, which empowers the president to hold a referendum on national 
security when the country faces an external threat that could interfere 
with national sovereignty. However, the new law denied the government 
the right to hold advisory referenda to gauge public opinion. Instead, the 
Legislative Yuan was able to initiate a referendum on topics that 
lawmakers felt should be referred to the people. The public could initiate 
a referendum by accumulating the signatures of 0.5% of the electorate 
that participated in the previous presidential election, and the proposed 
referendum would be examined by a supervisory committee composed 
of representatives of political parties in proportion to their share of seats 
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in the Legislative Yuan. More importantly, a majority vote would be 
required to pass a referendum. 
The relatively high quorum and the power of review by the 
Legislative Yuan in the Referendum Law upset the DPP and the Cabinet, 
who tried to overturn the law. However, Chen announced that he would 
launch a defensive referendum alongside the presidential election 
according to Article 17, which stunned not only opposition parties but 
also China, the United States and Japan among others. On January 5, a 
US official called Chen’s position on the referendum issue “inconsistent,” 
referring to the fact that Chen’s position on the matter had changed 
several times (Taipei Times 2004.01.04: 1). In December, former Japanese 
prime minister Yoshiro Mori and Japanese envoy Katsuhisa Uchida 
visited Taiwan, passing a message to Chen during their low-profile trips. 
Mori voiced the Japanese government’s concern over the plan. Uchida 
expressed similar concern and hoped that Chen would handle the issue 
carefully.  
On January 16, Chen unveiled the two questions to be put to 
referendum. The first question was: “The people of Taiwan demand that 
the Taiwan Strait issue be resolved through peaceful means. Should 
mainland China refuse to withdraw the missiles it has targeted at Taiwan 
and to openly renounce the use of force against us, would you agree that 
the government should acquire more advanced anti-missile weapons to 
strengthen Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities?” The second question was: 
“Would you agree that our government should engage in negotiations 
with mainland China on the establishment of a “peaceful and stable” 
framework for cross-strait interaction in order to build a consensus and 
for the welfare of the peoples on both sides?” 
Upon Chen’s announcement, the White House spokesman 
commented that the US did not oppose or endorse any referendum, and 
that it did not see any relationship between the outcome of the proposed 
referendum and the status quo.2 Secretary of State Colin Powell also said 
that Chen had shown “flexibilities,” referring to the new terms of the 
referendum (Taipei Times 2004.01.18: 1). Nevertheless, French President 
Jacques Chirac claimed when he met PRC Vice President Hu Jintao that 
the referendum would break the status quo unilaterally and would be a 
“grave error” (Taipei Times 2004.01.28: 1). 
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IV.  Developing National Identity 
Elections in Taiwan were originally used to strengthen the KMT’s 
legitimacy (Wang 1989). In the 1970s, China gradually displaced 
Taiwan’s representatives from international organizations. Diplomatic 
drawbacks pushed the KMT to open up elections in the hope of gaining 
international support, mainly from the US. Despite the fact that one-party 
politics was maintained until the late 1980s, Americans were convinced 
that Taiwan, as a democracy, could not be taken over by China, a view 
that is reflected in the Taiwan Relations Act, enacted in 1979 when the US 
recognized the PRC.  
In opening up elections, however, the KMT struggled to remain 
dominant. Before the DPP was formed, opposition activists had 
demanded sweeping political reforms and democratization. When the 
DPP was established in 1986, the issue of national identity had been on 
the political agenda and has affected the referendum question since that 
time. In 1983, opposition activists claimed that the future of Taiwan 
should be determined by referendum, and the DPP put this idea on its 
platform. The DPP emphasized that Taiwanese should seek international 
recognition as an independent state, but the KMT insisted that Taiwan 
was part of China and that the two sides should unify once China 
becomes prosperous and democratic. Since the 1990s, nearly every 
election has been colored by conflict between identities leaning toward 
Taiwan or China. 
However, the substance of the national identity issue gradually 
changed with the realignment of the party system. Former KMT 
chairman Lee Teng-Hui promoted the idea that Taiwan was already an 
independent country and that whoever identified with it could be called 
Taiwanese. Lee’s theory was appealing because it called for 
self-consciousness on the part of Taiwan and defined the “status quo” as 
an independent state. Since Taiwan had been out of China’s jurisdiction 
for fifty years and as most people were content with the status quo, 
Taiwan should be more aggressive on the international stage in spite of 
China’s threat. On the other hand, the image of China and its reaction to 
Lee Teng-Hui’s move strengthened Taiwanese identity. Figure 2 shows 
the change in national identity. 
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Figure 2 National identity in Taiwan, 1992-2003 
Source: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. 
 
Thanks to actions by China, the strength of Taiwanese national 
identity rose in 1994, 1996, 2000 and 2002. In 1994, a group of Taiwanese 
tourists were murdered during their trip to Qiandao Lake in China. The 
incident irritated Taiwanese because the Chinese government first tried 
to cover it up before admitting that a serious crime had taken place. 
Although police arrested suspects shortly after, China’s image was 
damaged. Then, on the eve of the 1996 presidential election, China 
launched several missiles off the shore of northern Taiwan to alarm Lee 
Teng-Hui, who was running in the first popular presidential election. The 
military showdown not only helped Lee win the election but also 
stimulated unity. In 1999, a massive earthquake struck central Taiwan, 
resulting in 2,455 deaths and the destruction of 38,935 homes. The 
Chinese government blocked formal international assistance and 
materials. This further upset a lot of Taiwanese and the level of national 
identity increased significantly. On the eve of the 2000 presidential 
election, Chinese premier Zhu Rongji warned that the Chinese people 
were willing to shed blood to prevent Taiwan from becoming 
independent, which again pushed people towards a Taiwanese identity. 
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Zhu’s comment did not scare Taiwanese voters away from the DPP 
candidate, Chen Shui-Bian; instead, it helped the DPP topple the KMT for 
the first time in a national election. The most recent boost to Taiwanese 
identity took place in 2003. In April, several cases of severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) were discovered in Taiwan. The initial 
cases were business travelers between Taiwan and China and Taiwan 
and Hong Kong, both of which had already reported cases. The outbreak 
lasted a few weeks, and Taiwan’s death toll ended up at 81. While 
Taiwan sought help from the World Health Organization (WHO), China 
again claimed that Taiwan was part of China and did not allow the WHO 
to assist Taipei in fighting the disease. Moreover, China erected all sorts 
of barriers preventing Taiwan from participating in the WHO. China’s 
remorseless behavior stimulated many Taiwanese to identify themselves 
as such (Liu and Cheng, n.d.; Jiang). 
At this point, the linear relationship between national identity and 
exogenous factors was a positive one. But Figure 2 only tells half the 
story — the impact of democratization suggested in Figure 1 is left out. 
The 1992 legislative election represented the peak of democratization, but 
the 1996 presidential election was also a milestone for the role played by 
external and internal forces in shaping national identity. Previously, 
national elections were limited to legislators and national assembly 
representatives, and campaign issues involved both national policy and 
local interests. In this sense, democratization merely ensured the freedom 
to discuss national identity and set up institutions representative of 
different identities. Only until the 1996 election did people in Taiwan 
elect the president as a national leader with a national mandate. 
Moreover, China’s provocative missile tests during the election that 
expressed wrath over Lee’s visit to the United States and efforts to join 
the UN changed the way that Taiwanese perceived China. On the other 
hand, many people turned out to vote for in the referendum despite 
pressure from China, the United States, France and Japan, confirming the 
fact that external influence was declining by the 2004 election. The former 
Chinese student movement leader, Wang Dan, pointed out that, “The 
DPP and TSU camp’s vote has jumped from 40% in 2000 to 50% this year, 
showing that a feeling of Taiwanese identity has expanded … If Beijing 
and Washington were not convinced about this trend four years ago, 
then they should be now.” (Taipei Times 2004.04.08) 
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V.  Two Referenda and the 2004 Presidential Campaign 
In discussing the campaign strategies of the candidates, it is imperative to 
first analyze their core base of support. Especially in a one-on-one 
showdown, the main strategy for the weaker pan-green camp headed by 
Chen lay in shoring up core support while attracting voters not affiliated 
with any party. For the pan-blue camp of Lien Chan and James Soong, 
who enjoyed an initial lead, the main task was preserving their 
advantage by wrecking their opponent’s momentum and blurring the 
distinction between the two parties. They decided to cooperate in this 
election largely because Chen won the three-way race between himself, 
Lien and Soong in the 2000 election.  
The first stage of this contest involved capturing the agenda. The 
“Rectifying the Name” rally in September successfully mobilized DPP 
partisans and offset the momentum created by the KMT-PFP alliance 
months earlier. Furthermore, Chen visited the United States and claimed 
that he would make a new constitution possible if he were elected; Lien 
denounced this as a campaign tactic to make a good impression, only to 
offer another version of a new constitution shortly thereafter. After that, 
the DPP controlled the pace of the campaign and the KMT merely played 
a defensive role. 
Before the referendum law was enacted, Chen vowed to hold a 
consultative referendum on the basis of the Constitution. After the law 
was enacted, Chen called for two referenda. After the two referenda were 
outlined, DPP strategy changed. For instance, then DPP chairman Frank 
Hsieh said that the referendum would deliver a message to the 
international community that the people of Taiwan would be fractured if 
the referendum failed (Taipei Times 2004.03.01: 1).  
Claiming that the nation was not facing a clear and present danger to 
its national sovereignty, vice presidential candidate James Soong stressed 
the referenda did not meet the criteria set by Article 17 of the 
Referendum Law. The pan-blue camp also questioned the DPP’s motives 
in holding the referendum on the same day as the presidential election, 
and expressed concerned that this might lead to conflict. Chen accused 
his rivals of mimicking his agenda, and the “pan-blue” camp made 
Chen’s challenge its own rallying cry. As controversy raged over Chen’s 
proposal to hold a “defensive referendum”, both camps rallied their 
bases as levels of support in opinion polls leveled off. However, due to 
ideological conflict within the alliance, the pan-blue camp was split over 
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whether it should boycott the referendum. According to the Taipei Times, 
some local KMT chiefs warned that “[Boycotting the referendum] would 
result in the KMT-PFP alliance being branded anti-democratic and 
anti-reform.” (Taipei Times 2004.01.28: 3) 
In the 2004 presidential election campaign, exogenous effects were 
also apparent. Around the time of the Lunar New Year holiday, 
controversy over the referendum issue began to grow.  Washington’s 
reaction became the key to the success or failure of the process. It is 
noteworthy that after President Chen finalized the referendum questions, 
the pan-blue camp and Beijing were forced to act.  Although the 
pan-blue camp advocated retreat on the referendum issue, as soon as 
Chen came up with the referendum questions, the pan-blue camp flexed 
its legislative muscle to ensure the co-existence of “blue” and “green” 
questions. With the possibility of a propaganda barrage or even military 
threats from China, the campaign entered a new stage. While China 
clearly played a role; the United States and Japan did this too by 
expressing concern over the referendum plans. The actions of the US and 
Japan also turned the presidential election into an issue of international 
concern. The effects of international scrutiny not only tested the 
pan-green camp’s ability to stay in control, but also gave the pan-blue 
camp an opportunity to stabilize its support base. Thus the battle over 
referenda questions itself entered a new round. The pan-green camp 
attempted to moderate international pressure over the referenda issue 
while the pan-blue camp crafted a mudslinging campaign style which 
alienated many voters. 
VI.  An Analysis of National Identity and the Referenda 
Questions 
The circumstances for the election and its accompanying referenda 
suggest that the public was divided on whether it should pick up the 
referendum ballots on the day. We expected that people who supported 
the KMT-PFP alliance would not vote in the referenda, while DPP 
supporters would. Moreover, people who identified themselves as 
Taiwanese were also expected to vote in the referenda due to strong 
sentiments of self-determination. As for those who identified themselves 
as Chinese, the preference would be not to vote at all. However, it is 
those people with dual identity that we are interested in here; in this 
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election, they were faced with a new kind of choice. Their decision to 
vote may or may not have depended on the party they supported in the 
presidential poll.  
Table 1 and Table 2 confirm our two hypotheses. In Table 1, DPP 
partisans overwhelmingly intended to vote on the referenda questions, 
but KMT partisans were not likely to vote. Among “non-response” 
subjects, 55.1% were to vote on the referenda and 44.9% were not. The 
result suggests that for every voter, the referenda questions were a 
partisan issue. This reflects the intense party competition at the election. 
 
Table 1 Partisanship and Referenda (%) 
 Will Vote Will Not Vote Total 
DPP 93.4 6.6 100.0 
KMT 18.3 81.7 100.0 
Non-partisan 55.1 44.9 100.0 
Source: Focus Survey Research Company. 
 
Table 2 offers evidence of a strong association between national 
identity and intention to vote on the referenda questions. Amongst those 
identifying as Taiwanese, 73.4% intended to vote in the referenda. 
However, 73.5% of those with Chinese identity decided not to vote. As 
for those with dual identity, only one-third would vote on the referenda 
and two-third preferred to abstain. Apparently, most people with dual 
identity were not likely to shift their identities straight away, but some 
had been successfully courted by DPP appeals.  
Note that only one-third of those people with dual identity would 
vote on the referenda questions, while 55% of non-partisans were to do 
so. These two categories refer to a similar number of people. It was 
suspected that people with dual identity would also be divided along 
party lines since they showed mixed support for the referenda. On one 
hand, they were not certain how to address the two-way pressure of 
identity in this election, but on the other hand, they may have preferred 
to move forward and backward between the two poles rather than 
immediately jumping to one pole. 
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Table 2 National Identity and Referenda (%) 
 Will Vote Will Not Vote Total 
Taiwanese 73.4 26.6 100.0 
Both 30.6 69.4 100.0 
Chinese 26.5 73.5 100.0 
Source: Focus Survey Research Company. 
 
If voting intentions are an indicator of partisanship, then the same 
proportion of “non-response” subjects should have been inclined to vote 
in the referenda. However, Table 3 shows that around 70% of 
“non-response” subjects tended to vote in the referenda while only 55% 
of non-partisan subjects tended to do so. The results imply that some 
non-partisan voters would turn out to vote hiding their choice. We 
assume that they, in general, agreed with the DPP and TSU camp’s call 
for Taiwanese identity through referenda. Some of these people may 
have felt there was a contradiction in voting in the referenda as well as 
voting for the pan-blue ticket. Despite the fact that many refused to 
answer the question of who they would vote for, it is very likely that they 
changed their choice at the last minute. If this is the case, it is not 
surprising that Chen won the election by a slight margin. 
 
Table 3 Voting Choices and Referenda (%) 
 Will Vote Will Not Vote Total 
DPP 96.1 3.9 100.0 
KMT 19.4 80.6 100.0 
Non-Response 71.7 28.3 100.0 
Source: Focus Survey Research Company. 
 
To investigate the possibility that people of dual national identity 
changed their political identification, we asked respondents if they would 
support the referenda and whether they agreed with the statement that 
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the public should participate in discussion and implementation of public 
issues. Table 4 shows that people with dual identity were more likely to 
encompass the democratic values of the referendum than people of 
“Chinese” identity. On one side, 81.7% said they would vote in future 
referenda on public policy and law. On the other, 76.9% agreed that 
people should get involved in discussions and decision-making on public 
policy. On the whole, people of dual identity had the potential to change 
because of the referenda. 
 
Table 4 National Identity and Democracy Values (%) 
Will you vote on referenda regarding public policies 
and laws in the future?  
Will Vote Will Not Vote Total 
Taiwanese 86.7 13.3 100.0 
Both 81.7 18.3 100.0 
Chinese 75.8 24.2 100.0 
    
Do you agree that people should participate in the 
discussion and decision of public issues?  
Will Vote Will Not Vote Total 
Taiwanese 81.5 18.5 100.0 
Both 76.9 23.1 100.0 
Chinese 70.4 29.6 100.0 
Source: Focus Survey Research Company. 
VII.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we have proposed a simple model summarizing two 
similar forces critical to the development of national identity. We also 
argued that the opening up of elections and subsequent events 
strengthened Taiwanese identity. The intersection between these forces 
occurred at the 1996 presidential election, from which Lee Teng-Hui 
became the first popularly elected president, despite China’s threat to 
spark a war. Before this election, support for Taiwanese identity mostly 
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resulted from dramatic events in China. Following this, however, 
changes to Taiwanese identity on account of China’s behavior decreased 
in size, while those caused by the internal process of democratization 
increased in size.  
The two referenda in the 2004 election allow us to examine how 
Taiwanese identity responded to a new democratic institution. The two 
referenda were loaded with the historical legacy of the independence and 
environmental movements from the very beginning. They were the 
product of a long-term struggle between two competing national 
identities. The strategies of the two camps also shaped the two referenda 
to consolidate their support base. The DPP managed to link the two 
referenda to national identity, but the KMT simply called the process 
illegal in an attempt to downplay their role in the campaign. Our 
cross-tabular analysis suggests that one-third of those with dual identity 
tended to turn out to vote in the referenda and that they were very likely 
to do so in future out of a belief in democratic institutions. 
We conclude that endogenous forces in the form of democratic 
process will continue to strengthen Taiwanese identity. When democratic 
institutions obtain legitimacy they become endogenous to the system. 
And in introducing more public opinion into the policymaking process, 
referenda facilitate Taiwanese national identity. Unlike one-party politics 
in China, a belief in democracy reinforces the effect of democratic 
processes on national identity. 
Appendix: Local Referenda Held in Taiwan to Date 
Date Place Issue/Question Result 
90.05.06 Houching Area, 
Kaohsiung City 
Should the fifth 
naphtha cracker be 
built? 
Turnout 66.4% 
Oppose 59.1% 
94.05.22 Kungliao Township, 
Taipei County 
Should the FNPP be 
built? 
Turnout 58.36% 
Oppose 96.1% 
94.11.27 Taipei County Should the FNPP be 
built? 
Turnout 18.45% 
Oppose 87.11% 
95.03.29 Hsichih Township, 
Taipei County 
Should a tunnel be 
built to connect to 
the Far Eastern 
project? 
Turnout 17% 
Support 95% 
95.06.18 Taliao Township, 
Kaohsiung County 
Reclaimed land 
development project 
Turnout? 
Support over 50% 
 Referendum: A New Way of Identifying National Identity  287 
95.08.12 Yungkang Borough, 
Taipei City 
Closure of alley next 
to park 
Turnout 15% 
Support 81.71% 
96.03.23 Taipei City Should the FNPP be 
built? 
Turnout 58.71% 
Oppose 51.54% 
97.08.03 Liaoting 
Community, 
Minhsiung 
Township, Chiayi 
County 
Community 
Development Project 
Turnout approx. 50% 
Oppose over 50% 
98.?.? Tali St., Wanhua 
District, Taipei City 
Should a nursing 
home be built? 
Turnout 65.47% 
Oppose 86% 
Should a medical 
center be built? 
Turnout 65.47% 
Oppose 51.54% 
98.12.05 Tahu Borough, 
Neihu District., 
Taipei City Should a park be 
built? 
Turnout ? 
Support 90.1% 
Can Taiwan accept 
being governed by 
the PRC? 
Turnout 25.% 
Oppose 77.88% 
98.12.05 Tainan City 
Should an airport be 
built? 
Turnout 16.82% 
Support 73.68% 
98.12.05 Ilan County Should the FNPP be 
built? 
Turnout 44.39% 
Oppose 60.1% 
Should a special 
gambling district be 
created? 
Turnout 45% 
Support 79.8% 
01.06.08 Penghu County 
Should Tungchi V, 
Wangan TS be 
transferred to Tainan 
County?  
Turnout 45% 
Support 91% 
03.06.07 Wuchieh Village, 
Wuchieh Township, 
Ilan County 
Where should the 
village activity 
center be built? 
Turnout 14% 
Support Chengan Temple 53% 
Support Kuomin school land 47% 
03.08.23 Ilan City and 
Sanhsing Township, 
Ilan County 
Choose the names 
for two sections of 
highway 
Ilan City section: 
Turnout 21% 
Support “Chungshan Road” 85% 
Sanhsing TS section: 
Turnout 24% 
Support “Sanhsing Road” 88% 
03.09.14 Pinglin Township, 
Taipei County 
Should the service 
ramp of the 
expressway be 
converted to a 
regular exit? 
Turnout 64.2% 
Support 97% 
 
Sources: Research and Planning Committee, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
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Notes 
1. See President Bush and Premier Wen Jiabao Remarks to the Press, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov 
2. See Press Briefing by Scott McClellan, http://www.whitehouse.gov 
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The Prospects of Deliberative Democracy 
in Taiwan1
Dung-Sheng Chen and Kuo-Ming Lin 
I.  Introduction 
Recently, the development of democracy theory has moved in a new 
direction, stimulated by fundamental limits that apply to representative 
democracy (Dryzek 2000). According to Elster (1998: 8), deliberative 
democracy includes “collective decision making with the participation of 
all who will be affected by the decision or their representatives and 
decision making by means of arguments offered by and to participants 
who are committed to the values of rationality and impartiality”. Hence, 
the literature on deliberative democracy has proposed that citizens are 
major actors in modern democratic institutions and that they should 
actively participate in public affairs rather than function as passive voters 
in elections. But before participating in public discussion, citizens need 
comprehensible and balanced information about target issues and an 
equal opportunity to express their opinions through fair procedure and 
in public forums (Benhabib 1996; Bohman 1996; Dryzek 1996; Elster 1998; 
Fishkin 1991; Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Nino 1996). The idea of 
deliberative democracy has highlighted important principles in the 
operation of democracy. In order to overcome limits of representative 
democracy, however, implementation of direct democracy is required. A 
capable civic society formed by citizens is able to check and balance the 
power of the legislative and administrative wings and to propose 
insightful blueprints of public policies on some occasions. Moreover, 
public participation should proceed on the basis of equal access, 
transparent and informed knowledge, mutual respect and the principle 
of by-the-people. 
Deliberative democracy emphasizes not only the importance of 
citizens as individual actors but also citizens as a collective actor in public 
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participation. Civic society is too complex a concept to be discussed in 
detail here; for our purposes we define civic society as a third grouping 
other than the nation and the market. While the three overlap in certain 
respects, civic society still has autonomy. It plays an important role in 
watching over, restricting and offering remedies for the problems that 
arise from the functioning of the nation and the market. Therefore, one of 
the issues that most concerns democracy theorists is that the authority of 
the nation must not either be allowed to suppress or violate the basic 
rights of people under the principle of democracy. Yet, depending on 
institutional restrictions stemming from the judiciary and the executive, 
and despite the fact that the emergence of elections as ways of controlling 
the exercise of political power became the foundation of protective 
democracy, citizen participation and civic society have been given rather 
passive meanings. Lately, American political scientist Putnam (1994), 
who followed the observations Alexis de Tocqueville made on American 
society, points out that the voluntary associations and civic networks 
formed by citizens to participate in public affairs are essential for 
optimizing the efficiency of institutions and maintaining a better 
operating democracy. Civic society and the mature operation of a 
democracy will reinforce each other. 
The main perspective from the advocates of direct democracy and 
deliberative democracy, however, is to expand the general public’s 
participation in the public sphere, transforming people from simple 
voters to citizens and eventually developing a capable civic society. Our 
focus is on the sophisticated discussions that citizens have in relation to 
contested public policies and the conflict between fundamental values 
these policies present, rather than the fuss over establishing, for instance, 
a referendum system. What we hope to point out is that without in-depth 
discussions among citizens, the electoral system can be of little help to 
deepen democracy. It is due to the manipulation of elections in such a 
way that they resemble genuine competition that the majority excludes 
minority opinions and dominates critical decisions. In this way, the 
opinions of the minority are neither heard nor respected. It might be the 
case that a majority can reach a consensus and make very important 
decisions when, in fact, what it has done is deepen social cleavages and 
extend conflict between different groups. 
The public discussion we mentioned is not like popular talk shows 
nor a forum full of expert jargon and conversations led by political elites 
and opinion leaders. None of these is based on opinions of the general 
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public. The form of public discussion asserted by deliberative democracy 
enables common people to read information written in languages they 
can understand and that represents different standpoints. Only through 
the allocation of equal time and respect for the articulation of ideas can 
such things be fully discussed. In short, public discussion does not 
merely emphasize communications and discussions among common 
people, it also provides for interaction with experts and scholars of 
different standpoints as a first principle. Any forms of presentation are 
encouraged and listening to all is also very important. It is nice if all 
participants eventually reach a consensus, yet often only a majority 
opinion can result, with a minority insisting on its points of view. 
Whether part of a consensus, a majority opinion, or a minority, 
participants must outline the reasons for their standpoints and, finally, 
following a procedure all accept, come to a decision. As Bohman (1996) 
pointed out, the very minimum requirement for people to participate in 
deliberative democracy is to respect minority opinions and to provide 
explanations for not accepting their suggestions. The practice of 
reasonable explanation is very important in maintaining the legitimacy of 
deliberative democracy as well as avoiding resilient cleavages among 
majority and minority groups. 
Deliberative democracy is not going to replace representative 
democracy or other formats of direct democracy; rather, it will function 
as a supplementary mechanism. However, some important contributions 
of deliberative democracy are to facilitate the development of strong civic 
society, to provide checks and balances for either market or state, to 
encourage public participation of the general public and to nurture the 
citizens’ solidarity. These features become essential in deepening a 
democracy that is largely ruled by the people. 
II.  Deliberative Democracy and Democratization in 
Taiwan 
Taiwan’s democratization has thrown up numerous challenges that have 
similarities to Western societies, although there are unique challenges, 
such as international intervention, the threat of cross-strait military 
conflict and a divided national identity (Chu 1996; Lin, Chu and Hinich 
1996; Tien and Chu 1996: 1168-1170; Wong 2001). Vote-buying practices 
prevail in elections at various levels, which are dominated by local 
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factions to a considerable extent. Money politics is therefore widespread 
in both the elections and operations of local councils and national 
representative bodies (Chen 1995). A large proportion of representatives 
pursue their own interests instead of the public interest; representative 
democracy in the legislative sphere has become rather corrupted and 
self-interested. 
Secondly, the administration’s dominance over the general public 
has become so common across different levels of government that the 
bureaucracy has developed very close relationships with large business 
groups and legislator interest groups (Chu 1994; Tan 2000). Bureaucrats 
draw up most policy without public discussion. As a consequence, 
policies have mainly come into being under the heavy influence of 
powerful interest groups and/or self-interested legislators. These policies 
are essentially short-sighted and not beneficial to the general population. 
Hence, the legitimacy of many policies has been challenged by both the 
public and social movements. In addition, the lack of public participation 
tends to make risk evaluation of policy implementation problematic 
because everyday perspectives of risk are neglected. In the recent 
literature on risk assessment, the experiences of ordinary people obtained 
from deliberative public discussion are important supplementary 
information to professional knowledge (Beck 1992; Lash and Wynne 
1992). The sophistication of public policies relies on the input of 
professional knowledge and everyday wisdom. 
Thirdly, the deep cleavage in national identity has been accelerated 
by national elections that are significant arenas for parties to advance 
inflexible positions2 on these issues (Chu 2004). Consequently, public 
solidarity is ruined rather than consolidated during elections because 
voters lack informed and status-free public discussion. 
Finally, the state has instituted some arrangements for direct 
democracy such as referenda, but the lack of trust among political parties 
and deep social cleavages lead to negative attitudes towards its practice. 
According a nationwide survey conducted by the authors, only 52.8% of 
respondents said they voted in the 2004 referendum, compared with 
89.6% of respondents who voted in the presidential poll. Among those 
who did not vote in the referendum, more than 90% were supporters of 
either the People First Party or the Kuomintang (KMT). On the opposite 
side, more than 90% of those who voted in the referendum were 
supporters of either the Taiwan Solidarity Union or the Democratic 
Progressive Party. Most of the people who consider themselves 
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“Taiwanese” (72%) voted in the referendum, while most who do not 
consider themselves “Taiwanese” (85%) did not. The problems with the 
referendum were exacerbated by a lack of public participation and 
deliberative discussion, the result of people lacking the opportunity to 
understand why fellow citizens develop different positions as well as the 
ability to respect the opinions of others. Therefore, the initiation of 
referenda, which might have contributed to a more mature democracy, 
faces serious challenges. It is apparent that democratic development 
needs other practices that can help move the country beyond the limits of 
representative institutions and referenda. 
These problems can be improved by practices of deliberative 
democracy to a certain extent. Deliberative practices can contribute to the 
development of Taiwan’s democracy by improving the public’s policy 
literacy, political efficacy, sense of solidarity and increasing the average 
person’s motivation to participate in public life. When citizens are willing 
to participate in public affairs, civic society tends to possess the capability 
of checking and balancing administrative apparatuses; this is especially 
important in a country with an authoritarian legacy and legislative 
organizations steeped in money politics. Moreover, deliberative public 
discussion provides an open channel for citizens to express their 
thoughts about policy risks and any professional knowledge that can 
guide policy in the direction of the public interest. The practice also 
functions as an arena for exchanging different perspectives and learning 
how to respect difference. This way, social cleavages could be diminished 
to a certain extent. 
Recently, various models of deliberative democracy have been 
developed and implemented in European, American and Asian countries. 
In Taiwan, a taskforce formed by sociologists, political scientists, legal 
scholars and health policy researchers learned about deliberative 
democracy practices and attempted pilot projects such as a citizens’ 
conference, deliberative polls, perspective workshops and scenario 
workshops. A list of milestones in the development of deliberative 
democracy can be seen in Table 1. In 2001, the citizens’ conference was 
convened and followed by a trial of deliberative polls in 2002. After these 
experiments, the taskforce began to develop a new method in 2003, the 
group-citizen forum, which increases from a small number of 
participants into a larger number to display the opinions of groups and 
individual citizens and compare them. One of the main purposes of 
innovating participatory methods is to establish a method that enriches 
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Taiwan’s political, social and cultural contexts. In 2003, the taskforce 
chose the improvement of health quality as a scenario workshop topic. 
The trial helped the taskforce to compile a standard operating procedure 
for scenario workshops and to highlight the opinions of citizens on the 
quality of health. 
Table 1 Milestones in the Development of Deliberative Democracy 
in Taiwan 
Year Method and Issue Level of Practices Organization 
2001/11 Citizen Conference on 
Health Insurance 
Resource Allocation 
National Level National Taiwan 
University Task 
Force 
2002/5 Deliberative Polls on 
Payment Methods of 
Health Insurance 
National Level National Taiwan 
University Task 
Force 
2002/11 A Combination of Group 
Forum and Citizen 
Forum 
National Level National Taiwan 
University Task 
Force 
2003/11 Scenario Workshop on 
Health Care Quality 
National Level National Taiwan 
University Task 
Force 
2004/3 Training Workshop for 
practices of Citizen 
Conference 
Local Level (Peitou 
Community College) 
National Taiwan 
University Task 
Force 
2004/6 Citizen Conference on 
the future of the Peitou 
Hot Spring Museum 
Local Level The Peitou Culture 
Foundation and 
NTU task force 
2004/9 Citizen Conference on 
Surrogate Motherhood 
National Level National Taiwan 
University Task 
Force 
2004/9 Training Workshop for 
practices of Citizen 
Conference 
National Level (Seven 
local organizations from 
different places) 
National Taiwan 
University Task 
Force 
2004/10 National Youth 
Conference 
National Level National Youth 
Council 
2004/11 Citizen Conference on 
the metropolitan sky-cab 
project   
Metropolitan Level National Taiwan 
University Task 
Force 
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2004/11 Citizen Conference on 
Peitou City 
Gentrification 
Local Level The Peitou Culture 
Foundation, 
Professional 
Planning Group, 
and National 
Taiwan University 
Task Force 
2004/11 Internet Citizen 
Conference on Peitou 
City Gentrification 
Local Level The Peitou Culture 
Foundation, 
Professional 
Planning Group, 
and Shih Hsin 
University Task 
Force 
2004/11 Citizen Conference on 
Environment Protection 
for the Tahan River 
Local Level The Panchiao 
Community 
College 
2004/12 Citizen Conference on 
Tax Reform 
Local Level Pingtung, Keelung, 
Peitou, and 
Sanchung 
community 
colleges 
2005/1 Citizen Conference on 
Sustainable 
Development of 
National Health 
Insurance 
National Level National Taiwan 
University Task 
Force 
2005/5 Citizen Conference on 
Genetic Therapy 
National Level National Taiwan 
University Task 
Force 
 
After three years of preparations for various modules of deliberative 
democracy, the taskforce started to collaborate with the National 
Association of Community Colleges to organize the first training 
workshop on citizen conference practices in early 2004. Then, the first 
local-level citizen conference was held in April 2004, which was 
coordinated by the Peitou Community College and the Peitou Cultural 
Foundation. The movement of deliberative democracy has been 
progressing faster than we expected on both local and national levels. 
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The idea of a citizens’ conference has spread to local associations in 
Kaohsiung and Taipei in the form of training for workshop participation. 
Conferences organized by local civic groups are taking place in Peitou, 
Keelung, Pingtung, Sanchung and Panchiao. These communities have 
selected tax reform or protection of local rivers as topics for the 
conferences. In addition, the Kaohsiung City Government has awarded 
funding to a university research team to hold a citizens’ conference on 
the ecological impact of a transportation project. Meanwhile, a research 
team at National Taiwan University organized citizens’ conferences on 
surrogate motherhood, sustainable development of public health 
insurance and genetic therapy in 2004 and 2005. 
Different practices of deliberative democracy have been 
implemented and evaluated by the research team. The idea of 
deliberative democracy has also spread widely among political elites, 
intellectuals and community activists. Some political leaders recognize 
the importance of deliberative practices in relation to policymaking and 
Taiwan’s democratic development; they have therefore made deliberative 
participation for the general public an essential part of floating 
controversial policies. The legalization of surrogate motherhood and the 
impact of the Kaohsiung transportation project are two examples of this. 
Many community activists also support the idea of deliberative 
democracy once they have become familiar with its principles; 
subsequently, they have made a considerable effort to organize local 
conferences. In future, it should be possible to integrate top-down and 
bottom-up efforts in promoting the idea of deliberative democracy and 
thus lay a more solid foundation for Taiwan’s democracy. 
III.  The Impact of Deliberative Processes  
How does deliberative public discussion help establish civic ability, 
identity and citizenship? Public discussions promoted by deliberative 
democracy are a self-training process for participation in public affairs. 
People gain a better understanding of specific public issues by reading 
background information, listening to each other’s opinions, talking to one 
another and having their attention and concern focused on the issues at 
hand. In this way they become citizens capable of shaping policies. In an 
in-depth discussion, participants are required to listen to each other’s 
opinions and attempt to understand why others reach their conclusions; 
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one must also give one’s point of view. By doing so, inter-subjective 
communication free of distortion is possible. Citizens gradually form a 
sense of respect toward one another and reinforce their identity as 
citizens. This is an essential mechanism to build up solidarity among 
citizens. In a public discussion that privileges parity, participants need to 
give detailed explanations and reasons for their views, but autarchic 
assertions will not be tolerated. Participants must approach problems out 
of both self-interest and the public interest and try to strike a balance. 
When people begin to display a willingness to take the public interest 
into consideration, their concerns for other citizens also grow and so lay 
the foundations for citizenship, solidarity and civic dignity and welfare – 
the core values of society. Denmark is a nation with a long tradition of 
discussions among grassroots communities. With this tradition the 
country built up citizen solidarity and established a mature democratic 
system encouraging civic participation and retaining a competent social 
welfare system, in addition to a highly technological, innovative and 
egalitarian economy.                  
In investigating the impact of deliberative public discussion on 
attitudes toward national health insurance reform, we will show how 
policy literacy, political efficacy, motivation of participation and policy 
attitudes have changed in citizens’ conferences on health resource 
allocation. First, four questions in two questionnaires explored the extent 
of improvement in knowledge on policy. Comparing the results, we 
found that correct answers increased from 1.6 to 2.9 after the conference. 
We also asked participants to evaluate their knowledge on National 
Health Insurance (NHI) matters. Before the conference, 94% of the panel 
said they knew nothing or very little about the issues. After the 
conference, 90% said they knew a lot more. Both “objective” knowledge 
tests and “subjective” evaluations showed that the conference produced 
learning effects.  
In two in-depth interviews, the citizens repeatedly emphasized that 
they learned a great deal from participating in the conference, and many 
of them regarded the educational effects the most valuable part of the 
consensus conference. Some pointed out that in the past they had not had 
access to information about the NHI policies. For them, the national 
health insurance is “paying premiums; visiting doctors.” In the process of 
the conference, through background readings, dialogues with experts, 
and discussions with other participants, they were presented with a large 
amount of policy-relevant information, heard many viewpoints that had 
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not occurred to them, and began to develop clearer views on the NHI 
issues. Many also pointed to the fact that the knowledge learned during 
the processes enhanced their abilities to identify problems and to form 
their own opinions on problem-solving. As they became more informed 
during the public deliberation, the shared common knowledge 
constituted communicative framework for proposing rational arguments, 
weighing conflicting evidence and making better judgments.  
Secondly, citizens tend to change some of their values, attitudes and 
policy preferences when they engage in this process of deliberative 
public discussions. We used multiple measures to evaluate the changes. 
As indicated by the two questionnaire surveys conducted before and 
after the conference, the participants’ general attitudes toward the NHI 
system and their specific policy preference. The percentage of the 
participants who said they were satisfied and very satisfied with the NHI 
system changed from 49% (7/18) to 67% (12/18) after the conference.3 
The percentage of the participants who agreed that the best way to solve 
the problem of fiscal imbalance was to raise premiums changed from 6% 
(1/18) before the conference to 39% (7/18) after the conference.  
Self-evaluation of changes in policy opinions about the NHI system 
was asked in the he questionnaire survey after the conference. Over 60% 
of the participants (11/18) reported that their opinions were changed by 
participation in the conference.  
In in-depth interviews, participants described changes in values and 
policy preferences in their own terms. Attitudes toward the NHI system 
and preferences for increased premiums showed the most significant 
change. Most of the panel said that it identified more with the causes of 
the NHI because it embodied values of mutual aid and risk sharing. The 
change in values attached to the program resulted from acquiring more 
information about the workings of the system. As far as higher premiums 
were concerned, most participants said they opposed them before they 
attended the conference. But by the end of the conference, all agreed to 
the change. This dramatic change in position was brought about by 
strong values attached to the NHI program that developed from public 
deliberation, as well as by newly gained knowledge about the fiscal 
situation of the NHI program. As one participant said: “Previously we 
opposed raising premiums because we didn’t know about the problems. 
But now we have learned that the national health insurance system is 
suffering a financial crisis. The system is taking care of our health and 
helping many people. We don’t want to see the system fall apart. 
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Therefore, to maintain the sustainable development [of the system], 
raising premiums is necessary and reasonable.”   
Our “solidarity indicator” also showed changes in participants’ 
values and policy preferences. We found that after the conference, there 
were more participants who agreed that the healthy and the wealthy 
ought to help the ill and the poor to pay for health services, and 
disagreed that those who visit doctors more frequently ought to pay 
more co-payments. According to these findings, we are able to say that 
public discussion has helped participants recognize the public good of 
NIH and to cultivate a sense of citizen solidarity. 
Thirdly, 83% of participants (15 out of 18) said they were more 
concerned about and interested in public affairs after the conference. In 
in-depth interviews, about 90% (16 out of 18) of respondents reported 
that after the conference they kept abreast of and actively discussed NHI 
issues with one another. Most pointed out that the knowledge gained 
from the conference helped to enhance their interest and willingness to 
participate in public affairs. As one participant put it, “We usually are not 
concerned about matters that we know nothing about. After you have 
learned something about the issue, you pay much more attention to it.” 
Another participant pointed to a “virtuous circle” of 
knowledge-participation: “After participating in an activity, you get 
knowledge about it, and the knowledge drives you into more 
participation.” The knowledge the citizens gained from the conference 
was not only relevant to policy, but also an intellectual exercising of 
citizenship rights. As one participant explained:  
“I have developed a keen interest in public affairs after the 
conference. Previously, I was indifferent to public affairs. I am 
not like what I was before. In the past, I lived in my own sphere 
of private life. But after the conference, I found out that many 
of our rights are ignored because we are ignorant about these 
matters. Through the process of a consensus conference, I have 
learned a lot of things, and I will actively participate in public 
affairs.” 
These findings are compatible with results from the national youth 
conference, the deliberative poll, and two citizen conferences. According 
to the results in Table 2, participants increased their policy literacy and a 
feeling of political efficacy and changed their attitudes toward the public 
interest to some extent. More than 88% of the participants had a strong 
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motivation to attend different types of deliberative public discussions in 
the future. Generally speaking, deliberative public discussions establish a 
meaningful channel for citizens to become actively involved in public 
affairs and to create a strong sense of citizenship. 
Table 2 Effects of Different Types of Deliberative Public 
Discussion 
Policy Literacy* Political Efficacy** Public Interest Attitude*** 
 
Before After Change Before After Change Before After Changes 
Motivation to 
Attend 
Deliberative 
Public 
Discussion 
Again 
Deliberative  
Poll on 
Payment 
Collection 
Methods for 
NIH  
(2002，N=215) 
2.8 3.7 +0.9 70% 86% +16 61% 81% +20% 88% 
National Youth
Council (2004，
N=174) 
-- -- -- 86% 88% +2% -- -- -- 94% 
Citizen 
Conference on 
Surrogate 
Motherhood 
(2004，N=18) 
2.8 3.5 +0.7 76% 89% +13% 78% 78% +0% 100% 
Peitou Hot 
Spring Museum
Citizen 
Conference 
(2004，N=13) 
1.2 2.7 +1.5 -- 30% -- 86% 92% +6% 100% 
Note: * The average number of correct answers in knowledge test questions. 
There are five questions in the deliberative poll, five questions in the 
surrogate motherhood citizen conference and four questions in the Peitou 
citizen conference. 
** We used the question “Are your opinions valuable for policy 
decision-making?” in the deliberative poll, the National Youth Conference, 
and the surrogate motherhood citizen conference to measure the concept 
of political efficacy. We used the question “Do you think the Taipei City 
Government should take the conclusions of the citizens’ conference 
seriously?” in the Peitou conference to measure the concept of political 
efficacy. 
*** We used the question “Do you agree that healthy people should help 
sick people?” in the deliberative poll to measure attitudes toward the 
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public interest. We used the question “Do you agree that issues of 
surrogate motherhood should be discussed and decided on by the general 
public?” in the surrogate motherhood citizen conference to measure 
attitudes toward the public interest. Finally, we used the question “Do you 
agree that citizens should be concerned with community affairs?” in the 
Peitou conference for this measure. 
From the experiences of the various consensus conferences, we 
found that under proper conditions in which citizens are given 
opportunities for informed discussion, the ability to deliberate on 
complex issues using rational arguments privileged the common interest. 
We also found that the deliberation process transformed values and 
policy preferences, improved intellectual qualities and encouraged an 
active sense of citizenship. The findings have important implications for 
both democratic practice and democratic theory. 
IV.  Prospects for Deliberative Democracy in Taiwan 
To establish informative and egalitarian public discussions as a norm, 
policy changes from the government are required. Nevertheless, 
grassroot action to establish community public discussion networks is a 
more important, if difficult, task. Denmark began establishing 
people-houses in rural communities during the 19th century, offering a 
site for continuing adult education as well as a location for discussing 
policies or other important issues. In the United States the Kettering 
Foundation, which works to bring community organizations together, 
established a network for national public discussions. It is hoped that 
public discussion can occur naturally in local communities, offering the 
general public access to and sufficient information on important policy 
discussions, as well as the space for public opinion to form a consensus. 
The establishment of public discussion networks is also an important 
goal for Taiwan, as these networks not only exchange different 
information and methods of discussion, but also function as platforms for 
discussion for all as well as a network for mobilizing collective action. 
Perhaps, in future, when this network is firmly established, we might 
hold a national public discussion day for major policies such as education 
reform or alternative energy sources, allowing many informed citizens to 
express their views and reasons for their positions they hold. This kind of 
spontaneous community public participation is an important way of 
promoting public policy discussion, the establishment of civic society, 
Asian New Democracies: The Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan Compared 
 
 
302 
and identification with citizenship that can help to improve both the 
quality and legitimacy of public policies. It can also serve to check the 
power of administrators and legislators and to bring divided social 
groups together (Wong 2003). The emergence of deliberative public 
discussion is therefore a key process in Taiwan’s democratic 
development. 
In the meantime, access to public participation remains limited. We 
therefore cannot criticize citizens as selfish or unworthy voters, because 
individual social values and actions in a democracy with electoral 
competition but no public interaction are very different to those of 
cooperation and collective interest in a democratic system that 
emphasizes equal access to discussion and the public interest. The 
deepening of democratic development through public participation is not 
a one-sided process; both grassroots and top-down establishment of 
public discussion networks require the cooperation of political elites, 
volunteer groups and the general public. This process of transformation 
is a slow one, and its effects are not very obvious at the beginning. It will 
face many difficulties, but it is also the necessary path for those activists 
who are concerned about the development of democracy. 
Notes 
1. The authors would like to thank the participants for their insightful 
comments. Part of this project was funded by the National Science 
Council, NSC93-2420-H002-003. 
2. Some political scientists have argued that social cleavages derived 
from national identity have weakened and that civic nationalism is 
emerging (Lin, Chu, and Hinich 1996; Tien and Chu 1996; T. Wong 
2001; J. Wong 2003). 
3. Two of the participants were not surveyed after the conference. 
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